Is it moral to join law enforcement?

[DavidOdden]

About federal prosecutors:

Why?  Is it that you think that all current federal laws are wrong?  Is it something to do with the impropriety of the jurisdiction in general?  What's the distinction?

The proportions aren't obvious (i.e. this is a feeling), but I'd say it's 10% because of improper jurisdiction and 90% because of improper law. This is a dumb way to answer the question, but consider the titles in the US code. Crimes are a small part, and rights-violating crimes are an even smaller part. I should say, there's an obvious exception for espionage that I should have mentioned, but otherwise, I can't think of any proper, exclusively federal crimes. For example: I agree with 18 USC 116, and it should be a law in every state (do you know if it is? How the heck do you find out?) Suppose there's a state that hasn't enacted the analog of 18 USC 116 (since by jove there is no such law protecting men in any state, it's not hard to imagine some state that fails to protect women). That doesn't show that the law is properly federal, it just shows that the particular state is slow to recognise certain facts about rights. If you can think of a clear exception, I'm always open. In light of an off the cuff editorial comment on a local case (State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1), I just rethought Scalia on "representative" in Chisom v. Roemer one more time and decided maybe he was right.

So would I merely be a better variety of thug? I don't mean this to be sarcastic or rude, I'm just having difficulty understanding the underlying principle. Wouldn't this "damage control" theory, if you will, apply equally to, say, the FCC? For example, could someone who thought the FCC improper work for them to try to keep them in line, so to speak?

That is pretty much it. As I say, I don't think it's entirely easy. If refusing to be a prosecutor would have consequences such as them letting drug sellers go about their business, that would be great and I'd say to hell with prosecution. But that is not the case: there will be a prosecutor, you or someone else. In the immoral words of Donald Rumsfeld, would it be better for me to have a rights-respecting semi-thug in charge of depriving me of my rights rather than a ravenous rights-abusing super-thug in charge of my prosecution? You bet! Of course, that's not a valid claim on your life, so the personal consequences should be number 1.

You can distinguish between the FCC and prosecution, since the FCC is never right, but prosecutors are ____ right (I don't know what word goes in there, but it's somewhere between "sometimes" and "often", and I really do not know -- that's for you to discover empirically, and hopefully report back on).

What do you mean by the 5-10 year limitation? Don't be a prosecutor for more than 10 years ever?

That. It's just a suggestion: because of the psychological and moral burden, I would be concerned about getting mentally assimilated to the statist viewpoint. A crime should not be seen as a wrong against the state or society, but I fear that this is what the prosecutorial mindset leads to. If, every working day of your life, year in and year out, you are told in no uncertain terms by your co-workers that possession of 100 grams of MJ is an evil act deserving or punishment, I think this will have a negative effect. Maybe I'm wrong: check Vern's posts, since I think he has had something to say about how to deal with the problem.

[Groovenstein]

If refusing to be a prosecutor would have consequences such as them letting drug sellers go about their business, that would be great and I'd say to hell with prosecution.

As would I, brother. I should have said already that I would change such laws if I could. Even if I were a prosecutor and all I handled were drug cases, I'd be a very happy man in that context if my job were no longer necessary.

But that is not the case: there will be a prosecutor, you or someone else. In the immoral words of Donald Rumsfeld, would it be better for me to have a rights-respecting semi-thug in charge of depriving me of my rights rather than a ravenous rights-abusing super-thug in charge of my prosecution? You bet!

I agree with this. However, if we grant that being a "thug" as we have been discussing in this context is wrong, why would rational people want to commit such a transgression? Why would a rational person want to be evil?? If he did not, then the "better" for you doesn't come up. So the better for you is that a rational person is evil?

Is this a matter of degree of evil? Am I less evil if I oppose such laws, and would continue to oppose them while prosecuting them? Am I less evil if I do whatever I can within the context of my job, legally required ethics, etc. to mitigate the harm done to the violators?

How could my rational friends and "brethren" (for lack of a better word) stand the sight of me if I willingly committed evil? Even for a not-as-evil purpose? Could a rational person love me then? What transgressions of another could I no longer condemn them for? Would this preclude me from calling myself an Objectivist, if I one day thought that was the correct thing to do?

Mr. Odden, I very much appreciate your comments. I apologize if I am being repetitive. I just don't quite understand, how, if at all, it is a good idea to choose a course of action one knows to be evil. (Assuming that evil in this context is a correct assessment.)

. . . because of the psychological and moral burden, I would be concerned about getting mentally assimilated to the statist viewpoint. . . .  Maybe I'm wrong: check Vern's posts, since I think he has had something to say about how to deal with the problem.

A very good point. Though I think, without having any personal experience, that this would probably not happen in many contexts, particularly those so flagrantly wrong as drugs. It might become an issue in more borderline situations, though. Either way, I think this is a valuable comment.

I will look for those posts. If you happen to know where they are already, or if it would be very little inconvenience to you to relocate them, I'd appreciate your letting me know. If it's a pain for you, I'm happy to do it myself.

[DavidOdden]

However, if we grant that being a "thug" as we have been discussing in this context is wrong, why would rational people want to commit such a transgression?  Why would a rational person want to be evil??  If he did not, then the "better" for you doesn't come up.  So the better for you is that a rational person is evil?

It's better for me if no evil befalls me. Since there doesn't happen to be such a choice of no evil befalling anyone, then naturally, I want it to befall the other guy, and not me. The moral responsibility for initiation of force lies with legislators who enact these immoral laws, and any attempt to ameliorate the situation is good (it is not evil), since it is an act of self-defense. And again, please remember that the rights of innocents will be violated, whatever you do -- the best you can say is "I am not the one who prosecutes the case". That is the best I can offer -- I'm not advocating that you become a prosecutor, just suggesting the best argument that I can think of, and if it isn't persuasive, then that does tell you something important about your value system (something that isn't bad).

[Groovenstein]

The moral responsibility for initiation of force lies with legislators who enact these immoral laws, and any attempt to ameliorate the situation is good (it is not evil), since it is an act of self-defense.

An interesting thought. I shall take some time to consider this self-defense theory, sometime after I get my nose out of Corporate Tax books. (You want to talk about immoral . . . )

I am sure we will discuss this more in the future, particularly if I decide to take the Clinic next spring. Thank you very much for your valuable insight thus far. I hope you benefited as much from this as I did.

[Edited to add that I am also interested at some point in the future in discussing your federal jurisdiction theories.]

Edited April 19, 2005 by Groovenstein

[Groovenstein]

About federal prosecutors:

The proportions aren't obvious (i.e. this is a feeling), but I'd say it's 10% because of improper jurisdiction and 90% because of improper law. This is a dumb way to answer the question, but consider the titles in the US code. Crimes are a small part, and rights-violating crimes are an even smaller part. I should say, there's an obvious exception for espionage that I should have mentioned, but otherwise, I can't think of any proper, exclusively federal crimes. For example: I agree with 18 USC 116, and it should be a law in every state (do you know if it is? How the heck do you find out?) Suppose there's a state that hasn't enacted the analog of 18 USC 116 (since by jove there is no such law protecting men in any state, it's not hard to imagine some state that fails to protect women). That doesn't show that the law is properly federal, it just shows that the particular state is slow to recognise certain facts about rights. If you can think of a clear exception, I'm always open. In light of an off the cuff editorial comment on a local case (State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1), I just rethought Scalia on "representative" in Chisom v. Roemer one more time and decided maybe he was right.

I'd like to explore this further with, say, 18 USC 1343 (wire fraud).

How does your "proper, exclusively" comment fit into this, i.e., what does it matter if it's exclusively federal or not? How would you handle a situation where someone uses television to implement a scheme to defraud nationwide? Let each state take a shot under their own laws?

I don't think the second half of your argument (the states being slow argument) applies here, which is why I chose this statute. My guess is that most, if not all, states probably have something similar, if not literally using radio and television, at least some way to prosecute such fraud. I only want to address the first part of your comment, the exclusively federal stuff.

I haven't yet read Chisom, I will give it a look in the near future. If you think that case properly addresses my question, feel free to answer by telling me just to look there.

[DavidOdden]

How does your "proper, exclusively" comment fit into this, i.e., what does it matter if it's exclusively federal or not?

That is, it isn't a crime that by nature has to be federal (cf. treason).

How would you handle a situation where someone uses television to implement a scheme to defraud nationwide?  Let each state take a shot under their own laws?

Yes, and indeed I think that's possible (do tell, if that's not so). Ohio Revised Code 2913.05 is our counterpart; randomly picking a state, Jeb Bush's state has the rather wordy 817.034. I'm not ever persuaded that it's a good thing to have separate statutes for each modality of fraud. I understand the need to eliminate common law crimes, but it seems to me that one well-considered fraud statute fills the bill. It's true that the person could end up in serious trouble if he has defrauded people in all 50 states, if he does a measly average of 2 years prison time per state, consecutively. What does the federal crime do, other than add a 51st jurisdiction (and create the need to invent rhetoric about "interstate commerce")? My complaint about that 51st jurisdiction is that it's everywhere, and while there are still walls, they don't seem to be all that high or solid, so we do have competing governments, and there isn't a proper monopoly on force.

I should add that if all crime were federal, then there's no objection to federal prosecutors. But the idea of making a federal case out of annoying kid vandalism doesn't appeal to me at all.

The Ohio statute refers to "by means of a wire, radio, satellite, telecommunication, telecommunications device, or telecommunications service", which explicitly covers more things than the federal "by means of wire, radio, or television communication". I'm imagining some future Supreme Court justice wielding expressio unius like a berserker wielding an axe, and concluding that Smith is not federally prosecutable because he used a satellite microwave transmission" for his fraud.

I haven't yet read Chisom

Yikes. That sentence you're replying to (and the preceding "any counterexample" sentence) was about something else, which I deleted -- mostly, except those two sentences. So it had to do with something totally different, namely whether judges enforce the law or enforce their feelings about what would be a good outcome, and use law as an excuse. Embarassingly bad editing on my part.

[Groovenstein]

Yes, and indeed I think that's possible (do tell, if that's not so). . . .  It's true that the person could end up in serious trouble if he has defrauded people in all 50 states, if he does a measly average of 2 years prison time per state, consecutively.

I don't know if it's possible or not. I'm interested in exploring it. Let me give a shot at a realistic example. Let's assume that every state has essentially the same wire fraud statute as 1343.

Somebody, for the purpose of executing his scheme to defraud (and all that other fun statutory language), runs an ad on Monday Night Football. I'm originally from the East Coast, so I don't know if this something that gets time delayed out West. But from what I recall during my visits to Cali sporting events are live out there. So, let's assume that everybody in the country sees MNF at the same time.

Let's also assume (unless, of course, this is an unreasonable assumption) that the ad is a nationwide ad that runs on all the networks at the same time. So, the fraud is committed simultaneously in all states.

Who gets first shot at trying him? If each trial lasts 2 weeks, and thus the last one takes place beginning week 99, do any of those trials violate the speedy trial right? Who gets first shot at sentencing him?

My complaint about that 51st jurisdiction is that it's everywhere, and while there are still walls, they don't seem to be all that high or solid, so we do have competing governments, and there isn't a proper monopoly on force.

Is there a proper monopoly where the man faces trial in multiple states, since only one state can try him at a time, and he can only serve his sentence in one place at a time? You may have answered this by the time you get to this question.

[DavidOdden]

Somebody, for the purpose of executing his scheme to defraud (and all that other fun statutory language), runs an ad on Monday Night Football.  I'm originally from the East Coast, so I don't know if this something that gets time delayed out West.  But from what I recall during my visits to Cali sporting events are live out there.  So, let's assume that everybody in the country sees MNF at the same time.

Let's also assume (unless, of course, this is an unreasonable assumption) that the ad is a nationwide ad that runs on all the networks at the same time.  So, the fraud is committed simultaneously in all states.

Who gets first shot at trying him? If each trial lasts 2 weeks, and thus the last one takes place beginning week 99, do any of those trials violate the speedy trial right?  Who gets first shot at sentencing him?

I think it's first come, first served, though surely there is cooperation across jurisdictions (for example it's not by accident that Virginia had the first prosecution against John Muhammad). Supposing there were no 1343 -- then each state can press charges. I'm not denying that this can lead to a major judicial logjam; but, does it solve matters to add an analogous federal crime? And I thought that the speedy trial thing was repealed years ago. Or, making all crimes federal is one way to resolve this: eliminate the states.

About the type of case we're talking about: here we have a single criminal act realized remotely in multiple locations. Perhaps then you've identified another proper application of federal jurisdiction, as long as it is preemptive -- crimes which are single acts perpetrated across state lines are to be prosecuted at the federal level. I'll mull that over, but it doesn't seem glaringly problematic.

Is there a proper monopoly where the man faces trial in multiple states, since only one state can try him at a time, and he can only serve his sentence in one place at a time?

Yes, if he has committed multiple crimes. As would be the case with John Muhammad, for example. For each criminal act committed in a jurisdiction, that government has the right to prosecute the perp within that jurisdiction, which is a monopoly. And since we're talking about the objective and exclusive control of force in law enforcement, it is a proper monopoly. Even if a criminal kills a bank teller in Georgia and steals a car in Texas, he can only be tried in one place at a time, and can only serve one sentence at a time (unless an arrangement is negotiated). So I don't see that affecting the validity of a government monopoly on force. It seems to me that the distinguishing feature has got to be whether we have a single act vs. multiple acts: a single act shouldn't be prosecutable by multiple authorities.

[Groovenstein]

The moral responsibility for initiation of force lies with legislators who enact these immoral laws, and any attempt to ameliorate the situation is good (it is not evil), since it is an act of self-defense.

I shall take some time to consider this self-defense theory . . .

And so I have. I am going to present this in something of a list form so that specific points can be easily addressed. Please note that I am discussing only the moral aspects of being a prosecutor, and not the emotional, psychological, or other aspects. That said, here goes.

It is moral to be a prosecutor:

1. because the legislature makes the laws, and thus bears the responsibility for their existence.

2. because a prosecutor is a proper government function.

3. so long as you oppose all improper laws. "Oppose" means, at the very least, making your positions known to your superiors and those asking you about your opinions. It can also include, to the extent you wish to do so, other expenditures of your time and effort outside your job to get the laws changed.

4. because you are in a way acting in defense of those charged with violating improper laws. Even though you have a duty as an advocate to the State, the law does allow for some consideration in charging decisions, plea bargaining, etc. To the extent the law allows and to the extent you can do so without losing your job (and thus destroying your chance to act in defense), you are acting properly if you do what you can to mitigate the effects of such laws.

Mr. Odden, do you think there is anything I have left out? Is anything here wrong? I very much look forward to your thoughts.

[DavidOdden]

It is moral to be a prosecutor:

1.  because the legislature makes the laws, and thus bears the responsibility for their existence.

2.  because a prosecutor is a proper government function.

Let me interject here that we want to avoid the Nuremburg defense. Point 1 has to be defeasible in some context. There aren't really any bright lines, but let's suppose there were: then 1. would be relevant for a "decent" government, but not for a sham government such as that of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, East Germany, North Korea, Zimbabwe or Belarus. OTOH, the situation in the US, Italy, Japan etc. really needs changing, but these are not brutal repressive regimes, and despite a serious nasty streak, I think the government of Russia is more or less moving in the right direction (but I still would not want to live there).

3.  so long as you oppose all improper laws.  "Oppose" means, at the very least, making your positions known to your superiors and those asking you about your opinions. It can also include, to the extent you wish to do so, other expenditures of your time and effort outside your job to get the laws changed.

4.  because you are in a way acting in defense of those charged with violating improper laws.  Even though you have a duty as an advocate to the State, the law does allow for some consideration in charging decisions, plea bargaining, etc.  To the extent the law allows and to the extent you can do so without losing your job (and thus destroying your chance to act in defense), you are acting properly if you do what you can to mitigate the effects of such laws.

That more or less sums it up. It seems to me that the fundamental choice is between struggling for the good vs. withdrawing, see Rearden v. State (2 AS 429) et al., also Narragansett, Mulligan & Wyatt v. D. Taggart on the matter of when enough is enough.

[Groovenstein]

see Rearden v. State (2 AS 429) et al., also Narragansett, Mulligan & Wyatt v. D. Taggart

This is a brief digression from the topic at hand, but it must said. That, sir, is hysterical. I'm glad to speak with another who realizes that the legal field is chock full of such comedic opportunities. For example:

While driving downtown several weeks ago, I saw a Benz with what appeared to be a random letter and number combination on its license plate: IRC280F. The thing is, though, that no random Nebraska license plate has that configuration. After thinking about it for a few seconds, I finally laughed my rear end off. As I'm sure you know, but others may not, "IRC" is the shorthand citation for the Internal Revenue Code. Section 280F limits the allowable depreciation deduction for luxury automobiles. On a Benz. Hysterical.

Glad to see a rich guy with a sense of humor using the government's own identification tag to mock it.

[Groovenstein]

It seems to me that the fundamental choice is between struggling for the good vs. withdrawing, see Rearden v. State (2 AS 429) et al., also Narragansett, Mulligan & Wyatt v. D. Taggart on the matter of when enough is enough.

In re struggling versus withdrawing:

Now that I am done with the semester, I plan to investigate this more thoroughly. I intend to continue this discussion, though I make no warranties, express or implied, including without limitation the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, as to when I will get to it.

[DavidOdden]

In re struggling versus withdrawing:

Now that I am done with the semester, I plan to investigate this more thoroughly.  I intend to continue this discussion, though I make no warranties, express or implied, including without limitation the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, as to when I will get to it.

Cool. Your liabilities under law are not limited by the terms of the contract, and will be determined at a future time in a court of law (MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382). But someone else would have to press. The bottom line on this question, also Kelo, is whether things are too far gone. I expect Kelo will have a narrow ruling if it's positive, which might not seem to be an improvement, but given the direction things are going, the status quo might be a good thing.

As for moi, I need to get informed about taunts and the provocation defense. When will the fun ever stop!

[Groovenstein]

I expect Kelo will have a narrow ruling if it's positive, which might not seem to be an improvement, but given the direction things are going, the status quo might be a good thing.

No doubt. Here in Lincoln, some hotel guy (Hammons, I think) just tried to get the city to grab a block of downtown for him. Though I'd prefer a large-scale ass-kicking, I agree that even a narrow ruling would be a good thing, if it could actually slow some of these clowns down.

Makes me respect New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft even more. As far as I know (which of course means that if confronted with contrary evidence I would consider it), Mr. Kraft didn't use eminent domain to get Gilette Stadium built, and actually paid for the whole thing himself instead of bilking the taxpayers (unlike, say, Colangelo and Bank One Ballpark).

[Groovenstein]

Let me interject here that we want to avoid the Nuremburg defense. Point 1 has to be defeasible in some context. There aren't really any bright lines, but let's suppose there were: then 1. would be relevant for a "decent" government, but not for a sham government such as that of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, East Germany, North Korea, Zimbabwe or Belarus.

Mr. Odden, what do you recall from "We the Living"? I can't find my copy, and it's been a year or so, but my recollection was that Andrei was portrayed as something of a hero. (Note: I say this only as my vague recollection, and not as an affirmative statement of any kind about Miss Rand's views or anything.) Wasn't he not only working for the Russian government, but thinking it was the right thing to do? Wasn't Kira justifiably in love with him?

How does this work with what we've discussed thus far?

[DavidOdden]

my recollection was that Andrei was portrayed as something of a hero.....

Wasn't he not only working for the Russian government, but thinking it was the right thing to do?  Wasn't Kira justifiably in love with him?

I have to say that I find WTL slightly disturbing -- too many basically bad people and the good people are not so crisply good. Anyhow, that might be a good lesson especially given that he blew his brains out when the reality of his actions sank in. His character was sorta admirable, but somehow deluded himself into thinking that the government's actions were necessary. Since he didn't satisfy the scienter requirement, his cooperation with the communists was "innocent", until he got a clue. I find myself feeling "how could you not know!" when I read that book, but I've got the luxury of hindsight and I didn't grow up in feudal Russia.

In terms of contemporary prosecution, it's hard to evade the fact that a large portion of what prosecutors do is fundamentally wrong (I think). Here's a factual question which you might know the answer to: what percentage of all arrests that lead to punishment are for drug offenses? I want to include both convictions at trial and plea bargains. I got the impression that it is near 50%, which is pretty significant.

[JMeganSnow]

Mr. Odden, what do you recall from "We the Living"?  I can't find my copy, and it's been a year or so, but my recollection was that Andrei was portrayed as something of a hero. 

...

How does this work with what we've discussed thus far?

I'm not David, but I can answer this question:

Andrei was actually a classical Shakespearian "tragic hero". He was in love with life and unwilling to accept that the gray, miserable world in which he found himself was the way life should be. He thought (much like Dagny from Atlas Shrugged) that EVERYONE had to accept this basic premise; it was so obvious to him that he literally could not imagine that anyone would not. He thought that, if he could raise men to the mountaintop and let them have a view of what was possible, they would automatically grasp it and become good and virtuous.

His tragic flaw was that he thought he could raise men to the mountaintop somehow. In reality, this can only be accomplished by leveling the mountains. He discovered that men HAD seen virtue, they HAD seen life . . . and rejected it as not worth the trouble, preferring instead to rot in the swamps of evil and mediocrity. He realized that, in seeking to force men to be good and virtuous, he had instead enabled them to be vile and destructive.

Edited to correct last sentence.

Edited May 14, 2005 by JMeganSnow

[softwareNerd]

His tragic flaw was that he thought he could raise men to the mountaintop somehow.

Well put Jennifer, thank you.

So many otherwise intelligent men want to raise other men to their mountain top by marching them up at gun point.

[skap35]

What does Objectivism have to say about law-enforcement officers having to enforce non-Objectivist laws?  For instance, I am considering going into the US Marshalls for a while, in order to make some money to pay for my PhD.  What if I am forced to take actions that are contrary to my beliefs?

This topic reminds me of the part in Atlas Shrugged when Dagny rescues Galt from the torture facility. Dagny shoots the guard because he was participating in the violation of Galt's basic rights. For this reason, according to Rand, Dagny was justified in killing the guard.

So the question you have to ask yourself is this: if you are sent to enforce an unjust law, and the "criminal" shoots you, is he morally justified in doing so?

This idea has already been brought up in this thread, but I thought I would point out the similar situation in Atlas Shrugged. For this reason, I have to disagree with Groovenstein's previous post. The prosecutor, while he does have the option of going easy on the accused, is still participating in the violation of another man's rights. The only exception I see to this is if the prosecutor decides to drop the charges for all cases he believes are unjustified. But if he does that he would certainly lose his job.

P.S. It's been a while since reading Atlas Shrugged, so I'm sorry if I got any of that wrong...

Edited June 4, 2005 by skap35

[Groovenstein]

Dagny shoots the guard because he was participating in the violation of Galt's basic rights.  For this reason, according to Rand, Dagny was justified in killing the guard.

Please elaborate on this point with evidence from the text and your analysis.

So the question you have to ask yourself is this: if you are sent to enforce an unjust law, and the "criminal" shoots you, is he morally justified in doing so?

No. If such a "criminal" took a few moments to talk to me, he would find out that I'm near the best he could hope for in a prosecutor. The prosecutor position exists and must prosecute law violations, and I'd be doing what could be done from that position. Shooting me would be highly irrational, and thus immoral.

The prosecutor . . . is still participating in the violation of another man's rights.  The only exception I see to this is if the prosecutor decides to drop the charges for all cases he believes are unjustified.  But if he does that he would certainly lose his job.

In other words, you see no exception.

[Groovenstein]

Here is an analogy. Suppose you can save the life of a person who is being attacked, but because of the circumstances you might have to harm the attackee (let us suppose, also, that there is no risk to you, one way or the other). You have the option of letting the person die, because his plight is not your moral responsibility; or you can intervene and inflict a lesser harm on the attackee. Now: can you save his life? If you realise that being put in that situation would impose a great psychological burden on you because of this conflict, that is a good reason to not be a prosecutor. If you think you could not impose a lesser rights violation on innocent people than the alternative prosecutor, do not become a prosecutor.

It's important for me to get this thread going again, as I will have to make another decision on the Criminal Clinic issue in a couple months. (I decided against it last time around because I was not comfortable enough with this issue to take the psychological risk.) David, I think you've raised interesting issues with this analogy.

To answer your question, it took me about 10 seconds to say, confidently, that I would save his life in this situation. However, clearly I am much more hesitant to do the prosecutor thing. I'm not sure why, so I would like to explore your analogy further to see if my hesitation is justified in the one context, but not the other.

One potential issue that jumps out at me is what I know or don't know about each person. Is your attackee a stranger to me? If so, my psychological burden is minimal. I would assume that he was a good person. Therefore, since there is no risk (and I assume no other "cost," such as a considerable time expenditure) to me, the value I'd get from helping a presumably good person is greater to me than the zero or minimal cost.

What if he is not a stranger? Then there are two possibilities. One is that I know he is a good person, or is in some other way of great value to me. In that case, the answer is even clearer. Of course I would spend little or nothing to help someone of great value to me. The other possibility is that I know he is a piece of crap. Would I spend little or nothing to help a batterer who had served his time but expressed no remorse for the beatings he administered? Here I'm inclined to say no. Is this the correct position? After all, by serving his time the idea is that he's "paid" for his violent acts.

Now I'll move this over to the prosecution angle. If the person is a stranger, or a good person, I say hell yes. I'd jump right in there to do what I could to mitigate the law's damage. Would I do the same for a sex offender (or thief, or . . .) and his dope charges? The charges themselves are unjust, but should I be so willing to stop an injustice on someone who unapologetically puts injustices on others? Psychologically, my response is that I still feel bad about the bogus charges, but would probably shrug it off with a "well, whatever."

The more I think about it, the more I think I can tolerate, and even enjoy (as far as reducing the harm to those without moral blemish) this pursuit. Your shot of golf.

[TheNewIntellectual]

It would seem to me that the question of paramount importance is, are things in such a state today that we should "give up" and let evil destroy itself? If not, what would make it necessary? I for one, am not interested in leveling mountains, unless great Roark-eusqe buildings or something of the sort are being built in their place.

[DavidOdden]

The more I think about it, the more I think I can tolerate, and even enjoy (as far as reducing the harm to those without moral blemish) this pursuit. Your shot of golf.

To point to a concrete example, Al Capone. Then the issue boils down to knowing whether you are dealing with another Capone or, another Martha Stewart or Hank Rearden. Since moral character is chosen, past behavior may point in a likely direction as far as the present is concerned, but it can't substitute for sufficient evidence about a person's actions. So at some point, you would be faced with a defendant who may have been righteously convicted of theft in the past, but can you conclude on that basis that he plans to commit another theft? If you have good evidence (but not legally ironclad evidence) of such separate unpunished wrongs, then I can comprehend the "well, whatever" response to a drug charge. That is essentially a recognition of a second flaw in the legal system, that for some reason you cannot obtain a conviction for the actual crime, in which case you have to substitute a bogus crime, like tax evasion or drug possession.

But I think the evidence of charge-independent badness should be very strong, and that a Capone-style prosecution should be exceptional -- by default, all people accused of victimless crimes should enjoy the benefit of your enlightenment. If you would distinguish between those accused of victimless crimes whom you would help avoid punishment, and those who you would be willing to let the lions eat, the next question for you to contemplate is, how certain would you need to be of moral corruption of an accused, for you to withhold assistance? When would it be right to substitute your feeling "but obviously he is guilty" for a contrary judgment by jurors? I don't mean, "give an exhaustive list of parameters", but this would be the really hard question for me to answer: when would I be willing to judge that my grip on reality is better than that of a panel of jurors or judges, and withhold assistance that I would otherwise render to a stranger?

Your ball.

[Groovenstein]

. . . by default, all people accused of victimless crimes should enjoy the benefit of your enlightenment.

Yes, I would assume that each person was morally clear until I knew otherwise.

. . . how certain would you need to be of moral corruption of an accused, for you to withhold assistance?

Great question. Initially, I think a reasonable doubt standard for myself is appropriate. Keep in mind there's a difference between evidence I have and evidence that's admissible. I will almost always have access to more information than juries. For example, I might have a confession I can't use for Miranda reasons but am nevertheless confident of its reliability, e.g. it was not beaten out of the accused.

When would it be right to substitute your feeling "but obviously he is guilty" for a contrary judgment by jurors? I don't mean, "give an exhaustive list of parameters", but this would be the really hard question for me to answer: when would I be willing to judge that my grip on reality is better than that of a panel of jurors or judges, and withhold assistance that I would otherwise render to a stranger?

I'm not sure I understand, so instead of trying to answer and spending several posts clarifying, I'll just ask you to restate your questions.

[softwareNerd]

If, while working in law-enforcement, one applies one's own standards, won't it "show" -- in the aggregate? Won't the boss in the department (say the D.A.'s office) ask you to change your ways? How would one handle that?