Perceptions coming first

[Herb Torres]

I am reading OPAR and am in the part where he is talking about the difference between the chronological order of our development and the epistemological order of our development.

He says the perceptions are epistemologically first. Is he simply saying that it is fist because that is the only way we can know about having sensations in the first place?

I guess I am not understanding the impact of this fact. Any insight would be appreciated. Thanks.

[Marc K.]

A chapter, page number, and maybe even a bit of a quote might help.

[Herb Torres]

Sure Marc.

It is chapter 2 page 53 (on my kindle) under the section, "Consciousness as possessing identity".

Peak off says,

Chronologically, the sensation stage comes first, then the perceptual, and then the conceptual. Epistemologically, however, the perceptual stage comes first.

Edited February 8, 2012 by Herb Torres

[Dante]

Percepts are epistemologically first because they are what our conscious mind actually deals with. Sensations are integrated into percepts unconsciously, automatically, before they reach our conscious mind. In terms of physics, sensations come first, interacting with our senses, and then are integrated into percepts automatically by our brains. When we look out, we don't see or hear individual sensations, we see them already integrated into percepts. This is important to understand because the fact that percept formation is automatic means that it cannot err. It occurs according to deterministic processes. Our conscious mind can misinterpret percepts, but there cannot be a contradiction within the physical process itself that produces percepts.

David Kelley's book "The Evidence of the Senses" goes into great detail concerning perception and sensations. Grames, one of our frequent forum users, has posted his notes on the relevant section here: http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=17927&view=findpost&p=237133. It's quite involved stuff.

[Grames]

The idea of sensations is quite an advanced concept requiring what has already been given to us by perception in order to figure it out.

More broadly, the idea of "the given" in epistemology is to identify the starting point of thought. For example in Descartes' statement "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) consciousness itself is taken as the given, the prior certainty upon which all thought begins. Objectivism rejects Descartes and identifies percepts as the epistemological given because of the primacy of existence and that there is always consciousness of something that exists (at least a memory), never consciousness without content.

[Herb Torres]

Ok that helpsmclearnsome things up for me. Thanks.

I have another question if consciousness has identity does that mean consciousness is a physical object? I know that to have identity means that a thing exist in a particular way, but how does consciousness exist particularly?

[Plasmatic]

That's not a philosophical question. It's a special science question that as far as I know we haven't discovered yet.

[Marc K.]

I have another question if consciousness has identity does that mean consciousness is a physical object?

Not necessarily. There are plenty of existents, which have identity, that are not physical objects: society, culture, my girlfriend's love, Santa Claus, a gravitational field ... etc.

I know that to have identity means that a thing exist in a particular way, but how does consciousness exist particularly?

Even if we don't know everything about human consciousness or how it operates, we do know that it is what it is, like everything in existence. And there are plenty of things that we do know about it. It doesn't exist in rocks or water or sand or plants, it is different from an animal's consciousness, it operates volitionally ... etc.

Sure Marc.

It is chapter 2 page 53 (on my kindle) under the section, "Consciousness as possessing identity".

Peak off says,

Just for clarity's sake, the quote you provided is located on page 54 of the book about 3 pages into the section heading: "The Perceptual Level as the Given".

In the paragraph below the one you quoted Peikoff gives his reason for considering this issue important. He wants to contradict philosophers such as Hume who denies the perceptual level and tries to build his epistemology on the sensational level. Imagine if that was true how hard it would be to conceptualize or even visualize a table. It would be like a blind person trying to describe a sunset.

[Grames]

Ok that helpsmclearnsome things up for me. Thanks.

I have another question if consciousness has identity does that mean consciousness is a physical object? I know that to have identity means that a thing exist in a particular way, but how does consciousness exist particularly?

Consciousness is a relationship, a subject's awareness of an object which has been described as a correspondence. As a relationship it is not a physical object even though both the subjects and objects are physical. There are separate metaphysical arguments that dismiss the possibility that consciousness is supernatural. Identity and causality apply to consciousness as they do to everything that exists.

How consciousness works is not known, but neither philosophy nor any individual needs to know how consciousness works in order to affirm that consciousness exists, has identity, and is causal. There are still further separate metaphysical arguments that deny causality implies determinism.

In my personal opinion the most promising scientific progress in understanding consciousness at least at the perceptual level for mammals is Jeff Hawkins theory of hierarchical temporal memory. The book On Intelligence describes the theory and there is a thread here with links to videos of Hawkins explaining aspects of his theory.