The Childs-Peikoff Hypothesis

[tadmjones]

Not at all. "Acting independently of the government" does not equal "indirectly threatening the rights of all the citizens" or any citizen. Acting independently of the government in a just manner -- even in the capacity of a "private defense agency" -- is just,

Take a "private court" which observes justice in the same manner as a just government would. This private court tries a murderer, finds him guilty, and administers punishment. Who is "the victim" in this scenario? Whose rights have been violated (directly or "indirectly")? How so?

Minus the sanction of a legitimate government, what is a court other than a group of vigilantees and some role playing?

Edited February 6, 2013 by tadmjones

[DonAthos]

Minus the sanction of a legitimate government, what is a court other than a group of vigilantees and some role playing?

In the example I've given? It is the very same thing as the court of said "legitimate government" with respect to the rights of every man involved and the administration of objective justice -- that is to say, with respect to everything that matters.

But let me put it to you: given a "private court" that functions just as the court of a "legitimate government" would, with respect to rights and justice, in what way is the "private court" not "legitimate government"?

[ruveyn1]

Not at all. "Acting independently of the government" does not equal "indirectly threatening the rights of all the citizens" or any citizen. Acting independently of the government in a just manner -- even in the capacity of a "private defense agency" -- is just, as you have already agreed in another post:

If a private defense agency, be it ever so just, tries to detain anyone by force they will soon be in trouble with the Law.

It is one thing to have private watchmen and guards. It is another to detain and punish or even recover stolen goods by force without a proper legal process.

Vigilantes are not legally kosher.

ruveyn

[tadmjones]

In the example I've given? It is the very same thing as the court of said "legitimate government" with respect to the rights of every man involved and the administration of objective justice -- that is to say, with respect to everything that matters.

But let me put it to you: given a "private court" that functions just as the court of a "legitimate government" would, with respect to rights and justice, in what way is the "private court" not "legitimate government"?

What makes the group of whimworshipping subjectivist vigilantes a court? is it a court because you say it is? Or because they decided they want to be?

[DonAthos]

What makes the group of whimworshipping subjectivist vigilantes a court? is it a court because you say it is? Or because they decided they want to be?

It is a court (that is to say, a legitimate court) in the same manner you would recognize any "government court" as being valid -- by its adherence to objective justice. Contrarily, a court could be endorsed or sanctioned by a given government, yet dispense no actual justice.

While the latter is really what deserves your invective, it has begun to look like you simply endorse anything with the "government" imprimatur on it, regardless of what that government is, how it came about, or how it actually functions.

[tadmjones]

It is a court (that is to say, a legitimate court) in the same manner you would recognize any "government court" as being valid -- by its adherence to objective justice. Contrarily, a court could be endorsed or sanctioned by a given government, yet dispense no actual justice.

While the latter is really what deserves your invective, it has begun to look like you simply endorse anything with the "government" imprimatur on it, regardless of what that government is, how it came about, or how it actually functions.

I wouldn't base the validity of a court on its adherence to objective justice, I would hope that its actions were just. I would base its validity on objective law(governance). Althought they do kinda sound the same. Edited February 6, 2013 by tadmjones

[2046]

Libertarian references to NIOF as an axiomatic principle

I think the above might suggest that someone here is, indeed, "totally ignorant of the material they are referring to."

This is a perfect example of why Objectivists come off as totally ignorant of the material they are criticizing. None of the quotes you reproduce here are examples of libertarians that take the nonaggression principle as an ungrounded axiom, and it's quite odd that you think any of these quotes do.

“The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the ‘nonaggression axiom.’ ‘Aggression’ is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else.”

For A New Liberty, Murray Rothbard, p 27 (second edition-1978)

Sure, you have found a quote with the word "axiom," but I'm sure a scholar of your caliber knows that not every philosopher uses the term "axiom" like Rand did. Moreover, the charge was that libertarians use the NAP as an ungrounded axiom, but where does this quote reference this charge at all? It doesn't. In fact, we can be sure that Hardin is totally ignorant of the work this citation belongs to, because the entire next 12 pages of the book is devoted to grounding the very sentence that Hardin quotes from the beginning of the chapter.

Here on page 27(in my version) "If the central axiom of the libertarian creed is nonaggression against anyone's person and property, how is this axiom arrived at? What is its groundwork or support? Here, libertarians, past and present, have differed considerably. Roughly, there are three broad types of foundation for the libertarian axiom, corresponding to three kinds of ethical philosophy: the emotivist, the utilitarian, and the natural rights viewpoint."

Rothbard then begins criticisms of the utilitarian and emotivist viewpoints and lays out a groundwork for his neo-Aristotelian/Lockean natural rights viewpoint; a viewpoint which is not very much dissimilar from Rand's own. How Hardin thinks this is evidence in his case can only be explained by one theory: he has never read it. Nor apparently any of Rothbard's other works, such as the entire section on natural law from his Ethics of Liberty.

Chapter entitled “The Nonaggression Axiom”

“No one has the right to initiate aggression against the person or property of anyone else. This is what libertarians call the nonaggression axiom, and it is a central principle of libertarianism.”

Libertarianism: A Primer, David Boaz, p. 74

This too is an odd choice for Hardin to support his claims, as Boaz spends time in this "primer" discussing various libertarians viewpoints regarding the grounding of the NAP, even mentioning Ayn Rand in the natural rights camp.

From the wikipedia article on the Libertarian Party:

“Since the Libertarian Party's inception, individuals have been able to join the party as voting members by signing their agreement with the organization's membership pledge, which states, based on the Non-Aggression Principle, that the signer does not advocate the initiation of force to achieve political or social goals.”

Okay? Hardin seems to think he is proving his point by reproducing something that says "Non-Aggression Principle" and thinks that maybe if he underlines it, it will be an example of a libertarian intellectual that believes the NAP is an ungrounded axiom? We can only conlclude he is hopelessly confused.

from LewRockwell.com:

In Defense of Libertarian Purity, Anthony Gregory

“I consider myself a principled libertarian. Or a radical libertarian. I suppose there are many ways of saying it. Murray Rothbard called it "plumb-line libertarianism," and Walter Block has seen fit to embrace that terminology. I see it simply as the belief that initiating force is wrong.”

Again, how does this back his claims up?

Evicting Libertarian Party Principles: The Portland Purge, by L.K. Samuels

[Objecting to the “LP Reform Caucus” in 2006]

“So what are some of the principles that they believe must go? First and foremost is the non-aggression principle, which is considered the main threat to an election-oriented populism. If Libertarians would simply throw away this ideal, explaining LP policies on taxation, the drug war, foreign policy and military intervention would no longer be a campaign embarrassment.”

Or this?

From a libertarian blog (technoeudaimonia):

:

The Problem with Axiomatic Libertarianism

“Many libertarians, following in the tradition of Murray Rothbard, propose that liberty is an axiom; that is, liberty is a self-evident fact. They include such thinkers as Hans-Hermann Hoppe with his libertarian version of argumentation ethics, Stephan Kinsella with his conception of estoppel, and Stefan Molyneux with his "universably preferable behavior". Non-aggression is thus singled out and separated from the rest of ethics, which leads to a separation of what is "right" and what is "good"; this is evident, for example, in many of the writings of Walter Block.”

So Hardin quotes someone else making the same claim as him, without actually referencing any libertarian writers' actual words to that effect, and thinks this counts as evidence? Not only that, but the content of this quote makes no sense; it would be the equivalent of me saying "Many libertarians propose that liberty is an ungrounded axiom, that is, liberty is a self-evident fact. They include such thinkers as Ayn Rand with her conception of ethical egoism." Does this writer have a clue what he is saying?



From a wikipedia entry on Hans-Hermann Hoppe:

“Argumentation ethics argues the non-aggression principle is a presupposition of argumentation and so cannot be rationally denied in discourse. Many modern libertarian scholars have accepted Hoppe's argument, among them Murray Rothbard, Walter Block, David Gordon and Stephan Kinsella."

This, of all, has to be the strangest of Hardin's citations. I can understand not having read the other books and being unfamiliar with the material, and being blinded by zealotry, not knowing what you are criticizing. However, this quote is actually evidence in my favor, since the very underlined portion makes reference to Prof. Hoppe's own work on the foundations of natural rights theory!

In other words, not only ignorant of the material they are criticizing, but embarrassingly ignorant.

Edited February 7, 2013 by 2046

[2046]

If a private defense agency, be it ever so just, tries to detain anyone by force they will soon be in trouble with the Law.

It is one thing to have private watchmen and guards. It is another to detain and punish or even recover stolen goods by force without a proper legal process.

Vigilantes are not legally kosher.

ruveyn

Again, people ignoring the actual arguments in this debate. Sure, as we have explained over and over, not having a proper legal process isn't "kosher." But the entire point market anarchism seeks to challenge is whether a monopoly is necessary in order to have a proper legal process. And a valid argument against that as Don Athos has pointed out, has yet to be forthcoming in this thread. Edited February 7, 2013 by 2046

[2046]

What makes the group of whimworshipping subjectivist vigilantes a court? is it a court because you say it is? Or because they decided they want to be?

You do know that a strawman argument is logically invalid right? Here's my challenge to you: are you actually capable of honestly reproducing our argument here? If not, what does that say about your integrity?

[ruveyn1]

Again, people ignoring the actual arguments in this debate. Sure, as we have explained over and over, not having a proper legal process isn't "kosher." But the entire point market anarchism seeks to challenge is whether a monopoly is necessary in order to have a proper legal process. And a valid argument against that as Don Athos has pointed out, has yet to be forthcoming in this thread.

You are wishing for a "guardian law" broad enough to permit the formation of private guards whose practices and organization meets some legal standards. Such a private "guard" would have to be accountable to some authority in case wrong doing is alleged. Who or what is that authority?

ruveyn1

[2046]

You are wishing for a "guardian law" broad enough to permit the formation of private guards whose practices and organization meets some legal standards. Such a private "guard" would have to be accountable to some authority in case wrong doing is alleged. Who or what is that authority?

ruveyn1

Again, this is like the theist's cosmological argument, that you need some super agency to make the lesser agencies accountable, but then don't you need another agency to make the super-agency accountable, and so you get an infinite regress.

I've already responded to this type of worry before, but I'll be happy to take it up again. First, I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "guardian law," but if I understand you correctly, you seem be to be saying basically, hey, you want to have a law code in society that conforms to certain objective standards, and that the executive function of this law code will have to be accountable to some external authority. If there is no monopoly government standing outside to force people to conform to those standards, then what's the make those standards "stick," so to speak.

Well so then what happens under government? Surely it is not the fact that some law is written on some piece of paper that "makes it stick," for as I pointed out, such written guarantees are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure people act in certain ways. As Wittgenstein explains, there is no such thing as a "self-enforcing rule," you can write on a piece of paper "we agree to be accountable to follow such and such procedures," but as long as people have free will, nothing external to those people and the institutions they arrange themselves in will "make it stick" or "make them accountable to some authority." Indeed, government is not external to the very society it is supposed to be constraining, rather it is constituted by it.

So accountability to an authority does not logically necessitate accountability to one single agency, but can actually include accountability to a multiplicity of them, and indeed according to proponents of market anarchism, this structure is superior in terms of accountability. Making judgments and enforcements accountable to the law code is the function of the entire system of interacting agencies, agreements, societal norms, and incentive structures that comprise the free market. Again, the idea that there must be one coercive super-agency to make something stick is precisely the idea market anarchism challenges. Even under the supposedly preferred regime of limited government, there is no one branch, let alone one individual officer, who makes such judgments stick. Securing cooperation among the branches of government is the function of checks and balances, separation of powers, etc., not the function of some unchecked superordinate branch. The free market as a constitutional political structure is simply a generalisation of the principle of checks and balances, not the elimination of accountability to authority.

Edited February 7, 2013 by 2046

[tadmjones]

Again, people ignoring the actual arguments in this debate. Sure, as we have explained over and over, not having a proper legal process isn't "kosher." But the entire point market anarchism seeks to challenge is whether a monopoly is necessary in order to have a proper legal process. And a valid argument against that as Don Athos has pointed out, has yet to be forthcoming in this thread.

Wouldn't vesting the protection of individual rights in governance necessitate that the application of law be held exclusively by 'government'? Does market anarchism in questioning this position, mean that protection of rights can be accomplished by allowing individuals to take actions, possibly the use of force ,at their own discretion ? That there would be no prohibtion for individuals taking unilateral actions toward others, but only the possibility of some(authority?) judging those actions(here I mean the actions of some private court) after the fact as either justifiable or not?

Edited February 7, 2013 by tadmjones

[tadmjones]

You do know that a strawman argument is logically invalid right? Here's my challenge to you: are you actually capable of honestly reproducing our argument here? If not, what does that say about your integrity?

Earlier in the thread I asked what a private court was. The definition didn't make sense to me , it seemed to be more a description of the actions of a group of individuals in within a society performing 'courtlike' actions. I should have asked what a cour tis, without the qualifier.

I wanted to understand how such actions performed by individuals, without the prior sanction of government be considered a court. Perhaps I do not understand what a court is. I will leave it to you to enlighten me.

[2046]

Wouldn't vesting the protection of individual rights in governance necessitate that the application of law be held exclusively by 'government'? Does market anarchism in questioning this position, mean that protection of rights can be accomplished by allowing individuals to take actions, possibly the use of force ,at their own discretion ? That there would be no prohibtion for individuals taking unilateral actions toward others, but only the possibility of some(authority?) judging those actions(here I mean the actions of some private court) after the fact as either justifiable or not?

Well to your first question, I'm unclear what you mean by "vesting the protection of individual rights in governance" and "application of law be held exclusively by 'government.'" If you mean something like: in order to have objective law and legal procedures, doesn't this necessitate a single coercive monopoly? Then obviously market anarchism would say no, but this is just a restatement of the very thing you quoted. So then, if you mean something like: in order to protect individual rights, doesn't this require adhering to objective law and legal procedures, and doesn't that mean that only certain kinds of organisations that employ these objective procedures are allowable? Then yes, this is true, but it is unclear how this is supposed to tell against market anarchism.

To your second question, you seem to be asking if anyone can just go around and start enforcing things in any old way they see fit. Of course not. Just think, how would you react, if you were my employer, my neighbor, my community, my insurance provider, or just another concerned citizen, and I went around kicking in peoples doors and started enforcing my own conception of justice, Rambo-style. Obviously, people would not take very kindly to this. Of course no one would stand for this. They would want an agency that utilizes only the proper procedures and is accountable to the public for how it enforces the law. But this does not necessitate one single coercive monopoly agency.

[2046]

Earlier in the thread I asked what a private court was. The definition didn't make sense to me , it seemed to be more a description of the actions of a group of individuals in within a society performing 'courtlike' actions. I should have asked what a cour tis, without the qualifier.

I wanted to understand how such actions performed by individuals, without the prior sanction of government be considered a court. Perhaps I do not understand what a court is. I will leave it to you to enlighten me.

Well I mean, I don't get why you don't get it. We're not using any fancy definitions here, just ordinar language ones. I'm okay with all these definitions:

court (kôrt, krt)

n.

3. Law

a. A person or body of persons whose task is to hear and submit a decision on cases at law.

b. The building, hall, or room in which such cases are heard and determined.

c. The regular session of a judicial assembly.

d. A similar authorized tribunal having military or ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

It seems to me what you're saying is basically this "I define a court as a monopoly agency. Therefore if you are advocating nonmonopoly courts, your courts aren't courts by the very definition of things, as I have decreed them to be." Well, this is an invalid way of arguing. In fact, it's a logical fallacy called circular reasoning.

[tadmjones]

Again, this is like the theist's cosmological argument, that you need some super agency to make the lesser agencies accountable, but then don't you need another agency to make the super-agency accountable, and so you get an infinite regress.

isn't this actually the answer to the theist's arugment ie that line of reasoning is invalid because it would lead to an infinite regress? and comparing accountability(were the buck stops) to what moves the prime mover, isn't that some kind of logical fallacy or strawman argument?

acountability would designate who or what was responsible for some action , the identification of the specific person or agency without ambiguity

I've already responded to this type of worry before, but I'll be happy to take it up again. First, I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "guardian law," but if I understand you correctly, you seem be to be saying basically, hey, you want to have a law code in society that conforms to certain objective standards, and that the executive function of this law code will have to be accountable to some external authority. If there is no monopoly government standing outside to force people to conform to those standards, then what's the make those standards "stick," so to speak.

how is it that the government's(monopoly holding of executive powers notwithstanding) function is to force people to conform to standards? doesn't market anarchism also hold that a governments function is to protect the rights of individuals?

Well so then what happens under government? Surely it is not the fact that some law is written on some piece of paper that "makes it stick," for as I pointed out, such written guarantees are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure people act in certain ways. As Wittgenstein explains, there is no such thing as a "self-enforcing rule," you can write on a piece of paper "we agree to be accountable to follow such and such procedures," but as long as people have free will, nothing external to those people and the institutions they arrange themselves in will "make it stick" or "make them accountable to some authority." Indeed, government is not external to the very society it is supposed to be constraining, rather it is constituted by it.

i think by this example you explain that those agencies are accountable, and you point out that they may not follow the such and such, that does not mean that are not accountable ,just that they may fail at the task

the individuals who enjoy the protection of their rights are not accountable to the government, it is the other way around, the hope is that government will conform to the standards of objective justice in all of its actions and be able to be held accountable if it fails

So accountability to an authority does not logically necessitate accountability to one single agency, but can actually include accountability to a multiplicity of them, and indeed according to proponents of market anarchism, this structure is superior in terms of accountability. Making judgments and enforcements accountable to the law code is the function of the entire system of interacting agencies, agreements, societal norms, and incentive structures that comprise the free market. Again, the idea that there must be one coercive super-agency to make something stick is precisely the idea market anarchism challenges. Even under the supposedly preferred regime of limited government, there is no one branch, let alone one individual officer, who makes such judgments stick. Securing cooperation among the branches of government is the function of checks and balances, separation of powers, etc., not the function of some unchecked superordinate branch. The free market as a constitutional political structure is simply a generalisation of the principle of checks and balances, not the elimination of accountability to authority.

here do you mean that the accountability attributed to authority will not be dimnished, the authority will still be accountable no matter how numerous the agencies that execute and dispense justice?

Edited February 7, 2013 by tadmjones

[DonAthos]

While looking at another thread today, I came upon this quote by Rand:

"If men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement."--Ayn Rand, "The Virtue of Selfishness," December 1963

It made me think about this discussion. I believe there's application here, for a discussion of "society" and government is certainly a discussion of men "deal[ing] with one another."

In the construction and administration of governance (including our running example -- the court), men must still deal with one another only by means of reason, just as Rand says. Governance itself, in the Objectivist politics, is the reservation of force for reprisal.

The basic political principle of the Objectivist ethics is: no man may initiate the use of physical force against others. -- "The Objectivist Ethics"

It is only as retaliation that force may be used and only against the man who starts its use. -- "Galt's Speech"

The principle of using force only in retaliation against those who initiate its use, is the principle of subordinating might to right. -- "Philosophy: Who Needs It"

Government has no special powers or rights apart from the right of self-defense of its citizens; i.e. the right to retaliate against the initiation of the use of force, with force. That -- and that alone -- is what a government may do. In "America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business," Rand said:

The individual does possess the right of self-defense and that is the right which he delegates to the government, for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement.

And from "Collectivized 'Rights'":

Any group or “collective,” large or small, is only a number of individuals. A group can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members.

Practically speaking, a government can only "govern" so long as it is funded (in some sense, though this may include volunteer work as well). But even this aspect of governance cannot be forced upon people, as elsewhere, Rand has argued that government should be funded through voluntary contribution alone (cf. "Government Financing in a Free Society").

Putting this all together, I think a picture begins to emerge. If we imagine some future government which adheres to the quotes given above, and play out the scenario of the construction of a "private court," what would we find?

Say that I set up a private court that administers objective justice in the same manner as the government court. While my court uses force against those who have initiated its use, it does not initiate force against anyone. Apart from this just application of self-defense, it operates solely "by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement," and is funded by the voluntary contributions of those who support my endeavor.

Those who would argue for the necessity of the "monopoly" aspect of governance would insist that the preexisting government must prevent me from doing this, and that it is right to do so. But how so, and on what grounds?

Insofar as government is an entity to which individuals may delegate some (or all) aspects of their right to self-defense, for the purpose of objective justice -- created through uncoerced agreement and funded voluntarily -- then in what sense have I not created a legitimate government? In that I have not initiated the use of force against any man, how can there be any just call for an action of force against me?

In some ways, this is simply a recapitulation of the argument that has been emerging throughout the thread... But as I say, I think that when these concepts are taken and held together in the mind, a picture emerges. We may arrive at a "monopoly" government by ignoring some element of the above, but I don't see how otherwise.

[tadmjones]

Government has no special powers or rights apart from the right of self-defense of its citizens; i.e. the right to retaliate against the initiation of the use of force, with force. That -- and that alone -- is what a government may do.

Say that I set up a private court that administers objective justice in the same manner as the government court. While my court uses force against those who have initiated its use, it does not initiate force against anyone. Apart from this just application of self-defense, it operates solely "by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement," and is funded by the voluntary contributions of those who support my endeavor.

the first paragraph is a quote you attributed to Rand , what follows ignores that quote and instead proposes starting an extra governmental agency out of thin air, the justification on the face of it seems to be self defense, but it really means being an agent that seeks retribution in the name of some unspecified individual , is that action actually compatible with what is meant by self defense?

Those who would argue for the necessity of the "monopoly" aspect of governance would insist that the preexisting government must prevent me from doing this, and that it is right to do so. But how so, and on what grounds?

on the practical grounds ,that someone can not just stand up and say" i feel like being the judge." or " i feel like being the jury.." or any such, how in a society based on objective law would any individual be ceded the power to at any time decide they would have those powers, even if they consented to their actions being judged , after the fact

Insofar as government is an entity to which individuals may delegate some (or all) aspects of their right to self-defense, for the purpose of objective justice -- created through uncoerced agreement and funded voluntarily -- then in what sense have I not created a legitimate government? In that I have not initiated the use of force against any man, how can there be any just call for an action of force against me

i would say simply because, YOU decided, you being any random individual that may endeavour to act in that capacity, how or by what mechanism do the other individuals in the society protect themselves (or have another agency protect them) and be able to expect accountability from either , eg you as self appointed judge , and some agency to protect others from your wrongful actions

in this less than scholarly post, i would suggest the answer is that all members of a society have to be considered equal before the law , and that that law could only be instituted in society through an agency that is fully accountable for its actions, which would also have to mean that it would have to have exclusive control in its sphere of influence

Edited February 8, 2013 by tadmjones

[DonAthos]

the first paragraph is a quote you attributed to Rand , what follows ignores that quote and instead proposes starting an extra governmental agency out of thin air, the justification on the face of it seems to be self defense, but it really means being an agent that seeks retribution in the name of some unspecified individual , is that action actually compatible with what is meant by self defense?

Yes. That which any court does -- being an agent that seeks retribution in the name of some unspecified individual -- is absolutely a function of self-defense. If it was not a proper function of self-defense, then the government would have no legitimate power to perform it either.

Look again at this quote I've provided:

The individual does possess the right of self-defense and that is the right which he delegates to the government, for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement.

Whatever powers the government legitimately wields -- including the court -- is nothing more than the right of self-defense of the individuals who have deferred that right to the government. And -- again -- this follows suit with Rand's observations that groups have no additional powers, but only the rights that belong to the individuals which comprise that group:

Any group or “collective,” large or small, is only a number of individuals. A group can have no rights other than the rights of its individual members.

If a government possesses the power to form a court, and etc., it is only because the individuals who comprise that government possess that same power.

But you continually argue from this apparent point of view that the government somehow has a special right to hold court, and etc.; a right that no other group or individual can have. And when I have asked you, numerous times, to argue for a source of this additional right -- this additional power -- you have not provided anything. It seems to come from nowhere at all, and exists only because a body declares itself to be the government. In the absence of giving this additional power or right a justification, or even a name, I have begun to wonder if we're not actually discussing magic.

on the practical grounds ,that someone can not just stand up and say" i feel like being the judge." or " i feel like being the jury.." or any such, how in a society based on objective law would any individual be ceded the power to at any time decide they would have those powers, even if they consented to their actions being judged , after the fact

Do you know what the boundaries of legal action are in a free society? There is only one, and it is that a man may not initiate the use of force against any other.

Whether someone stands up and says "I feel like being the judge" is completely besides the point. Rather, if someone stands up and provides objective justice -- justice according to those same standards that we would demand of a just government -- then there are no proper grounds for objection.

i would say simply because, YOU decided, you being any random individual that may endeavour to act in that capacity, how or by what mechanism do the other individuals in the society protect themselves (or have another agency protect them) and be able to expect accountability from either , eg you as self appointed judge , and some agency to protect others from your wrongful actions

Yes, "I decided."

From "Textbook of Americanism":

A right is the sanction of independent action. A right is that which can be exercised without anyone’s permission.

[...]

If, before undertaking some action, you must obtain the permission of society—you are not free, whether such permission is granted to you or not. Only a slave acts on permission. A permission is not a right.

I have the right to do whatever does not initiate the use of force. Self-defense, and the legal aspects of the same, are not an initiation of the use of force, but a response of force to force. I have the right of self-defense and I do not need your permission to exercise it.

My exercise of that self-defense must proceed in an objective manner. Whatever procedural manners we ultimately would deem generally necessary (whether it be trial-by-jury, or rules of evidence, or review by an appellate process, or what have you) would have to have an objective basis, and would have to be observed -- otherwise I would be initiating the use of force. But so long as I take the pains necessary to carry out justice in an objective manner, then yes, even a random individual such as myself could "endeavor to act in that capacity."

in this less than scholarly post, i would suggest the answer is that all members of a society have to be considered equal before the law , and that that law could only be instituted in society through an agency that is fully accountable for its actions, which would also have to mean that it would have to have exclusive control in its sphere of influence

"Equality before the law"? Yes. But this highest and most fundamental law must be the source of all subsequent law, if we want to institute a free society: no man may initiate the use of force against any other man. And this law, fully implemented, leaves men free to institute courts of objective justice -- according to their right of self-defense -- with no one man, or institution able to lay claim to a coercive monopoly of the same.

[tadmjones]

DonAthos quoted Rand

The individual does possess the right of self-defense and that is the right which he delegates to the government, for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement.

 

 

The right of self defense is delegated to the government, was Rand being ambiguous? Did she say that but mean, well of course as long as everything is kosher, agencies or individuals other than the government can in some or all instances take it upon themselves to dispense objective justice? If no , was she wrong?

 

I don't mean to suggest that because Rand said such and such makes it true, but I'm not using quotes to prove my point.

[tadmjones]

My over all point is that courts are an instrument of government, that can not exist apart from that function. I think the idea of a private court is a floating abstraction, and no arguments here have dissuaded me of that view.

 

The delegation of the right to self defense to a government is what produces the conditions necessary for a society of free men. By delegating that right to the institution of government , that government then is the institution that needs to be accountable for providing the protection that is to be gained from such delegation.

 

The idea of a private court, or ad hoc individuals enacting or dispensing justice could only function in say the Gulch. It would function in a 'society' of pledge takers, if society was in fact constituted of such individuals there would be little need of courts, but the Gulch is a fiction.

Edited February 9, 2013 by tadmjones

[DonAthos]

DonAthos quoted Rand

The individual does possess the right of self-defense and that is the right which he delegates to the government, for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement.

 

 

The right of self defense is delegated to the government, was Rand being ambiguous?

 

No. Rand wasn't being ambiguous, yet this quote may not mean exactly what you want it to mean. Let's try to unpack this, as best we can, and see what we find.

I take this quote as being a description of the nature of governmental power, and also an explanation as to why government exists in the first place -- why men should want such a thing, and choose it. In sum, it explains the origin of governance, sourcing it in the individual's right of self-defense, and appealing to man's reason that he should adopt government according to the blessings that it can confer; the better defense of his rights.  And let us remember that this is consonant with the idea that all "group rights" are ultimately nothing more than the application of the rights of those individuals which comprise that group; a "government" would have no power to make a court of law if the individuals within that government did not have that selfsame power.

However, you seem to take this quote as meaning that there is no choice for an individual to make -- that in some attenuated (and I would argue meaningless) sense, he has a "right of self-defense," but this right is metaphysically stripped from him (presumably before birth) to be vested in this other preexisting, eternal entity called "government," regardless of the shape or form of the body currently calling itself government, and regardless of the individual's will. That this is a singular, automatic transaction, taking place outside of space and time (rather like Christ's self-sacrifice, sucking up the sins of the world), and it is irrevocable.

I disagree with what I view as your interpretation.

What does it mean to have a "right"? And what does it mean to "delegate" that right? Let us say that, everything else being equal, I have a "right" to go to the market and buy groceries. (Strictly I have the right to do anything that does not initiate the use of force against another man; so if the grocery store doesn't want to have me, then I can't go there, but bear with me for this example.) How can I "delegate" my right in this case? Surely, I could empower another person to be my purchasing agent -- provide them with the funds, or etc., to buy the groceries that I desire.

Yet we will observe in this case that, in "delegating my right," I have not lost any part of it. In empowering my purchasing agent to act on my behalf, I have not given up my own ability to go to the store myself. Neither is this some permanent arrangement existing outside of spacetime. It is a real world transaction that has all of the ordinary limits that we recognize of a general right of contract, or of association. Neither have I foreclosed from myself the option of further delegation.

An individual cannot be divested of his rights, however else we believe that such a "delegation" occurs; that is what it means to have a right in the first place. They are "inalienable."

From "Textbook of Americanism":

 

When we say that we hold individual rights to be inalienable, we must mean just that. Inalienable means that which we may not take away, suspend, infringe, restrict or violate—not ever, not at any time, not for any purpose whatsoever.

You cannot say that “man has inalienable rights except in cold weather and on every second Tuesday,” just as you cannot say that “man has inalienable rights except in an emergency,” or “man’s rights cannot be violated except for a good purpose.”

Either man’s rights are inalienable, or they are not. You cannot say a thing such as “semi-inalienable” and consider yourself either honest or sane.

 

So, what does that mean for us? It means that every individual has his full right of self-defense, and even those parts of it he has "delegated" to some other individual or group of individuals (as even a "government" is no more than this -- it is just people) "for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement." Furthermore, whatever is involved in this "delegation," it is fully reversible. A group of men may form a government on Tuesday and dissolve that same government on Wednesday; there is no supernatural power thereafter binding them together in perpetuity, because someone spoke the arcane word "government." Men only work together in this -- or any other fashion -- according to their rational self-interest, and without physical force if we are to consider it just.

Remember:

 

If men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement.

 

This applies as much to the formation or maintenance of an official "state" as anything else. And if you mean to take from men their right to self-defense, or even "delegate" it, against their will, and leave them (literally) defenseless against such a government as you would proclaim legitimate, then you have initiated the use of force against them, and contravened the Objectivist Ethics entirely.

Now, let's briefly consider a couple of examples to try to better understand what we're talking about.

Suppose a man on an island, alone. We will call him Gilligan. Is Gilligan in full possession of his rights? Does he have his full right of self-defense? Or does he belong to some nebulous "government" (that simply has the misfortune of not actually existing yet) and thereby has he already "delegated" (and, per your view, lost) some portion of it, or the entirety?

But no. There is no government here, except for the man himself, insofar as he acts in self-defense and we recognize those actions as having the character of "governance." Of course, in a political sense, there can be no "self-defense" without another person, and neither can there be politics! So let us put somebody else on the island -- the Skipper.

Now we have an island with two people. It is a small "society," but it is a society. Do we have government yet? Has one of them somehow delegated his right of self-defense to the other? Or do they both automatically delegate their rights to a mystical abstraction of the two-acting-together -- again, somehow? If one attacks the other -- the Skipper always did resort to violence against poor Gilligan, after all -- does the victim not have the right to defend himself (for his "government" cannot reach quorum to resolve the matter one way or the other)? I believe it would be nonsensical for Gilligan to do anything other than defend himself, according to his right of self-defense. He has not lost a wit of his rights, simply because someone else has appeared on the island.

Now suppose that the Howells show up and build a resort. And the Globetrotters are there, and suddenly a hundred, a thousand, a million other people move to this (apparently rather big) island. What now? Has Gilligan... somehow lost some part of his "semi-inalienable" rights? If that Million Others decides that they should get together and form a government -- but they do not invite Gilligan to the meeting -- is he automatically included in it anyways? Has he lost his rights to them at that point, on their say-so? Or suppose they divide the island in half and form two distinct governments... Gilligan's hut lies right on the border, both governments eager that the other should take him and unable to reach consensus. Are we to say that Gilligan must give up his rights to someone, but now he gets a "choice" (of exactly two options)? Or does he yet have the right to withhold such a delegation altogether?

Per Rand and Objectivism, we would not force Gilligan to "contribute" to any government via tax. Per Rand and Objectivism, we would not force him to act in concert with any other man except "by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement." Per Rand and Objectivism, Gilligan -- as any other individual -- has the right of self-defense. Remember the first portion of the quote that sent us down this rabbit-hole: "[Gilligan] does possess the right of self-defense..." and we know that this right, as they all are, is inalienable.

So what gives anyone else the "right" to draw a border around Gilligan's hut and say that he has -- against his will, and possibly even without his knowledge -- delegated his individual rights, to them?

And beyond all of this, let us recognize that there is not -- and never will be -- any justice in initiating the use of force against Gilligan. However it gets sorted between the Professor, the Howells, Ginger and the rest in drawing up this new, political map of the island, they can take no legitimate action against Gilligan unless he initiates the use of force against another man.

If Gilligan were to declare himself his own government, that would not be an initiation of the use of force on his part. If he were to defend himself, according to his rights as an individual, that would not be an initiation of the use of force. If he were to establish a court and administer justice in as objective a fashion as anyone else on the island could manage, that would not be an initiation of the use of force. And that -- his establishment of such a court -- would provide the controversy around which this entire conversation turns in the first place. So please note: the two governments -- Skipper's Ship, and Howell Valley -- would neither have any more justification for breaking up Gilligan's court as he would for breaking up the ones that they establish.

But let's leave Gilligan's isle for a moment.

Suppose a person lives in Nazi Germany, and suppose that person has the temerity to consider himself an individual with rights and all that, despite his poor condition. Does that individual have a choice as to whether to "delegate" his right of self-defense to Adolf Hitler, Fuhrer and Chancellor for life, or whatever it was he was supposed to be? If he gets such a choice, should he do it? Would you?

The justification Rand gives for governance -- as we turn to the second portion of the quote -- is "for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement."

Let us say that order is a "good" in an abstract fashion, where governance is concerned, as is "legally defined enforcement." And perhaps we can "give the devil his due," and admit that Nazi Germany was both orderly, and its law was characterized by "legal definition." (Now, if we were to look closely at the historical record, I'm sure we could find arguments on either side -- as with any actual government -- but again, please bear with.) If you were Jewish, let us say, your life might be legally defined as forfeit, and you would be taken by train to the place of your execution in as orderly a fashion as you could wish.

So what then? In the name of government, and because you believe yourself to have already (somehow!) "delegated" your rights of self-defense to the tender mercies of Hitler and Co., would you willingly obey their commands -- recognizing them as the legitimate rulers of your land, and yourself?

I should hope not! I should hope that you would fight like a wildcat! (Or fight in whatever manner was most effective, at least; perhaps, at times, more like a mosquito.) And in what name should you fight? Upon what justification? Why, in your own name, and justified by your own rights as an individual, which -- as it turns out -- you never actually lost, whatever you were supposed to have "delegated." (Because: inalienable.)

If we delegate our right of self-defense to the government, even in the limited sense that I'm talking about, then we do so because (per rational self-interest) we judge it to promote our life. But we cannot delegate ourselves to "government, as such." There exists no "government, as such," but only actual governments with actual laws and actual people enforcing them. And whatever good may come of "order" and "legal definition," they are only good when in the service of the principle of the non-initiation of force. Order and legal definition, when in the service of the initiation of force, just gets the train on time to Auschwitz.

And so we find that it is in an individual's interest to delegate his right of self-defense to an agency committed to the non-initiation of force... but not otherwise. And even once he has "delegated" this right, it is still his. If and when he is attacked, by any individual or group and including the agency to which he has delegated his right, he retains the power and the moral legitimacy to fight back. In every event, this "delegation" does not authorize a given government to initiate the use of force against anybody -- and to bring it all back home, this applies equally to the construction of a new court of objective justice.

 

I don't mean to suggest that because Rand said such and such makes it true, but I'm not using quotes to prove my point.

 

Neither am I "using quotes to prove my point," but I am making arguments and sourcing them in other arguments which -- given the nature of this board -- I expect you will find familiar, and with which you have some basic form of agreement.

But that may be a mistake. After all, it could be that you don't really believe in the non-initiation of force (as it ultimately appears was true of other participants here). But I'm not here to argue for the non-initiation of force, per se. That justification would require its own thread/discussion, just as it would if you were suddenly to argue against what I'm saying by appealing to some general skepticism or mysticism or something (i.e. "God told me that a monopoly government is the way to go!") I am taking it for granted that you agree with me on matters of Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics -- since these form the foundation of political argument -- and my use of quotes is meant to remind you of that upon which we are presumed to agree.

But again, if you have God on your side, then I'm not going to convince you of anything here. I need you to already be open to reason.

 

My over all point is that courts are an instrument of government, that can not exist apart from that function. I think the idea of a private court is a floating abstraction, and no arguments here have dissuaded me of that view.

 

That is just as well. None of my arguments are meant to convince you of the term "private court," which I long ago (in this thread, and directly in response to you no less) said was a contradiction in terms:

 

For after all, the idea of a "private court" is ultimately a self-contradiction, is it not? Insofar as the word "private" is meant to mean apart from governance, and that role which government is meant to play in effecting justice within a society, there can be no "private court"; every court is government of its nature. Equally suspect is the term "anarchy," thrown around in this thread and elsewhere. To suggest that the creation of an additional court which provides objective justice means to have no government whatever is flawed on its face, when we're actually talking about a net increase in... uh... archy.

 

Do you see? I agree with you that "courts are an instrument of government." And I agree that a court "can not exist apart from that function."

There are many ways of looking at this concept of a "private court." Once such way is to view it as the creation of a "new, separate government" from the original "monopoly government." And another way to view it -- and my preferred way, because I believe it to be apt -- is that it is not actually a separate government at all, but merely a new legal institution within the one proper monopoly government, where the political monopoly consists of the principle of the non-initiation of force, and its implementation throughout society:

 

In one sense -- viewing "government" as a particular set of defined institutions and individuals which have a monopoly on the administration of justice -- this will seem like "anarchy," despite what we've discussed above. In another sense, however, it can be understood that these "private courts" would actually be operating within one government -- but it would be a government aligned around the principle of the non-initiation of force (which would have the only monopoly remaining: a philosophical monopoly), as opposed to being aligned around specific men and specific institutions. It would be a full recognition of the objectivity of justice, which does not derive its legitimacy from the "official" nature of those who enact it, but from the nature of the act itself -- what is just is just, and what is not is not.

 

Again, I ask: do you see? If we were to establish a country, bound by the political ideal (as set forth by Ayn Rand) of the non-initiation of force, we would need some mechanism by which to enforce this. That any citizen, acting in the capacity of "government," could administrate justice -- so long as he did so in an objective fashion -- would be one such mechanism. As it turns out, and as I'm arguing, it would be the only mechanism fully consonant with the non-initiation of force. That is to say, it is the only ethical system of government available.

From the modern point of view, where government is presumed to rest in a predefined set of institutions, and individual citizens have no right of self-defense (except what government allows them), that would look like utter anarchy. (Just as, I'd assume, someone who believed in the Divine Right of an Absolute Monarch would find the United States with its checks and balances and overlapping jurisdictions and state assemblies and democratic institutions like propositions and judicial oversight and etc., utterly anarchic.) But really? It's not anarchy at all. It is objective government, yet radical to our current way of thinking, and easily misunderstood.

[2046]

My over all point is that courts are an instrument of government, that can not exist apart from that function. I think the idea of a private court is a floating abstraction, and no arguments here have dissuaded me of that view.

 

The delegation of the right to self defense to a government is what produces the conditions necessary for a society of free men. By delegating that right to the institution of government , that government then is the institution that needs to be accountable for providing the protection that is to be gained from such delegation.

We know you have that view, but the question is what is the justification for that view, and to that, we require argument, not self-evident assertions. Moreover we hear repeated assertions from Tad that courts just are a coercive monopoly institution in the form of the modern state, because well, he defines it that way. Again, ignoring that this is the fallacy of begging the question as previously pointed out, Tad refused earlier to even entertain the idea of reading books which point to actual historical instances of non-state law and non-monopoly courts and judicial systems. So once again, this is the inquisition refusing to even look into Galileo's telescope, as they are just empirically wrong in the assertion that courts can only be monopoly institutions. Of course they are free to disagree with our historical data, but again, that is something they continue to refuse to even look at!

[Garshasp]

At the least, I think it can be admitted that people have the right to anarchy. They can instantly, and without reason or warning, declare themselves and their real estate property to be an independent country -- even if it's only one house, on half an acre of land, which is completely landlocked. Of course, if criminals attack their house then they can't justly count on help from the police from the now foreign country next to them. In turn, if they leave their home country and venture abroad they have to obey the laws and police of the country they're visiting, notwithstanding their anarchic status when at home. 

Edited February 10, 2013 by Garshasp

[DonAthos]

At the least, I think it can be admitted that people have the right to anarchy. They can instantly, and without reason or warning, declare themselves and their real estate property to be an independent country -- even if it's only one house, on half an acre of land, which is completely landlocked. Of course, if criminals attack their house then they can't justly count on help from the police from the now foreign country next to them. In turn, if they leave their home country and venture abroad they have to obey the laws and police of the country they're visiting, notwithstanding their anarchic status when at home.

 

I'm glad for this post, because it allows me to briefly draw a distinction between the system I've been talking about and "anarchy."

What I've been discussing is not the elimination of government, but instead a more ethical system of government. (And almost certainly a more effective one, too, though that is not my primary interest.) What I've been discussing is this: putting people under the rule of law according to an objective system of justice, where free men do not tolerate one another to initiate the use of force. The "anarchic" character from our modern perspective is only that this would necessarily allow people their full use of their right of self defense, legally, even in matters otherwise delegated to the government. Which means that no individual or singular institution would have a "monopoly" on those matters, like the establishment of a court. But such a court could not be created "on any terms at all," but only on objective terms, defined by the requirements of objective justice. To do less than this would be an initiation of the use of force, and illegal.

So, strictly speaking? Sure, a person (such as my Gilligan) could declare himself to be an independent country, as in my example. Does that mean that he lives in "anarchy"? Does it mean that he is somehow not beholden to the government that otherwise exists on the island? That he is freed from objective justice? Not at all.

If Gilligan, in his hut, or in any other place, and whether in his capacity as "governor" of his hut, or citizen of the island, initiates the use of force against any other man, then he has broken the law around which the entire system is organized, and from which every other law must be derived. He would be dealt with as any other criminal.

Certainly every man is "king of his castle"... to a point. And that point is the bounds of objective justice; the non-initiation of force. The system I propose is taking that principle seriously, and implementing it fully, across the board. What I'm discussing is still a "monopoly government," just not the kind that we're used to seeing. It is a government consistent with the principle of the non-initiation of force; an ethical government.