Roark the dynamiter

[Jonathan13]

So Jonathan are you stating emphatically that you haven't mischaracterized or lied about what occurred in the novel and daring me to prove it?

 

Wow, you're just riled up, aren't you? Is this second grade? I'm not "daring" you to do anything, but having an adult conversation with other adults about the content of a novel. If you have something of substance to add, please do so. I'd only suggest that you maybe take a little time to calm down and not take it so personally. There's really no need for the personal attacks.

 

J

[Marc K.]

You see, you won't even state emphatically that you haven't mischaracterized Ayn Rand or lied about what was in the novel, something I should think you would want to deny. The fact that you won't makes me suspect that you know you have done such. That is intellectual dishonesty. Not a personal attack, just a fact.

[DonAthos]

Your faulty line of argument above was already tried by Kendall on a previous thread. I thoroughly refuted it.

 

Here are some highlights:

 

I haven't yet read the thread you're referencing, though perhaps I should.

But can I ask, since it brings it to mind? On the subject of "subcontracting," what do you think about ghostwriting as a general practice?

 

I should think then that you would want to be clear in your own head about who initiated force and you admit below that you don't.

 

I don't think I've been unclear, in either "my own head," or in this thread on the subject. I've said since the beginning that I was uncertain about my position re: Roark's dynamiting. But no, I don't need to resolve that particular situation before I can say -- with certainty -- that no man may morally initiate force, contra the claims raised in this thread.

 

I am asking you about your claims. I have no intention of talking to Jonathan. He is a troll whose only purpose here is to bash Ayn Rand and Objectivism and to do it using mischaracterizations and dishonesty.

 

Okay. I don't agree with your characterization of Jonathan, but I certainly won't force you to talk to him. But I don't think you were asking me about my claims, and I still don't. You quoted me providing a defense of individual rights. Do you think I'm wrong with respect to individual rights? In any of the claims I've actually made across the thread, where do you find me mistaken? (I'd sincerely like to know, because I don't like being mistaken.)

If, on the other hand, you have cast this as there being "sides," and account to me every claim made by Jonathan, then no, I'm not prepared to defend everything he's said. My claim -- and specifically the one from which you've quoted -- is that individual rights may not be violated morally. Am I wrong about that?

 

There is absolutely nothing morally or legally wrong with hiding one's involvement in a project from those not involved in said project, if for no other reason than that one wants to maintain their privacy. So lying to Toohey or Wynand is perfectly acceptable.

 

I agree with you if the intention is just to maintain privacy. I would only disagree if the intention were otherwise, and specifically to deceive.

 

That is why he had a contract.

 

Maybe so. I don't know. If I make a deal with someone I know to be utterly unreliable, I may be able to hold that person legally accountable when he breaks his word... but am I morally blameless, when I knew (or would have known, had I given it some thought) what the results would be?

[Jonathan13]

You see, you won't even state emphatically that you haven't mischaracterized Ayn Rand or lied about what was in the novel, something I should think you would want to deny. The fact that you won't makes me suspect that you know you have done such. That is intellectual dishonesty. Not a personal attack, just a fact.

 

I most certainly will state that I haven't mischaracterized Rand, and that I haven't lied about what is in the novel. Now enough with the childishness and personal distractions. Do you have any substance to add?

 

J

Edited February 20, 2013 by Jonathan13

[Marc K.]

If, on the other hand, you have cast this as there being "sides," and account to me every claim made by Jonathan, then no, I'm not prepared to defend everything he's said. My claim -- and specifically the one from which you've quoted -- is that individual rights may not be violated morally. Am I wrong about that?

Barring emergency situations (which are amoral anyway) yes, rights may not be violated morally.

 

Well, whyNot was arguing with Jonathan and you were arguing with him. So when you referenced rights and initiation of force I thought you were saying that Roark had initiated force. If you are saying that you don't know who initiated force, OK. But then I should think, for clarity's sake, it would be incumbent upon you to post a caveat, in this thread which asks a specific question, whenever referencing rights or initiation of force, to say that you have no idea whether Roark initiated force or not.

 

Frankly, I have not fully read any of your posts in this thread. I find the walls of text you produce to be hard to read and follow. I'm not trying to be mean, just my opinion. I think you could, again for clarity's sake, severely edit the length of your posts and perhaps try to stick to one or two issues of principle per post. Again, just my opinion.

 

 

I agree with you if the intention is just to maintain privacy. I would only disagree if the intention were otherwise, and specifically to deceive.

 

It depends on who you are deceiving. Certainly you may not be deceptive in contractual talks. However, if a child molester comes up to you and asks where your daughter is sleeping, please be deceptive.

 

 

Maybe so. I don't know. If I make a deal with someone I know to be utterly unreliable, I may be able to hold that person legally accountable when he breaks his word... but am I morally blameless, when I knew (or would have known, had I given it some thought) what the results would be?

There are drawbacks to dealing with people, that is what contracts are for. I think Roark took the chance because of the tremendous value he was receiving.

 

 

 

 

Aside: Ugh, damn, this quote function is impossible, it erased my entire post. Can you guys do anything about it?

[Marc K.]

It is an obvious, objectively observable fact that Roark's conspiring with Keating was immoral by Objectivist standards. It was dishonest. It was intentional. The two of them actively hid Roark's involvement from the project's owners. They lied when questioned about it by others.

This is a mischaracterization of Objectivism. It is not obvious. It is perfectly acceptable to be intentionally dishonest in some cases. You mentioned Toohey and Wynand elsewhere, neither of whom was party to the contract. It is perfectly acceptable for Roark to lie about his involvement to them even if his only reason is to maintain his privacy.

As for the project's owners, they actively hid nothing from them. The owners had a chance to see what they were getting and they were getting a tremendous value.

 

 

In conspiring with Keating, he knowingly violates their right to not hire him.

This is a confusion about the nature of rights. Since Rights are moral sanctions to act. The way this should be stated is that they have a right to hire whoever they want. And while in this instance it doesn't make a real difference about the outcome, stating what someone has a right to do in this fashion will eventually lead to problems. For instance there is no such right as the right to not be free. The statement contradicts itself and confuses the nature of what rights are meant to do.

 

 

He also explicitly states his moral objections to the existence of such government projects, but then proceeds to act against his own stated morality by working on it.

This is a complete misunderstanding and if you have heard of "The Question of Scholarships", then this is a mischaracterization and lie. Generally it is only the enemies of Ayn Rand who spout "she was a hypocrite, she collected Social Security". If you admire Ayn Rand, then you should be ashamed of associating yourself with these remarks. I have my doubts about whether you admire her. I know for certain you don't understand her.

 

 

The owners did not take the benefit of his work and make him contribute it as a gift.

Of course they did, they got what they wanted and were building it, he got nothing.

 

 

He pushed his way onto the project without their knowledge.

This is a lie. He did not "push" his way onto the project. Keating came to him.

 

 

He pushed his way onto the project without their knowledge. They didn't ask him for anything, but in fact made it clear to him that they wouldn't hire him.

No, another lie. The owners did not make it clear to him that they wouldn't hire him. Toohey might have, they didn't.

So Jonathan, care to revise your earlier statement that you haven't mischaracterized Ayn Rand or lied about the facts of the novel?

[DonAthos]

Barring emergency situations (which are amoral anyway) yes, rights may not be violated morally.

 

Then we're agreed.

 

Well, whyNot was arguing with Jonathan and you were arguing with him. So when you referenced rights and initiation of force I thought you were saying that Roark had initiated force. If you are saying that you don't know who initiated force, OK. But then I should think, for clarity's sake, it would be incumbent upon you to post a caveat, in this thread which asks a specific question, whenever referencing rights or initiation of force, to say that you have no idea whether Roark initiated force or not.

 

whYNOT made the claim that rights may be violated morally (outside of emergency situations), and that's what I was responding to primarily, though it subsequently spiraled out into a number of other claims and side-discussions (as these things tend to do). For your reference, if you're interested, here is my initial contribution to this thread.

As regards a "caveat" with respect to my position on Roark and Cortlandt, I think that I have placed a few notices throughout, but no, I have not done so consistently and in every post. I have treated the thread as an ongoing conversation, and have expected posters to bear the context of the preceding conversation in mind. Perhaps this is a mistake on my part, and especially as the conversation gets longer and the topics more numerous and tangential.

 

Frankly, I have not fully read any of your posts in this thread. I find the walls of text you produce to be hard to read and follow. I'm not trying to be mean, just my opinion. I think you could, again for clarity's sake, severely edit the length of your posts and perhaps try to stick to one or two issues of principle per post. Again, just my opinion.

 

I respect that this is your opinion, but...

I write just so much as I feel I need to do to respond substantively, and to explain myself in full. If I become a better writer over time -- and if I learn to convey myself more succinctly while retaining the full force of my arguments, to my best understanding -- then you'll find that change in my posts. But until then, I write as I write.

If my posts are too long for you to read, I understand. (Though I find "walls of text" to be a rather insulting mischaracterization. Do you know what a "wall of text" looks like?) But I would be equally understanding if someone chose not to read Atlas Shrugged due to its length.

And as to "one or two issues of principle per post"? I suppose I should point out that I'm currently responding to your observations on my posting style. If you had not brought that up, I wouldn't be responding about it now. I am, I believe, only responding to those matters that you have introduced, whether one or two issues, or more. If you'd like me to treat on fewer matters, don't bring so many up.

 

It depends on who you are deceiving. Certainly you may not be deceptive in contractual talks. However, if a child molester comes up to you and asks where your daughter is sleeping, please be deceptive.

 

Agreed.

 

There are drawbacks to dealing with people, that is what contracts are for. I think Roark took the chance because of the tremendous value he was receiving.

 

But it isn't just that "there are drawbacks to dealing with people"; when you know specific people, you have a better understanding of the specific drawbacks to dealing with them (just as you stated that you don't want to discuss matters with Jonathan, judging him to be a troll). If Peter Keating were real and wanted to do business, I think it would be a bad idea to work with him, even contractually, not just because "there are drawbacks to dealing with people," but because Keating is characteristically unreliable.

It may be that Roark took the chance, as you say, because of the value he hoped to receive... and it resulted in blowing buildings up. And I guess I'm saying that such an outcome (or something else equally bad) was to be expected going in. It's like moving to a communist nation and making a deal with the government to set up your business, right? You might take such a chance because of the potential you see... but is it then surprising when they nationalize your business and throw you in prison for being a greedy capitalist? Is that something you might have anticipated and avoided?

Perhaps in a given scenario, it still might be worth the risk? And maybe that applies to Roark in the present case. But in any event, I would advise that a person not fool himself as to what he's getting into. Your chances of operating your business in the communist nation and getting away with it are slim, and so are your chances of getting what you'd hoped out of your arrangement with Keating, even with contract in hand.

[Marc K.]

If Peter Keating were real and wanted to do business, I think it would be a bad idea to work with him, even contractually, not just because "there are drawbacks to dealing with people," but because Keating is characteristically unreliable.

Let us not forget that this a novel driven by conflict.

 

 

It may be that Roark took the chance, as you say, because of the value he hoped to receive... and it resulted in blowing buildings up. And I guess I'm saying that such an outcome (or something else equally bad) was to be expected going in.

No, no one can predict the future. People have free will and can change. However, if he had changed that wouldn't have made for a very good novel would it?

 

 

Perhaps in a given scenario, it still might be worth the risk? And maybe that applies to Roark in the present case. But in any event, I would advise that a person not fool himself as to what he's getting into. Your chances of operating your business in the communist nation and getting away with it are slim, and so are your chances of getting what you'd hoped out of your arrangement with Keating, even with contract in hand.

I don't think he was fooling himself. He might not have foreseen the blowing up of buildings but he did protect himself with a contract and ultimately that is what allowed him to prevail at trial. They took what was his and gave him nothing in return and thus broke the contract. He was justified in what he did.

This isn't even that unusual. Maybe blowing up buildings is unusual but the more general category of taking extrajudicial action is allowed and sanctioned by the courts all the time. If a criminal is confronting you in your house, you have a right to defend yourself. Many a criminal has died that way and the person defending themselves is acquitted or never even tried.

[DonAthos]

Let us not forget that this a novel driven by conflict.

 

Absolutely, you're right. And that may help to explain Roark's choice to work with Keating; it may exist to allow for the conflict that ultimately results in the dynamiting of Cortlandt. But such a thing has more than one "cause": there are the author's reasons in crafting the novel (to introduce conflict; to move the plot towards the ending sequence); and then there are the characters' motivations within the work. I am speaking to this second consideration.

Were I writing such a thing, I would want to have my characters act as to create conflict and convey my themes and so on... and I would also want their actions and motivations to be internally consistent and understandable. I may want a specific action to have a particular moral flavor, whether good or bad. And it is with respect to this sort of analysis that I say that it's a bad idea to work with Peter Keating. Not that it's bad for the sake of the construction of the novel; as a reader, I love conflict.

 

 

No, no one can predict the future. People have free will and can change. However, if he had changed that wouldn't have made for a very good novel would it?

 

People do have free will, and we cannot predict the future. On the other hand, you advised me earlier to deceive the child molester who wants to tuck my daughter into bed and wish her a good night (and I agreed). The child molester has free will and can change, and I can't predict the future, and yet...

I find it still a bad idea to tell him the truth.

If Keating had changed, it certainly would have made for a very different novel. I don't take issue with the plot events at all in service of good fiction, and I quite enjoyed The Fountainhead. I wouldn't presume to try to change it. While it's been a long time, as I've said, and actually I read The Fountainhead well prior to any formal sort of introduction to Objectivism, I do remember that one of the most compelling things to me was what I took to be the battle over Keating's soul. I was rooting for him for much of the novel to turn things around.

 

 

I don't think he was fooling himself. He might not have foreseen the blowing up of buildings but he did protect himself with a contract and ultimately that is what allowed him to prevail at trial. They took what was his and gave him nothing in return and thus broke the contract. He was justified in what he did.

 

I'm not completely satisfied that Roark wasn't allowing himself at least a little bit of... wishful thinking in working with Keating. But I think I am satisfied by your argument that Roark was justified in his response (generally speaking, with allowances for the romantic and dramatic nature of the work), so long as there was no intent-to-deceive / fraud in the initial arrangement, as you have argued.

 

This isn't even that unusual. Maybe blowing up buildings is unusual but the more general category of taking extrajudicial action is allowed and sanctioned by the courts all the time. If a criminal is confronting you in your house, you have a right to defend yourself. Many a criminal has died that way and the person defending themselves is acquitted or never even tried.

 

Well, we're in complete agreement here.

[Jonathan13]

This is a mischaracterization of Objectivism. It is not obvious. It is perfectly acceptable to be intentionally dishonest in some cases. You mentioned Toohey and Wynand elsewhere, neither of whom was party to the contract. It is perfectly acceptable for Roark to lie about his involvement to them even if his only reason is to maintain his privacy.

 

That's false. Objectivism does not hold that it is acceptable to lie for the mere sake of privacy. That's not an Objectivist position, but a Peikovian one. Peikoff's views on the subject do not represent the closed-system Objectivist views on the subject. The only circumstances under which Rand's actual Objectivism accepts lying is when one is being faced with the threat of initiation of force (for example, someone wielding a gun breaks into your house and ask where the children are, and you lie to him that they're not home when in fact they're hiding in the next room). Roark and Keating were not being threatened with the initiation of force when being asked which of them designed Cortland.

And not only that, but lying to members of the press (Wynand and Toohey) about one's involvement in a publicly-funded work of art-architecture doesn't qualify as the type of situation that Peikoff was talking about when promoting his idea of acceptable "privacy lies." Being asked by a prominent publisher or cultural critic if one is the creator of a publicly funded project is nothing like being asked by an office gossip if one is sleeping with Suzi.
 

As for the project's owners, they actively hid nothing from them.

False. Roark and Keating intentionally and actively hid Roark's involvement in the project from everyone, including the owners. As I said in a recent post, Roark and Keating agreed not to meet at Roark's office so as not to be seen together -- they thought that "somebody might guess," and Roark told Keating to redraw the sketches in his own manner because some people would recognize Roark's way of drawing. They didn't want anyone to know, including the owners.
 

The owners had a chance to see what they were getting and they were getting a tremendous value.

The fact that the owners received value has no relevance to whether or not Roark's actions were immoral. The same is true of any other example of fraud: People received value when purchasing Van Meegeren's paintings which they thought were Vermeer's, and people who purchased Milli Vanilli albums got more value from them than they would have gotten if Rob and Fab had actually sung on them instead. None of which changes the fact that putting forth one's own work as someone else's is fraudulent.
 

This is a confusion about the nature of rights. Since Rights are moral sanctions to act. The way this should be stated is that they have a right to hire whoever they want. And while in this instance it doesn't make a real difference about the outcome, stating what someone has a right to do in this fashion will eventually lead to problems. For instance there is no such right as the right to not be free. The statement contradicts itself and confuses the nature of what rights are meant to do.

False. People have the right to associate with whomever they choose, and to not associate with whomever they choose. They have the right to hire a Howard Roark, and they have the right to not hire a Howard Roark.
 

This is a complete misunderstanding and if you have heard of "The Question of Scholarships", then this is a mischaracterization and lie. Generally it is only the enemies of Ayn Rand who spout "she was a hypocrite, she collected Social Security". If you admire Ayn Rand, then you should be ashamed of associating yourself with these remarks. I have my doubts about whether you admire her. I know for certain you don't understand her.

No, Rand's "question of scholarships" approach doesn't apply here. A person has a right to recuperate what was stolen from him by government. Roark was not recuperating anything that was stolen from him. Additionally, Rand's view was that one cannot aid an improper government action, either in thought or in action, when recuperating one's stolen wealth. In other words, it would be immoral for, say, a writer to take a position with government in which she is required to use her writing and marketing talents to promote government projects which should not exist. The same is true of an architect using his talents to provide solutions to public housing projects which should not exist. I would suggest that you reread Rand's views on the subject more carefully.

 

Of course they did, they got what they wanted and were building it, he got nothing.

They did not get what they wanted. They wanted a building designed by Keating and not by Roark. Additionally, Roark did not have a contract with them which stipulated that he would get what he wanted, just as the singers on Milli Vanilli's album did not have a contract with those who purchased their albums that stipulated that the singers would get what they wanted.
 

This is a lie. He did not "push" his way onto the project. Keating came to him.

No, it's not a lie. Are you claiming to know my mind better than I do? In order to call my statement a lie, you would have to be claiming to know that I am intentionally telling a falsehood. Do you think that Objectivism holds that you can know such things about my state of mind?

Anyway, the fact that Keating approached Roark for help is irrelevant. Roark knew that the owners didn't want him on the project, so he should have told Keating that he wouldn't be able to help him. Instead, he came up with his own proposal, which was to do much more than just help Keating. He proposed taking over the project entirely and allowing Keating to take full credit. Therefore it is accurate to say that he pushed his way onto the project. The fact that Keating brought the opportunity to him doesn't change the fact that he used it to push his way onto the project.
 

No, another lie. The owners did not make it clear to him that they wouldn't hire him. Toohey might have, they didn't.

Roark himself states that he is aware that no committee, public or private, will hire him. Therefore they have made it clear to him that they will not hire him. They need not tell him so directly in order for it to qualify as their making it clear to him. They can send a messenger like Toohey. It doesn't matter who specifically told him or how he figured it out. The point is simply that it was made clear to him, and that he subverted their right to not hire with him.

When Roark stated that he knew that no committee would hire him, his response should have been to say, "As is their right," and then to go about dealing with those who were willing to deal with him voluntarily. Instead he proposed actions to subvert their right.
 

So Jonathan, care to revise your earlier statement that you haven't mischaracterized Ayn Rand or lied about the facts of the novel?

No. I have not mischaracterized Rand or lied about the facts of the novel.

J

Edited February 20, 2013 by Jonathan13

[whYNOT]

You forgot to respond to this part:

 

 

What do I need to say/do to get you on topic? I sincerely want to know.

 

 

We're not talking about laws, but a theory of rights as part of a philosophy (such a philosophy as an individual might hold), though I don't know whether you appreciate that distinction. But yes. Respect for individual rights -- for the right of every man to act according to his values, so long as he does not initiate force -- is very much what prevents a "rationally moral person" from interfering with other people. If not for that respect, who knows what such a man might do "in pursuit of his values"? He might get into fights with others for insulting his wife, or blow up buildings, or etc. To avoid doing dumb shit like that, a man must have principles.

Here, specifically, the principle of the non-initiation of force. But why that? What's so important about physical force that it needs to be eliminated from society...? I thought I wrote about that somewhere... but then you referred to my understanding of rights as being a "floating abstraction," so lemme check...

Oh, right.

 

 

I suppose I should forgive you for missing that? I found it way back in the post that you were responding to, and quoted.

Unless you think I'm wrong here, or unless you really did miss it... somehow... is it possible that your use of "floating abstraction" is... a floating abstraction?

 

 

This is very confused. All "societies" have the rights under discussion, though not every law or government respects those rights, or protects them. All individuals have the rights under discussion. But what we're talking about is whether a man must observe this principle in order to act morally. And yes, he must. And yes, it is observing principles such as these that keeps people from each others' throats... not the simple fact that they never, I don't know, get violent urges. But that they have principles that they observe, and which guide their actions.

 

 

It kills me! It really does! Despite everything, I really want you to understand -- and I just can't see why you don't.

Look. When you say that a "rational egoist...doesn't need to be told what he can, or cannot do to others," you are absolutely wrong. In fact, when you quote Rand? You're quoting her stating what a rational egoist can or cannot do to others! She is stating "principles guiding [a rational egoist's] relationship with others"!

So yes, the Objectivist Ethics do explicitly state -- as a part of its "moral code" -- that "rights" must be observed, to "preserve and protect individual morality." That is the foundation of the Objectivist Politics. You say that the rational egoist doesn't need to be told what to do... and then quote Rand telling the rational egoist what he must do!

 

 

Do you mean that you'll stop posting? Didn't you already write your grand farewell? I swear I remember that happening!

But really, you lost the privilege to chide me over tone when you responded to my sincere and painstaking efforts to discuss these ideas by castigating my posting methods ("slicing and dicing"; "demanded a lot of questions") and said that I "lack[ed] good faith" and accused me of sophistry.  (Sophistry!  You're lucky I didn't just curse you out, you ungrateful punk.) You thought you could punch me in the nose and then run away like a coward ("so I'm gone"). If you stay, you stay, but don't tell me now to be civil with you. You want civility? Earn it by demonstrating some yourself. You can start by engaging these ideas honestly. And you can start that by making a plain argument with respect to the central question. Here, I'll help you out:

Are you saying that Roark (and presumably men like Roark in the real world) is not bound by "individual rights" or the principle of the non-initiation of force? That because he is a moral egoist, he has no use for such "man made rules"? Are you saying that Roark (and/or such men) may violate other peoples' rights morally? And that, therefore, his dynamiting of Cortlandt -- though technically initiating physical force -- was nonetheless moral?

 

You forgot to respond to this part:

 

 

What do I need to say/do to get you on topic? I sincerely want to know.

 

 

We're not talking about laws, but a theory of rights as part of a philosophy (such a philosophy as an individual might hold), though I don't know whether you appreciate that distinction. But yes. Respect for individual rights -- for the right of every man to act according to his values, so long as he does not initiate force -- is very much what prevents a "rationally moral person" from interfering with other people. If not for that respect, who knows what such a man might do "in pursuit of his values"? He might get into fights with others for insulting his wife, or blow up buildings, or etc. To avoid doing dumb shit like that, a man must have principles.

Here, specifically, the principle of the non-initiation of force. But why that? What's so important about physical force that it needs to be eliminated from society...? I thought I wrote about that somewhere... but then you referred to my understanding of rights as being a "floating abstraction," so lemme check...

Oh, right.

 

 

I suppose I should forgive you for missing that? I found it way back in the post that you were responding to, and quoted.

Unless you think I'm wrong here, or unless you really did miss it... somehow... is it possible that your use of "floating abstraction" is... a floating abstraction?

 

 

This is very confused. All "societies" have the rights under discussion, though not every law or government respects those rights, or protects them. All individuals have the rights under discussion. But what we're talking about is whether a man must observe this principle in order to act morally. And yes, he must. And yes, it is observing principles such as these that keeps people from each others' throats... not the simple fact that they never, I don't know, get violent urges. But that they have principles that they observe, and which guide their actions.

 

 

It kills me! It really does! Despite everything, I really want you to understand -- and I just can't see why you don't.

Look. When you say that a "rational egoist...doesn't need to be told what he can, or cannot do to others," you are absolutely wrong. In fact, when you quote Rand? You're quoting her stating what a rational egoist can or cannot do to others! She is stating "principles guiding [a rational egoist's] relationship with others"!

So yes, the Objectivist Ethics do explicitly state -- as a part of its "moral code" -- that "rights" must be observed, to "preserve and protect individual morality." That is the foundation of the Objectivist Politics. You say that the rational egoist doesn't need to be told what to do... and then quote Rand telling the rational egoist what he must do!

 

 

Do you mean that you'll stop posting? Didn't you already write your grand farewell? I swear I remember that happening!

But really, you lost the privilege to chide me over tone when you responded to my sincere and painstaking efforts to discuss these ideas by castigating my posting methods ("slicing and dicing"; "demanded a lot of questions") and said that I "lack[ed] good faith" and accused me of sophistry.  (Sophistry!  You're lucky I didn't just curse you out, you ungrateful punk.) You thought you could punch me in the nose and then run away like a coward ("so I'm gone"). If you stay, you stay, but don't tell me now to be civil with you. You want civility? Earn it by demonstrating some yourself. You can start by engaging these ideas honestly. And you can start that by making a plain argument with respect to the central question. Here, I'll help you out:

Are you saying that Roark (and presumably men like Roark in the real world) is not bound by "individual rights" or the principle of the non-initiation of force? That because he is a moral egoist, he has no use for such "man made rules"? Are you saying that Roark (and/or such men) may violate other peoples' rights morally? And that, therefore, his dynamiting of Cortlandt -- though technically initiating physical force -- was nonetheless moral?

 

You forgot to respond to this part:

 

 

What do I need to say/do to get you on topic? I sincerely want to know.

 

 

We're not talking about laws, but a theory of rights as part of a philosophy (such a philosophy as an individual might hold), though I don't know whether you appreciate that distinction. But yes. Respect for individual rights -- for the right of every man to act according to his values, so long as he does not initiate force -- is very much what prevents a "rationally moral person" from interfering with other people. If not for that respect, who knows what such a man might do "in pursuit of his values"? He might get into fights with others for insulting his wife, or blow up buildings, or etc. To avoid doing dumb shit like that, a man must have principles.

Here, specifically, the principle of the non-initiation of force. But why that? What's so important about physical force that it needs to be eliminated from society...? I thought I wrote about that somewhere... but then you referred to my understanding of rights as being a "floating abstraction," so lemme check...

Oh, right.

 

 

I suppose I should forgive you for missing that? I found it way back in the post that you were responding to, and quoted.

Unless you think I'm wrong here, or unless you really did miss it... somehow... is it possible that your use of "floating abstraction" is... a floating abstraction?

 

 

This is very confused. All "societies" have the rights under discussion, though not every law or government respects those rights, or protects them. All individuals have the rights under discussion. But what we're talking about is whether a man must observe this principle in order to act morally. And yes, he must. And yes, it is observing principles such as these that keeps people from each others' throats... not the simple fact that they never, I don't know, get violent urges. But that they have principles that they observe, and which guide their actions.

 

 

It kills me! It really does! Despite everything, I really want you to understand -- and I just can't see why you don't.

Look. When you say that a "rational egoist...doesn't need to be told what he can, or cannot do to others," you are absolutely wrong. In fact, when you quote Rand? You're quoting her stating what a rational egoist can or cannot do to others! She is stating "principles guiding [a rational egoist's] relationship with others"!

So yes, the Objectivist Ethics do explicitly state -- as a part of its "moral code" -- that "rights" must be observed, to "preserve and protect individual morality." That is the foundation of the Objectivist Politics. You say that the rational egoist doesn't need to be told what to do... and then quote Rand telling the rational egoist what he must do!

 

 

Do you mean that you'll stop posting? Didn't you already write your grand farewell? I swear I remember that happening!

But really, you lost the privilege to chide me over tone when you responded to my sincere and painstaking efforts to discuss these ideas by castigating my posting methods ("slicing and dicing"; "demanded a lot of questions") and said that I "lack[ed] good faith" and accused me of sophistry.  (Sophistry!  You're lucky I didn't just curse you out, you ungrateful punk.) You thought you could punch me in the nose and then run away like a coward ("so I'm gone"). If you stay, you stay, but don't tell me now to be civil with you. You want civility? Earn it by demonstrating some yourself. You can start by engaging these ideas honestly. And you can start that by making a plain argument with respect to the central question. Here, I'll help you out:

Are you saying that Roark (and presumably men like Roark in the real world) is not bound by "individual rights" or the principle of the non-initiation of force? That because he is a moral egoist, he has no use for such "man made rules"? Are you saying that Roark (and/or such men) may violate other peoples' rights morally? And that, therefore, his dynamiting of Cortlandt -- though technically initiating physical force -- was nonetheless moral?

There is nothing rational and everything immoral about a person initiating force. It so happens that a rational and moral egoist esteems value and life without having to be told that. Standard and value of life is explicit within that morality, and implicit throughout. What he asserts for himself, he doesn't, cannot, disallow to others.

I think that Rand "re-inforced" this principle explicitly with NIOF and individual rights, in order to make clear beyond doubt, that freedom of action has objective limits in a social context. Without doubt, this was essential. (For starters, not everyone in a society might be rationally selfish by conviction; then, it's conceivable that rational egoists have lapses.) That's my reading, and is open to criticism.

 

All along you have insisted that I answer your questions, on your terms. You dismissed my "Perfect Man" thoughts as

the probable underlying premise to this entire debate, and now it's becoming ever more apparent that this is so. Intrinsicists desire Roark (hell, any 'hero') to be perfect, and are terribly disappointed when (what they consider) 'imperfection' emerges. It is a leftover from Christianity in one's past. It totally negates man's volitional nature - that moral perfection is not a final state

(bestowed...somehow) but rather a commitment. That is reality, and Rand illustrated it perfectly. (She defined Romanticism

in terms of recognition of man's volitional faculty, as I quoted.)

But you didn't approve of my direction. Why not? Don't you see the relevance? You're an Objectivist, you think in principles, too, not so?

It was becoming obvious to me from your first posts that you had a barely concealed anger that I should have the temerity to question NIOF with respect to rational egoism. Who does this guy think he is!! right?Your pretense at civility soon became an interrogatory harangue , while I attempted to change the subject (while not the topic). THEN, when your simmering rage came clear, I identified your sophistry and bad faith. My guess was proved correct with these latest insults. Is this what you know about rational egoism, or benevolence, that I must allow you to dictate to me, and meekly answer your demands - as your 'right'?

 

(And if all that prevents you from stealing my lawnmower is NIOF and individual rights - I am not sure I'd want you as my neighbour!)

 

Yes, I did take an argument to the extreme. I do that.

So I'll state my case again, simply: it is the Objectivist ethics which 'drive' Objectivist politics and laissez-faire capitalism.

In practice, it would be an entire package, of course. But if one focuses primarily on the latter two as the ends, not the means to an end - of the individual - one loses all moral foundation to them, and will eventually lose them too.

[DonAthos]

You dismissed my "Perfect Man" thoughts as

the probable underlying premise to this entire debate, and now it's becoming ever more apparent that this is so.

 

Yeah? Care to provide some evidence of that?  Who is talking about the Perfect Man?  Where are the quotes?

 

It was becoming obvious to me from your first posts that you had a barely concealed anger that I should have the temerity to question NIOF with respect to rational egoism.

 

You're wrong about nearly every conclusion you draw, in every post. So why should I stop you from speculating about my emotional state? Evidence, reason, nothing gets through to you. But for what it's worth? I was frustrated when you didn't engage me honestly, and I told you so. I'm pissed now, because I've engaged in this long and pointless conversation with you, and due to your gross insults, which I've noted, and which you repeat in this very post. It's not what you're talking about, but I'll say that yeah -- I suffer fools poorly, and insulting, evading jerks even more so.  I'm angry and you deserve my anger.

 

(And if all that prevents you from stealing my lawnmower is NIOF and individual rights - I am not sure I'd want you as my neighbour!)

 

Between us two, I am the one who has affirmed that no man has the right to initiate the use of force, and I've also spoken about the reasons why. That is part of my ethical approach to life, and is the foundation of my political beliefs, though it does not express my ethics in total as you would otherwise like to imply. Contrarily, you are the one who has posited that a "moral man" such as yourself has no need for "man-made rules" like non-initiation of force, and that you can disregard that sort of thing when in pursuit of your values. (Then you've disavowed the claim, then reaffirmed it, then... oh who can keep track!?) So... you know that I won't steal your lawnmower, because I believe that to do such a thing is wrong except for emergencies, but I don't know that you won't take mine, neighbor.

 

So I'll state my case again, simply: it is the Objectivist ethics which 'drive' Objectivist politics and laissez-faire capitalism.

In practice, it would be an entire package, of course. But if one focuses primarily on the latter two as the ends, not the means to an end - of the individual - one loses all moral foundation to them, and will eventually lose them too.

 

They are an entire package in theory, too.  That package is "Objectivism." When one advocates the Ethics or the Politics as being more important than the other, so that one may (or must) be violated in the name of the other -- as you have repeatedly done -- then one doesn't know what he's talking about.

[Jonathan13]

I wrote:

That's false. Objectivism does not hold that it is acceptable to lie for the mere sake of privacy. That's not an Objectivist position, but a Peikovian one. Peikoff's views on the subject do not represent the closed-system Objectivist views on the subject. The only circumstances under which Rand's actual Objectivism accepts lying is when one is being faced with the threat of initiation of force (for example, someone wielding a gun breaks into your house and ask where the children are, and you lie to him that they're not home when in fact they're hiding in the next room). Roark and Keating were not being threatened with the initiation of force when being asked which of them designed Cortland.

And not only that, but lying to members of the press (Wynand and Toohey) about one's involvement in a publicly-funded work of art-architecture doesn't qualify as the type of situation that Peikoff was talking about when promoting his idea of acceptable "privacy lies." Being asked by a prominent publisher or cultural critic if one is the creator of a publicly funded project is nothing like being asked by an office gossip if one is sleeping with Suzi.

 

I just dug up Peikoff's views on the subject.

In his podcast from January 12, 2009, Peikoff mistakenly says that Roark wasn't dishonest in conspiring to allow Keating to pass off Roark's work as his own. He mistakenly claims that Roark was "simply retaining his right to privacy," and that he wasn't lying, but just "not telling" the public anything; he was "not distorting the facts," but just "refusing to discuss them," which is perfectly acceptable according to Peikoff.

Peikoff would be correct that Roark wasn't lying if it were true that Roark simply remained silent. But Roark didn't remain silent. Peikoff was mistaken about that detail of the novel.

Peikoff also says that "it would be a very different thing if he was going around places saying, 'I had nothing to do with this thing...'" Peikoff says that "then it would be deception."

Indeed! And therefore it was deception by Peikoff's standards, because Roark did tell someone that he had nothing to do with it -- that it was Keating's design rather than his own. Apparently Peikoff had forgotten about that part of the novel.

J

[Jonathan13]

Hypothetically, let's say that Tyler (DonAthos) turns evil and decides that he wants to defraud Objectivists out of their money by selling them art forgeries. He suspects that there's a market for newly discovered paintings by Jose Capuletti and by Frank O'Connor. So he comes to me and asks me to join him in his scheme. He proposes that I will paint images in the styles that they used, and he will sell them to Objectivists by claiming that they are original Capulettis and O'Connors, and that we will split the proceeds.

 

Since Tyler has turned evil, he is willing to engage in such lies, but I am not. So, following Marc's theory of privacy lies being acceptable, or Peikoff's theory about not distorting facts but simply refusing to discuss them, I agree to Tyler's scheme and create the paintings for him to sell.

 

I tell no one about my involvement. When questioned about it directly, I say, "I have nothing to say to you."

 

Does anyone here think that I would be acting morally according to Objectivism? Do you think that only statements can be dishonest, and not actions? Do you seriously think that Rand would agree that I'm not being deceptive or dishonest in knowingly joining Tyler in his evil scheme?!!!

 

J

[ruveyn1]

This isn't even that unusual. Maybe blowing up buildings is unusual but the more general category of taking extrajudicial action is allowed and sanctioned by the courts all the time. If a criminal is confronting you in your house, you have a right to defend yourself. Many a criminal has died that way and the person defending themselves is acquitted or never even tried.

Not if you do it in such a way as to endanger the lives of passers by.  You cannot kill a burglar using a 500 pound high explosive bomb.

 

ruveyn1

[DonAthos]

Hypothetically, let's say that Tyler (DonAthos) turns evil and decides that he wants to defraud Objectivists out of their money by selling them art forgeries. He suspects that there's a market for newly discovered paintings by Jose Capuletti and by Frank O'Connor. So he comes to me and asks me to join him in his scheme. He proposes that I will paint images in the styles that they used, and he will sell them to Objectivists by claiming that they are original Capulettis and O'Connors, and that we will split the proceeds.

 

Since Tyler has turned evil, he is willing to engage in such lies, but I am not. So, following Marc's theory of privacy lies being acceptable, or Peikoff's theory about not distorting facts but simply refusing to discuss them, I agree to Tyler's scheme and create the paintings for him to sell.

 

I tell no one about my involvement. When questioned about it directly, I say, "I have nothing to say to you."

 

Does anyone here think that I would be acting morally according to Objectivism? Do you think that only statements can be dishonest, and not actions? Do you seriously think that Rand would agree that I'm not being deceptive or dishonest in knowingly joining Tyler in his evil scheme?!!!

 

J

Is this a serious offer? Because, being a sophist and the kind of guy who's a hair away from stealing his neighbor's lawnmower, I guess I should start considering this sort of thing...

[intellectualammo]

Thank you Jonathan for continued contributions to this thread.

Roark thought that the government would never give him a job, and this was afterall a government housing project, and that he could not get past Toohey, who was the one who would recommend an architect for the job. So, he commits fraud along with Keating, to get around all that.

Later he does say to Keating that he shouldn't have done Cortlandt along with other things he'd done with Keatings work, and instead of taking it like a man, he becomes a big baby and goes and dynamites it.

[Jonathan13]

Is this a serious offer? Because, being a sophist and the kind of guy who's a hair away from stealing his neighbor's lawnmower, I guess I should start considering this sort of thing...

 

Hey, if Marc and Peikoff give us the moral green light, I'm in. If we can find a technical way to make your lies about who created the forgeries qualify as "privacy lies" according to Marc's theory, and if we can get Peikoff to sign off on the idea that my silence would absolve me from accusations of dishonesty and deception, then I think that we should go ahead with the project and sell the art specifically to them and to those who agree with them.

 

J

[DonAthos]

Hey, if Marc and Peikoff give us the moral green light, I'm in. If we can find a technical way to make your lies about who created the forgeries qualify as "privacy lies" according to Marc's theory, and if we can get Peikoff to sign off on the idea that my silence would absolve me from accusations of dishonesty and deception, then I think that we should go ahead with the project and sell the art specifically to them and to those who agree with them.

 

J

 

No need for all that. We simply have to value what we're after enough that we're willing to "do the time" if caught, that's all. Then it's moral egoism.

[Jonathan13]

Thank you Jonathan for continued contributions to this thread.

Roark thought that the government would never give him a job, and this was afterall a government housing project, and that he could not get past Toohey, who was the one who would recommend an architect for the job. So, he commits fraud along with Keating, to get around all that.

Later he does say to Keating that he shouldn't have done Cortlandt along with other things he'd done with Keatings work, and instead of taking it like a man, he becomes a big baby and goes and dynamites it.

 

 

Thanks!

 

What Roark did basically boils down to the equivalent of doing a fellow classmate's homework. So, would Peikoff, as an instructor of a philosophy class, think that it is moral for me to take his classes and hire out my services writing term papers for my classmates, as long as I refused to answer his questions when accused of helping them cheat? Would he say that I'm not engaged in dishonesty or deception, but just exercising my right to privacy, if I remained silent after he recognized my writing style in the essays that others handed in? If my customers admitted to Peikoff that I had written their papers, but I still remained silent, would he have moral grounds on which to punish them, but not to punish me? Would he act according to his stated principles about "not telling" and "refusing to discuss" the issue, and therefore happily allow me to continue taking his classes?

 

J

 

P.S. Personally, I wouldn't characterize Roark as becoming a big baby, but as opening up a seriously huge can of "bad-boy" whoop-ass!

Edited February 21, 2013 by Jonathan13

[Jonathan13]

No need for all that. We simply have to value what we're after enough that we're willing to "do the time" if caught, that's all. Then it's moral egoism.

 

Okay, you talked me into it by appealing to my Tony-esque rational egoism. I'll start working on the paintings tonight.

 

Cha-ching!

 

J

[intellectualammo]

When you are in a class and make a deal with someone to do an essay/assignment for you, put your own name on it, then hand it in as your own essay, I wonder how many here would call that "subcontracting" and not fraud?

Edited February 21, 2013 by intellectualammo

[intellectualammo]

Roark the liar tells Wynand "Peter Keating designed it, Gail"

But he couldn't fool him, nor Dominique in that scene.

That's lying and committing fraud.

When Keating went to Toohey about getting Cortlandt initially, Toohey says "Think you can do it?" "If you can, it's yours."

He couldn't. Roark could. Neither would have gotten it without committing fraud.

Keating the liar lied to Toohey and said he designed it, he lied three times to Toohey when Toohey confronted him about it after cortlandt was dynamited by Roark.

That's lying and committing fraud.

So I'm not making it up, Marc K.

It's evidenced in the book. It's indisputable. Both lied and committed fraud.

Edited February 21, 2013 by intellectualammo

[Jonathan13]

Roark the liar tells Wynand "Peter Keating designed it, Gail"

But he couldn't fool him, nor Dominique in that scene.

That's lying and committing fraud.

 

I'd like to stress again that, contrary to Peikoff's views, one need not actually lie in order to be dishonest and deceptive. Morality isn't a game of technicalities in which one can claim that he is being honest simply by refusing to discuss or admit to his misdeeds when confronted about them. Fraud is an action, and it doesn't become less of an evil if its perpetrator keeps it a secret with the excuse that he's virtuously protecting his "privacy." The act of fraud itself is dishonest. Lying about it later is only a secondary act of evil.

 

J

[DonAthos]

I'd like to stress again that, contrary to Peikoff's views, one need not actually lie in order to be dishonest and deceptive. Morality isn't a game of technicalities in which one can claim that he is being honest simply by refusing to discuss or admit to his misdeeds when confronted about them. Fraud is an action, and it doesn't become less of an evil if its perpetrator keeps it a secret with the excuse that he's virtuously protecting his "privacy." The act of fraud itself is dishonest. Lying about it later is only a secondary act of evil.

 

J

 

My inclination is that Marc is right (though I'm unfamiliar with Peikoff's arguments) that a person may be morally deceptive in service to some sort of privacy -- though I've never really thought deeply about the subject, let alone argued it, so I'm open to debate on that score.

 

But let's say that Roark and Keating were fraudulent in dealing with Cortlandt, and not merely protecting Roark's privacy, however we'd otherwise regard that.  Would it still be possible that such fraudulent dealings might be morally justified?

 

If a Nazi came to one's door, demanding information on whether Anne Frank was in the attic, of course it would be moral to lie.  But if one was living in a Nazi state, would one ever be under a moral obligation to tell the truth to the government?  Would defrauding the Nazis not generally be a response of force, rather than an initiation?  And if that's the case, could that same sort of rationale possibly apply to Cortlandt?