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Intellectual Property: A Thought Experiment

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The thought experiment is even pretty specific that the topic of discussion isn't a right to concepts. Or concepts as property. I wrote the thought experiment so I didn't need to repeat what IP refers to for every other post. See post #51.

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Moving on... (He said she said doesn't help anything and I want to keep this on topic. Post in that other thread if you find it necessary.) I'm using this thought experiment to ask specific question

Property rights, like all rights, are a right to action, not objects, materials, etc. Seems like everyone is ignoring this, and treating property rights as the right to materials and objects. The i

Not virgin land, without inhabitants or signs of civilization; no.  But anything you do TO the land or WITH the land will allow you to define it ostensibly.   I would argue that land-ownership is no

The thought experiment is even pretty specific that the topic of discussion isn't a right to concepts. Or concepts as property. I wrote the thought experiment so I didn't need to repeat what IP refers to for every other post. See post #51.

 

Your thought experiment does not speak to the actual issues of intellectual property.  The question of IP is not whether Theseus owns his ship, even if he replaces it bit by bit over time or what-have-you, but whether he owns the ships other people build on account of their ships being "similar."  These are two separate discussions.

 

Patents (IP) do not exclude persons from conceptualization, or from speaking. 

 

 

Concepts per se cannot and are not the subject of intellectual property rights.

 

 

Thinking, feeling, imagining, conceptualizing, as such never were and simply are not part of the discussion of IP.

 

 

You are getting way off track here.

 

My claim that concepts are the subject of IP does not mean that I believe IP excludes people from conceptualizing or speaking, or thinking, feeling, etc.  Property rights are a person's right to life translated into material and into action for the purpose of living, flourishing, etc.  If a person is able to "conceptualize" a certain kind of ship, but disallowed to build it (because it is deemed "too similar" to someone else's), then that concept is owned for every practical purpose.

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Your thought experiment does not speak to the actual issues of intellectual property.  The question of IP is not whether Theseus owns his ship, even if he replaces it bit by bit over time or what-have-you, but whether he owns the ships other people build on account of their ships being "similar."  These are two separate discussions.

I don't see why it isn't. IP isn't (shouldn't be) about similarity. For the record, I don't think IP would translate to owning the ship itself, at least I don't think that anymore. Either way, you can use the thought experiment, including to prove points you may have. Further, the Ship of Theseus inspired my idea - it isn't the thought experiment. If you call IP one thing with different referents than me, we're talking about totally different things. I am against IP being at root similarity; it's a weak and invalid foundation. That doesn't mean IP is in principle wrong, only that there is a bad standard. Sort of how I could demolish Kantian morality, but it doesn't invalidate morality (this is the frozen abstraction fallacy). I don't mean it is the same, it's just I don't follow really what your point is.

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 And I don't see, in any event, how we'll find anything at the root of the answers we give but people's whim, though perhaps that's my bias showing. For if I'm right about IP -- as I believe that I am -- then the application of IP is bound to be a mess of arbitrariness and rationalizations...

 

Arbitrariness and rationalizations are necessary because ideas (and concepts) are not subject to the same limitations with physical objects.

 

Great lengths must be gone to establish that theft is possible when nothing actually is lost.

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I don't see why it isn't.

All right. It's been a while, and I don't believe I ever addressed your OP due to overwhelming frustration at the time. Let's take this from the top.

 

Franz has a specific blueprint to build pianos, which are special kinds of pianos with building specifications that Franz developed after figuring out new techniques to bring out important acoustic qualities. His brand of piano is distinct. Right now, he has only built one piano – he needs investors first. Recently, he took the piano apart and will rebuild it, to make sure his blueprints were perfect. The pieces are organized on the floor, and Franz can rebuild it with his blueprints. He goes piece by piece, until it is complete.

Does Franz own the piano?

Sure.

 

This part so far is deliberately simple. I would bet most people say yes, Franz owns the piano. The reasons, though, may vary. As I said, I don’t think it’s just because he owns the individual pieces.

On that subject, let's briefly pause.

Suppose Franz had not yet designed his piano or his blueprint. Suppose that he had simply purchased the material as he struggles to come up with a design, and now that material is on the floor in similar fashion to your proposal. Is that material any less Franz's, in terms of ownership, for not yet having been collated into a particular piano design?

Does he not, even at such a stage, already have complete ownership of those materials?

 

The stance I take is that he owns the coupling of an idea with the corresponding physical goods made from that idea. Keep in mind, since property is what one needs to maintain their existence, and by extension, their flourishing. (I’m skipping a lot of inductive steps, I know, I can’t write a book here.) To be able to define what is actually part of maintaining one’s existence (as related to their personal evaluations and decisions), we need to have a reasonable constraint to its range of application. This way, claims to property can be objectively evaluated. A range of application isn’t as simple as saying a physical boundary. That may apply to a basketball, but not an open cattle range - there is no intrinsic boundary to land. Some degree of value is needed as well, otherwise there would be no need to recognize any existents in a special way with regard to individuals.

I believe that land is a special category of property at least. If we are dealing in pianos and ships and basketballs, and if something "as simple as saying a physical boundary" applies well enough to them, then let's deal on that level unless we have some good reason not to. If we were discussing engineering a roller coaster, after all, there would be no need to begin our discussion with quantum mechanics -- would there?

 

I would argue that the pieces are of no value to Franz anyway, and the value only comes from the fact he knows how to build his brand of piano. Although I’m sure Franz can build other styles of piano that are very old, the pieces are for making a Franz brand piano. So, you couldn’t say “the pieces have infinite uses, why focus on a piano brand?” Building a treehouse is not his intention. In this sense, his pieces are only of value because of what he wants to create. Franz could sell the parts for a price, but since no intrinsic monetary value of goods exist, I can say that relative to him, there is no monetary value. The value is in the potential piano, similar to how value of farmland is potential crops. No actual piano exists, so what I’m getting at is that the property in question is intellectual in nature, not merely concrete existents.

Let's be careful here. First of all, I need to clarify (because this is very often at the root of my critique of your approach to IP) that your assertion here -- "what I’m getting at is that the property in question is intellectual in nature" -- does not mean that you are necessarily addressing yourself to IP, despite your use of the word "intellectual," and even if this use of the term is accurate.

There is a difference between a standard theory of property and a theory of intellectual property. Which is not to say that there can't be some "grand unifying theory," which... I think is what you're after? But at minimum, a theory of IP (and even such a grand unifying theory) would have to be able to address those things that IP actually does/has done in the world, namely patents, copyrights and trademarks. (If it does not, then we are not discussing IP at all.)

So even if you're right in your approach to standard property, in that there is this "intellectual" component to it, that does not serve to justify what we mean in the world when we discuss IP; IP still requires its own justification.

As regards the content here, in terms of property I think we recognize that Franz owns these materials independent of his purported intentions for them. Whether he values them for their own sake, or only for some specific design, is another matter. (And "monetary value" is yet another thing altogether, and I would argue a needless complication.) I'd agree with you that people typically value materials, as such, because we recognize that they have some eventual, potential application... but I don't think we necessarily need to know whether some specific material is slotted for a piano or for a treehouse or for anything at all, for those to fall under the umbrella of "property rights."

After all, if you had a warehouse filled with material -- material for which you had not yet found a particular use, but were preserving against future discovery/need -- I doubt that you would be comfortable with my ransacking your warehouse, because I had judged my own need for that material more important or more immediate than yours, because I would like to use it to build a piano, for which I have a design ready. Or if that's deemed allowable under your theory of property rights, then I'm not certain it is a recognizable theory of property rights at all.

 

Let’s modify this a little bit. Suppose Wolfgang saw Franz’s blueprints, and Franz said nothing special to Wolfgang about building a piano. Unbeknownst to Franz, Wolfgang acquires the necessary pieces to build the piano. Later on, Franz visits his friend Wolfgang’s house after hearing beautiful piano music. When he greeted Wolfgang and saw the piano, he realized it was his own piano that he designed! Franz finds this to be unjust and even as theft, because it was his design and creation.

Should Franz have the right to bring Wolfgang to court if he so chooses?

I'm a little hesitant about responding to your question as phrased. Should Franz have the right to bring Wolfgang to court if he so chooses? Don't we generally have the right to bring people to court for any manner of reason -- injuries real or imagined?

The real question is whether Wolfgang has committed some crime against Franz. Now how I would normally try to assess such a thing is to ask whether Wolfgang has in some fashion initiated the use of force against Franz, because that's what I hold to be criminal. Leaving aside the question begging I might expect from others (i.e. the response that "he *must* have initiated the use of force, because he violated intellectual property rights!"), let's ask ourselves what it means to initiate force against a person -- what it looks like, what it means, and how we respond to it.

Because, look: if we can establish that Wolfgang is now employing physical force against Franz, then you and I will be finally agreed on the basis for IP.

 

In the earlier case, if Wolfgang took a finished piano or even the piano pieces without permission, that is a clear case of theft, and should be taken to court.

Yes. It's a criminal matter, and Wolfgang should be processed through the criminal justice system in such a case (which might mean going to prison).

 

But where does the difference come in with Wolfgang creating a piano with his own materials?

I would argue that the difference is such that he has committed no crime. Let's return here to the question of the initiation of physical force.

Things are what they are -- are we agreed? If I initiate physical force against you, then it doesn't matter whether you're aware of my having done so or not -- I have committed that crime.

But how do we recognize the initiation of physical force, or any crime, to begin with? Let's consider Wolfgang.

You have him building a piano of his own materials in his own home by virtue of the design he learned from seeing Franz's blueprints, yes? And then you have Franz discovering the fact when visiting Wolfgang's home, leading to court. But let us note, that moment of discovery is not when the crime was committed.

In theory (and specifically what I take to be the theory of IP you would lay out), Wolfgang has initiated the use of physical force against Franz at the moment he has built his piano.

Now please, in the name of your at least understanding my position on this matter, I would like for you to give that scenario some substantial thought.

We do not have to further suppose that Franz visits Wolfgang's house and sees the piano. That would not change the supposed criminal nature of the deed in question. Franz would not ever need to know that "he has been harmed."

But has he been harmed? In truth? In reality?

We can recognize the harm when Wolfgang takes Franz's physical, actual piano from him, such that Franz is left bereft of his piano. We understand how and why Franz might defend himself physically against such an ordeal, or failing that, use some third party to use retributive force in response, in the name of justice. It is clear to see that Franz is injured from such an action, which is why we would act to prevent it from happening, or in retribution.

But how do we account it the same kind of thing when Wolfgang is ensconced in his home playing music on a piano he has built, apparently injuring no one, and possibly without anyone else's knowledge? How is that harm at all?

 

An easy answer is to say that the two pianos are not exactly the same, so inventing a type of piano does not imply owning pianos that Wolfgang (or anyone else) creates. People own what they make, and it follows that what they make is their property, fitting all the standards I mentioned earlier with constraint to range of application.

My answer is that there is no difference, except perhaps what the property in question is. The easy answer I find to be too materialistic by ignoring the very means and person that enabled Wolfgang to build the piano.

Another caution: "materialism," so far as I understand it, is a theory that denies consciousness -- a theory to which I do not subscribe. The position that property has to do with material is not an advocacy of "materialism," unless the very claim that material is something which exists -- that things are made of material, and are recognizable (as a piano, or a basketball, or etc.) -- is somehow considered suspect.

In specific, I'm not "ignoring" the means by which Wolfgang has built his piano. But I would argue that you might be doing that very thing, if you are arguing in similar pattern to what I've found typical of the proponents of IP.

Contra "materialism," both Franz and Wolfgang have a consciousness. Wolfgang has learned of the idea of the piano through Franz, but his consciousness has also grasped that idea. And furthermore, he has translated that idea into reality, which is the basis of property rights. The object of that translation, the idea made manifest -- the piano, which is material -- is what is property.

Wolfgang is not somehow using Franz's mind to build this piano; he is using his own.

 

Franz did a lot of research, then took time to develop the specific piano design. He had to figure which wood to use, how to bend the wood, how to set up the curves, etc. The whole value of the piano is in every case dependent upon what Franz developed.

No. The value of the specific piano that Wolfgang has built is immediately dependent on two things: 1) Wolfgang choosing to adhere to the design he learned from Franz's blueprints/research (for he could have altered them, either intentionally or accidentally); and 2) Wolfgang's having built the piano in reality. If Wolfgang does not accomplish step two, then there is no piano to speak of, and no material value.

 

Other people even find value in the piano. To the extent that the design is useful to many people, not just the piano itself, there is reason to say Franz should have the right to control the design in any manner he chooses – who can use it, how he wants to profit from it.

Of what use is a piano design, except in the construction of one or more actual pianos?

But the rest of this is just a reassertion of your premise, I believe. I agree that I may design a piano, and others may find value in that design and opt to purchase a piano or build their own, but I disagree that there's any necessary "therefore, I should be able to tell them that they can't do it."

I disagree that building a piano or a type of piano (with all of the requisite research granted) gives me reason or right to control "the design," which actually means to control the actions of others, even should those actions cause no injury to myself.

If anything, the usefulness and value to multiple people makes a design worth recognizing as property, especially since Franz designed it for the reasons anyone would create or seek property. The value a variety of people hold towards the piano is indicative that at least some people find the piano design a contributor to flourishing, even for Franz. In ethical terms, this means Franz has a right to his designs and what people may make from those designs, or to shorten the phrase down, intellectual property.

I disagree. I find an implicit premise to all of this that "whatever contributes to flourishing" is therefore property (or a similar thought, though I'm sure you'd want other language to express it, if you'd even agree that this underlies your position). We give away "value" and contribute to the flourishing of others all the time without some resulting claim in property.

To use an example that I've employed before, imagine that I smile at a pretty girl as I pass her on the street. My smile may well inspire her to do something great -- I have a killer smile. I think in terms of reality, we may speak of this as being a "contributor to flourishing." What we do, even down to something so apparently small as a smile, matters. But I have no property stake (in reason or in law) in what she does thereafter, even if she cites me as her muse and accounts her entire product to our chance meeting. Even if she is, in some sense, right.

Ethically? We could perhaps talk about her recognizing the relationship that my choice to smile at her has had to her resultant fame and fortune. Perhaps it would be nice of her to invite me over for a spot of tea. But I do not own what she does, even on the basis of the inspiration I have provided. The property that she creates is directly a product of her mind and her physical labor, and that forms the basis for property. Her property.

Edited by DonAthos
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Assuming rational standard/practice of recognizing an innovator's creation or idea and registration thereof ie patents, copyrights and such, why would violations be criminal and not civil? It seems must opponents of IP argue based on the idea that such violations are not actual violations of NAP. Why would the onus of prosecution necessarily be on the government , doesn't making it a civil matter (meaning the injured party has to prove ownership rights and show that the guilty party knowingly abused their rights) reduce the opponent position?

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Assuming rational standard/practice of recognizing an innovator's creation or idea and registration thereof ie patents, copyrights and such, why would violations be criminal and not civil?

 

The whole point of anti-IP argument is that IP is not rational. So, you might as well started by saying "assuming 2 + 2 is 5...".

 

Also recognizing an innovator's creation doesn't necessarily mean a monolopoly should be granted.

 

 

It seems must opponents of IP argue based on the idea that such violations are not actual violations of NAP. Why would the onus of prosecution necessarily be on the government , doesn't making it a civil matter (meaning the injured party has to prove ownership rights and show that the guilty party knowingly abused their rights) reduce the opponent position?

 

 If there is no such thing as IP, there wouldn't be any violation. If there aren't IP laws, there wouldn't be a prosecution.

 

Anti-IP argument is "ideas (or concepts) are not property".

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 If there is no such thing as IP, there wouldn't be any violation. If there aren't IP laws, there wouldn't be a prosecution.

 

Anti-IP argument is "ideas (or concepts) are not property".

Stick to the OP, the point is to add context so we're talking about the same thing. I don't get the sense that you read it.

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So Eiuol,

 

While anticipating your reply, I've been thinking about this thread and my participation in it -- my participation on this board, more generally, really.  I've been down this particular path before; we both have.  Earlier results don't give me great hope to expect a better outcome this time...  so it might be time to try something different.

 

I know that some people have occasionally griped at my posting style -- the length of each post, and how I try to respond to each of my opponents' points or claims in their turn, resulting in their confusion.  I don't make any apologies for it, but why not experiment and see if I can communicate myself more effectively some other way?  So starting with this post, I'm going to make an attempt to really pare down and focus my end of the conversation.  You don't need to adjust anything if you don't want.  You can respond to this post or to my previous one, or however best as you determine it.  But I wanted to provide this warning upfront so that you understand that if I don't directly respond to something you've said, it's not because I'm trying to avoid some certain topic.  We can get to everything eventually, if you'll be patient with me as I attempt something new.

 

***

 

So, to make an initial stab at this, I've been asking myself -- where is the root of our disagreement?  What's the earliest (or most fundamental) point at which we diverge?  I don't know that I yet know the answer, but that's what I'll aim to try to get at now.

 

I want to first try to pin down a view of property rights.  Not intellectual property yet, but just plain old physical property.  Not owning some class of pianos, but a single piano.  So allow me to construct a scenario or two for this endeavor.

 

Scenario #1.  We'll stick with our old buddy Franz.  Imagine that it is The Future -- at a time when nearly all patentable piano designs have passed into "the public domain," so we do not need to fear about Franz's relationship with IP as he decides to build a piano for himself.  He gathers the requisite materials such that they are his property (he purchases them, or he finds them in some copacetic manner, or etc), and then selects a design that he finds appealing from whatever the Internet has become.  He constructs the piano in his garage according to that design.

 

Question(s): is the resultant piano Franz's piano?  If so, on what basis?

 

Scenario #2.  Introducing Wolfgang.  Same setting -- The Future.  Franz proceeds as before, acquiring the materials in whatever way you would find legitimate and selecting his preferred design from the Internet.  But then he employs Wolfgang to build the piano, making a contractual arrangement such that Wolfgang will put it together for Franz, for a fee.  Wolfgang does so, and we wind up again with a single piano.

 

Question(s): Is the resultant piano Franz's piano?  Or Wolfgang's?  Again, upon what basis do we make this determination?

 

(I of course have my own answers to these questions.  So Part 1 of my plan is to compare our respective answers, to see if we already have some disagreement.  Then we can take it from there.  I hope you'll indulge me. :) )

 

((And anyone else may weigh in, too.  I don't mean to exclude by addressing Eiuol directly.))

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But I wanted to provide this warning upfront so that you understand that if I don't directly respond to something you've said, it's not because I'm trying to avoid some certain topic.  We can get to everything eventually, if you'll be patient with me as I attempt something new.

 

Sure. I probably won't respond until this weekend though, busy with school papers.

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Do you still consider it a straw man if I rephrase it like this:

 

All properties are purely physical objects.

 

 

I don't know if it's a strawman, but if you're trying to relate the Objectivist description of property, then that's wrong too.

 

Thanks for the straight answer.

 

Quoting from the lexicon:

 

It is the right to gain, to keep, to use and to dispose of material values.

 

Any material element or resource which, in order to become of use or value to men, requires the application of human knowledge and effort, should be private property—by the right of those who apply the knowledge and effort.

 

 

 
A right does not include the material implementation of that right by other men; it includes only the freedom to earn that implementation by one’s own effort . . . .

 

 

Emphasis are mine.
 
(I assume property rights is bijectively defined over all properties. There are no properties without rights and there are no rights without properties.)
 
I couldn't find anything that would include mental entities into property rights. It seems like property rights are defined exclusively over material objects.
 
Could you please point me to the Objectivist definition of property that includes intellectual entities as well as physical ones?
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Could you please point me to the Objectivist definition of property that includes intellectual entities as well as physical ones?

http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=27229&p=323261

Several related quotes from Rand in a post from another related thread.

Edited by JASKN
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None of the quotes below contains a definition of property that would include intellectual entities as well as physical ones:

 

Man has to work and produce in order to support his life. He has to support his life by his own effort and by the guidance of his own mind. If he cannot dispose of the product of his effort, he cannot dispose of his effort; if he cannot dispose of his effort, he cannot dispose of his life.
 

 

 

 
It is the institution of private property that protects and implements the right to disagree—and thus keeps the road open to man’s most valuable attribute (valuable personally, socially, and objectively): the creative mind.
 

 

 

 
...the man who has no right to the product of his effort has no means to sustain his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his product, is a slave.
 
Bear in mind that the right to property is a right to action, like all the others: it is not the right to an object, but to the action and the consequences of producing or earning that object. It is not a guarantee that a man will earn any property, but only a guarantee that he will own it if he earns it. It is the right to gain, to keep, to use and to dispose of material values.

 

 

 
 
Any material element or resource which, in order to become of use or value to men, requires the application of human knowledge and effort, should be private property—by the right of those who apply the knowledge and effort.
 

 

 

 
Acknowledging differences in physical objects and mental entities does not suggest a body-mind dichotomy.
 
Also your link is broken.
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I do not thik that you meant" 'wet' is a physical object".

 

I'm not claiming to be a particularly smart person. But only a moron would have said "wet is a physical object". I would really appreciate if you refrain from expressing this kind of passive aggressive insulting statements.

 

OTOH, if you think I am stupid, you are welcome to say it openly. Especially if you can provide some details on why you think I am stupid.

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Scenario #1.  We'll stick with our old buddy Franz.  Imagine that it is The Future -- at a time when nearly all patentable piano designs have passed into "the public domain," so we do not need to fear about Franz's relationship with IP as he decides to build a piano for himself.  He gathers the requisite materials such that they are his property (he purchases them, or he finds them in some copacetic manner, or etc), and then selects a design that he finds appealing from whatever the Internet has become.  He constructs the piano in his garage according to that design.

 

Question(s): is the resultant piano Franz's piano?  If so, on what basis?

 

Is the resultant piano Franz's? I'd say yes, and I think pro-IP would also agree with it.

 

On what basis?

 

Any material element or resource which, in order to become of use or value to men, requires the application of human knowledge and effort, should be private property—by the right of those who apply the knowledge and effort.
 
That and also he wouldn't be infringing others' property rights (i.e initiating force).

 

Scenario #2.  Introducing Wolfgang.  Same setting -- The Future.  Franz proceeds as before, acquiring the materials in whatever way you would find legitimate and selecting his preferred design from the Internet.  But then he employs Wolfgang to build the piano, making a contractual arrangement such that Wolfgang will put it together for Franz, for a fee.  Wolfgang does so, and we wind up again with a single piano.

 

Question(s): Is the resultant piano Franz's piano?  Or Wolfgang's?  Again, upon what basis do we make this determination?

 

Is the resultant piano Franz's piano? Or Wolfgang's?

 

Provided both parties satisfy their contractual requirements (F paying W, and W delivering finished piano) it is Franz's. I think there are 2 important states:

 

  1. Before construction: Franz owns materials. Neither Franz nor Wolfgang owes anything to each other.
  2. After delivery: Franz owns the piano. Neither Franz nor Wolfgang owes anything to each other.

 

In between those two:

 

  • Franz and Wolfgang make a contractual agreement where Franz would provide raw materials and compensate Wolfgang for his work and Wolfgang would in return construct and deliver a piano from those materials.
  • Franz lends Wolfgang the materials. Technically Franz is still the owner of them, but Wolfgang has them in his possession.
  • Wolfgang spends physical and mental effort to convert raw materials into a piano.
  • Wolfgang delivers the piano.
  • Franz pays Wolfgang for his work.

 

Ordering may be different.

 

I don't have a fancy philosophical term to explain the principle here. But I approach this like an accountant, you credit something into an account it has to be debited from some other account.

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None of the quotes below contains a definition of property that would include intellectual entities as well as physical ones:

Also your link is broken.

Link fixed.

As I've noted in threads you've followed before, "intellectual entities" *are* "physical" entities, in that they are contained in your brain. Thoughts in your brain are specific sequences of the physical elements of your brain, but those elements don't become *not* physical. So, your distinction is not true in a literal sense.

But, it's also missing the point. The entire purpose of distinguishing "property" from "rock" or "wood" is to acknowledge the link to human requirements for living, which are fundamentally traced to achievements of his thinking.

In those quotes from Rand, she links property to thinking in the same breath. When you say all property is only "physical objects," it begs the question, "Why is property only physical objects? What is property, anyway?"

So, when property is defined as the link between the elements of the universe and the necessity of a man's use of them through his reasoning mind, it's easy to see at least a hint as to why one would take it to the next step and accept "intellectual" property as another form of property.

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As I've noted in threads you've followed before, "intellectual entities" *are* "physical" entities, in that they are contained in your brain. Thoughts in your brain are specific sequences of the physical elements of your brain, but those elements don't become *not* physical. So, your distinction is not true in a literal sense.

 

It doesn't matter how many times you repeat it, an incorrect statement is incorrect. Nor does *surrounding* words make it any more correct.

 

Intellectual entities are not physical. They are not contained in brain in the same way water is contained in a glass.

 

Thoughts are not sequences of physical elements in brain. Thoughts are also not merely electrical signals. Thoughts result from (chemical/electrical) state changes in brain.

 

All physical entities have mass. Electrons have mass. Thoughts do not have mass.

 

So your premise that "intellectual entities" *are* "physical" entities is wrong.

 

 

"Why is property only physical objects? What is property, anyway?"

 

See #91.
 

 

So, when property is defined as the link between the elements of the universe and the necessity of a man's use of them through his reasoning mind, it's easy to see at least a hint as to why one would take it to the next step and accept "intellectual" property as another form of property.

 

Where is this definition of property as the link between the elements of the universe?

 
If there are non-physical properties why did AR define property as explicitly physical? (Again see #91)
 

 

...but if you're trying to relate the Objectivist description of property, then that's wrong too.

 

Show me the official description of property that include mental entities and I will admit I was wrong.

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... and I will admit I was wrong.

I doubt it.

Your link to "post 91" explained nothing. Why do you think we have property?

And if you don't think thoughts exist in our brains, a physical thing, I don't know what else to tell you except, "You're wrong."

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Show me the official description of property that include mental entities and I will admit I was wrong.

There is none, because IP is about application of ideas, not ideas as such. At least by Rand's thinking. Your wording with "non-physical properties" is awkward because properties plural is usually limited to characteristics, hence Tad's question earlier. But I'm not sure if you meant that all properties, including color/wetness/value/etc are physical? That isn't calling you stupid, it's saying your wording doesn't match up with what you seem to want to say. If you mean property as in limited to things you can own, that is usually left singular.

Edited by Eiuol
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..., because IP is about application of ideas, not ideas as such.

 

This is a vague statement. Application of ideas is an action. How can an action itself be property? Let's forget about what IP is about. What is IP?

 

 

There is none.

 

That is my point. I am also saying that Ayn Rand defines property explicitly as material. (#91)

 

 

And if you don't think thoughts exist in our brains, a physical thing, I don't know what else to tell you except, "You're wrong."

 

What I am saying is quite clear; your premise that "intellectual entities" *are* "physical" entities is wrong.

 

Don't try to distort my message. Brains are physical, thoughts are not.

 

 

 

But I'm not sure if you meant that all properties, including color/wetness/value/etc are physical? That isn't calling you stupid, it's saying your wording doesn't match up with what you seem to want to say. If you mean property as in limited to things you can own, that is usually left singular.

 

I am not a native speaker. Now I learned it's property even when it's plural. But you are dropping an important word there;

 

 

I do not thik that you meant" 'wet' is a physical object".

 

This is still a passive aggressive insult.

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