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Intellectual Property: A Thought Experiment

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Show me the official description of property that include mental entities and I will admit I was wrong.

I don't particularly care whether you admit you're wrong or not. I already know you're wrong, and people reading this thread can check and find out that you're wrong too, if they want to.
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Moving on... (He said she said doesn't help anything and I want to keep this on topic. Post in that other thread if you find it necessary.) I'm using this thought experiment to ask specific question

Property rights, like all rights, are a right to action, not objects, materials, etc. Seems like everyone is ignoring this, and treating property rights as the right to materials and objects. The i

Not virgin land, without inhabitants or signs of civilization; no.  But anything you do TO the land or WITH the land will allow you to define it ostensibly.   I would argue that land-ownership is no

I already know you're wrong, and people reading this thread can check and find out that you're wrong too, if they want to.

 

You don't owe me a response. But since you care so much about what the audience thinks, perhaps you might want to consider that:they will also find out who flees after realizing he's made a claim he can't substantiate.

 

 

All properties are purely physical objects.

 

 

... if you're trying to relate the Objectivist description of property, then that's wrong too.

 
And my response that Objectivism defines property as exclusively material. And your response so far is "you are wrong because I say so".
 
 
I actually expect those debating me to have the intellectual integrity to admit they are wrong when they realize they are wrong.
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My statement about wet was admittedly snarky, but my moronic attempt was to present the question in pass/agg, socratic, rhetoric, kinda way.

 

Why is it that the concept of ownership can only apply to physical objects? Why can't an identifiable , discrete, and unique idea, eg a widget design be recognized as an existent or entity ?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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My statement about wet was admittedly snarky, but my moronic attempt was to present the question in pass/agg, socratic, rhetoric, kinda way.

 

I restrain myself to not be snarky, and it's not easy. But if we go down that road it won't end well.

 

Also I usually see socratic used when patronizing is meant. So, please don't.

 

 

Why is it that the concept of ownership can only apply to physical objects? Why can't an identifiable , discrete, and unique idea, eg a widget design be recognized as an existent or entity ?

 

What do you exactly mean by discrete idea? And what do you exactly mean by unique idea?

 

Edits in blue.

Edited by muhuk
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an example of a discrete unique idea would be the design of a widget that does 'x', or a novel whichever

 

and as an aside, my answer to Franz's piano woud be that if Franz lived in isolation  from society there would be no need for the abstraction ownership, if Wolfgang alone showed up, they may use ownership to politely denote specific items among themselves but still very lttle context in which to use the concept.

Edited by tadmjones
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You don't owe me a response. But since you care so much about what the audience thinks, perhaps you might want to consider that:they will also find out who flees after realizing he's made a claim he can't substantiate.

I only care about the part of the audience that doesn't need me to substantiate easily verifiable statements.

And my response that Objectivism defines property as exclusively material. And your response so far is "you are wrong because I say so".

My response is that you're wrong. I never said that it's "because I say so". All I said is that you're wrong.

The reason why you're wrong is too obvious to warrant further debate. You wouldn't even need to read Rand for it, the proof is a quick Google search away.

Edited by Nicky
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I already know you're wrong, and people reading this thread can check and find out that you're wrong too, if they want to.

 

 

The reason why you're wrong is too obvious to warrant further debate. You wouldn't even need to read Rand for it, the proof is a quick Google search away.

 

If there was such a description, and it was so easy to find out, you would simply quote it.

 

Every time you assert that I am wrong without any reasoning you are just affirming that you simply have no arguments left. (So, I sincerely hope you will keep doing it)

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What do you exactly mean by discrete idea? And what do you exactly mean by unique idea?

 

 

an example of a discrete unique idea would be the design of a widget that does 'x', or a novel whichever

 

I asked for a definition and you gave me an example.

 

 

 

...an identifiable , discrete, and unique idea...

 

When you used this phrase, I assumed you knew that those adjectives, in the context of ideas, mean and that you were not using them purely as embellishments.

 

That phrase implies and idea that is identifiable and discrete and unique. Therefore should be able to categorize any given idea in (up to) 8 categories. According your statement. I'm not saying I agree with it. I'm just trying to understand the question.

 

According to this, an idea can be discrete and another idea can be not discrete. And idea can be unique and another one can be not unique (banal?). What makes an idea discrete/unique/identifiable?

 

I understand if I give you an example idea you are qualified to slot it into one of those 8 categories. How do you do that? What is the objective measure of an idea?

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DonAthos:

Well, whatever I say about property as a whole will apply to IP, land, tangible objects, traded goods, etc. As clarification for you, I was working in the OP to show a constrained and clear range which all property is ultimately based on a cognitive and purposeful interaction with reality. The points I made about value is to illustrate that valuing some entity is reason to believe it deserves the status of property. By cognitive interaction, I mean an identification of what an entity is good for, and then an ability to use that entity in reality. Keep in mind that entity here is meant as anything at all, but property is narrower by those constraints I provided. All that is to clear up terminology I will use.

1. Do you mean that nearly all possible patentable designs have passed into a public domain? I'm not sure that matters, but the nature of creation is that in principle there is no limit to possible creations. That open-endedness is part of my reason to say designs deserve the special status of property. Creation is that big of a deal, in the sense that there is so much that can be done. It's a notable ability and more than a discovery.

If that doesn't matter, then my response is simple. The situation you've made is specifically saying that there are no owned piano designs, so there is no IP to even violate. Similarly, if you land on the moon, there is no way to violate land property - no one owns any of the moon's land yet. So, of course Franz owns the piano he built. There is no interaction with anyone's IP. In other words, no rights violations have occured in construction. Furthermore, there are no violations that could occur. (My view now by the way is that if you can reverse engineer, that is fine. IP really can't constrain an individual item that someone else creates if it's 100% private and individual).

2. The piano is owned by Franz to the degree Wolfgang is given the designs, and to the degree Wolfgang did not develop that design. Wolfgang didn't make the piano in any sense because he didn't even reverse engineer the piano. No thought past following directions happened. All that work was Franz. The contract pertains to the labor both parties agreed on, not to make an agreement to tell Wolfgang that he'll only get paid if he lets Franz determine how to use the pianos. This is different than 1 since there is no need to consider who owned the materials - we know Wolfgang didn't even own the materials here.

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Wolfgang didn't make the piano in any sense because he didn't even reverse engineer the piano. No thought past following directions happened.

 

Since Wolfgang didn't make that piano, he shouldn't take pride in his work. He was a mindless drone, no better than a robotic arm programmed to make pianos.

 

This quote expresses the point I'm trying to make more eloquently:

 

To treat property as alone the work of the mind, ignoring the physical labor equally necessary to create that property, is to mistake what wealth is, why it is necessary and a right, and how men come by it in reality.  To enshrine this false division in law is to commit a grave injustice.

Edited by muhuk
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Is the resultant piano Franz's? I'd say yes, and I think pro-IP would also agree with it.

On what basis?

That and also he wouldn't be infringing others' property rights (i.e initiating force).

Okay. I don't mean to belabor the obvious, but I do want to try to be as specific as possible as we move forward. So I'm going to attempt to break down this quote you've provided and apply it to our situation so that we may clarify what's going on here.

In general, Rand starts with "any material element or resource." I expect that she is particularly addressing herself to the primary instance, where there are "natural resources" owned by nobody in particular -- sticks in the woods and so forth. A piano could be made out of such stuff, or it could be refined into materials of greater utility (or there could be value added in other ways, such as the transport of the sticks to your local store). Thereafter these materials, now become property, would be legitimately acquired by trade.

In any event, Rand cites that these materials/resources undergo an initial transformation from unowned to owned, into property, by an application of human knowledge and effort. That "effort" I understand as physical action. Given sticks in the woods, one would have to perform the effort of gathering those sticks and then keeping them in such a manner as to communicate their "claimed" status. It would not do to leave them in the woods without any marker, while thinking of them as one's own. It is not enough to desire these sticks, or to plan to gather them, or to have some use for them in mind; physical effort must be applied. It may be worthwhile to note that we do not need some further proof of "human knowledge" to recognize a thing as being or becoming property -- that one has the requisite knowledge to do so is necessarily implied in the act of gathering these sticks and storing them in some clear manner.

Once Franz has his materials -- which may be sticks or anything else gathered in like fashion, or traded for -- he may use them in any manner he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon anyone else's rights (as this is the nature of "property rights").

Building a piano in one's garage does not appear to infringe upon anyone else's rights, and thus I would say that, on account of a previous ownership of the requisite materials (or the transformation we've documented, of natural resource -> property, if Franz is maybe sitting in the woods, just building his piano out of the wilderness somehow), the piano is indeed his property.

 

 

Is the resultant piano Franz's piano? Or Wolfgang's?

 

Provided both parties satisfy their contractual requirements (F paying W, and W delivering finished piano) it is Franz's. I think there are 2 important states:

  • Before construction: Franz owns materials. Neither Franz nor Wolfgang owes anything to each other.
  • After delivery: Franz owns the piano. Neither Franz nor Wolfgang owes anything to each other.
In between those two:
  • Franz and Wolfgang make a contractual agreement where Franz would provide raw materials and compensate Wolfgang for his work and Wolfgang would in return construct and deliver a piano from those materials.
  • Franz lends Wolfgang the materials. Technically Franz is still the owner of them, but Wolfgang has them in his possession.
  • Wolfgang spends physical and mental effort to convert raw materials into a piano.
  • Wolfgang delivers the piano.
  • Franz pays Wolfgang for his work.
Ordering may be different.

 

I don't have a fancy philosophical term to explain the principle here. But I approach this like an accountant, you credit something into an account it has to be debited from some other account.

I believe we are agreed on all counts. This scenario is, in my opinion, no challenge to the earlier description of property. The only "complication" that arises is that there is a trade between Franz and Wolfgang -- Wolfgang is trading his time and his effort (which you've observed, with justice, is both mental and physical), and the end product of that effort (a piano), to Franz for an agreed-upon fee.

Though I had specified that Franz supplies both design and materials to Wolfgang, the outcome would not be altered, in my view, had Wolfgang been contracted to supply both himself.

In any case, Franz winds up exactly as he had in my Scenario #1 -- the owner of one piano. 

 

and as an aside, my answer to Franz's piano woud be that if Franz lived in isolation  from society there would be no need for the abstraction ownership, if Wolfgang alone showed up, they may use ownership to politely denote specific items among themselves but still very lttle context in which to use the concept.

Hi Tad,

I'm assuming that you're responding to me (though please correct me if I'm wrong). I don't believe that I'd introduced "isolation" as being an aspect of my scenarios, and that's not how I'd conceived of it.

It's tempting to respond further on this subject of how/whether rights manifest "in isolation"... but I'm trying to keep as focused as I can. :)

 

DonAthos:

Well, whatever I say about property as a whole will apply to IP, land, tangible objects, traded goods, etc. As clarification for you, I was working in the OP to show a constrained and clear range which all property is ultimately based on a cognitive and purposeful interaction with reality.

I well understand that this is your aim, to describe all property in terms of IP, to which I'd referred as a "grand unified theory." :) For *now*, however, I will continue to address myself to what we normally understand as property, and specifically pianos, so that I don't lamely blow up my "focus" idea immediately. (More than I'm bound to do, or already have done, through my natural verbosity and desire to be comprehensive.)

 

1. Do you mean that nearly all possible patentable designs have passed into a public domain? I'm not sure that matters, but the nature of creation is that in principle there is no limit to possible creations. That open-endedness is part of my reason to say designs deserve the special status of property. Creation is that big of a deal, in the sense that there is so much that can be done. It's a notable ability and more than a discovery.

I only mean to exclude considerations of patent violation from my scenario of Franz building his piano (or employing Wolfgang to do the same) so that we can study a simple case of property without too much distraction. And so I am positing that Franz is using a preexisting piano design, but one to which no one may lay an existing property claim, due to its having fallen into the public domain.

 

If that doesn't matter, then my response is simple. The situation you've made is specifically saying that there are no owned piano designs, so there is no IP to even violate. Similarly, if you land on the moon, there is no way to violate land property - no one owns any of the moon's land yet. So, of course Franz owns the piano he built. There is no interaction with anyone's IP. In other words, no rights violations have occured in construction. Furthermore, there are no violations that could occur.

Well... hang on just a bit. I'm nearly positive we already agree on what I'm about to ask, but for the sake of clarity before we move forward...

There has to be more to it than "Franz violates no one else's rights," doesn't there? There has to be some sort of positive process by which we come to recognize the piano as being Franz's, such that if Wolfgang came by and took the piano for himself, we could say, "Stop right there, Wolfie -- that's Franz's piano!"

Your phrase "of course Franz owns the piano he built," seems to imply that Franz owns the piano by virtue of being the person who built it, meaning: physically constructed it... but as I say, I just want to make sure all the I's are dotted and so forth. There's an attempt at a more laborious description of this process at the top of this post, both by muhuk (complete with a quote from Rand), and then with elaboration/commentary by myself. Would you mind reading that over and letting me know if we are agreed point-by-point, or whether we have some disagreement at this stage? (For even a minor disagreement at this early juncture might account later for large discrepancies, so I feel that we should allow ourselves to be scrupulous here, even if it seems tedious.)

Here's what I believe right now: you, I, muhuk, (and I will guess tad, though I don't know for certain) all agree that Franz owns the piano. But do we all also agree on the rationale behind that assignment? Or are there already diverging opinions that need to be rectified/addressed?

 

(My view now by the way is that if you can reverse engineer, that is fine. IP really can't constrain an individual item that someone else creates if it's 100% private and individual).

Well, that's an interesting footnote! When it's appropriate, we shall have to get into that. But for now, I must endeavor to focus! :)

 

2. The piano is owned by Franz to the degree Wolfgang is given the designs, and to the degree Wolfgang did not develop that design. Wolfgang didn't make the piano in any sense because he didn't even reverse engineer the piano. No thought past following directions happened. All that work was Franz. The contract pertains to the labor both parties agreed on, not to make an agreement to tell Wolfgang that he'll only get paid if he lets Franz determine how to use the pianos. This is different than 1 since there is no need to consider who owned the materials - we know Wolfgang didn't even own the materials here.

Ah! Here is some potentially rich material, as we might possibly find some disagreements here. But let's dig in and discover whether that's true...

 

The piano is owned by Franz to the degree Wolfgang is given the designs, and to the degree Wolfgang did not develop that design.

Again it is potentially of interest to me that you seem to be explaining why Wolfgang doesn't own the piano, as opposed to explaining why Franz does.

Let me first note that, while it is true that Wolfgang did not develop the piano design, neither did Franz in my example. Franz selected a preexisting design from the Internet. (Unless you believe that such a selection constitutes "developing the design"? But that's not normally how we speak, I don't think. If I take a recipe from the Internet to make dinner, I don't say that I "developed" that recipe, and if I did, I'd account myself a liar.)

 

Wolfgang didn't make the piano in any sense because he didn't even reverse engineer the piano.

Are you certain that it's correct to say that "Wolfgang didn't make the piano in any sense"? [Emphasis added.]

If he is the person who constructed it physically, isn't that a valid sense in which one "makes a piano"? (And maybe even the primary one?)

If a Subway Sandwich Artist constructs a sandwich to your order, do you think it's right to say that the person "did not make the sandwich in any sense"?

And I should also note that Franz has also not "reverse engineered" anything. So far, the efforts you've undertaken to show why Wolfgang does not own this piano... appear to me to apply equally to Franz. Does no one own this piano? :)

 

No thought past following directions happened. All that work was Franz. The contract pertains to the labor both parties agreed on, not to make an agreement to tell Wolfgang that he'll only get paid if he lets Franz determine how to use the pianos. This is different than 1 since there is no need to consider who owned the materials - we know Wolfgang didn't even own the materials here.

I apologize, but I'm having a hard time understanding this paragraph (and particularly the portion I've italicized). Perhaps you can clarify your meaning?

In any event, I understand you as saying that "all that work was Franz," which (taken with your response altogether) leads me to a few questions, to probe more deeply into this scenario:

* Do you believe that Franz is the only person in this scenario who has performed work? Or has Wolfgang also performed work?

* Do you believe that Wolfgang, in whatever labor you might concede to him, has acted mindfully? Or mindlessly? If "mindlessly," do you generally believe that it is possible for men to act as mindless automatons? Or do you think that's possibly an unwitting example of a "mind-body split"?

* Do you believe that Franz necessarily acted "more mindfully" than Wolfgang (however you would propose to determine such a thing)? Or could Franz's selection of his piano design from the Internet, and even his entire decision to pursue a piano and hire Wolfgang to build it, be some whim-borne act?

* Earlier, in respnonse to muhuk, I'd said the following:

 

Though I had specified that Franz supplies both design and materials to Wolfgang, the outcome would not be altered, in my view, had Wolfgang been contracted to supply both himself.

But based upon your reply, and your description of Franz having done "all that work," while Wolfgang "didn't make the piano in any sense," I'm not certain you'd agree. Suppose that Franz had contracted Wolfgang to act as we otherwise have Franz acting now: Wolfgang acquires the materials (through legitimate means), selects a design from the Internet (that is in the public domain), and builds that piano for Franz, for a fee. Whose piano is it now, and upon what basis?

[Well... that didn't come out any shorter, really. And I don't know if it's what I want yet in terms of focus... But I won't abandon the project just yet.]

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DonAthos

My comments were an answer to your scenario, but directed to muhuk in that post to flesh out or start to set a context in which I see how the property of property (in conjunction with the concept ownership)is assigned , or manifests, to things.

The context of a civilized division of labor society is the only context that the validity of IP can be discussed, yes?

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The context of a civilized division of labor society is the only context that the validity of IP can be discussed, yes?

 

What difference does it make? Do (material) property rights cease to exist in a primitive society or a communist one? Are certain principles, like IP, dependent upon the context?

 

I would say, if IP is valid, it would be equally valid in any context of society. It might not have been respected and implemented as law, but as a principle it would have been valid.

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DonAthos

My comments were an answer to your scenario, but directed to muhuk in that post to flesh out or start to set a context in which I see how the property of property (in conjunction with the concept ownership)is assigned , or manifests, to things.

The context of a civilized division of labor society is the only context that the validity of IP can be discussed, yes?

Muhuk may answer you as he chooses, but I'm going to refrain from addressing your question about the context for IP, for the moment. I'm trying to keep the discussion (or at least my participation in it) somewhat focused, as opposed to the experiences we've all had before where we wind up discussing ten different things simultaneously.

The scenarios I've introduced take place in society, if that matters to your evaluation of them. They are not meant to address IP at all; instead, I'm attempting to begin a discussion of ordinary, plain-old property rights (as in, how does a man come to own one single solitary piano, and what does that ownership entail) so that we have a solid foundation, and hopefully even agreement, on the nature of such property rights, before extending the discussion into more controversial matters.

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What difference does it make? Do (material) property rights cease to exist in a primitive society or a communist one? Are certain principles, like IP, dependent upon the context?.

Yes and no, the principle of property rights is based or founded on the immutable nature of man qua being. Societies that recognize and implement laws to protect ownership are or can be established. Principles are man made , epistemologic, but based on objective reality.

Ownership , the right to disposal of a thing , is protected in society by principled actions of those individuals that make up society. Society is the abstraction whose referent is the aggregate actions of the individuals subsumed under that particular group , this or that society.

I contend in LFC society, it is reasonable to develope principles that would protect ownership rights in things like widget designs.

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Yes and no, the principle of property rights is based or founded on the immutable nature of man qua being. Societies that recognize and implement laws to protect ownership are or can be established. Principles are man made , epistemologic, but based on objective reality.

Ownership , the right to disposal of a thing , is protected in society by principled actions of those individuals that make up society. Society is the abstraction whose referent is the aggregate actions of the individuals subsumed under that particular group , this or that society.

I contend in LFC society, it is reasonable to develope principles that would protect ownership rights in things like widget designs.

 

I am not convinced. Even if we were living in a communist society, wouldn't we arrive the conclusion that we own our bodies? And therefore wouldn't be able to reach the principle of property rights? Reality does not change when you change the social context. Reality is not created by social context. Neither do principles.

 

I think you are trying to steer the discussion from an abstract, principles level to a more practical level and discuss the applications and practical consequences of IP. But you are making a big mistake by implying that principles change based on social context (the `yes` part of your answer).

 

The politics of IP might be an interesting subject. But the main question here is; is IP part of Objectivism, or is Objectivism compatible with IP.

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I think you are trying to steer the discussion from an abstract, principles level to a more practical level and discuss the applications and practical consequences of IP. But you are making a big mistake by implying that principles change based on social context (the `yes` part of your answer).

 

 

Yes, that is exactly what I am doing. Principles divorced from their practical applications and consequences are useless. I never said principles change, the idea I was trying to convey is that IP or the trade thereof can only arise in a civilized, division of labor society based on the principles of capitalism.

And I am not sure what you mean by part of O'ism , does this mean a citation by Rand herself(or her intellectual heir(?)?).

As for compatible , I think, it certainly is. I do not see why a widget design can not in principle be property. Obviously if it can, I assume you would agree that the principle of property rights in the O'ist sense would be satisfied.

 

So it seems the argument is whether or not the principle of ownership is only applicable to physicality.

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So it seems the argument is whether or not the principle of ownership is only applicable to physicality.

 

You might be onto something there. Yes, that's the argument.

 

 

Anti-IP argument is "ideas (or concepts) are not property".

 

 

All properties are purely physical objects.

 

 

 

I couldn't find anything that would include mental entities into property rights. It seems like property rights are defined exclusively over material objects.

 
Could you please point me to the Objectivist definition of property that includes intellectual entities as well as physical ones?

 

 

 

-----

 

 

 

Principles divorced from their practical applications and consequences are useless.

 

Maybe. But we have a disagreement in principle here. A discussion of practical applications and consequences would only be beneficial if we had an agreement at an abstract level. I assume you'd agree that nationalization is immoral. What would your response be if somebody made a case for nationalization by citing the supposed benefits of certain real world applications?

 

 

-----

 

 

Also you haven't addressed any of my questions in #108. Was I wrong to think that you knew what you were talking about?

Edited by muhuk
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muhuk said in #118

"Also you haven't addressed any of my questions in #108. Was I wrong to think that you knew what you were talking about?"

 

By discrete idea, I meant an idea that can be viewed as separate from other ideas.

 

By unique idea , I meant an idea that is unlike any other.

 

I was being facetious when I used identifiable, based on the fact that we keep using the word idea and I assumed we were refering to a referent in reality, so identifiable would be redundant.

 

And then I just listed them, so perhaps just embellishment. But look around, you must see that I am one of, if not the least articulate posters on this forum.

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Post #1... To the extent that the design is useful to many people, not just the piano itself, there is reason to say Franz should have the right to control the design in any manner he chooses – who can use it, how he wants to profit from it. If anything, the usefulness and value to multiple people makes a design worth recognizing as property, especially since Franz designed it for the reasons anyone would create or seek property.

... In ethical terms, this means Franz has a right to his designs and what people may make from those designs...

Eiuol is not, of course discussing the "control of the design" as he claims, but rather the control of other people and their property. Nor is he discussing a "right to the design", but rather the right to initiate force against others.

All of this euphemistic rhetoric is necessary to the upkeep of the IP error. Continuously invoking new examples in order to redeploy the same rhetorical tactics is pointless.

And note the ethical concern expressed through these rhetorical devises: the "problem" is not that the innovator has lost anything by being imitated - he hasn't. It is that someone else may benefit - at no cost to anyone. Preventing this presumably scary possibility is the whole purpose of IP law and why the rhetoric is so diligently crafted as a false claim that imitation harms the imitated.

Edited by howardofski
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Post #25... But if there are piano making competitors, then realistically, there is possible economic loss, including the piano Wolfgang made.

This is false. Competition does not cause economic loss. Not getting as much as you want is not the same as losing what you have or have a right to. You do not have a right to a market share. Market share = other people and their money and their choices.

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Post #54... the principle would be that no one would ever be able to build an invention without the owner's consent. What's the issue with that? No one can eat food without the producer's consent...

Once again, we are treated to the false argument that to imitate an action = to steal an object. The Pro-IP debate depends on the continuing very false implication that the imitator is removing something from its rightful owner, the imitated, a falsehood based on the metaphor that action = property.

Edited by howardofski
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Post # 7...If you prevent me from stealing your car, you have restricted my freedom of choice with my property, [for instance, my body]...

This is a great example of a stolen concept. Your property rights end suddenly where mine begin. Your property rights do not include the right to violate the property rights of others, any more than your liberty includes the right to deprive others of their liberty. It means to be free of that sort of thing.

Your argument reverses the meaning of the word 'property' in order to defend IP. And rightly so; that's just the sort of rhetorical monkey-business that IP requires.

Edited by howardofski
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Post #7... Only establishing a story that ties Fran’z self-ownership to his creation of the designs, and relates it in such a way that appropriating the designs is appropriating Franz’ extension of himself and is thereby an initiation of force will do. And I’m not sure if your argument successfully does that.

Agreed. 'Appropriate', in this context, means 'steal', which means to remove something from its rightful owner. Obviously, the Pro-IP debate depends on the continuing false implication that the imitator is removing something from its rightful owner, the imitated (for instance, his "extension of himself"). And obviously, that is false - no one's 'self-ownership' is threatened or limited by imitation.

But the 'self-ownership' of imitators IS curtailed by IP law.

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Post #15... IP [means the] ownership of the physical implementation of the pattern, design, artistic work, etc.,

This translates to the ownership of an action, regardless of the actor or whose object is acted upon. But action is an attribute - of the actor. Put simply: no, you can not own my actions, nor my objects that I act upon - unless you own me and my objects.

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