Conceptual lineage

[Vik]

You can sweep your arm around your room and say "furnishings", but that doesn't make the concept first level.

 

You had to know about such things as tables and chairs.

 

 

Because the concept life can be defined ostensively, wordlessly, by pointing out its referents.  The meaning of a concept is its referents, not its definition.  Of course we still need the word "life" to have a concept at all but a wordy definition can be dispensed with.

[Vik]

Above the level of conceptualized sensations and metaphysical axioms, every concept requires a verbal definition. Paradoxically enough, it is the simplest concepts that most people find it hardest to define

—

the concepts of the perceptual concretes with which they deal daily, such as "table", "house", "man", "walking", "tall", "number", etc. There is a good reason for it: such concepts are, chronologically, the first concepts man forms or grasps, and can be defined verbally only by means of later concepts

—

as, for instance, one grasps the concept "table" long before one can grasp such concepts as "flat", "level", "surface", "supports". Most people, therefore, regard formal definitions as unnecessary and treat simple concepts as if they were pure sense data, to be identified by means of

ostensive

definitions, i.e. simply by pointing.

There is a certain psychological justification for this policy. Man's discriminated awareness begins with

percepts

; the conceptual identifications of daily-observed percepts have become so thoroughly automatized in men's minds that they seem to require no definitions

—

and men have no difficulty in identifying the referents of such concepts

ostensive

ly.

~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, "5. Definitions", pg. 49-50

 

 

I'm taking this to mean that after so many levels of abstraction, you NEED formal definitions.

 

I can define "colors" ostensively, but that concept is NOT first-level.

 

It takes years for children to reach "colors" as such.

 

When a definition in terms of other concepts is not required to specify what it is that a concept refers to, that concept is first level. Life is such a concept.

[dream_weaver]

Existence, identity and consciousness are the three primary axioms. They serve as the widest integrations and are implicit in all knowledge, and are not formed explicitly until much later - disqualifying them as first-level concepts.

 

Entity, self (ITOE appendix), volition (as axiomatic, OPAR), and life are axiomatic although not axioms in previously noted sense. They are an identification of primary facts of realty which cannot be analyzed. Entity, self and volition are not first-level concepts, are they?

 

It is first-level concepts that appear to have differing criteria among the participants in this thread as to their constituents. I would not argue "life" as first-level. Concepts of motion require the formulation of the entity which moves. Clearly if you have to form the concept of the entity prior to forming the concepts of motion, positing "life" on the perception of animation would presuppose the entities which are animate.

 

Concepts of entities, perceptual concretes, discrete entities which can be discriminated from their background as whole or contiguous objects easily qualify as a basis for meeting the criteria of a first-level concept. To include "life" as first-level, shouldn't we be able to point to an object in the manner of indicating that it is what we mean by "life"? Pointing to a dog or a bird requires the further qualification and consideration of the fact that it is moving of its own accord, and thus what enables it to do so is part of the basis for the fact that they are alive.

 

edited for spell-check.

Edited July 20, 2013 by dream_weaver

[Plasmatic]

Just when I thought I was banging my head against a wall.....

Thanks Vik and weaver

All first-level concepts are ostensive but NOT all ostensive concepts are first-level!

Edited July 20, 2013 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

Somewhere in the 1976 lectures Dr. Peikoff makes the point that there are several "primary" concepts that are not exactly the same as axioms. He says, paraphrased, " even consciousness can be defined as "the faculty of percieving that which exist", so its different from existence, exists but its still axiomatic. Ill find the spot today probably in the lectures.

[Jake]

This is an incomplete thought, not a position taken...

What would AI researchers have to say about the possibility of consciousness without life? Volitional consciousness is certainly self-generated, but I don't see the predication on self-sustaining (yet).

Thoughts?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

What would AI researchers have to say about the possibility of consciousness without life? Volitional consciousness is certainly self-generated, but I don't see the predication on self-sustaining (yet).

Thoughts?

Depends on your definition of life.

 

Many of our mental traits and abilities stem from neuroplasticity; the fact that your brain cells do not exist in a static form but are continually changing and rearranging themselves.  There are a great many things our brains do which computers cannot, simply because of the hardware differences.

 

It may be the case that consciousness requires growth, metabolism, et cetera- because of their complex interplay with the brain.  If so then a self-aware machine would have to grow and change and repair itself just as we do, in which case, is it not alive?

 

Depends on how you define several things, ultimately.

[tadmjones]

Who can say for sure that perhaps crystalline formation is not the ultimate self generated action resulting in goal attainment.

Edited July 23, 2013 by tadmjones

[Grames]

Who can say for sure that perhaps crystalline formation is not the ultimate self generated action resulting in goal attainment.

I can say for sure that "crystalline formation is not the ultimate self generated action resulting in goal attainment".    Crystals don't have selves, and treating them as though they do is the fallacy of anthropomorphism, or simply animism.  Other fallacies may apply as well.

[Grames]

I am primarily interested in defending the notion that life is an axiomatic concept.   Does anyone still want to 'pushback' on that conclusion?

 

I'll defend the broad application of first level concepts separately so as not to get the subjects confused.  By separately I mean in later posts in this thread.

[dream_weaver]

Grames, your breakdown of how life qualifies as an axiomatic concept outlined it quite well.

 

Dipping into ITOE2 near the end of page 49 provided a bit more insight into my overly delimited notion of first-level concepts.

 

"Paradoxically enough, it is the simplest concepts that most people find it hardest to define—the concepts of the perceptual concretes with which they deal daily, such as "table," "house," "man," "walking," "tall," "number," etc."

 

Walking, tall and number are not entities in the sense I earlier suggested as the broad criteria for meeting the requirements of being first-level. Given her short list, "length", "swimming", and "hot" should fit in nicely.

 

"Number", like "life" seems a bit surprising. Corvini suggested visual confirmation of 2, 3 and 4 are perceptually given (of course, once you've grasped the relationships) but even so, "number" and even "2", "3", "4" do not come across as obvious as "table", "house", "man" and less so than trying to add "walking", and "tall".

[tadmjones]

I can say for sure that "crystalline formation is not the ultimate self generated action resulting in goal attainment".    Crystals don't have selves, and treating them as though they do is the fallacy of anthropomorphism, or simply animism.  Other fallacies may apply as well.

I must resolve to fix this personal problem, but be that is it may, my comment was directed toward the idea of AI as such. Or rather AI qua intelligence.

 

So basically yeh me and grames are in the same boat, here

Edited July 23, 2013 by tadmjones

[tadmjones]

As to whether or not life is axiomatic, still not sure( not that my opinion matters) but I do see it as 'implicitly' axiomatic, perhaps a new category is warranted? 

[Plasmatic]

Weaver, why do you think that excerpt from ITOE has any direct relevance to "first-level"ness? In fact it says "chronologically", which is specifically contrasted to the "logical" hierarchy by Ms. Rand.

Edited July 23, 2013 by Plasmatic

[dream_weaver]

Picking up on the term "chronologically", it would be the first-level concepts which we learn first. By the time logical hierarchy is invoked, it would be to distinguish what first-level concepts a particular widening or narrowing depend on. Much like what is at stake in this inquiry regarding life. Life is the concept that explains self-generated action. Distinguishing entities which move on their own from those which do not can be accomplished by observation over time. Even a car, which may appear to be moving on its own, is usually accompanied by a human being when moving and not when the vehicle is still. Watching birds flit from limb to limb, or hop about on a lawn give us entities which move on its own, contrasted against other objects that do not, or only do so when acted upon by a entity which does.

[Plasmatic]

Ms. Rand specifically says that first-level is "logically not chronologically" determined.

Edit: "the hierarchy of which concept depends on

the other, will not be determined by the accidental order

in which you learned them, because that can have a

great deal of the optional element and depends on what

is available in your immediate surroundings." ITOE

Edited July 24, 2013 by Plasmatic

[dream_weaver]

Yes, the hierarchy of which concept depends on another is not determined by the incidental order in which it is was acquired. If a concept depends on another, it is logically correlated, thus hierarchal in nature: i.e.: not first-level..

[thenelli01]

Doesn't consciousness presuppose life? Isn't it implied in consciousness?

[StrictlyLogical]

Doesn't consciousness presuppose life? Isn't it implied in consciousness?

 

Currently only livings things can properly be said to be conscious.  The mere coincidence that nothing non-living has ever been conscious before is not a proper restraint on the definition of consciousness.  It would be like saying having four legs, presupposes animals because nothing made of wood has ever had four legs... then someone in ancient times built a table (not the best analogy). 

 

Consciousness, in terms of structure and function although not well understood in terms of any reductive scientific explanation, is something which very possibly "could" occur in an artificial system.  This artificial system could be made such that it had no attribute or quality associated with life except for the fact that it was conscious.  Does this remove it from the current concept we have of consciousness?

 

At the time this thing is made, of course we COULD always define consciousness arbitrarily to include or not include that kind of artificial system, however, we would not be able to escape from the fact of reality (if we created an artificially "conscious-like" entity) that the thing we observe functions and is structured in accordance with something conscious which we do observe in biological systems.

[StrictlyLogical]

If you can properly think about what IS in a logical proper hierarchy, with appropriate identification and integration of data, IS there any reason OTHER than communication with others and society, to determine what you CALL those things in your knowledge and what kind of, type of, category of knowledge you label them as?

 

How important is labeling something "first-level" in the actual process of integration?

 

Is this to be contrasted from its importance in the analysis/discussion of the process of integration... ?

Edited July 24, 2013 by StrictlyLogical

[dream_weaver]

A first-level integration lies at the base or foundation of our knowledge.

 

In a process of validating a concept which is not first-level, reaching a first-level concept signifies the terminus of a chain in the reduction,

 

The process of integration is how you would arrive at or grasp something such as a first-level concept.

 

While language may be beneficial for communicating with others, more importantly it is the tool of thought. For a conceptual being, it is necessary on a deserted isle as well as in a thriving metropolis.

[Plasmatic]

"Concepts and therefore language are primarily are a tool of cognition - not of communication" ITOE

What is being debated is not the "label", first-level, but the referents.

Edited July 24, 2013 by Plasmatic

[StrictlyLogical]

"Concepts and therefore language are primarily are a tool of cognition - not of communication" ITOE

What is being debated is not the "label", first-level, but the referents.

 

I am familiar with the axioms. No problem.  I'm sort of comfortable with corollaries, which I see as deductively following from the axioms.  What is the definition of a "first-level" concept, and how is it related to the axioms and corollaries?  Is first-level just one of the others (axioms or corollaries)integrated with a small ostensive observation or bit of perceptual information? 

 

How can one tease apart, in debating a word associated with a concept, the definition of the word (drawing a boundary over the conceptual territory) versus identifying the referents to which it applies?  Are not these one in the same?  Certainly the conceptual territory has natural features, protrusions, valleys, mountains etc. (metaphorical of course) which suggest the boundaries but in the end I assume one must define the boundary first, and then deal with whether or not particular referents actually fall within or outside of it.  I guess this is what you meant.

[Plasmatic]

SL said:

"How can one tease apart, in debating a word associated with a concept, the definition of the word (drawing a boundary over the conceptual territory) versus identifying the referents to which it applies? Are not these one in the same?"

No they are not the same. Concepts are their referents not their definition. A definition only specifies the essential characteristic of the referential existent the auditory symbol or "label" designates.

The definition of "first-level" is the concepts that you can designate without reference to, or pressuposing other concepts. "Entities qua entities" are the only concepts that fit this bill. Yes one can point ostensively to entities while possessing a word for them and not require a definition initially but that is not the essential criteria for first-levelness.

Edited July 25, 2013 by Plasmatic

[dream_weaver]

What does one point to ostensibly or presuppose when perceiving a clap or roll of thunder, a dog barking, the aroma of smoke (when it is not visibly smoky) or of skunk-secretion?