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Epistemology Without Weights and an Objectivist Mistake

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Objectivists accuse Popperians of being skeptics. Popperians accuse Objectivists of being infallibilists. Actually, both philosophies are valuable and largely compatible. I present here some integrating ideas and then a mistake that both philosophies share.

 

Knowledge is contextual, absolute, certain, conclusive and progressive. The standard of knowledge is conclusiveness not infallibility, perfection or omniscience.

 

Certain means we should act on it instead of hesitating. We should follow its implications and use it, rather than sitting around doubting, wondering, scared it might be wrong. Certain also means that it is knowledge, as opposed to non-knowledge; it denies skepticism.

 

Absolute means no contradictions, compromises or exceptions are allowed.

 

Contextual means that knowledge must be considered in context. A good idea in one context may not be a good idea when transplanted into another context. No knowledge could hold up against arbitrary context switches and context dropping.

 

Further, knowledge is problem oriented. Knowledge needs some problem(s) or question(s) for context, which it addresses or solves. Knowledge has to be knowledge about something, with some purpose. This implies: if you have an answer to a question, and then in the future you learn more, the old answer still answers the old question. It's still knowledge in its original, intended context.

 

Consider blood types. People wanted to know which blood transfusions were safe (among other questions) and they created some knowledge of A, B, AB and O blood types. Later they found out more. Actually there is A+, A-, B+, B-, AB+, AB-, O+ and O-. It was proper to act on the earlier knowledge in its context. It would not be proper to act on it today; now we know that some B type blood is incompatible with some other B type blood. Today's superior knowledge of blood types is also contextual. Maybe there will be a new medical breakthrough next year. But it's still knowledge in today's context, and it's proper to act on it.

 

One thing to learn here is that a false idea can be knowledge. The idea that all B type blood is compatible is contextual knowledge. It was always false, as a matter of fact, and the mistake got some people killed. Yet it was still knowledge. How can that be?

 

Perfection is not the standard of knowledge. And not all false ideas are equally good. What matters is the early idea about blood types had value, it had useful information, it helped make many correct decisions, and no better idea was available at the time. That value never goes away even when we learn about a mistake. That original value is still knowledge, considered contextually, even though the idea as a whole is now known to be false.

 

Conclusive means the current context only allows for one rational conclusion. This conclusion is not infallible, but it's the only reasonable option available. All the alternative ideas have known flaws; they are refuted. There's only one idea left which is not refuted, which could be true, is true as far as we know (no known flaws), and which we should therefore accept. And that is knowledge.

 

None of this contradicts the progressive character of knowledge. Our knowledge is not frozen and final. We can learn more and better – without limit. We can keep identifying and correcting errors in our ideas and thereby achieve better and better knowledge. (One way knowledge can be better is that it is correct in more contexts and successfully addresses more problems and questions.)

 

The Mistake

 

Peikoff says that certainty (meaning conclusive knowledge) is when you get to the point that nothing else is possible. He means that, in the current context, there are no other options. There's just one option, and we should accept it. All the other ideas have something wrong with them, they can't be accepted. This is fine.

 

Peikoff also says that before you have certainty you have a different situation where there are multiple competing ideas. Fine. And that's not certainty, that's not conclusive knowledge, it's a precursor stage where you're considering the ideas. Fine.

 

But then Peikoff makes what I think is an important mistake. He says that if you don't have knowledge or certainty, you can still judge by the weight of the evidence. This is a standard view held by many non-Objectivists too. I think this is too compromising. I think the choices are knowledge or irrationality. We need knowledge; nothing less will suffice.

 

The weight of the evidence is no good. Either you have knowledge or you don't. If it's not knowledge, it's not worth anything. You need to come up with a good idea – no compromises, no contradictions, no known problems – and use that. If you can't or won't do that, all you have left is the irrationality of acting on and believing arbitrary non-knowledge.

 

I think we can always act on knowledge without contradictions. Knowledge is always possible to man. Not all knowledge instantly, but enough knowledge to act, in time to act. We may not know everything – but we don't need to. We can always know enough to continue life rationally. Living and acting by reason and knowledge is always possible.

 

(How can we always do this? That will be the subject of another essay. I'm not including any summary or hints because I think it's too confusing and misleading without a full explanation.)

 

Knowledge doesn't allow contradictions. Suppose you're considering two ideas that contradict each other. And you don't have a conclusive answer, you don't have knowledge of which is right. Then using or believing either one is irrational. No "weight of the evidence" or anything else can change this.

 

Don't pick a side when you know there is a contradiction but have not rationally resolved it. Resolve it; create knowledge; learn; think; figure it out. Neither idea being considered is good enough to address the contradiction or refute the other idea – so you know they are both flawed. Don't hope or pray that acting on a known-to-be-flawed idea will work out anyway. Irrationality doesn't work.

 

That's not good enough. If you discover a contradiction, you should resolve it rationally. If you fail at that – fail at the use of reason – then that's bad, that's a disaster, that's not OK.

 

Karl Popper made the same mistake in a different form. He said that we critically analyze competing ideas and the one that best survives criticism should be acted on. Again this is too compromising. Either exactly one idea survives criticism, or else there is still a contradiction. "Best survives criticism", and "weight of the evidence", are irrational ways of arbitrarily elevating one flawed idea over another, instead of using reason to come up with a correct idea.

 

(For some further discussion about weighing ideas, see also the choices chapter of The Beginning of Infinity by David Deutsch.)

Edited by curi
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Peikoff also says that before you have certainty you have a different situation where there are multiple competing ideas. Fine. And that's not certainty, that's not conclusive knowledge, it's a precursor stage where you're considering the ideas. Fine.

 

But then Peikoff makes what I think is an important mistake. He says that if you don't have knowledge or certainty, you can still judge by the weight of the evidence. This is a standard view held by many non-Objectivists too. I think this is too compromising. I think the choices are knowledge or irrationality. We need knowledge; nothing less will suffice.

 

Since so much turns on this point, would you mind providing the relevant quote(s)?

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Hey it looks like my title got cut off (should end with "Critical Rationalism Both Made"). I can't seem to edit it. Can any admin fix it?

 

If it has to be short, just "Epistemology Without Weights and an Objectivist Mistake" is better than the current cut off version.

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Here are OPAR quotes. It's also in http://www.peikoff.com/courses_and_lectures/philosophy-of-objectivism/

 

Like possibilities, probabilities are asserted within a context and may be weakened or strengthened as it changes. If favorable evidence continues to be discovered, at some point the cognitive climax will be reached. The conclusion ceases to be a hypothesis and becomes knowledge. Such a conclusion is certain. The concept of “certainty” designates knowledge from a particular perspective: it designates some complex items of knowledge considered in contrast to the transitional evidential states that precede them. (By extension, the term may be applied to all knowledge, perceptual and conceptual, to indicate that it is free of doubt.) A conclusion is “certain” when the evidence in its favor is conclusive; i.e., when it has been logically validated. At this stage, one has gone beyond “substantial” evidence. Rather, the total of the available evidence points in a single direction, and this evidence fulfills the standard of proof. In such a context, there is nothing to suggest even the possibility of another interpretation. There are, therefore, no longer any grounds for doubt. 

 

Certainty is a contextual assessment, and in countless situations the context permits no other. Despite the claims of skeptics, doubt is not the human fate, with cognition being an unattainable ideal. Doubt, rationally exercised, is a temporary, transitional state, which is applicable only to (some) higher-level questions—and which itself expresses a cognitive judgment: that the evidence one has is still inconclusive. As such, doubt is made possible only by a vast context of knowledge in the doubter’s mind. The doubter must know both facts and logic; he must know the facts known so far—and also the means by which in principle his doubt is eventually to be removed, i.e., what else is required to reach full proof. 

 

 

 

In considering any issue, never permit yourself one minute in the quicksands of a baseless “I don’t know.” Instead, establish first that the issue is related to the realm of evidence and thus deserves consideration. Then study the evidence, weighing the possibilities in accordance with the principles of logic. Then make up your mind and take a stand. 

 

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Our knowledge is not frozen and final. We can learn more and better – without limit. We can keep identifying and correcting errors in our ideas and thereby achieve better and better knowledge. (One way knowledge can be better is that it is correct in more contexts and successfully addresses more problems and questions.)

 

This is the key point you left out of your conclusion. People, ideas, character, etc are all works in progress. It's unrealistic to expect a person to find answers to all of his questions about every subject he encounters. (Sometimes we're uninterested in the subject and do not want to spend the time figuring out what is correct and what is jibberish. Sometimes we don't have all the information available to make an informed decision. Sometimes we think we've made an informed decision, only to realize later that we were completely wrong/ were missing important information which is what happened in the blood example you gave.) I don't see this as a character flaw or a compromise.

Edited by mdegges
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This is the key point you left out of your conclusion. People, ideas, character, etc are all works in progress. It's unrealistic to expect a person to find answers to all of his questions about every subject he encounters. (Sometimes we're uninterested in the subject and do not want to spend the time figuring out what is correct and what is jibberish. Sometimes we don't have all the information available to make an informed decision. Sometimes we think we've made an informed decision, only to realize later that we were completely wrong/ were missing important information which is what happened in the blood example you gave.) I don't see this as a character flaw or a compromise.

 

You don't have to know about everything. You do need rational knowledge relevant to your life, actions, choices, in order to live rationally. To live without that would be a flaw. (I'm not really sure what you're advocating though.)

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Curi said:

"That's not good enough. If you discover a contradiction, you should resolve it rationally. If you fail at that – fail at the use of reason – then that's bad, that's a disaster, that's not OK.

Karl Popper made the same mistake in a different form. He said that we critically analyze competing ideas and the one that best survives criticism should be acted on. Again this is too compromising. Either exactly one idea survives criticism, or else there is still a contradiction. "Best survives criticism", and "weight of the evidence", are irrational ways of arbitrarily elevating one flawed idea over another, instead of using reason to come up with a correct idea."

Ok Popper 1 , let me ask you a question. How does one know what a contradiction is without a meaning criteria and definitions? How does one divorce knowledge and logic from meaning?

Edited by Plasmatic
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There are always holes that can be poked in your theory, no matter how elegant or accurate it is.  I think Peikoff's definition of "certainty" only really describes a very limited amount of knowledge; things like universal gravitation and the mortality of men (which aren't usually disputed, anyway).

So in that context, all he seems to be saying is that it's alright to act on theories that aren't 100% conclusive; you don't need to dissect and analyze each and every component of your car before you attempt to start it in the morning.

 

That said, I would personally tend to agree with you, and that's alright.  I simply enjoy learning for the sake of learning, itself, and I would be loathe to act on an idea I wasn't completely sure of.

But that's just my personal value-judgments, and not meant to be universal at all.

 

All it amounts to is that 100% certainty isn't absolutely necessary, so long as you act on the most likely ideas.  For instance: despite the gaps in the fossil record and the flaws that exist with the theory of evolution, we can accept it as true because it's still probabilistic miles ahead of its competitors.

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Harrison said :

your complaint would demonstrate exactly the sort of things that aren't necessary to acting on probable knowledge.

Not sure what you mean.

 

Curi said:

 

But then Peikoff makes what I think is an important mistake. He says that if you don't have knowledge or certainty, you can still judge by the weight of the evidence.

This is a standard view held by many non-Objectivists too. I think this is too compromising. I think the choices are knowledge or irrationality. We need knowledge; nothing less will suffice.

 

Where in the quotes or elsewhere did Peikoff claim there is a point one makes a judgment without knowledge? I'd search but I'm not by my research CD.

 

Peikoff states clearly that the inconclusive state is a state of knowledge:

 

doubt is made possible only by a vast context of knowledge in the doubter’s mind. The doubter must know both facts and logic; he must know the facts known so far—and also the means by which in principle his doubt is eventually to be removed, i.e., what else is required to reach full proof

 

 

For the record, I consider it dishonest to say you are espousing CR or Popper's philosophy. There is very little in common with your above claims and Popper's actual claims. Popper's whole philosophy is based on skepticism and that's irrefutable. You are trying to sterilize his claims and isolate them from the context motivating them. 

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Peikoff states clearly that the inconclusive state is a state of knowledge:

A state of uncertainty is not knowledge. Peikoff doesn't say otherwise in the quotes even. "If favorable evidence continues to be discovered, at some point the cognitive climax will be reached. The conclusion ceases to be a hypothesis and becomes knowledge." This would mean that prior to knowledge, there is some hypothesis, conjecture, or whatever else that is not anything at all the same as knowledge. If it were knowledge, he wouldn't say "become" knowledge.

Curi, I largely agree with your OP, although I disagree that you are identifying a mistake. It looks to me like you misunderstood what Peikoff was saying. You are right, people need knowledge, nothing less should be sought. At some point, there must be a precursor stage of knowledge, which you agree is fine. I know you also say one should start with a conjecture generated by some sort of creativity. Your disagreement comes in when Peikoff says that it is okay to make a judgment by weight of evidence when one does not yet have knowledge. I don't see the issue there. The point isn't that weight of evidence is sufficient or even required for knowledge, but it is fine in order to generate a conjecture. So far, you haven't described any variety of methods of creativity, meaning I don't know why you have an issue with weight of evidence in the context of hypothesizing. At least this way, you can start investigation in your journey towards knowledge. Weight of evidence is just one tool to develop an idea, but insufficient to reach certainty and thus knowledge.

Suppose you're considering two ideas that contradict each other. And you don't have a conclusive answer, you don't have knowledge of which is right.

This line is true, and good. However, not even the quotes you cited suggest that if you are considering a limited set of ideas that you *must* pick one of them. If they're all bad, don't accept it, resolve it. That entails finding another idea to consider. Again, I think what you say is right, I just think Peikoff happens to agree too, and his statements support yours.

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I was saying only that "conclusive and certain" is all that we can call knowledge. "Inconclusive and uncertain" is not knowledge, but you can act on it in the sense you can use it as a starting point for a hypothesis. Also, there are some contexts where you won't be able to reach certainty, such as an imminent threat of violence where you simply won't be reasonably fast enough, just simply because it takes time to think out a plan of action. For a more practical example, if you were in a contest to finish a crossword within 5 minutes, you might not be able to finish because you are a novice and it takes you longer than an expert to solve. You couldn't even say "in my context, I know that X", because the only way to know about a crossword's solution is to finish it. On the other hand, you can say "I don't know the whole solution, but 1 across is 'epistemology' ". 

 

I think Objectivism holds this position from exactly what you quoted, as well as having listened to Peikoff's lectures and other things I've read. I probably can find some quotes for you from the new book by Gotthelf called "Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge". Or at the least, since I think developing  one's theories is barely covered, I'm saying there is no contradiction.

Edited by Eiuol
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Eiuol, you said "It looks to me like you misunderstood what Peikoff was saying." and said that the mistake I identified in Objectivism is not a mistake made by Objectivism. I asked for a source where Objectivism explains the correct view of the issue. I don't think it's something Objectivism understands correctly; you claimed it is. OK, source? Rather than giving a source, you then backtracked and said a bunch of other stuff and didn't address the point.

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Louie said:

"Plasmatic, on 07 Jul 2013 - 22:44, said:

Peikoff states clearly that the inconclusive state is a state of knowledge:

A state of uncertainty is not knowledge. Peikoff doesn't say otherwise in the quotes even. "If favorable evidence continues to be discovered, at some point the cognitive climax will be reached. The conclusion ceases to be a hypothesis and becomes knowledge." This would mean that prior to knowledge, there is some hypothesis, conjecture, or whatever else that is not anything at all the same as knowledge. If it were knowledge, he wouldn't say "become" knowledge."

Your dropping context in your rush to disagree with me.

Curi stated:

"But then Peikoff makes what I think is an important mistake. He says that if you don't have knowledge or certainty, you can still judge by the weight of the evidence."

To which I asked:

"Where in the quotes or elsewhere did Peikoff claim there is a point one makes a judgment without knowledge? "

When I said :

"Peikoff states clearly that the inconclusive state is a state of knowledge:"

And followed that statement with a direct quote from Peikoff concerning what I mean by the inconclusive state being a state of knowledge. The context should tell one that I am not claiming that one has knowledge of what is inconclusive but THAT it is inconclusive.

That means " you do know what you do know", ( ITOE) and that is not an irrational state. Contrast this with Popper's, "we never know what we are talking about".....

Knowledge of the conditions of doubt being pressuposed by knowledge still does not answer the question I asked Curi:

Where in the quotes or elsewhere did Peikoff claim there is a point one makes a judgment without knowledge? "

That is, where does Peikoff admonish one to make a "judgment" from an inconclusive state of doubt ?

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I was saying only that "conclusive and certain" is all that we can call knowledge. "Inconclusive and uncertain" is not knowledge, but you can act on it in the sense you can use it as a starting point for a hypothesis.

What is this "it" if it's not knowledge?

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From Lecture 6 of The Philosophy of Objectivism:

"In actual fact all knowledge is certain, speaking strictly. An uncertain knowledge is literally a contradiction in terms. Even when we say, "x is only probable", we must be certain of the items of evidence which are offered on x's behalf. We must know them and we must be certain that x deserves the status of probable. We know that."

24:50

Edited by Plasmatic
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