A definition of Reason

[organon1973]

What is Reason?  It is the faculty that establishes Truth by means of logic.

 

Rand offered as a definition of Reason, "The faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses."  Yet she also wrote (in the Romantic Manifesto), and correctly, "Nothing is outside the province of reason."  Her definition of Reason, though, wholly excludes the data of the processes of consciousness, of which one is aware introspectively and which is not available to the senses (the health or dysfunction of which is the subject of the science of psychology).

[Plasmatic]

Why would you deny introspection as a sensory input?

We say "Existence and Consciousness" without meaning consciousness doesn't exist but to stress the primacy of existence.

Edited July 12, 2013 by Plasmatic

[organon1973]

Pardon?  The term "sensory input" generally refers to data received from sensory modalities.

[dream_weaver]

The data of the processes of consciousness is the content reason seeks to identify and integrate. It would include that which one is aware of introspectively.

Edited July 12, 2013 by dream_weaver

[organon1973]

The data of the processes of consciousness is the content reason [has the capacity] to identify and integrate. It would include that which one is aware of introspectively.

 

With the slight modification in brackets, agreed.  And introspection is not a sensory process, to which Rand's definition limited the data of Reason, if I am correct.

 

Now: Was the definition she offered in the Romantic Manifesto meant to be exhaustive, and a formal definition of Reason?  I do not know -- and doubt it.  Of course she was (deeply!) aware of introspection, and that Reason was applicable to the data thus gathered.

[Plasmatic]

So, would it be correct to say you find her definition non-essential given the broader context?

Edit: the senses are our only means of awareness. What then would "direct introspection" be?

Edited July 12, 2013 by Plasmatic

[organon1973]

Introspection is not a sensory process, but does involve awareness -- it involves consciousness examining itself.

[JayR]

But even during introspection, aren't we ultimately examining data provided by our senses, ie. the contents of our consciousness?

 

not that I see anything wrong w/ your definition right off the bat....

Edited July 13, 2013 by JayR

[Plasmatic]

Anyone who wants to divorce the idea that introspection has a directness akin to the directness of extrospection had better ask themselves what happens to our validation of free will.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Anyone who wants to divorce the idea that introspection has a directness akin to the directness of extrospection had better ask themselves what happens to our validation of free will.

 Good point.

Organon, I think you're mainly correct, but is introspection the act of examining your own consciousness, as such?

 

Introspection involves the examination of your previous mental activities; your prior consciousness (which was conscious of something else at that time) and thusly is more like remembering a previous experience than active perception.

Of course, you're always aware of your own mind- but only in a periphery sort of way; never directly.

 

Try directing your attention to your own attention; your mind's eye at itself, literally.

Not paying attention to the content of your thoughts [i.e. I'm thinking about consciousness] but to the act of thinking, itself.

Let me know if you succeed.  I really don't think it's possible.

[organon1973]

Anyone who wants to divorce the idea that introspection has a directness akin to the directness of extrospection had better ask themselves what happens to our validation of free will.

 

Introspection can involve direct awareness, but again -- is not a sensory process.

Free will is to the choice to think or not.  While sensory awareness is automatic, identification, thought and integration are not.  Introspective awareness is not automatic -- it requires an active motivation to review one's prior conscious processes.

One cannot review a conscious process while it is in progress -- it happens afterward.  But certainly, the rationality of a prior thought process can be judged -- e.g., as logical or not so, as objective or not so.

[organon1973]

But even during introspection, aren't we ultimately examining data provided by our senses, ie. the contents of our consciousness?

 

not that I see anything wrong w/ your definition right off the bat....

 

Hi Jay,

 

Consider an emotion about which one is introspecting, e.g. anger, or regret.  An emotion that one feels is part of the content of your consciousness, but the awareness of it is not provided by the senses -- it is a biopsychological phenomenon that hits conscious awareness directly.

[dream_weaver]

If the senses are aware of existence directly, does that translate into difficulties of a biopsychological phenomenon hitting conscious awareness directly? Is it not proper to say that you can sense that you can sense, you are aware that you are aware, you are conscous that you are conscious?

[organon1973]

The content of consciousness has different constituents -- e.g., sensory data, emotion (unrepressed emotion, that reaches the mind), thought, memory -- but are not all of these things of which one is directly aware, when the process is in process? ( : ) )

Edited July 14, 2013 by organon1973

[dream_weaver]

This thread strikes me as "reason reasoning about reason".

[softwareNerd]

Mostly, definitions aren't good for much, but if you're going to be picky, change it to:

"The faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's [functions outside the frontal lobe of the brain]."

[A is A]

The content of consciousness has different constituents -- e.g., sensory data, emotion (unrepressed emotion, that reaches the mind), thought, memory -- but are not all of these things of which one is directly aware, when the process is in process? ( : ) )

The content of consciousness has the same constituents as extrospection.  When you think, you can only thing about something.  When you remember, you remember something.  When one conceptualizes the process of thinking or remembering, one regards the specific "things" as the units with the distinguishing characteristics whose measurements are omitted.  

[organon1973]

The content of consciousness has the same constituents as extrospection.  When you think, you can only [think] about something... [italics added]

 

By this, do you mean that all cognitive processes have in common that they have content?  If so, yes, of course, I agree.  But the content involved in a given cognitive process will vary, depending on what that process is.

[A is A]

By this, do you mean that all cognitive processes have in common that they have content?  If so, yes, of course, I agree.  But the content involved in a given cognitive process will vary, depending on what that process is.

Not fully sure what  you mean.  If I'm thinking of a chair or remembering a chair, it is still a chair that I'm focusing on.  The perspective may change, as I can think of a chair as a unit among a class of objects but I can remember a particular chair I saw yesterday.  Thinking is different than remembering but neither process occurs without content of some kind.  There is always some existential entity that any mental process must ultimately rely on, no matter how abstract the concepts are.  I can certainly think about remembering, and remember about thinking.  But without the existential content, nothing happens.

Edited July 14, 2013 by A is A

[organon1973]

Not fully sure what  you mean.  If I'm thinking of a chair or remembering a chair, it is still a chair that I'm focusing on.  The perspective may change, as I can think of a chair as a unit among a class of objects but I can remember a particular chair I saw yesterday.  Thinking is different than remembering but neither process occurs without content of some kind.  There is always some existential entity that any mental process must ultimately rely on, no matter how abstract the concepts are.  I can certainly think about remembering, and remember about thinking.  But without the existential content, nothing happens.

 

With the modification of "some existential entity" to simply "something" (and this includes emotional responses about which is introspecting), and "must ultimately rely on" to "must have as its subject", i.e.:

"There is always something that any mental process must have as its subject"

...I would agree.

 

One is thinking about something, one is imagining something, one is perceiving something.  To suggest otherwise would be to imply movement can exist separate from that which moves.

Edited July 14, 2013 by organon1973

[A is A]

With the modification of "some existential entity" to simply "something" (and this includes emotional responses about which is introspecting), and "must ultimately rely on" to "must have as its subject", i.e.:

"There is always something that any mental process must have as its subject"

...I would agree.

 

One is thinking about something, one is imagining something, one is perceiving something.  To suggest otherwise would be to imply movement can exist separate from that which moves.

Agreed.

[Eiuol]

This thread strikes me as "reason reasoning about reason".

The concept of metacognition might be useful here.

[Plasmatic]

Metacognition sounds like a cognitive science substitute for epistemology in some sense.

[Vik]

Metacognition sounds like a cognitive science substitute for epistemology in some sense.

 

You can also apply the term to studying the art of thinking.  And to thinking about psycho-epistemology.

[FrolicsomeQuipster]

To me the initial question sounded like; "If we had a sense that told us what's inside of a specific initially empty box it would be invalid because we'd first have to put something inside."