Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

validating volition

Rate this topic


Recommended Posts

Over the years many different Objectivists have said much about free will; most notably the original, herself. But the subject has been recurring rather frequently and I, for one, think a thorough reexamination and (more importantly) concretization is in order.

To start things off, the root of the problem [for average laymen] seems to stem from two seemingly contradictory principles:

1; Volition is axiomatic

The fact that everyone who reads this sentence has the choice to read it or not, as they wish, is self evident to them.

Volition itself is introspectively apparent, indisputable and irreducible (at least as far as I can tell); I'm fairly sure it's axiomatic but we'll return to the implications shortly.

2: Every thing is ultimately necessary

By this I mean that nothing is causeless. There is a reason for the existence and actions of every entity and, given enough knowledge, every entity's future actions could be predicted. In the words of Peikoff:

"No other universe is possible or imaginable [given sufficient information]"; one could imagine flying through the sky like superman but, if one bears the law of gravity in mind, one knows it isn't possible.

This principle of necessity is, I think, not only an explicit part of Objectivism; it's implicit in all rational thought whatsoever. The alternative is for things to act randomly and, if that were ever truly accepted, no inquiry of any sort would be possible; even superstition would be too specific of a confinement (and without knowledge, no action or life would be possible).

So we have 1: the axiom of volition and 2: the principle of necessity (corollary of identity)

I use necessity because the meaning of causality has been somewhat obscured, but that's essentially what I mean.

---

The problem arises when we apply necessity to volition, because we end up debating either Volition by analyzing whether choice is REALLY possible or Necessity by analyzing whether every effect must REALLY have a cause.

I think that both principles are valid and accurate; I think the thing to reexamine is their derivative implications, specifically regarding each other, which thus far have been taken for granted [by average laymen].

---

Regarding necessity, we have a habit of assigning ONE cause to ONE effect. I'm not sure where it stems from but it obviously doesn't conform to reality and, consequently, I'd like everyone to bear in mind that multiple interacting entities usually produce multiple effects, in nature.

For example: were you caused by your mother, your father or an oxygenated atmosphere? That's what I mean; let's avoid it.

---

Regarding volition, the implicit fallacy is in a widespread misintegration of the concept "possible" which is taken to mean causeless; a negation of necessity (which is what makes the two seem contradictory).

But do human beings actually behave arbitrarily?

I think that all of my own choices, including the choice to write this presently, are determined in a singularly necessary way: MY CHOICES ARE DETERMINED BY MY THOUGHTS.

---

Sorry if that's a non sequiter at present but I have to go.

That is, in a nutshell, what I've surmised about Objectivism's take on volition and why I think that free will is absolutely compatible with determinism: you make every decision for your own specific reasons and your ultimate fate depends on those decisions.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Anyway; applying one to the other:

P: Everything which happens, including chosen actions, is necessary under the antecedent conditions

p: I am capable of choosing from a range of possible actions

C: My own choice IS part of the antecedent conditions of my actions!

Now I know this might not obviously square with the Necessity principle, at first glance, so let's reapply it to the predicate term (?):

P: I am capable of choosing from a range of possible actions

p: I choose whichever option seems best, according to certain valuative standards

C: Those standards of value partially cause my choices

And we could repeat this one step further and one step further until we got right down into my sense of life and judgments I formed in infancy.

---

Ultimately I think you *could* completely dissect someone, every perception to every thought to every action, but you couldn't reduce it straight into stimuli and response.

Human beings are self aware creatures which think before they act (and think about thinking, too). Computational nightmare aside, you can't accurately predict anyone's actions while ignoring their mind- NOR chalk it up to a lack of identity.

Compatibilism is right because neither Volition nor Necessity is dispensable. . .

. . . Right?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Over the years many different Objectivists have said much about free will; most notably the original, herself. But the subject has been recurring rather frequently and I, for one, think a thorough reexamination and (more importantly) concretization is in order.

To start things off, the root of the problem [for average laymen] seems to stem from two seemingly contradictory principles:

1; Volition is axiomatic

The fact that everyone who reads this sentence has the choice to read it or not, as they wish, is self evident to them.

Volition itself is introspectively apparent, indisputable and irreducible (at least as far as I can tell); I'm fairly sure it's axiomatic but we'll return to the implications shortly.

2: Every thing is ultimately necessary

By this I mean that nothing is causeless. There is a reason for the existence and actions of every entity and, given enough knowledge, every entity's future actions could be predicted. In the words of Peikoff:

"No other universe is possible or imaginable [given sufficient information]"; one could imagine flying through the sky like superman but, if one bears the law of gravity in mind, one knows it isn't possible.

This principle of necessity is, I think, not only an explicit part of Objectivism; it's implicit in all rational thought whatsoever. The alternative is for things to act randomly and, if that were ever truly accepted, no inquiry of any sort would be possible; even superstition would be too specific of a confinement (and without knowledge, no action or life would be possible).

So we have 1: the axiom of volition and 2: the principle of necessity (corollary of identity)

I use necessity because the meaning of causality has been somewhat obscured, but that's essentially what I mean.

---

The problem arises when we apply necessity to volition, because we end up debating either Volition by analyzing whether choice is REALLY possible or Necessity by analyzing whether every effect must REALLY have a cause.

I think that both principles are valid and accurate; I think the thing to reexamine is their derivative implications, specifically regarding each other, which thus far have been taken for granted [by average laymen].

---

Regarding necessity, we have a habit of assigning ONE cause to ONE effect. I'm not sure where it stems from but it obviously doesn't conform to reality and, consequently, I'd like everyone to bear in mind that multiple interacting entities usually produce multiple effects, in nature.

For example: were you caused by your mother, your father or an oxygenated atmosphere? That's what I mean; let's avoid it.

---

Regarding volition, the implicit fallacy is in a widespread misintegration of the concept "possible" which is taken to mean causeless; a negation of necessity (which is what makes the two seem contradictory).

But do human beings actually behave arbitrarily?

I think that all of my own choices, including the choice to write this presently, are determined in a singularly necessary way: MY CHOICES ARE DETERMINED BY MY THOUGHTS.

---

Sorry if that's a non sequiter at present but I have to go.

That is, in a nutshell, what I've surmised about Objectivism's take on volition and why I think that free will is absolutely compatible with determinism: you make every decision for your own specific reasons and your ultimate fate depends on those decisions.

I think you left out two important identifications that Objectivism has made: what volition is and what causality means.  Volition is the choice to think or not, to focus one's mind or not, to raise one's level of awareness from from a narrower context to a wider context that requires focusing on specific issues.  Causality refer to entities and their actions, not to actions and other actions.  These two issues avoid the usual confusion that thinking is caused by external or internal factors, such as environment or heredity.  

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yes but the identification of volition as the choice to focus doesn't really fix the problem, by itself; it only moves it to "what causes someone to focus or not".

Entity based causality shoul've been mentioned, though; that's one of the major flaws in eliminative materialism.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yes but the identification of volition as the choice to focus doesn't really fix the problem, by itself; it only moves it to "what causes someone to focus or not".

There is no end to which people can ask questions. There is an end to which questions can be asked and answers can logically be given. The question is not "moved" to what is self-evident. The question is declared to be illogical and without foundation.

 

Entity based causality shoul've been mentioned, though; that's one of the major flaws in eliminative materialism.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A=A: I don't follow; I think there's a connection somewhere around the choice to focus that I've failed to make.

Could you elaborate on why the causes of someone's choice to focus or not isn't a valid line of inquiry?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A=A: I don't follow; I think there's a connection somewhere around the choice to focus that I've failed to make.

Could you elaborate on why the causes of someone's choice to focus or not isn't a valid line of inquiry?

Since the choice to focus is an action, the only cause that can be attributed to it is the entity making the choice.  If by 'cause' you mean an internal or external deterministic process that makes the choice non-volitional, then the claim is self-invalidating.  The choice to focus presupposes any such knowledge on your part.  If your grasp of the truth of any item of your knowledge is predetermined, then you have no basis for claiming it is true, that is, that it corresponds to reality.  Logical fallacies are studied for a purpose: to delimit valid knowledge from invalid knowledge no matter how much scientific research one wants to devote to the study.

 

What is the nature of reason if the choice to focus is determined?

 

Do you think the question "why contradictions exist" is a valid line of inquiry?  Why not consider Descartes claim that there may be an evil demon deceiving us, therefore we can't be certain of our perception of the world?  Is that a valid line of inquiry?

 

Where and how would you draw a line?  At what point would you claim "this line of inquiry is illogical and cannot be pursued"?  Where and when does one accept that one has reached a fundamental fact of reality and further questioning is fruitless?

Edited by A is A
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Since the choice to focus is an action, the only cause that can be attributed to it is the entity making the choice.  If by 'cause' you mean an internal or external deterministic process that makes the choice non-volitional, then the claim is self-invalidating.  The choice to focus presupposes any such knowledge on your part.  If your grasp of the truth of any item of your knowledge is predetermined, then you have no basis for claiming it is true, that is, that it corresponds to reality.  Logical fallacies are studied for a purpose: to delimit valid knowledge from invalid knowledge no matter how much scientific research one wants to devote to the study.

 

What is the nature of reason if the choice to focus is determined?

 

Do you think the question "why contradictions exist" is a valid line of inquiry?  Why not consider Descartes claim that there may be an evil demon deceiving us, therefore we can't be certain of our perception of the world?  Is that a valid line of inquiry?

 

Where and how would you draw a line?  At what point would you claim "this line of inquiry is illogical and cannot be pursued"?  Where and when does one accept that one has reached a fundamental fact of reality and further questioning is fruitless?

 

A is A

 

Consider specifically choosing "to focus or not" (although I would argue the analysis applies to "choice" generally and it is irrelevant what particular choice is being discussed but I digress)

 

Consider the choice being made and there being an "outcome" being one of focussing or not focussing.

 

From the following premises of Objectivism:

 

A.  Consciousness/minds/brains/human beings are natural entities of reality.

B.  All entities however chosen in reality whether a system, group, part, subpart, obey the law of identity, as does the universe as a whole.

C.  Objectivism holds that a direct corollary of the law of identity is the law of causation according to objectivism. which is a law of how entities act

D.  The law of causation according to Objectivism is the law of identity applied to action, specifically, that an entity having a specific nature will act in only one way in a specific context.

 

Reason dictates that:

1. a human being, if a natural entity in reality must have an (one) identity as in B

2. If as objectivism holds the law of causation is logically required/implied by the law of identity, then humans must obey the law of causation ©

3. If, as objectivism holds, the law of causation implies a single outcome given the nature/identity of the entity and the nature/identity of the context, then a human entity can only act in one given way having a particular nature/identity in a specific context. 

4. If a human entity can act in only one given way the outcome of any choice is determined at the instant just prior to the choice

 

How is it that humans can have choice, and can choose the "outcome" (focus or not in the hypothetical above) given the premises of Objectivism and reason applied thereto?

 

Which of the premises is/are false or which of the statements of reasoning is/are false?

 

I really need your help here.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A is A

 

Consider specifically choosing "to focus or not" (although I would argue the analysis applies to "choice" generally and it is irrelevant what particular choice is being discussed but I digress)

 

Consider the choice being made and there being an "outcome" being one of focussing or not focussing.

 

From the following premises of Objectivism:

 

A.  Consciousness/minds/brains/human beings are natural entities of reality.

B.  All entities however chosen in reality whether a system, group, part, subpart, obey the law of identity, as does the universe as a whole.

C.  Objectivism holds that a direct corollary of the law of identity is the law of causation according to objectivism. which is a law of how entities act

D.  The law of causation according to Objectivism is the law of identity applied to action, specifically, that an entity having a specific nature will act in only one way in a specific context.

 

Reason dictates that:

1. a human being, if a natural entity in reality must have an (one) identity as in B

2. If as objectivism holds the law of causation is logically required/implied by the law of identity, then humans must obey the law of causation ©

3. If, as objectivism holds, the law of causation implies a single outcome given the nature/identity of the entity and the nature/identity of the context, then a human entity can only act in one given way having a particular nature/identity in a specific context. 

4. If a human entity can act in only one given way the outcome of any choice is determined at the instant just prior to the choice

 

How is it that humans can have choice, and can choose the "outcome" (focus or not in the hypothetical above) given the premises of Objectivism and reason applied thereto?

 

Which of the premises is/are false or which of the statements of reasoning is/are false?

 

I really need your help here.

D is incorrect.  It applies to all other living organisms except those with volition.  

4 assumes D, which I hold is incorrect.  You have no way to predict which choice a volitional being will take no matter how much information you have about them.  You have no way to know whether I will choose to act on my choice once made.  I challenge you to predict whether I will consider your arguments or ignore or evade them when considering my response.  

 

Outcomes only come into play when one has specific information about the values or thinking methods used by a person.  For example, you can probably predict that I will eat food when I get hungry; that I will watch TV if I want to see Jeopardy; that I will think about problems at work if I want to get paid and keep my job.  You can probably predict an outcome if you know that I will keep all of the relevant information in focus before I make decision.  But nothing will enable you to predict that I will focus on the relevant information when making a decision, and nothing will determine it other than my choice to focus or not.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Consciousness is not an entity for starters. It( the abstraction of consciousness ) is an attribute, without going through the rest of the post, would this observation change the logic of the argument?

Who is this addressed to?  If me, I don't understand how it relates to my argument.  Please explain.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A is A: I think I see now. I think there are several components of "deterministic" which need to be differentiated.

I do think the choice to focus must be predictable, given enough information. Whether or not a sufficient amount of information is attainable is a debatable point but, in principle, there must be some "causes" which can be understood.

I think this because the alternative would be that this choice is fundamentally unpredictable; fundamentally arbitrary and incomprehensible, which I do not accept.

However, I see your point about reason and any formal epistemology (thank you); the other component to "determinism" is automation, ie. that X will occur without anyone's deliberate action (which is obviously false).

For example:

If there were a problem which required several conceptual steps to solve, nobody could ever solve it without explicitly taking those steps for themselves- even if they were "destined" to find the solution.

And might I also point out that this is a predictive claim which can only be valid if volitional action is caused.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

"Determinism" contains identity, which I think applies, and automation, which can't.

And I would draw the line of validity between what has a genuine alternate (such as truth) and what doesn't (such as existence).

Contradictions may be formed because the human mind requires things to either be affirmed or denied, to form functional knowledge, and is fallible.

Every application of "illusion" to reality is invalid because an illusion is a perception which contradicts reality; it boils down to questioning the truth or falsehood of the very standard for comparison, itself.

So Descartes' deciever was invalid for the same reason the Matrix is: reality is perfectly identical to reality, A=A. :-P

Link to comment
Share on other sites

"Reality isn't real" is a perfect reification of a contradiction- and interestingly, I've never seen any variation nor permutation of which wasn't uttered with some alternative dreamworld on hand to solve it with.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A is A: I think I see now. I think there are several components of "deterministic" which need to be differentiated.

I do think the choice to focus must be predictable, given enough information. Whether or not a sufficient amount of information is attainable is a debatable point but, in principle, there must be some "causes" which can be understood.

I think this because the alternative would be that this choice is fundamentally unpredictable; fundamentally arbitrary and incomprehensible, which I do not accept.

I would challenge your first sentence in the second paragraph. The cause is the entity, not the amount of information.  There is an element of subjectivism here: given sufficient info, you could then predict.  Look at it from the perspective of the volitional being.  How much information does it take to make the fundamental choice?  NO information is needed because the choice is introspectively self-evident.  I do not need any information about, let's say, the importance of philosophy in life, in order to think about it.  All I have to do is be aware of the subject and decide (choose) to focus on the material at hand to study the issue: to choose to acquire information.  How much information would I need that would cause me to think about the subject matter?  How would I acquire such information without already having made the choice to think?  By the same token, how would YOU acquire such information about me before you'd find it predictable if YOU were not focusing?

 

The choice to focus is independent of any subject or any amount of information.  It is irrelevant whether the choice is to shoot heroine into your veins or which career to follow.  The principle is, then, will I cause my consciousness to function in such a manner as to obtain the information about the subject I am focusing on.  

 

The alternative to predictability is not unpredictability, the alternative is acceptance of the fact of volition as a action open of human consciousness. In other words, the only thing that is predictable is that a choice will be made, and that I (each individual) will face such a choice. 

 

However, I see your point about reason and any formal epistemology (thank you); the other component to "determinism" is automation, ie. that X will occur without anyone's deliberate action (which is obviously false).

For example:

If there were a problem which required several conceptual steps to solve, nobody could ever solve it without explicitly taking those steps for themselves- even if they were "destined" to find the solution.

And might I also point out that this is a predictive claim which can only be valid if volitional action is caused.

There is no such thing as destiny, again, it contradicts volition. But how does this last solve your question. You're basically saying that if certain choices are made, then the consequences of those choices will follow. But the issue here, as I understand your question, is what determines the choice?

 

It is caused, by the entity facing the choice.

 

Edited by A is A
Link to comment
Share on other sites

"Determinism" contains identity, which I think applies, and automation, which can't.

And I would draw the line of validity between what has a genuine alternate (such as truth) and what doesn't (such as existence).

Contradictions may be formed because the human mind requires things to either be affirmed or denied, to form functional knowledge, and is fallible.

Every application of "illusion" to reality is invalid because an illusion is a perception which contradicts reality; it boils down to questioning the truth or falsehood of the very standard for comparison, itself.

So Descartes' deciever was invalid for the same reason the Matrix is: reality is perfectly identical to reality, A=A. :-P

And how does this affect your understanding of volition?  If truth has an alternative but existence does not, what does that tell you about volition?  If human consciousness were not volitional, how could one distinguish between truth and existence?  Do non-human animals have a problem with what is true or not?  Why not?

Edited by A is A
Link to comment
Share on other sites

D is incorrect.  It applies to all other living organisms except those with volition.  

4 assumes D, which I hold is incorrect.  You have no way to predict which choice a volitional being will take no matter how much information you have about them.  You have no way to know whether I will choose to act on my choice once made.  I challenge you to predict whether I will consider your arguments or ignore or evade them when considering my response.  

 

Outcomes only come into play when one has specific information about the values or thinking methods used by a person.  For example, you can probably predict that I will eat food when I get hungry; that I will watch TV if I want to see Jeopardy; that I will think about problems at work if I want to get paid and keep my job.  You can probably predict an outcome if you know that I will keep all of the relevant information in focus before I make decision.  But nothing will enable you to predict that I will focus on the relevant information when making a decision, and nothing will determine it other than my choice to focus or not.

 

Please clarify if you mean D is correctly identified according to Objectivism, but is incorrect, or if you mean to say I have incorrectly identified the premises of Objectivism and D according to Objectivism is something actually something different.  Which is it?

 

I would submit D cannot be incorrect unless something in B or C is incorrect. 

B is taken to be universal according to Objectivism, while C is according to Objectivism logically necessitated from/entailed in B.  Recall the law of causality according to Objectivism is SINGLE valued, and is claimed by Objectivism to be a corollary of the law of identity , merely the law of identity as applied to action.  

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think "could have been otherwise" is the essential difference of volitional action. All existents have identity and have to act accordingly. The identity of volitional organisms is such that its actions could have been otherwise. The actions are caused by the organisms choice to act.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A is A: The posts on valid inquiry were rather tangential; I know your questions were rhetorical but I wanted to share some answers, anyway.

There are two ways I can see in which they relate to volition.

1: The choice to focus having two possible alternates would be, in my opinion, a valid study.

2: This choice, along with the finite nature of knowledge, give rise to the possibility of error (which instincts do not possess).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Concerning "destiny" yes; that's exactly what I'm saying. Actions have consequences- AND CAUSES.

And to say that 'I choose to focus because I'm me' is a tautology. It's completely true (because people who tend to evade will usually continue to evade, and vice versa, across diverse subjects at different times), in that it adheres to observable reality, but it tells us absolutely nothing further.

It isn't functional knowledge; it takes time and effort to remember "people act according to their natures" but by itself this makes no predictions and confers no cognitive advantage whatsoever. If the only function of such is to assert that no further answers are possible and this 'nature' is a necessary blank, then what's the point?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

In order to focus on something one first needs to be aware of its importance.

When someone is driving, cars which pass in the opposite direction usually warrant a minimal level of attention, while the peripheral glimpse of directly oncoming vehicle is enough to supercede every other unrelated thought. Why? Because of the implicit awareness of the impact ;-) of choosing not to focus.

In order to predict someone else's direction of focus, you must know what they consider important (metaphysical value judgments).

---

I'm curious as to what this acceptance of open-endedness is based on and qualitatively how it differs from randomness. If no prediction of anyone else's choice to focus is possible then explain this:

I predict that a devout Christian will evade any logical discussion of certain issues (evolution, logic, selfishness), 95% to 100% of the time. If you'd like we could even observe and empirically quantify how this relates to reality.

And if you grant that such is probably true then what may we infer about volition?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Because if the choice to focus cannot be predicted (further than "it will be made") then logically, nobody is any more or less likely to focus or evade; it's all equally incomprehensible.

To sincerely accept and act on this would mean to never give up on chronic evaders, make no guesses about whether anyone would or wouldn't approach things rationally; take a vow of social agnosticism.

Or have I taken things too literally?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I am starting to see a certain direction here...

 

HD.. I am hitting the same critical point as well.  I think we have contradictory expectations and wants...

 

What I am seeing as a pattern is the desire to believe that WE make choices which are

 

1. not predetermined by anything (including our identity/nature) and not scientifically predictable from natural physical/biological/chemical/psychological processes because we could have chosen otherwise.

2. not unpredictable (not arbitrary or random) but consonant with our personality (due to our nature/identity)

 

It is as if we somehow want to be outside of ourselves or of nature in order to make choice free.  We want to be supernatural... (the "natural" I am referring to here is independent of any particular scientific theory of reality, I take the law of identity and Objectivism's reasoning that the law of single valued causality is a logical consequence of the law of identity as applied to action).  It's like we want to BE "unpredictable" (yet not?), and we want our choices to be determined by US.

 

 

I am also seeing a related pattern with regard to the choice itself (e.g. to focus or not), we want:

 

1. choice to be "determined" by us (after all it's our choice)

2. that the "determination" must be free from external reality

3. that the determination must be "free" enough from reality, the universe, and the nature of the oneself at the instant of choice such that a different outcome "could have been made".

4. that the different outcome of 3 not be arbitrary or random as between the different possibilities but depend on the personality of the chooser.

 

Here we see that we want choice to be non-natural, but beyond this we also want it to be "possibly otherwise" or independent of our nature... in a sense the choice is "not personal"... but at the same time not arbitrary or random.  We want to be the originator of the choice while at the same time restricting the choice to come from outside of ourselves. 

 

 

Take the example of a "could have chosen otherwise" in the context of a choice to focus or not.  Define time T, the instant of choice such that before and at time T the situation is we "could choose either way" and after time T we have chosen to focus or not (leave open the possibility that there is a delay in milliseconds before we actually transition to the state of focus or non focus).

 

At the instant of choice time T consider what "determines" the actual choice made?  If we have in that instant a single identity a single nature how can we said to be able to chose either way?  If in REALITY we are NATURAL and having a single valued IDENTITY, how can at that instant of choice, the choice be "arbitrary".  The arbitrariness of the choice here is literal, if the chooser causes the choice and the choice is independent of the nature of the chooser it must be arbitrary.  You cannot say that it is BECAUSE you were a person B at time T that you happen to choose to focus or that you were person A at time T that you happened to choose "otherwise".  A is A, you are ONE identity, you were in totality one in the same person at that instant in time.  Where in reality does the "could have chosen otherwise" come from if it cannot come from your nature and also cannot be arbitrary? 

 

 

There is something here that needs closer inspection... not sweeping generalization and/or bromides...  

 

 

HD, care to crack out that fine toothed comb and microscope?...  What's really going on here?  I keep thinking the law of causality according to Objectivism is too strong, or its exception re. volition arbitrary and or vague (still possibly valid if undefined... but no one seems to admit that)  In fact the law of causality may be true in reality although not necessarily a logical corollary of the law of identity.

 

 

In complex systems we one day design would observation of any contravention of the law of causality according to Objectivism constitute scientific evidence of a form of volition (perhaps not intelligence but of the mechanism of choice manifesting itself)?

  

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.

×
×
  • Create New...