Animal rights

[Plasmatic]

DA said:

"Grames link asserts they're no fundamental particulars; only configurations of particulars at all scales. This seems to me different than asserting that observable action is presumed to arise from nothing..."

Actually, it says that there are no particulars since it rejects substance ontology altogether.

Edited October 28, 2013 by Plasmatic

[Devil's Advocate]

DA said:

"Grames link asserts they're no fundamental particulars; only configurations of particulars at all scales. This seems to me different than asserting that observable action is presumed to arise from nothing..."

Actually, it says that there are no particulars since it rejects substance ontology altogether.

Hmm... so "patterns of processes" (without substance) vs "base-level entities" (with substance) is what is being contested?  I'll have to read more.  I'm missing where quantum fields lack form or substance, or I'm missing the point altogether (more likely), which I take to be essentially an argument over whether actions can be attributed to quantum fields...

[Harrison Danneskjold]

From the article Grames linked to:

 

On all sides, the presumption has been that the fundamental level of the natural world consists of micro-physical entities of some sort, with their primary properties. These physical entities are clearly some sort of particular. But what sort? Some physicalists believe that it does not matter, that the notion of a physical particular might be defined as an object, a concrete event, or whatever.

That would be "actions without entities".

 

 

What our best contemporary physics reveals is that there are no elementary ‘particles’, fundamental events, or some such particulars. There are only processes of various scales and complexity.

What is the difference between an entity- or an action-based ontology?

A basis of actions, such as David Hume's, defines "cause" as consistently coincident events (summarized from Wikipedia).

So therefore, according to such an ontology, a sporting event could be considered as "caused" by ticket sales.  Barack Obama's reelection was caused by the counting of votes and murder is caused by a gunshot.

Notice that none of these would actually be strictly false, but nonessential (and unable to actually describe the essentials).  The problem, in a nutshell: 

 

They proclaim that there is no law of identity, that nothing exists but change, and blank out the fact that change presupposes the concepts of what changes, from what and to what, that without the law of identity no such concept as“change” is possible.  -Ayn Rand

The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities.)  -Ayn Rand

So, in defining these "primary existents", the purpose is to accurately designate metaphysical essentials. 

---

 

The wave/particle duality places fields and particles on essentially equal footing, empirically.  Whether "fields" can be found in nature is a non-issue because they have been for some time, now.

Whether fields can accurately identify the essential characteristics of QM, in rational and coherent terms, really seems like a no-brainer to me.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

This seems to me different than asserting that observable action is presumed to arise from nothing...

You're absolutely right.

 

H D said:

"Plasmatic: The gist of the paper was that on the quantum level, spatially distinct particles cannot be grasped accurately in isolation; hence the holistic emphasis on FIELDS and CONFIGURATIONS. "

Uh, no. What made you think that?

 From the article:

 

The trajectory of some molecule in an iron wheel cannot be explained other than by taking account of its location in that wheel.  The motion of the wheel as a whole, as it rolls along, is clearly what determines the curving trajectory of that single iron molecule. Yet, the wheel is made up of molecules like this one. It seems as if the properties of the whole depend upon the properties of its parts, yet the movement of each part depends upon the movement of the whole. . .

It [particulate ontology] supposes that molecules, for example, can be decomposed, without remainder, into atoms. Of course, no-one wants to deny that some force holds the atoms in a molecule together. Nevertheless, the implicit claim is that the proper parts of, say, a molecule of water, are two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen, and nothing else. . . So, this apparently harmless explanation of the multi-layered hierarchy of the sciences already implies a clear denial that the spatio-temporal organization of those atoms has any role to play – other than being boundary conditions – in the emergence of the characteristic properties of water. Accordingly, higher-level emergent properties are rendered causally superfluous in this ontology; they have been designed out from the start. . .

However, to take one of the simplest examples, there is more to an atom of hydrogen than an electron and a proton; there is the pattern of the relationship between them, and that pattern of the process, its organization, is what is crucial to the emergent properties of hydrogen. .

 

The glaringly obvious point, if one actually reads the thing, is that entities are not reducible to their components alone; organization also holds causal effaciacy.

And while I have never had much respect for anyone who runs around talking about "the whole being greater than the sum of the parts", with respect to internal configuration it's true!

[Harrison Danneskjold]

You cannot coherently describe the path of a valence electron by any reference to its "nature", nor the path of a single atom inside of a wheel.

This is eloquently pronounced by the identity of combustion and even moreso by that of biological life.

 

The point of the article was that volition is ontologically incommunicable to modern epistemology.

Edited October 28, 2013 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Plasmatic]

Harrison:

The quote you excerpted:

"On all sides, the presumption has been that the fundamental level of the natural world consists of micro-physical entities of some sort, with their primary properties. These physical entities are clearly some sort of particular. But what sort? Some physicalists believe that it does not matter, that the notion of a physical particular might be defined as an object, a concrete event, or whatever."

Is the author describing his opponents "presumption". By " These physical entities are clearly some sort of particular." Campbell is describing the substance ontology he is repudiating. Just to be clear. I clarify because again I don't see how your comment relates to the quote.

How does that quote lead you to believe that the substance ontology he is describing is action without entities? Campbell is criticizing that very presumption because it doesn't fit his anti-substance, bottomless ontology.

[Plasmatic]

Harrison, you are doing it again: (context dropping.)

The quotes you posted are Campbell describing others view point...

"Nevertheless, even simple aggregates have been taken to raise the question of whether some of their macro-properties could exert downward causation upon their constituent parts. One much-discussed example, because it seems to involve reflexivity, is a wheel"

You left this out.

Harrison said:

"The glaringly obvious point, if one actually reads the thing, is that entities are not reducible to their components alone; organization also holds causal effaciacy."

You keep this mind reading rhetoric up and we are gonna have a repeat of the last time you embarrassed yourself. Read, keep context, understand.

You are confused because you aren't familiar with the technical details of debates in ontology and technical terms like substance as it relates to it.

[Plasmatic]

Harrison said:

"If you accept that an internal-combustion engine is different from an axel driven by squirrels (I hope!), then you can't dispute the ontological importance of organization [in entities]."

I haven't disputed "organization in entities" anywhere!

[Harrison Danneskjold]

How does that quote lead you to believe that the substance ontology he is describing is action without entities?

"Some physicalists believe that it does not matter, that the notion of a physical particular might be defined as. . . a concrete event. . ."

 

Sorry.

[Plasmatic]

Ok, so you were referring to the use of "concrete event". It wasn't clear to me what you were pointing at in particular,so rather than assume your point, I wanted to ask you directly.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Plasmatic: I'm sorry, yet again, for my (brief!) lapse of rationality.

If nothing I've said was actually relevant then I really don't get it and would appreciate some explanation of what is wrong with an ontology of fields and processes.

[Plasmatic]

Well, your point that a concrete event is action without entities is correct. Understand that I am contending with Campbell's particular attribution/formulation of what fields and processes could mean. The general question is, "What is one validly entitled to mean by x, where x is a hypothetical imperceptible.

Edited October 30, 2013 by Plasmatic

[Devil's Advocate]

Well, your point that a concrete event is action without entities is correct. Understand that I am contending with Campbell's particular attribution/formulation of what fields and processes could mean. The general question is, "What is one validly entitled to mean by x, where x is a hypothetical imperceptible.

Your "hypothetical imperceptible" sounds a lot like conjecture to me; essentially being some undiscovered reality.  Magicians exist and magic doesn't, so one expects the trick to be dependent on that which can be reproduced by any man, given the knowledge.  In terms of validity, only that which is real can be validated, therefore one wouldn't be entitled to introduce say, God, as anything other than someone like, The Great and Powerful Oz, hiding in a very real room, pulling very real levers, and subject to the same physical laws we all are subject to.

 

Of course the validation process is complicated when the validity of a hypothetical imperceptible is dependent on physical laws that have yet to be resolved.  However until someone discovers a God with irrational powers, I'll continue to presume that all actions depend on real objects; that something cannot be derived from nothing; and that one is only entitled to introduce real evidence to substantiate a claim objectively.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Thank you, Plasmatic.  That makes a bit more sense.

 

However until someone discovers a God with irrational powers, I'll continue to presume that all actions depend on real objects; that something cannot be derived from nothing; and that one is only entitled to introduce real evidence to substantiate a claim objectively.

There wasn't anything wrong with your post, DA, but I just thought I'd point out that the issue with God is more than empirical; the concept itself is self-contradictory.

For instance: if God can do anything, can he microwave a burrito so hot that He, Himself, couldn't eat it?  If he could then he couldn't eat it and if he couldn't then he could; it's a contradiction.

 

So the concepts of "omnipotence", "omniscience", et cetera, are themselves logically impossible.  So I just thought I'd mention, it's safe to assume that no such thing will ever be discovered.

[StrictlyLogical]

HD:

 

You speak of a weak god according to perhaps an ancient philosophy.

 

 

The one true God of the TRUE mystic IS a contradiction.  He has no identity for identity would be a limit to what he is, he is THIS, he is like THAT.  God can and cannot do anything, everything, and nothing.  He is beyond logic, outside of time and space, and you cannot say anything about him whatever, even that he is the one true God. 

 

Logical impossibility, as a true mystic would "just know", is no limit to the power of God. 

 

The only thing for us mortals to do is obey, bow our heads and kneel, and cease trying to understand and/or explain what is beyond everything.

[Devil's Advocate]

...

So the concepts of "omnipotence", "omniscience", et cetera, are themselves logically impossible.  So I just thought I'd mention, it's safe to assume that no such thing will ever be discovered.

Oh, I hope not...

 

Doing anything, or knowing everything is still logically possible, so long as what is possible is confined to reality.  The contradiction would be to assert that doing or knowing something is possible, but not achievable.  Humans are fallible beings because we make mistakes, but that's hardly a condition that logically prevents us from getting it right.  The concept of God, or being godlike, is too often used to justify a presumption of inability and ignorance, i.e., of being only human, but fallibility ≠ incapacity.  That which is possible cannot logically be impossible because it has yet to be done or learned.

 

Discovery is the bridge between what is possible and what is achievable.

[Devil's Advocate]

"It may be that our role on this planet is not to worship God, but to create him." ~ Arthur C. Clarke

[dream_weaver]

The first question that comes to mind from that is "Role? As determined by whom?" As self-determined individuals, we determine our own role on this planet. That some individuals determine their role is either to worship or create myth is sad. Sadder still is when enough of them determine their role is to make sure everyone else is *supposed* to do what they have determined such a role *ought* be.

[Devil's Advocate]

I was using Clarke's statement (which happened to be one of the quotes listed below as I reviewed this page earlier) to supplement my prior comments to Harrison (post #152).  My point there being primarily that a finite universe implies finite abilities and knowledge, i.e., finite possibilities.  Doing anything that is doable, and knowing everything that is knowable remains possible even for fallible beings.

 

Voltaire makes a similar point to Clarke's ~ "If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him."

 

I believe the common thread being expressed (if not in terms of role) is that concepts like God (or heroic beings) serve to advance our understanding of what is possible for us to become.  Rather than kneel to the unattainable, we simply desire to achieve a better version of ourselves.

[dream_weaver]

This interpretation would be more in line with an author like Joeseph Campbell who did a number of books such as "The Power of Myth", "Hero With a Thousand Faces", etc.

[Devil's Advocate]

The distinction I'd make at this point is the use of the supernatural in such concepts to account for what is possible.  As Plasmatic asks in post #148, "The general question is, 'What is one validly entitled to mean by x, where x is a hypothetical imperceptible?'"  Contemporary knowledge doesn't allow for a supernatural 'x'.  In this respect, I believe the use of Nature's God is more credible, but only as a means of accounting for actions and abilities that don't contradict reality.  That which we aspire to become, or to discover, must remain attainable in reality.

 

The obvious problem is the use of terms like omniscience and omnipotence (or hypothetical imperceptibles?) to imply what is impossible.  Again, knowing everything that can be known, or doing anything that can be done, isn't unachievable to fallible beings such as ourselves, so long as what is possible is ultimately validated by reality.

Edited November 2, 2013 by Devil's Advocate

[stevetherawman]

[Mod's note: merged with a previous thread. - sN]

 

 

Hey guys, longtime Objectivist here... One thing I just can't get over is the idea of animals having rights. Obviously it's ridiculous and all but how do we prove without a doubt that animals don't have a conceptual consciousness like humans and that they only exist to survive and reproduce and to fill an ecological niche? I've seen animal rights groups stating that whales, dolphins, great apes, elephants, etc. are self aware like us and can conceptualize (because self-awareness means stepping outside your body hypothetically) ... Any ideas on how to prove them wrong? Thoughts? Thanks guys looking forward to some answers. 

Edited March 8, 2014 by softwareNerd
Merged

[tadmjones]

Hey Steve

Which card level are you? I hear seventh level one is now stainless steel ,and I think they're skimping because it's real thin.

I'm new ,so I don't know how to prove animal rights don't exist,yet (fingers crossed tho!) somebody will probably post soon and tell you.

[Hairnet]

SteveTheRAWMAN

 

STRAWMAN

 

Forgive me, I am not sober.

 

Anyways...

 

If this conversation is serious, we have to ask to what degree animals can actually respect human rights. . Cognitive abilities aren't as important to this discussion as people usually make it.

 

I would like for Elephants to not be threatened by violence, but they need an environment where they won't come into conflict with human property rights. I view this as similar to the conflict between nomads and civilized people. The most realistic way for these beings to get help is to get a human patron who can establish a large area of land to sustain these creatures efficiently. I think this is very feasible because there is wilderness all over the world.

[bluecherry]

". . . how do we prove without a doubt that animals don't have a conceptual consciousness like humans . . ."

The burden of proof is on those who say that they do have such a consciousness.