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Ultimate Constituents and their Actions

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In another thread, a question arose. This is an interesting and controversial issue, deserving of a thread of its own.

Are you saying that you hold open the possibility that inanimate matter could act volitionally?

Isn't it true that as long as current theory (the first quote above) [The current argument is that there are two fundamental and mutually exclusive modes of actions possible to all entities that exist in the universe; they either act deterministically, or by choice.] doesn't contradict the fundamental axioms that no matter what we discover about the nature of the ultimate constituents their actions will not contradict that theory either?

Your assertion that the ultimate constituents could act indeterministically seems arbitrary to me. And since everything I've ever read from you negates this possibility it must be my interpretation that is faulty. Help.

I have made no positive assertions as to the mode of action of the ultimate constituents, other than to say that they will act in accord with their nature. We are not omniscient and philosophy alone cannot tell us what sort of things may exist in the universe, and by what causal principles they may act. The ultimate constituents may be as different in nature and action as consciousness is from matter. All that can be ruled out are metaphysical impossibilities such as contradictions of identity, or actions that are not causal.

Notions such as deterministic or volitional behavior are derived from entities that exist in the three-dimensional world perceived by our senses. Attributes of these entities -- such as extension, shape, color, texture, etc. -- may not be primary aspects of metaphysical reality, but rather effects of the ultimate constituents as perceived by our senses. We simply cannot state in advance, philosophically, what the nature of the ultimate constituents must be, and not knowing their identity we cannot know in advance how the very notion of action applies to them.

Edit: Would a moderator please correct the spelling error ("Ultimat" should be "Ultimate") in the subject name of this thread. Thanks.

<FC: Done. Actually, the thread's title is specified in the first post of the thread. You could have edited it yourself :lol: When I started using forums regularly it took me some time to realize this.>

Edited by Free Capitalist
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Interesting. Deterministic and volitional are not necessarily exhaustive of all types of behaviors. They are merely what we have observed in our three-dimensional world so far.

This is easier to grasp if one remembers that deterministic and volitional is not the same as causal and non-causal (two terms that are exhaustive).

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Interesting.  Deterministic and volitional are not necessarily exhaustive of all types of behaviors.  They are merely what we have observed in our three-dimensional world so far.

I was with you up until that last "so far." I would say that on the level of entities that we perceive, "determinstic" and "volitional" are exhaustive in that they represent two fundamental alternative modes of action. We know this not just as empirical observation, but having to do with the nature of entities. So, the "so far" would be arbitrarily entertaining something different. But, for the ultimate constituents the issue is not the same, because we cannot necessarily philosophically ascribe to them a nature like that of our three dimensional entities. We do not even know in what way action applies to the ultimate constituents, other than such action reflects their nature.

This is easier to grasp if one remembers that deterministic and volitional is not the same as causal and non-causal (two terms that are exhaustive).

That is an interesting observation in its own right.

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Incidentally, I should note that this particular issue regarding the ultimate constituents and their action was first brought to my attention by Alex. We subsequently discussed this subject for some time on HBL, and it remains, for some, controversial. All credit for the intitial thought goes to Alex, and any errors in representing his view are mine.

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Edit: Would a moderator please correct the spelling error ("Ultimat" should be "Ultimate") in the subject name of this thread. Thanks.

<FC: Done. Actually, the thread's title is specified in the first post of the thread. You could have edited it yourself :D When I started using forums regularly it took me some time to realize this.>

After it posted I noted the error in the subject line, and wanted to correct via the "Edit." Unfortunately, I could not find any way for that to be done, which is why I edited the post with the request for a moderator to fix it. How can an edit of the first post allow me to change the subject line if it does not give me the subject line as an editable entry?

Anyway, thanks for the fix.

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Notions such as deterministic or volitional behavior are derived from entities that exist in the three-dimensional world perceived by our senses. Attributes of these entities -- such as extension, shape, color, texture, etc. -- may not be primary aspects of metaphysical reality, but rather effects of the ultimate constituents as perceived by our senses. We simply cannot state in advance, philosophically, what the nature of the ultimate constituents must be, and not knowing their identity we cannot know in advance how the very notion of action applies to them.

I agree entirely. I take credit (or, should I say, responsibility :D) for first raising this issue a while back. As I see it, there are two central premises here, both of which are explicit in the Objectivist corpus:

1) All we can say about the ultimate constituents is that they must have identity; as such, they need not be anything like perceptible, three-dimensional objects. As Ayn Rand said: "The only thing of which we can be sure, philosophically, is that the ultimate stuff, if its ever found -- one element or ten of them -- will have identity" (ITOE, 291). See also Dr. Peikoff's discussion of the "puffs of meta-energy" in Chapter Two of OPAR, which he says may be "radically different from anything men know now" (45).

2) The law of causality -- and, therefore, the law of identity as well -- do not by themselves mandate determinism. The law of causality is an abstract, metaphysical law, which only states that an entity cannot act in contradiction to its nature. As Dr. Peikoff writes on p.68 of OPAR:

The law of causality affirms a necessary connection between entities and their actions. It does not, however, specify any particular kind of entity or of action. The law does not say that only mechanistic relationships can occur, the kind that apply when one billiard ball strikes another; this is one common form of causation, but it does not preempt the field....The law of causality does not inventory the universe; it does not tell us what kinds of entities or actions are possible.

Given these two facts, we simply cannot say that the ultimate constituents must be deterministic -- and nor can we say that they must be either determinstic or volitional. Since their nature may be "radically different from anything men know now," so might their actions.

P.S. - With Stephen, I wanted to underscore that this issue is controversial, and the conclusions here being advocated by myself and Stephen are not part of Objectivism.

--Alex

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So, to make sure I understand this: It may turn out that the behavior of the ultimate constituents is either deterministic or volitional -- or it may be something entirely new to us. We cannot know which is the case without knowing the constituent's identity, which philosophy cannot tell us.

How is this controversial? What are the arguments against it?

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So, to make sure I understand this:  It may turn out that the behavior of the ultimate constituents is either deterministic or volitional -- or it may be something entirely new to us.

I would not make any positive assertions at all about the mode of action of the ultimate constituents, even in the form of possibilities. We simply do not know what action really means when applied to the ultimate constituents.

We cannot know which is the case without knowing the constituent's identity, which philosophy cannot tell us.
Replacing "which" with "what," I would agree.

How is this controversial?  What are the arguments against it?

Since I do not think there are any arguments against this that are fully coherent, it is best left to those who disagree to present their arguments.

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Let me see if I can see ask this question correctly. From what I understand of Metaphysics its definition is essentially: all things that our conciousness percieves out in reality. Correct me if I'm wrong. Then from there we have epistimology and that leads eventually to the physical sciences. Correct?

My question is: Can we properly apply the knowledge that we gain from the physical sciences, physics in particular to metaphysical reality? In other words, say we start with a table that we perceive with our senses. We say it's a table, that it has that identity, that it exists.

But as we gain more knowledge we learn more about that table. Eventually we learn that table is composed of many atoms. Can we now say we not just metaphysically perceive a table but also its constituent atoms?

Then we learn the table's atoms consist of entities such as quarks, gluons, leptons, et cetera. Can't we now state that we metaphysically perceive those particles also? We may not directly perceive them with our natural senses. But we can use scientific experiments to infer their existence. But we now know they exist metaphysically, correct?

Couldn't we follow this procedure repeatedly until we reach the ultimate constituents?

In a very real way since the first time you noticed the table sitting out in reality metaphysically with just your basic senses weren't you actually really just doing elementary physics? Were you not describing the table's properties in an elementary way so as to make sense of reality? Were you not just doing this so you could make predictions of tables you may incounter in the future?

I guess my main question is do we need the concept "metaphysical" when what we mean is the physical? Do we need "metaphysics" when what we are really always doing is elementary physics?

Is metaphyisics a valid concept when what we are refering to is reality?

Comments? And I understand Ayn Rand refered to it as metaphysics, but this is still a valid question.

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Let me see if I can see ask this question correctly.  From what I understand of Metaphysics its definition is essentially:  all things that our conciousness percieves out in reality.  Correct me if I'm wrong.  Then from there we have epistimology and that leads eventually to the physical sciences. Correct?

Metaphysics studies the nature of reality from a broad perspective, reality as a whole. So, for instance, metaphysics is concerned with matter as that which all things are made of, whereas the physical sciences deal with the specific forms of matter, the detailed nature of substances.

My question is: Can we properly apply the knowledge that we gain from the physical sciences, physics in particular to metaphysical reality?
Of course. What else would the physical sciences deal with if not with metaphysical reality?

In other words, say we start with a table that we perceive with our senses. We say it's a table, that it has that identity, that it exists.

But as we gain more knowledge we learn more about that table. Eventually we learn that table is composed of many atoms. Can we now say we not just metaphysically perceive a table but also its constituent atoms?

I do not know what you mean by "metaphysically perceive," but we cannot perceive atoms directly with our unaided senses.

Then we learn the table's atoms consist of entities such as quarks, gluons, leptons, et cetera.  Can't we now state that we metaphysically perceive those particles also?  We may not directly perceive them with our natural senses.  But we can use scientific experiments to infer their existence. But we now know they exist metaphysically, correct?
If we do not observe these entities, either directly by our senses or indirectly with the aid of appropriate instruments, then their existence is an inference whose validity is dependent on the quality of the evidence and the logic of the inference. But, yes, granted appropiate evidence and proper reasoning, an inference can lead to knowledge where we know with certainty of the existence of entities that we have not yet directly perceived. But, the further we get from sense perception the more we require in accumulated evidence. The acceptance of atomic theory in the 19th century is an example of this.

Couldn't we follow this procedure repeatedly until we reach the ultimate constituents?

Unless we actually look at reality along the way -- unless we get to perceive these intermediate entities, either directly or indirectly through instrumentation -- the more risk we run of rationalistically building castles in the sky.

In a very real way since the first time you noticed the table sitting out in reality metaphysically with just your basic senses weren't you actually really just doing elementary physics?
No.

Were you not describing the table's properties in an elementary way so as to make sense of reality?

We isolate characteristics or attributes of "table," but only in a general way, leaving out specific measurements. That is part of how we form concepts. By contrast physics deals with the detailed nature of the table, i.e., the specific geometrical properties of its shape, the detailed properties of the material of which it is composed, etc.

Were you not just doing this so you could make predictions of tables you may incounter in the future?
"[P]redictions of tables?" Perhaps you mean: by forming a proper concept of "table" we can automatize that identification and automatically perceive as a table some particular thing that we did not perceive before.

I guess my main question is do we need the concept "metaphysical" when what we mean is the physical? Do we need "metaphysics" when what we are really always doing is elementary physics?

Hopefully by now you will see that this is not the case.

Is metaphyisics a valid concept when what we are refering to is reality?

I do not understand. What else should metaphysics refer to if not reality?

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Notions such as deterministic or volitional behavior are derived from entities that exist in the three-dimensional world perceived by our senses. Attributes of these entities -- such as extension, shape, color, texture, etc. -- may not be primary aspects of metaphysical reality, but rather effects of the ultimate constituents as perceived by our senses.

You say that some things (extension, shape, color, texture, etc.) are not necessarily "primary aspects of metaphysical reality." What do you mean by that?

The way I understand it, things like shape, color, and texture are relationships among entities and these concepts refer to different identifications of these relationships (the frequencies of light they reflect, etc.). I see these relationships as necessarily existing in reality--our senses don't give us "bad data."

In that sense, I think it's perfectly valid to say that extension exists in reality (as an identified relationship among entities).

I think I get the rest of the argument, but I'm unclear on what exactly is meant by this particular claim. What I don't understand is whether or not you're saying it's possible that things like shape, extension, color, etc. do not exist in reality. An important part of my misundersatnding is that I don't understand what you mean by "effects ... as perceived by our senses." Could you elaborate on this idea to help clarify my confusions?

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Metaphysics studies the nature of reality from a broad perspective, reality as a whole. So, for instance, metaphysics is concerned with matter as that which all things are made of, whereas the physical sciences deal with the specific forms of matter, the detailed nature of substances.

I just want to add (even though I'm sure Mr. Speicher is aware of this) that metaphysics does not say that (only) a physical world exists. (See Leonard Peikoff's OPAR, Chapter One.) In reality, there is also consciousness, which is not material, i.e., not physical.

Matter might substantiate consciousness, but it is not consciousness. That is to say, consciousness qua consciousness falls outside the domain of matter and, thus, of physics.

Consciousness may be produced by chemophysical components and processes, but, to quote Harry Binswanger, "what is produced is produced." (The Metaphysics of Consciousness.)

Consciousness is an irreducible primary.

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I don't understand is whether or not you're saying it's possible that things like shape, extension, color, etc. do not exist in reality.... An important part of my misundersatnding is that I don't understand what you mean by "effects ... as perceived by our senses."

I think you would enjoy reading the section in OPAR where Peikoff discusses these sort of issues (Chapter 2, in the section "Sensory Qualities as Real," pp. 44-48). Personally, I think this is one of the best written sections in OPAR, and, perhaps, an area where he explicates some fascinating issues that were not greatly discussed in the Objectivist corpus.

In essence, though, of course there is only one reality -- all that exists -- and certainly shape, size, etc. exist in reality. But it is illustrative to distinguish between form and object, between those things that are tied to our perceptual apparatus, and that which exists apart from us. The former are not primaries -- not fundamental aspects of metaphysical reality -- and the latter are efects -- effects of the actions of primaries on our perceptual apparatus. But calling them "effects" does not make them less real; we explain the reality of these effects by reference to the primaries that cause them.

Edit: Fixed wrong Chapter number for OPAR.

Edited by stephen_speicher
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...

Thanks, that cleared up my confusion on the issue. I appreciate your very precise use of terminology--it made understanding what you said very clear when I re-read the section of OPAR you mentioned.

Also, I thought your and Alex's HBL posts on the topic were excellent.

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Thanks, that cleared up my confusion on the issue.  I appreciate your very precise use of terminology--it made understanding what you said very clear when I re-read the section of OPAR you mentioned.

Also, I thought your and Alex's HBL posts on the topic were excellent.

Thanks. Glad you enjoyed it.

It is really fascinating to observe how often we hear the claim from anti- or pseudo- Objectivists, that Objectivists march in lockstep and just blindly follow a leader. They obviously are not aware of the debates and disagreements that we have had on HBL and other forums.

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Stephen, I am trying to understand Little's Theory of Elemental Waves. In part one of your non-technical explanation (very helpful, by the way), you write:

It is not a wave in the usual sense at all - it is an elementary wave -

a _fundamental constituent of reality_. In effect, it _is_ the

medium. I cannot stress strongly enough the importance of this

idea. Little's theory identifies the most basic 'stuff' of

existence. This is not just the mathematical representation of a

phenomenon, this is a _real_ wave. The elementary wave cannot be

understood by appealing to anything more basic to explain it -

there is nothing more basic. The elementary waves have a

structure and the effects of the changes in that structure are

all we can know about them.

And a little later you write:

In Little's view the elementary waves are

primary in the sense that they carry dynamic quantities such as

mass, momentum, energy, etc.

This seems to be inconsistent with what you have expressed in this thread, inasmuch as Little is claiming to know that the behavior of the ultimate constituent is deterministic. Has Little's theory been abandoned? Or, in these posts are you referring to other, as yet unidentified ultimate constituents?

Or am I mixing science and philosophy by comparing these?

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(AisA @ Jan 21 2005, 02:01 PM)

Deterministic and volitional are not necessarily exhaustive of all types of behaviors.  They are merely what we have observed in our three-dimensional world so far.

(Stephen)I was with you up until that last "so far." I would say that on the level of entities that we perceive, "determinstic" and "volitional" are exhaustive in that they represent two fundamental alternative modes of action. We know this not just as empirical observation, but having to do with the nature of entities. So, the "so far" would be arbitrarily entertaining something different.
This is the way I see it (and not having seen HBL): Deterministic and volitional are both causal. Volition is self-caused, leaving more than one possible action for the same conditions. But even though self-caused and not self caused are exhaustive, the concept of volition has arisen in the context of facts of consciousness. If there is no evidence of any non-conscious form of self causation, then one cannot assert its possibility. Still, volition is not defined as non-deterministic, which is a broader idea, i.e., volition vs. determinstic is not a case of A or not A. This leaves open the possibility of a scientific investigation in search of evidence for other kinds of self-causation, just as science may try to investigate any realm of the unknown -- but only in accordance with a proper epistemology for the particular, specialized science. What that may be depends on the objectivity, integrity and standards established by specialists in that field, and cannot be deduced from general philosophy (which also of course cannnot rationalistically deduce particular scientific facts). What is the controversy?
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  • 5 months later...

This topic is very interesting and is especially misunderstood in the context of Christian theology. I see similar misunderstanding on this board. Free will does not require that physics be non-deterministic. Free will is misunderstood as an ability to make truly random choices. I would suggest that free will be reinterpreted as the physical ability of the brain to dynamically process situations in an incredibly exhaustive context (memories, recent feelings, the weather, etc.). Why is the thought of making blind random decisions so sought after? It seems to me that "free will" as people are thinking of it is the pointless ability to make arbitrary decisions without a cause. This doesn't make any sense.

The emotional issues unknowledgeable Christians or atheists have when dealing with the concept of predestination in its theological context can be solved by this rethinking of free will.

I will attempt to explain free will from a deterministic perspective. Destiny be "changed" without randomness Here is an example: I have told you that you can make your own decisions, and you have in your memory a collection of ideas about "good decisions" that you'd like to make. This context is enough to cause you to change your decision making patterns. The realization of "free will" and the ideas in your memory are enough to change your behavior.

Isn't choice simply the realization of your ability to evaluate complex information, where that realization (or lack thereof) is enough to change the outcome of your evaluation?

I think this is enough for now, and I would appreciate feedback if you disagree so that I can deconstruct this idea in the hopes that I can take things a step further.

Edited by fitchmicah
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I would suggest that free will be reinterpreted as the physical ability of the brain to dynamically process situations in an incredibly exhaustive context (memories, recent feelings, the weather, etc.). [...]

[...] I would appreciate feedback if you disagree so that I can deconstruct this idea in the hopes that I can take things a step further.

[bold added for emphasis.]

Are you trying to make a point in philosophy or in a specialized science such as physiology?

What do you mean by "deconstruct"?

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[bold added for emphasis.]

Are you trying to make a point in philosophy or in a specialized science such as physiology?

What do you mean by "deconstruct"?

Perhaps I am making the point by means of psychology, but I don't think anyone can argue against the idea that the brain is able to process complex and even abstract situations and determine an outcome; whether or not you believe in its ability to make "random choices" it seems undisputed that brains have the ability process information and human brains are even able to process abstract information.

When I say "deconstruct" I am referring to deconstructionism, which is the movement promoting the examination of assumptions (including "binary opposites") in the context of competing metanarratives. I am not necessarily a postmodernist but I definitely find deconstruction useful as a tool to solidify ideas.

Edited by fitchmicah
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I will attempt to explain free will from a deterministic perspective.  Destiny be "changed" without randomness  Here is an example:  I have told you that you can make your own decisions, and you have in your memory a collection of ideas about "good decisions" that you'd like to make.

Looks like I was tired last night at 3 in the morning!

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I will attempt to explain free will from a deterministic perspective.  Destiny be "changed" without randomness  Here is an example:  I have told you that you can make your own decisions, and you have in your memory a collection of ideas about "good decisions" that you'd like to make.  This context is enough to cause you to change your decision making patterns.  The realization of "free will" and the ideas in your memory are enough to change your behavior.

Im going to continue my hostility towards compatibilism until the day someone gives me a non-arbitrary reason why we cant attribute compatibalist freewill to animals, computers, thermometers, and any other physical system which we can take the intentional stance towards (to borrow a term from Dennett).

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Perhaps I am making the point by means of psychology, but I don't think anyone can argue against the idea that the brain is able to process complex and even abstract situations and determine an outcome;  whether or not you believe in its ability to make "random choices" it seems undisputed that brains have the ability process information and human brains are even able to process abstract information.

Within the current model of physics, it doesnt make sense to talk about brains processing information. A brain is a physical object, made up of elementary particles. Other physical objects, also made of elementary particles, interact with the brain. This is a purely physical process and most scientists would assume it can be described entirely by the equations of quantum physics, or whatever other physical theory we have to describe the interactions of particles at this basic level.

But, at no stage in this process is there any 'processing of information' - there is only the interaction of quantum objects, in accordance with the equations of physics. In this sense, the brain is no different from any other physical system - it doesnt make any more sense to say a brain processes information than to say a tree or a rock processes information. Yet out of this physical system, consciousness somehow emerges. And on the level of consciousness, no information is processed either. I am not aware of any 'information processing' in my day to life, nor have I any reason to believe that it occurs behind the scenes.

The information processing idea requires that there exists a third ''layer' which sits in between the physical brain and the non physical mind, and carries out some kind of computational process. But there is no evidence that such a layer exists, nor is it clear what explanatory role it is supposed to play. As far as I can tell, its just a product of speculative metaphysics and rationalism.

Edited by Hal
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Within the current model of physics, it doesnt make sense to talk about brains processing information. A brain is a physical object, made up of elementary particles. Other physical objects, also made of elementary particles, interact with the brain. This is a purely physical process and most scientists would assume it can be described entirely by the equations of quantum physics, or whatever other physical theory we have to describe the interactions of particles at this basic level.

But, at no stage in this process is there any 'processing of information' - there is only the interaction of quantum objects, in accordance with the equations of physics. In this sense, the brain is no different from any other physical system - it doesnt make any more sense to say a brain processes information than to say a tree or a rock processes information. Yet out of this physical system, consciousness somehow emerges. And on the level of consciousness, no information is processed either. I am not aware of any 'information processing' in my day to life, nor have I any reason to believe that it occurs behind the scenes.

The information processing idea requires that there exists a third ''layer' which sits in between the physical brain and the non physical mind, and carries out some kind of computational process. But there is no evidence that such a layer exists, nor is it clear what explanatory role it is supposed to play. As far as I can tell, its just a product of speculative metaphysics and rationalism.

I don't know what you think I mean by "processing information." All I mean is that the brain takes multiple inputs and adds them together to give an output. The "third layer" idea is not required. I personally am against the idea of any layers, as it seems that there is a clear and intuitive way to determine what is information. Just because information itself is not physical, quantum particles and abstract ideas aren't in different "layers." On the contrary, abstract ideas are represented and kept alive by the arrangements and interactions of particles (i.e. the brain, a calculator, a piece of paper with writing on it, a phone call, etc.).

But, at no stage in this process is there any 'processing of information' - there is only the interaction of quantum objects, in accordance with the equations of physics. In this sense, the brain is no different from any other physical system

But the interaction of quantum objects can be processing of information. That is what a computer is. The difference (and it is a very big difference, not just arbitrary) between a computer and a human being–or a thermometer/animal for that matter–is the level at which abstract ideas can be processed (again, there is no "layering" system for a computer to process information as you have suggested is necessary, the patterns of quantum particles interacting are the processing of information). Human beings can comprehend their own existence. A computer cannot logically comprehend its own existence from the input given to it, while a person can; "information" enters a humans brain in the form of physical observation of the interactions of particles, whether it be particles in a sound wave or particles of light bouncing off of a sheet of paper, and a some of this "information" causes the brain to act in a way that realizes its own existence. Why doesn't a dog have free will? Because it doesn't realize its own ability to make decisions.

Edited by fitchmicah
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In this sense, the brain is no different from any other physical system - it doesnt make any more sense to say a brain processes information than to say a tree or a rock processes information. Yet out of this physical system, consciousness somehow emerges. And on the level of consciousness, no information is processed either. I am not aware of any 'information processing' in my day to life, nor have I any reason to believe that it occurs behind the scenes.

You should rethink what "information" is. What does it mean for something to be "abstract." Just because everything is physical it doesn't mean things can't carry different amounts of abstract value. I think the simplest way of thinking about abstract value is mathematics. Interaction of quantities, whether or not they exist, is abstract. Rocks and trees don't do math, brains do.

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