Nitpick: Words are not concepts

[Questioner]

Personally, I don't read it exactly in that way. She has already suggested that there is a wordless process immediately prior to and immediately following that quote. As for when she says, "if the process were identified in words," I read the "if" statement as a conditional statement where the if-clause indicates that there is a condition that is, in theory, possible to fulfill. The fact that it suggests possible fulfillment in theory does not entail that its fulfillment is necessary. I understand the quote as being there merely to serve as an example to illustrate and somewhat clarify the meaning of the wordless process. Remember, in the text, she has so far said nothing in a formal way to indicate that a concept's existence is dependent upon being denoted by a word or that that is what we should understand from that quote. I could certainly be wrong in my reading of this passage, but this is how I understand it.

 

Also, look at the line just before the one that you quoted:

 

"In order to form the concept 'length,' the child’s mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following..."

 

Again, that line suggests that the child’s mind retains the attribute [common to multiple existents] and omits [the] particular measurements [of those multiple existents] in order to form the concept "length." In other words, it is not entirely clear whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word.

 

Now, as for when you say:

 

"'I shall identify as 'length,'" indicates an explicit identification, which would be a word."

 

I think that you might be right. Maybe, in this case, "length" refers to the word and not just the attribute. Thank you for catching that and pointing it out, I definitely overlooked it. I will need more time to really think about it.

 

Thanks again — it is an excellent point!

Edited February 19, 2014 by Questioner

[Questioner]

I realize that surely this is a dead horse by now; nonetheless, my own compulsiveness requires that I mention this.

 

Apparently due to my lack of diligence and thorough reading, I missed this passage from the ITOE which I would now like to present:

 

• The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought (but which can be broken into its component units whenever required). _________In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts. Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. (Proper names are used in order to identify and include particular entities in a conceptual method of cognition. Observe that even proper names, in advanced civilizations, follow the definitional principles of genus and differentia: e.g., John Smith, with “Smith” serving as genus and “John” as differentia— or New York, U.S.A.) Words transform concepts into (mental) entities; definitions provide them with identity. (Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate sounds.)

 

Rand, Ayn (1990-04-26). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition (p. 10-11). Plume. 

 

Obviously, this passage clearly refutes my earlier position — implied or otherwise, that Rand never formally and explicitly mentions that concepts and words have a specific type of relationship until page 19 of the ITOE. It is worth noting that the above passage still retains a lack of clarity with regard to concepts and words. It is only after page 19 (additionally supplemented by conversations in the appendix) that things become somewhat clearer (i.e. — concepts do not exist in the mind of an individual until there is a word associated with/that denotes that concept in the mind of that individual).

 

From this passage, we may gather the following:

1. The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought...
2. In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete (i.e. — a material/physical/non-mental existent that is a visible, audible, and/or tangible word)
3. Language is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes
4. Words transform concepts into (mental) entities

This passage, for me, really exemplifies some of Rand's confusing writing style. If we just look at what she actually says, it is not at all clear what she is actually trying to say. I suppose that this is why this forum is so helpful — it helps clarify one's own thinking, as well as Rand's actual meaning.

 

• From point #1, we can understand that the integration involved in a concept blends units into a single, new mental entity.

• From point #2, we can understand that, generally, a concept can only be used as a single unit if it is given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete.
  • More specifically, we can understand that the enormous sum integrated by a concept can only be used as a single unit if it is given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. 

 

Let's pause here for a moment. For the sake of simplicity, let's use what I am designating as the general point #2 (i.e. — a concept can only be used as a single unit if...) in order to elucidate what is being said. Here, we can extract more clarity from the above statement if we substitute the definition of unit for the word unit, so that the statement reads:

 

We can understand that, generally, a concept can only be used as a single existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members if it is given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete (i.e. — a visible, audible, and/or tangible word).

 

 

Why is this significant? It is because if, generally, a concept is NOT given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, then it CANNOT be used as a single unit. In such a case, this merely means that a concept CANNOT be used as a single existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members. 

 

Thus, we can understand that as long as a concept is not regarded as an unique member of a kind/group, then there is no need for it to be given the form of a perceptual concrete. From this position, it is indeed possible for there to be any number of primary/first level concepts that utterly and completely lack the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. This is because these primary/first level concepts are not mental integrations of two or more concept-units... Instead, they are mental integrations of two or more material-existent-units. 

 

A similar case may be made with regard to specific point #2 (i.e. — the enormous sum integrated by a concept can only be used as a single unit if...). I will leave it up to the reader to formulate that argument on their own — they should be careful to follow the same argument form as the one outlined above.

 

• From point #3, we can understand that language converts concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes.

Her use of the word, “converts,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental equivalents of concretes until such a time that a word converts that concept into the mental equivalent of a concrete. There is the explicit intimation that concepts exist prior to being denoted by a word and independently of whether or not they are actually denoted by a word.

• From point #4, we can understand that words transform concepts into (mental) entities.

Again, her use of the word, “transform,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental entities until such a time that a word transforms that concept into a mental entity. There is, once more, the explicit intimation that concepts exist prior to being denoted by a word and independently of whether or not they are actually denoted by a word.

 

I would like to take this moment to pause again and draw our attention to what was said in point #1 and then, here, in point #4.

 

Point #1 says: the integration involved in a concept blends units into a single, new mental entity.

 

Point #4 says: words transform concepts into (mental) entities.

 

For me, this is a confusing quasi-repetition. Thus, we have a case where a concept "contains" a single mental entity (i.e. — the blended units), and yet is not itself a mental entity until a word transforms it into one. In this first case, we have a non-mental entity that "contains" a mental entity. Subsequently, at the point when a concept is transformed into a mental entity, it also becomes partially constituted by and/or "contains" another mental entity. Thus, in this second case, we have one mental entity that "contains" another mental entity — perhaps this, in itself, is not actually so bizarre.

 

What seems most bizarre for me is that the integration involved in a concept can blend units into a mental entity while the concept itself remains, at that time, a non-mental entity. It all feels a little arbitrary and/or confused on the part of Rand and can be somewhat confusing, to say the least, to try to untangle.

 

In closing, I would like to add that there is certainly a charitable way to understand the above passage from Rand — a way that I did not attempt, as I was more focused on the specific meaning of what Rand was actually saying. I also want to emphasize that I am not against there being a charitable presentation of her ideas and would, in fact, prefer to understand the most charitable interpretations of Rand. Thus, more than likely and without giving it too much thought, I would probably defer to Plasmatic's interpretation which demarcates the pre-conceptual from the conceptual.

 

Nonetheless, it concerns me that Rand's presentation of her own ideas seem to be so lacking in clarity themselves.

[Questioner]

Further wrinkles...

 

First, my above mentioned Point #2:

 

In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete (i.e. — a material/physical/non-mental existent that is a visible, audible, and/or tangible word).

 

Here, I would like to add another confusion. Are we to understand from this that the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete.

 

In other words, should we understand that  the enormous sum integrated by a concept, but NOT the concept itself, has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. In this case, the enormous integrated sum takes the form of a perceptual concrete and then, later, the concept itself is denoted by a word. Strange indeed.

 

Second, my above mentioned Point #1 & #4:

 

Point #1 says: the integration involved in a concept blends units into a single, new mental entity.

 

Point #4 says: words transform concepts into (mental) entities.

 

Again, her use of the word, “transform,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental entities until such a time that a word transforms that concept into a mental entity.

 

Once more, in this first instance, we have a non-mental entity that "contains" a mental entity.

 

Is this equivalent to saying that a mental nothing contains a mental something?

 

Or, should we understand that some unspecified material entity — material entities being non-mental entities, contains a mental entity?

 

Stranger yet, should we go so far as to understand that some unspecified non-entity/non-existent — non-entities/non-existents being in fact non-mental entities, contains a mental entity?

 

Nothing contains something?

 

What are we to make of this shambolic account of concepts and words?

Edited March 1, 2014 by Questioner