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Nitpick: Words are not concepts

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I am arguing that your definition of concept does not preclude a word from being a concept.

 

If you imagine the word [CUP], without looking at any physical letters, then it fits your definition of what a concept is.

 

Thus, the mental existent — the word [CUP], is the mental integration of existents — the mental existents, the letters [C], , & [P].

 

It is your definition that does not support your claim and which must be changed if you wish to maintain your position that a word is not a concept.

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I can mentally integrate the components of a pizza (crust, sauce, cheese), but a pizza is not a concept!

Also, if it is possible for you to mentally integrate the components of a pizza (crust, sauce, cheese), then it follows that pizza is a concept.

 

This is according to your own definition of what a concept is.

 

If a concept does not integrate its components, then what does it integrate exactly?

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Also, if it is possible for you to mentally integrate the components of a pizza (crust, sauce, cheese), then it follows that pizza is a concept.

 

This is according to your own definition of what a concept is.

 

If a concept does not integrate its components, then what does it integrate exactly?

 

Here are 3 principles I expected agreement with around here:

1. Your idea of something is not the thing itself.

2. A concept is not its definition. (So, just that concepts are mental integrations, does not mean that every mental state that might be described as an integration is a concept.)

3. A concept integrates things external to itself.

 

 

 

You appear to actually be arguing for words being completely identical to concepts. Is this correct? If so, this is a different metaphysical position as well as an epistemological one, because I see words as "out there" and concepts as "in here".

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Here are 3 principles I expected agreement with around here:

1. Your idea of something is not the thing itself.

2. A concept is not its definition. (So, just that concepts are mental integrations, does not mean that every mental state that might be described as an integration is a concept.)

3. A concept integrates things external to itself.

 

 

 

You appear to actually be arguing for words being completely identical to concepts. Is this correct? If so, this is a different metaphysical position as well as an epistemological one, because I see words as "out there" and concepts as "in here".

 

1. "Your idea of something is not the thing itself."

  • I assume that you mean that no mental existents are ever physical existents and that this is always true whether or not a particular mental existent denotes a particular physical existent.
  • If this is true, I accept.

2.1 "A concept is not its definition." 

  • Superficially, I accept.
  • Using your definition of concept, I never said that a concept is its definition. Instead, I said that whatever is a concept is necessarily a mental integration of existents and vice versa.
  • For example, if the subject, [X], is a concept, then it follows that the subject, [X], is also a mental integration of existents.
  • I never said the subject, [CONCEPT], is a mental integration of existents.

2.2 "So, just [because] concepts are mental integrations, does not mean that every mental state that might be described as an integration is a concept."

  • This just seems like an equivocation. 
  • I never said that "every mental state that might be described as an integration is a concept."
  • Instead, I again said that whatever is a mental integration of existents is necessarily a concept and vice versa.
  • Also, if something [X] is a mental state that might be described as an integration actually is a mental integration of existents, then it is a concept. If it is not a mental integration of existents, then it is not a concept.

 

3. "A concept integrates things external to itself."

  • This seems too vague for me and just seems to repeat your point #1.
  • Integrates in what sense?
  • Do you mean telekinesis?
  • Does a concept integrate two physically existent rocks into one physically existent rock?
  • Does this mean that your new definition of concept is [THE MENTAL INTEGRATION OF PHYSICAL EXISTENTS]
  • If so, then it follows that you can't have a concept about two or more concepts because a concept is a mental existent and not a physical existent.

4. "You appear to actually be arguing for words being completely identical to concepts. Is this correct? If so, this is a different metaphysical position as well as an epistemological one, because I see words as "out there" and concepts as 'in here.'"

  • I am not arguing that words = concepts. I am merely trying to argue, successfully or not, from the perspective of what is entailed by Objectivist epistemology. Personally, I do not accept Objectivist epistemology.
  • I am also arguing using logical consequences of your own position. In other words, I am trying to get you to see that what you say logically commits you to saying things that you don't want to say. It is a method of argumentation that gets you to contradict yourself, thus revealing error in reasoning.
  • For example, if words are "out there" and concepts are "in here," then it follows that you cannot think of a word as that would mean that a word was "in here."
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Itoe said:

there is one more step involved in

this unification, according to the definition

given of "concept" on page 10: "A concept is a

mental integration of two or more units

which are isolated according to specific

characteristics and united by a specific

definition."

AR: Aren't you confusing two aspects

here? The definition on page 10 refers to

what a concept is—it refers to the product of

the process. But now you are describing the

process. Well now, as a process yes, you first

have to separate them as you described. And

in the process of deciding that these three

have something in common and are different

from others, you are treating them as a unit.

You are now looking at them not only as

three blue objects, but three units of one

group that have something in common as

against everything else.

Prof. D: I've described the process, but I

have arrived also at a product which is: these

regarded as units. Now at that point do I

have the concept of "pad," or do I still have

something further to do, a further

integration to make, before the product

would be a concept?AR: Yes. You have to give it a name.

Prof. D: Oh, give it a name—not "united

by a specific definition"?

AR: A definition would be involved in

more complex subjects, but on the first level,

you don't have to have a definition. None of

us would use a definition of "table," but in

fact a definition is possible. In regard to a

higher complexity of concepts, however, you

couldn't possibly hold it in mind beyond a

moment, without giving it a definition.

But here, as you described the process of

forming a concept of three perceptual

entities, when you've reached the point you

described—that is, you now regard them as

units of one group—that knowledge as such

is not going to be a concept in your mind, for

the following reason. In order to hold the

group, you still have to mentally project,

visualize, or deal with three entities.

Therefore you are not yet mentally out of the

stage of perceptual awareness.

Prof. D: In other words, at this stage

there would be just this perceptual group.

AR: That's exactly what you would have: a

perceptual group.

This Is what I was referring to in my first post about Rand clearing this up in the appendix to ITOE. "Prof. D: Oh, give it a name—not "united

by a specific definition"?"

Edited by Plasmatic
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  • I am not arguing that words = concepts. I am merely trying to argue, successfully or not, from the perspective of what is entailed by Objectivist epistemology. Personally, I do not accept Objectivist epistemology.
  • ...you cannot think of a word as that would mean that a word was "in here."

 

The latter is idealism and hardly comes from the perspective of Objectivist epistemology. As you are merely trying to argue, and are not arguing for anything or from a perspective you actually believe, there's no point continuing.

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The latter is idealism and hardly comes from the perspective of Objectivist epistemology. As you are merely trying to argue, and are not arguing for anything or from a perspective you actually believe, there's no point continuing.

I would argue that your inability to critically engage with the consequences of your own position, as well as your refusal to thoughtfully read through what I have actually said, is a better basis for you to not continue the debate.

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Mmm. Thank you, Rowsdower; that was a rather major oversight.

1- To clarify, words are not concepts (as I said earlier, in my haste); they correspond to them.

2- While all words refer to concepts, not all concepts are referred to by a word (nor can they be).

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Concepts actually cannot all be named.

When someone forms a primary concept, they do so by selectively observing something extrospectively, as opposed to everything else available to their senses. After doing this repeatedly they amass enough memories of concept formation to form the concept of "concept formation" (in some simpler term) by a similarly observational process of introspection.

But each new act of cognition generates new introspective 'stuff' which could be organized into concepts BY another cognitive act which would immediately create more unlabeled 'stuff'.

So from that observation, the relation between any conceptual framework and the sum of its available abstraction-fodder seems analogous to the second law of thermodynamics; the more you organize some the messier the others get.

And the relation between concepts and our symbols for them is the same.

If you name a concept by selective observation (among other things) you generate implicit associations and unnamed mental units which you haven't named yet.

So while ALL words refer to concepts, SOME concepts CANNOT be referred to.

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And a concept doesn't exclusively consist of its referents or definition; the concept is the uniting element between them.

Take "man". The concept of "man" has certain referents which it applies to interchangeably; it has extensional specification.

And "man" also has intensional specificity, such as "mortal" and "rational animal" and "has thumbs," which describe it (the primary traits defining it).

I would also contend another dimension to each concept which is unspecified; for example in "man" the specification of any particular "season" would be simply inapplicable.

Here's the kicker.

How do we know which referents "man" applies to, and which knowledge applies to "man"?

A concept is the link BETWEEN referents and definition (and all contextual essentials). You can't give either side of it primacy.

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So while ALL words refer to concepts, SOME concepts CANNOT be referred to

Rand's theory specifically says concepts always have a word. You need a word to finish concept formation. If you're just saying Rand is wrong, okay, but how could you possibly use a concept if you can't refer to it?

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Rand says:
 
"Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically)— for instance, the concept “length.” If a child considers a match, a pencil and a stick, he observes that length is the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ. The difference is one of measurement. In order to form the concept “length,” the child’s mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: “Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity.”
 
The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly. And that is the principle which his mind follows, when, having grasped the concept “length” by observing the three objects, he uses it to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street."
 
Rand, Ayn (1990-04-26). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition (p. 11). 
 
How do we square this passage with my earlier quotes from her where she said that a concept must have a word to be considered a concept.
 
She seems to have two positions:
  1. Concepts must consist of a word/be named by a word in order to be considered a concept. (see her previous quotes that I posted earlier)
  2. Concepts do NOT need to consist of a word/be named by a word in order to be considered a concept. (see the above quote)
Edited by Questioner
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She seems to have two positions:
  1. Concepts must consist of a word/be named by a word in order to be considered a concept. (see her previous quotes that I posted earlier)
  2. Concepts do NOT need to consist of a word/be named by a word in order to be considered a concept. (see the above quote)

How'd you conclude 2? It says a child wouldn't think in words and sentences in order to form a concept. I'd look for more context before concluding that Rand contradicted herself.

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I think the issue is what I'm using interchangeably as "conceptual", actually.

When I refer to a concept I'm not primarily referring to it in a passive sense, as certain referents and traits and a definition; I'm primarily referring to its actual cognitive effects on the mind of its adherent.

I didn't stop to consider it until just now but I'm categorizing "concepts" on a purely functionalistic basis which may not be compatible with the way Rand categorized them. I'm not sure; I'll have to think about it some more.

But okay; let's try this.

A "lexeme" is a basic unit of meaning; the smallest introspective 'thing' which we use in any cognitive act, whatsoever.

So a "lexeme" could refer to a concept, percept, implicit awareness, etc.; all interchangeably.

If I clarified that what I'm referring to as 'concepts' would likely be closer to 'lexemes' than the proper Objectivist meaning of a 'concept', would that help?

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Plasmatic, I think you must be right. Being charitable with Rand, I would tend to agree that what is being described is, as you say, the "'pre-conceptual' stage of the 'implicit concept.'" 

 

However, this reading is itself still problematic, as we have to recognize that she is explicitly discussing the process of concept formation and referencing “concepts” specifically. Moreover, if we take into account her overall epistemological project, then we are forced to accept that an “implicit concept” is not in any way, nor can it ever be a “concept.” An “implicit concept,” epistemologically, is not a subtype of “concept.” Rather, it is in a separate category altogether from that of a “concept” — whatever is one is necessarily not the other.

 

Eioul, for me, the quote I provided is enough context. In the ITOE, she doesn't mention anything else especially pertinent related to that particular quote. I guess I just don't know how much context you want/need — the whole chapter, the whole book, her whole oeuvre, etc. Also, if it is not enough, please feel free to quote other passages from the ITOE that better help to contextualize the passage that I quoted. It is always possible that I may have overlooked something. Thanks.

 

Moreover, while I agree with Plasmatic about what Rand probably meant, the passage that I quoted still remains a little ambiguous and imprecise for me. Ambiguity and imprecision may have their place in certain types of writing; however, a book whose premise is to lay out the epistemological bedrock of a certain position would do better to not trade in such things as ambiguity and imprecision.

 

Why do I say that it is ambiguous and imprecise? Let's refer back to what she says, imagining that we are reading her for the first time, while also including more context:

 

I. First, two quotes that, more or less, immediately precede the main quote (found on pg. 11 of the ITOE 2nd Ed.):

  • Rand says, “Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.” (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 10).
    • Here, the only point that I would like to note is that she here seems to be marking words as different from concepts, in that I assume she here means that words are symbols that stand for concepts and are not actually the concepts themselves.
  • Shortly thereafter, Rand says, “Words transform concepts into (mental) entities...” (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 11).
    • Again, the same sort of sentiment prevails, in that she again seems to be marking words as different from concepts. Repeating myself, I assume that she means that words are symbols that stand for concepts and are not actually concepts themselves. Furthermore, her use of the word, “transform,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental entities until such a time that a word transforms that concept into a mental entity. Thus, there is the explicit intimation that concepts exist independently of whether or not they are denoted by a word.
  • I am hoping that we are all in agreement. As far as I can tell, I don’t think that I am stretching or twisting her meaning in any way and certainly don’t mean to be if I am. Also, if you need more context, then please refer to the text yourself.

II. Second, from the main quote (p. 11), she says, "Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically) — for instance, the concept 'length.'" 

  • This is the first sentence of that paragraph. As a reader, I would expect the first sentence of a paragraph to briefly identify what the content of the paragraph will be, as well as the possible direction of the ensuing content. It should foreshadow what is to come.
  • Thus, I understand this to mean that she will discuss "The Process of Forming the Simplest Concept."
  • The concept-formation-process that will be discussed is the process of forming the concept of a single attribute — "length."
  • So far, so good. I hope. I don't think that I have read this in a bizarre way. I think that, so far, I have just repeated what she said and what she meant.

III. Third, she says, “In order to form the concept ‘length,’ the child’s mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements” (p. 11).

  • Within the context of the book, imagining that we are reading her for the first time, this sentence is somewhat problematic. Its facile brevity suggests that a concept is merely formed after “the child’s mind retains the attribute [common to multiple existents] and omits [the] particular measurements [of those multiple existents].” 
  • She has already suggested that words and concepts are different from each other without making it clear whether or not they are actually independent of each other. Here, she continues in that vein by suggesting that a concept can be formed without being denoted by a word. In other words, in the text thus far, she has yet to make it clear whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word. Thus, how are we to know, as first-time readers, that a concept’s existence is, in fact, dependent upon being connected with a word?
    • The answer: We can know only retroactively.

IV. Fourth, she says: 

  • "if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: ‘Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity.’ ___The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly. And that is the principle which his mind follows, when, having grasped the concept “length” by observing the three objects, he uses it to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street" (p. 11).
    • At this point, she has described the child's process of forming a concept.
    • She then refers to "the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly."
      • What is "the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly." 
      • I take it to refer to the fact that the child does not think in words since he has “no knowledge of words.”
    • In the last sentence, she then mentions, "the principle which his mind follows."
      • What is this “principle” that she is referring to?
      • I take it to also refer to the fact that the child does not think in words since he has “no knowledge of words.”
    • Then later, in the last sentence, she says, “he uses it to identify the attribute.”
      • What is this “it” that she is referring to?
      • I take it to refer to the aforementioned, “mind.”
    • Hopefully, we are all in agreement up to this point. Again, I don't think that I have read this in a bizarre way and I still think that I have just repeated what she said and what she meant; though certainly, there is room for interpretation.
    • Now, another iteration of the problem:
      • The problem for me is when she says, “when, having grasped the concept ‘length’ by observing the three objects...”
      • For me, this phrase — situated in the context of this sentence, paragraph, and chapter, suggests several things:
        • It suggests that grasping the concept “length” is done merely in dependence upon observing that those three objects share a common attribute — “length,” and not additionally in dependence upon and in conjunction with apprehending the word, “length” — the word that stands for that common attribute.
        • This is thus an echo of the third (i.e. — III) quote that I mentioned. It is again, as of yet in the text, unclear whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word.
        • All that we may surmise thus far is that for the child 1) grasping the concept “length” occurs prior to his identifying the attribute of length in existents that are different from the original “three objects,” and 2) that his mind follows the principle of not thinking in words, since he has “no knowledge of words,” in order “to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street."
        • Thus, we might reread/re-imagine the sentence as, “After having grasped the concept ‘length’ by observing the three objects, his mind — having no knowledge of words, follows the principle of not thinking in words in order “to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street."
  • The quote from this last section (i.e. — Section IV), as well as its re-imagining, again, gives no indication whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word. In fact, it suggests that a concept may be formed, then actually exist, and then be grasped by a child with no knowledge of words. For obvious reasons, this is quite problematic when compared to Rand's other perspectives on what constitutes a concept.

V. Moving forward some, Rand later says: “The process of forming a concept is not complete until its constituent units have been integrated into a single mental unit by means of a specific word” (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 19).

  • This is the first mention in the ITOE that the process of forming a concept is not complete until it has been connected to a specific word.
  • It is really worth noting that this sentiment is not expressed until several pages after the quotes from Sections I-IV and that this sentiment may or may not plant a seed in the minds of first time readers, thereby leaving the trace of a lingering confusion.
  • It is only after reading this quote that the reader can go back and try to guess at her previous meaning.

VI. Then, moving forward to "Ch. 5 — Definitions," she says several things that I would like to point out:

  • "A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed under a concept" (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 40).
  • "As an example, let us trace the development of the concept 'man.'        ___On the pre-verbal level of awareness, when a child first learns to differentiate men from the rest of his perceptual field, he observes distinguishing characteristics which, if translated into words, would amount to a definition such as: 'A thing that moves and makes sounds.' Within the context of his awareness, this is a valid definition: man, in fact, does move and make sounds, and this distinguishes him from the inanimate objects around him..." (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 43).
  • "...The specific steps given in this example are not necessarily the literal steps of the conceptual development of every man, there may be many more steps (or fewer), they may not be as clearly and consciously delimited — but this is the pattern of development which most concepts and definitions undergo in a man’s mind with the growth of his knowledge" (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 45).
  • If needed, please refer to ITOE, p. 40 & 43-45, or ITOE, Ch. 5 — Definitions, for the full context.
    • So, what is significant here? It is that here, we are talking about concept development in relation to a concept’s definition and not concept formation. In this case, concept development in relation to a concept’s definition entails the existence of the concept in question. Here, the concept exists. Generally speaking, she says that refinement of the defining characteristic(s) is, “the pattern of development which most concepts and definitions undergo in a man’s mind.” Curiously, Rand offers as an example of one such concept, that of the concept, “man,” wordlessly grasped by a child with a “pre-verbal level of awareness.”
      • Can we be certain that a child with a “pre-verbal level of awareness” is actually, wordlessly grasping the concept, "man?"
        • Yes, we can be certain because she says of this child with a “pre-verbal level of awareness” that, "Within the context of his awareness, this is a valid definition." Definitions entail the actual existence of concepts. Thus, we can formally, for the first time, conclude that concepts, in this case, can exist without being denoted by any word whatsoever.
    • Thus, from a much more charitable perspective, we again have a case where Rand suggests that a concept can be formed and exist in a wordless mental space and without actually being denoted by a word. We are left once more with the impression that words and concepts are different from each other without clearly knowing whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being denoted by a word, though it certainly feels like a concept exists independent of whether or not it is denoted by a word.

VII. These are the most salient examples that I have found thus far that illustrate Rand’s vacillation about what the necessary constituents of a concept are.

 

Her official position, especially when pressed for an explanation, being:

  • Position #1: Concepts must consist of a word/be named by a word/be denoted by a word in order to be considered a concept that exists. 

Her unofficial/subconscious position being:

  • Position #2: Concepts do NOT need to consist of a word/be named by a word/be denoted by a word in order to be considered a concept that exists (i.e. — concepts may be wordlessly grasped by a person with a pre-verbal level of awareness).

At the very least, I am arguing that her writing about concepts lacks the precision that one would expect of an author laying out their "rationally-oriented" epistemological position. On the one hand, she suggests, implies, or actually indicates that Position #2 is really true. On the other hand, one could say that she regularly omits information about what the necessary constituents of a concept are at certain key junctures. Moreover, trying to be somewhat more charitable, she also seems to fluidly blend her perspectives on what constitutes a concept and what constitutes the pre-conceptual level of implicit concepts. She does this when such should not be the case as the two are actually mutually exclusive according to (at least some of) her own descriptions. She does this categorical blending so much that, at times, it is very far from obvious when she is talking about one and not the other.

 

I am not saying that she unequivocally contradicts herself, though I tend to think that she actually does. Rather, I want to emphasize that her writing traffics in ambiguity and even, perhaps, a degree of subconscious vacillation about what actually constitutes a concept. These sorts of things have no place in a decidedly formal "philosophical" setting.

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"In other words, in the text thus far, she has yet to make it clear whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word. Thus, how are we to know, as first-time readers, that a concept’s existence is, in fact, dependent upon being connected with a word?"

The next sentence, which you didn't analyze:

"Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: “Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity.”

This shows how a word is used to form the concept. Or are you suggesting that the identification is not a word? You could think of it that way, but the rest makes more sense if we take into account that we know Rand is arguing that words are necessary for concepts. "I shall identify as 'length' " indicates an explicit identification, which would be a word. Would you call 'length' in this explanation anything other than a word?

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