One Fallacy of Objectivism — Part II

[Questioner]

As far as I can tell, at the moment, they actually seem to be two different applications of the same concept.  So he's ultimately wrong; if I'm correct then they can't depend on each other because they're synonymous.

First, you said a lot of other stuff that I need time to process and I think you raise some good points.

 

I just wanted to point out that in Thesis B he says that Objectivists seem to hold that the distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated.

 

Then he says that:

 

5.4) The above objections simply do not succeed to dispense with the Modal distinction; they cannot replace it; and they cannot show that it is not conceptually prior to any distinction they propose.

 

5.5) And if the Modal-distinction is conceptually prior, more fundamental, and presupposed by the Randian distinction, then the scope of the Modal distinction is determined on its own grounds rather than dictated by the Randian distinction it is used to explicate.

 

6) Hence, Thesis B is false.

 

I don't know that he's necessarily right. I just thought it was worth bringing those quotes into focus.

Edited March 6, 2014 by Questioner

[softwareNerd]

I just wanted to point out that in Thesis B he says that Objectivists seem to hold that the distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated.

This is just one example of his poor writing. Even after a third reading, I find it unbelievably convoluted. Consider the way he states this thesis as an either-or. Objectivists simply say the distinction between necessary and contingent is an error/incoherent. No need for the "either it is reducible to...".

However, we have an even more fundamental problem because he uses the terms "necessary and contingent" very differently from the Objectivist way. So, he's talking about something completely different. If we switch back to his concept of these, there is no reason to believe Objectivists reject it.

I think the essay is basically irredeemable. If you want clarity on the topic, I suggest you re-state the argument that you glean from in, but in your own words.

The problem in doing so is that you will need two new terms, so that one can distinguish between his concept of "necessary" and the one actually critiqued in Objectivist essays. BTW, I'm not sure where he gets his concept from. The one that Objectivism critiques is the standard usage. So, we'll need to invent some terms to denote his versions of the concept. Let's say we use the terms: "just-are" and "could-have-been-different" (I'm trying to use his terms.)

With this, here is how I re-write what he is saying:

A. Objectivists make a distinction between metaphysical and man-made ... granted

B1. Objectivists reject the distinction between necessary and contingent facts ... granted

B2. Objectivists reject the distinction between "just-are" and "could-have-been-different" facts ... sorry, not granted. This is a straw-man claim. He is simply assigning his own non-standard concept to commonly-used philosophical terms and then assuming Objectivists are critiquing his concept rather than the standard one! 

 

Do you agree that this is a fair statement of how he begins his essay? If not, how would you state it, in your own words? If it is a fair re-statement, then how would you re-state his conclusion, based on the above clarified terminology?

Edited March 6, 2014 by softwareNerd

[Nicky]

Thesis B: The content of the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated; for the sake of brevity I shall occasionally refer to the distinction between contingent (and possible) vs. necessary facts as the ‘Modal distinction.’

__________

 

Rand says: 

 

The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy has its roots in two types of error: one epistemological, the other metaphysical. The epistemological error, as I have discussed, is an incorrect view of the nature of concepts. The metaphysical error is: the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts.

 

Rand, Ayn (1990-04-26). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition (p. 106). Plume. 

_________

 

So, here we can observe that, to the extent that Rand asserts that the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts is a metaphysical error, it can certainly be said that she is asserting that the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is, at the very least, conceptually incoherent. This of course assumes that we can agree that whatever is an error — at least in terms of thinking, is also, ultimately, conceptually incoherent.

Yes (well, yes as in let's not go there, because we have bigger issues to deal with), but where does Rand talk about this being reducible to metaphysical vs. man made facts, which is the part I took issue with?

Or are we just gonna accept that since he put an or there, we can ignore the first part? So, if I decided to go to a different venue, mention your name and start a critique of your position that "Hitler was right to kill the Jews or at least you're entertaining the idea of contingency in Epistemology", would you be fine with it? Don't you think that would amount to a lie about you?

Edited March 6, 2014 by Nicky

[Questioner]

Yes (well, yes as in let's not go there, because we have bigger issues to deal with), but where does Rand talk about this being reducible to metaphysical vs. man made facts, which is the part I took issue with?

Or are we just gonna accept that since he put an or there, we can ignore the first part? So, if I decided to go to a different venue, mention your name and start a critique of your position that "Hitler was right to kill the Jews or at least you're entertaining the idea of contingency in Epistemology", would you be fine with it? Don't you think that would amount to a lie about you?

You certainly have a point. I am in full agreement that Thesis B needs more citations/quotes from Rand/Objectivists in order for it to be a completely fair thing to say.

[Questioner]

This is just one example of his poor writing. Even after a third reading, I find it unbelievably convoluted. Consider the way he states this thesis as an either-or. Objectivists simply say the distinction between necessary and contingent is an error/incoherent. No need for the "either it is reducible to...".

However, we have an even more fundamental problem because he uses the terms "necessary and contingent" very differently from the Objectivist way. So, he's talking about something completely different. If we switch back to his concept of these, there is no reason to believe Objectivists reject it.

I think the essay is basically irredeemable. If you want clarity on the topic, I suggest you re-state the argument that you glean from in, but in your own words.

The problem in doing so is that you will need two new terms, so that one can distinguish between his concept of "necessary" and the one actually critiqued in Objectivist essays. BTW, I'm not sure where he gets his concept from. The one that Objectivism critiques is the standard usage. So, we'll need to invent some terms to denote his versions of the concept. Let's say we use the terms: "just-are" and "could-have-been-different" (I'm trying to use his terms.)

With this, here is how I re-write what he is saying:

A. Objectivists make a distinction between metaphysical and man-made ... granted

B1. Objectivists reject the distinction between necessary and contingent facts ... granted

B2. Objectivists reject the distinction between "just-are" and "could-have-been-different" facts ... sorry, not granted. This is a straw-man claim. He is simply assigning his own non-standard concept to commonly-used philosophical terms and then assuming Objectivists are critiquing his concept rather than the standard one! 

 

Do you agree that this is a fair statement of how he begins his essay? If not, how would you state it, in your own words? If it is a fair re-statement, then how would you re-state his conclusion, based on the above clarified terminology?

I just need more time to formulate my position.

[StrictlyLogical]

The original author either does not know what the "concepts" (invalid ones at that) of traditional modern philosophy in the realm of necessary truths/contingent truths, or has knowingly or unknowingly conflated or confused them with a NEW set of concepts, which seem to be based on a historical evaluation of the deterministic versus volitional causal factors that brought them about. 

 

This latter division of facts, call it the "deterministic/volitionally caused" dichotomy, has nothing to do with the necessary/contingent (a priori, a posteriori) "distinction" (note the quotes...) held my modern philosophers. 

 

 

Methinks he may have simply used the term "contingent" in the temporal, "there are different possible outcomes" sort of way rather than in the "the universe could have been otherwise" sort of way, which is held by many philosophers.

 

From what I understand, a modern philosopher would take these as contingent facts:

 

The mass of an electron is 9.1x10-31 kg.

Men have two eyes.

The Earth orbits the sun.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Thank you, Q.

 

Then he says that:

 

5.4) The above objections simply do not succeed to dispense with the Modal distinction; they cannot replace it; and they cannot show that it is not conceptually prior to any distinction they propose.

 

5.5) And if the Modal-distinction is conceptually prior, more fundamental, and presupposed by the Randian distinction, then the scope of the Modal distinction is determined on its own grounds rather than dictated by the Randian distinction it is used to explicate.

 

6) Hence, Thesis B is false.

 

I don't know that he's necessarily right. I just thought it was worth bringing those quotes into focus.

 

Yes, that's what I mean.  Within the context of the rest of the article, the statement that "thesis B is false" is a euphemism for "the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is valid".

 

If you hold on one moment I'll try to give a clearer indication of what I'm looking at, with the analysis I've expressed.

[Questioner]

The original author either does not know what the "concepts" (invalid ones at that) of traditional modern philosophy in the realm of necessary truths/contingent truths, or has knowingly or unknowingly conflated or confused them with a NEW set of concepts, which seem to be based on a historical evaluation of the deterministic versus volitional causal factors that brought them about. 

 

This latter division of facts, call it the "deterministic/volitionally caused" dichotomy, has nothing to do with the necessary/contingent (a priori, a posteriori) "distinction" (note the quotes...) held my modern philosophers. 

 

 

Methinks he may have simply used the term "contingent" in the temporal, "there are different possible outcomes" sort of way rather than in the "the universe could have been otherwise" sort of way, which is held by many philosophers.

 

From what I understand, a modern philosopher would take these as contingent facts:

 

The mass of an electron is 9.1x10-31 kg.

Men have two eyes.

The Earth orbits the sun.

I'm still working on my thoughts, but it seemed worth it to point out the wikipedia entry on Modal Logic as well as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Modal Logic.

 

I think that this is context that he is using to frame his argument and it is from that context that we should be considering his position.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I apologize in advance.  This is about to get very long-winded and there's no way around it.

 

Thesis B: The content of the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated; for the sake of brevity I shall occasionally refer to the distinction between contingent (and possible) vs. necessary facts as the ‘Modal distinction’.

 

This is a reference to Objectivist epistemology, specifically conceptual reduction.

The important thing here is that he's not actually discussing truth or falsehood for either thesis; his only goal is to invert this alleged derivation and prove that the Modal isn't descended from the Randian, but vice-versa.  This is a matter of primacy instead of outright validity.

 

3) Examination of the Randian distinction.

3.1) Objectivists maintain that there is a distinction between so-called “metaphysical facts” and “man-made or volitional facts”.

3.2) These sort of facts are claimed by Objectivists to have the common property of being “necessary”.

3.3) Now, these metaphysical facts that are necessary in the sense that they could not have been otherwise are contrasted with another class of facts, namely, those facts that are “man-made” or the product of “volition”.

 

3.4) In what way do the facts described in examples (v)-(viii) contrast with the facts described by examples (i)-(iv)? . . . a certain action was undertaken by a human being voluntarily or freely. But, now, what do we mean by saying that an action was performed “voluntarily” or “freely”? It will certainly not do here to keep re-describing the problem by introducing additional terms such as ‘free-will’, ‘choice’, ‘intention’ etc., because all of these additional terms belong to the very same family of terms we have already used to describe the situation in the first place.

3.4 is also key, because volition is axiomatic.

Any attempt to reduce the concepts of "value", "intention", "possibility", et cetera, will fail.  So is any attempt to refute or discard them; every synonym and variant is implicit in every single conscious action.  What he wants here is to break apart "choice" and find its conceptual roots- which in and of itself assumes his conclusion (because he's choosing to do so).

Which is not to say that "choice, itself" cannot be analyzed or understood at all, (which is one way Rand's distinction could be misconstrued); only that it must be done with surgical precision because it cannot actually be explained.

 

In 3.4 he attempts to answer a question he raises, but the question itself is invalid.

 

3.6) But, now, what exactly are these possible alternatives which I must recognize as within my *power* to do: that are possible for me to prefer? . . . But, notice, that the *possibility* of a certain course of action is conceptually prior to any of the other cognitive tasks (or conscious tasks) of recognizing these as alternatives among which I can exercise my free choice and select one of them.

The assertion here is accurate; the reason is that "possibility" is another synonym for the volitional axiom and is therefore conceptually prior to everything.  But notice that when he says "possibility" he's preparing for a sleight-of-hand, where the Modal distinction (between necessary and contingent truths) becomes something else, entirely.

 

4) What did just happen here? Well, what happened is that we have succeeded in clarifying the Randian-distinction; i.e., the distinction obscurely labeled by Objectivists in terms of the distinction between “metaphysical” vs. “man-made” facts, in terms of the Modal distinction between things that “could have been otherwise” vs. things that “could not have been otherwise”.

He's attempting to pass this off as the conceptual reduction; it isn't.  When one concept is abstracted from other concepts, the details of its constituents are omitted in a very specific manner.

They are not specified, but left implied.  For example, the concept of "justice" includes the volitional synonym of "intention" (which is why manslaughter is not treated as interchangeable with murder), but does not explicitly specify it when used; that variable is indicated but not mentioned.

Any concept implicitly includes all of its constituents' attributes.

 

Now where the Randian distinction is A and the Modular is B, he's attempting to prove that:

 

A= B+t

 

But logical necessity is not simply 'causal necessity minus time;' the crucial difference is purpose.  Logical necessity is epistemological while causal necessity is metaphysical.  A is an assertion about the nature of the universe, regardless of whether anyone knows it.  B is about the proper formation of knowledge.

So where 'our knowledge of it' is k (which is an implicit part of , what he's actually shown is:

 

A= (B-k)+t

 

And 'our knowledge of it' is not simply left implied in this definition.  It's dropped completely.  So his 4 does not demonstrate a conceptual reduction; it's simply an analogy.

So the good news is that [A=B+t] is false.  The Randian distinction is not abstracted from the Modular distinction because if it were then it would not simply be "all volitional acts and only volitional acts are contingent"; it would include "depending on how you know it"!

The bad news is that in actuality:

 

A-t=B-k

 

Meaning that, as far as I can presently tell, there's some smaller concept which both are independently derived from; some common ancestor (something close to the distinction between necessity and contingency, itself).  However, even if I am correct, the problem with Rand's distinction shouldn't present much trouble, at all.

It's only a matter of verifying that she actually made a mistake and then applying her own epistemology to it, thoroughly. 

Edited March 6, 2014 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Harrison Danneskjold]

This latter division of facts, call it the "deterministic/volitionally caused" dichotomy, has nothing to do with the necessary/contingent (a priori, a posteriori) "distinction" (note the quotes...) held my modern philosophers. 

That's where I started out too, but I realized the problem while attempting to clarify the difference between the two.  They aren't identical, for sure, and the former is not reducible to the latter.  But they are similar (and I still don't know the precise extent of that).

I think it does merit further examination.  Not to mention a complete overhaul of the terms it's framed in; we're not going to make any progress with the current formulation.

[EC]

The essay in the OP doesn't make a single reference to the purpose of the metaphysical/man-made distinction, the reason that Rand makes it in the first place.  Ridiculous.

 

The purpose of the distinction that Rand puts forth is to aid in one's moral judgment of facts.  

And here's the real answer folks. Was trying to think of the best way to say it myself till I got here.

 

Always ask why someone is doing something or attacking something first. It saves you a lot of time. I.e., you attack this distinction or "muddy it up" and higher up in the hierarchy you get to the point where you can't morally evaluate between two different moralities because "Hey they are all facts made by someone, Who are you to judge?"

Edited March 11, 2014 by EC

[frank harley]

Part of the fallacy issue as described is that objectivist 'epistemology' assumes that all concepts that are created by the bundleing of perceptions are necessarily true.

 

But in reality, many different people employ the same  'perception bundling' method to derive concepts that are different.

 

Likewise, there is obvious dispute as to what the perceptive inputs are, varying as it were from person to person.

 

In this sense, Rand's 'epistemology' is only a rough outline as to how the brain processes and derives concepts fronm sensory inputting. But again, this is what everyone does.

 

As such, it cannot account for the justification of beliefs, whci is what 'epistemology is supposed to do.

[dream_weaver]

Interesting. Searching the core books by Miss Rand for "perception near bundling" returned no results. I then concluded that what you state as what "objectivist 'epistemology' assumes" is itself, an assumption. Any conclusions you try to build off such a premise, by extension, must be assumptive.

[A is A]

Part of the fallacy issue as described is that objectivist 'epistemology' assumes that all concepts that are created by the bundleing of perceptions are necessarily true.

This is false. Objectivism doesn't use such terminology as 'bundling of perceptions.' Objectivism readily recognizes imagination. I can perceive man's torso, head and arms, and a horse's body and create centaur. However, this is not a concept formed in the way required for concepts to be tied to reality.

 

But in reality, many different people employ the same  'perception bundling' method to derive concepts that are different.

 

Likewise, there is obvious dispute as to what the perceptive inputs are, varying as it were from person to person.

 

In this sense, Rand's 'epistemology' is only a rough outline as to how the brain processes and derives concepts fronm sensory inputting. But again, this is what everyone does.

 

As such, it cannot account for the justification of beliefs, whci is what 'epistemology is supposed to do.

Epistemology is not the study of neuroscience. How the brain processes concept or percepts is not part of her theory.

It would be nice if you actually demonstrated having read what she wrote by citing where you're getting your interpretation from. None of what you attribute to her is in her theory.

Edited April 4, 2014 by A is A

[frank harley]

This is false. Objectivism doesn't use such terminology as 'bundling of perceptions.' Objectivism readily recognizes imagination. I can perceive man's torso, head and arms, and a horse's body and create centaur. However, this is not a concept formed in the way required for concepts to be tied to reality.

 

Epistemology is not the study of neuroscience. How the brain processes concept or percepts is not part of her theory.

It would be nice if you actually demonstrated having read what she wrote by citing where you're getting your interpretation from. None of what you attribute to her is in her theory.

Dream and A,

 

According to Rand,sensory data as 'perceptions' are processed into concepts by the brain. 'Bundleing is my term whic adequately describes how snmll  bits of data become a general idea, or 'concept'.

 

So yes,, my point is that neuroscience-- true, false, or otherwise is-- not epistemology. But this is theonly account of epistemology that Rand seems to offer.

 

We all derive concepts from putting data bites of experience together. To a certain extent, this might be called 'induction'.

 

Yet this sameness works against Rand's epistyemology as such: what, in her book, counts for a 'true' concept versus a 'false' one in sofar as all concepts derive from the process of reasoning?

[dream_weaver]

How do you get to "small bits of data" from sensory data, presuming that is what you are attempting to derive it from?

 

What are you referring to as "this sameness" in "Yet this sameness works against . . ."

[Harrison Danneskjold]

"Bundle" is a somewhat misleading term because while concept-formation requires categorization (bundling certain things together) it goes much farther than that; all of the particulars of each "bundle" are omitted (but not erased) and every member of that bundle is then treated as interchangeable, within a certain context. 

This contextual identity is part of Rand's theory of concept-formation, and I consider it the most important part because of its role in analogy.

For example, percepts cannot literally be bundled; when you refer to "perceptual bundling" you are drawing an analogy between concept-formation and physical bundles [of anything]- and without measurement omission, that action itself could not be explained.

 

So it's a very minor error, but I consider your terminology to be definition-by-nonessentials, because of its implicit analogy, and therefore slightly flawed.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I have good news and bad news.

 

In this sense, Rand's 'epistemology' is only a rough outline as to how the brain processes and derives concepts from sensory inputting. But again, this is what everyone does.

You are equivocating between the content of the Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, and Objectivist Epistemology.  This is clearly an understandable mistake; the title of the book would suggest something more about proper Objectivist Epistemology (how to arrive at true knowledge) when it's primarily a presentation of her theory of concept-formation (which, as you noticed, everybody uses in every single thought- including thoughts which are false, irrational or outright evasive).

So I absolutely see where you're coming from but you're missing something important.

1. Your statements are completely accurate with regard to Rand's conceptual theory, except for "all concepts that are created by the bundleing of perceptions are necessarily true" which seems to stem from that equivocation I mentioned. 
2. Objectivist Epistemology, itself, contains but is not limited to Rand's theory.  Objectivist Epistemology is more than the Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (and to this day has not been completely explained, which is why the ITOE is an "introduction").
3. You are wrong about Objectivist Epistemology, itself, presumably because you had not realized 2 [educated guess].

So the bad news is that your post is wrong.  But that is why it's wrong and there is the solution. 

So yes, my point is that neuroscience-- true, false, or otherwise-- is not epistemology.

It's not really neuroscience, either.  Neuroscience is about extrospective entities (such as neurons in pitri dishes or CAT scans on computer screens); things you can find "out there".  The ITOE is exclusively introspective.  You can't verify her theory by reference to anything "out there"; you find its truth or falsehood by looking at things "in here".

You're right that her theory of concept-formation doesn't qualify as epistemology, as such.  But it isn't neuroscience either, nor any existing branch of science that I'm aware of.

It might be something totally new; I'm not sure.  I've never tried to define it before.

 

But this is the only account of epistemology that Rand seems to offer.

The good news is that this is wrong, too.  Her epistemology is implicit throughout everything that she ever wrote, if you stop to look for it. 

I'll even help you find such evidence in a little while.

[Plasmatic]

Bill said:

According to Rand,sensory data as 'perceptions' are processed into concepts by the brain. 'Bundleing is my term whic adequately describes how snmll bits of data become a general idea, or 'concept'.

So yes,, my point is that neuroscience-- true, false, or otherwise is-- not epistemology. But this is theonly account of epistemology that Rand seems to offer.

We all derive concepts from putting data bites of experience together. To a certain extent, this might be called 'induction'.

Nope...conceptualization is not a passive process done by the "brain" for Ms. Rand. The "bundleing" is an active process of volitional, conditional method. The science that answers the question of how we form concepts is epistemology, not neuroscience. You are conflating the two, ergo your "brain" comment. Edited April 4, 2014 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

Harrison said:

This contextual identity is part of Rand's theory of concept-formation, and I consider it the most important part because of its role in analogy.

What do you mean "contextual identity"? You don't mean the axiom of Identity, do you?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Harrison said:

What do you mean "contextual identity"? You don't mean the axiom of Identity, do you?

Galt, no!  I'm referring to measurement omission, in which some details are specified while others aren't.

 

Unspecified differences between percepts= interchangeable percepts (in that concept's context)

---

Edit:  "Unspecification" is more precise than "interchangibility," but less efficient.  I don't know about you but the latter is much easier for me to conceptualize.

Edited April 4, 2014 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Plasmatic]

Concerning #44

 

Consciousness is the faculty of awareness—the faculty of perceiving that which exists.

Awareness is not a passive state, but an active process. On the lower levels of awareness, a complex neurological process is required to enable man to experience a sensation and to integrate sensations into percepts; that process is automatic and non-volitional: man is aware of its results, but not of the process itself. On the higher, conceptual level, the process is psychological, conscious and volitional. In either case, awareness is achieved and maintained by continuous action.

ITOE

[A is A]

Dream and A,

 

According to Rand,sensory data as 'perceptions' are processed into concepts by the brain. 'Bundleing is my term whic adequately describes how snmll  bits of data become a general idea, or 'concept'.

 

So yes,, my point is that neuroscience-- true, false, or otherwise is-- not epistemology. But this is theonly account of epistemology that Rand seems to offer.

 

We all derive concepts from putting data bites of experience together. To a certain extent, this might be called 'induction'.

 

Yet this sameness works against Rand's epistyemology as such: what, in her book, counts for a 'true' concept versus a 'false' one in sofar as all concepts derive from the process of reasoning?

Again, you don't understand her theory.  Your invention of "bundling" does not adequately describe how concepts are formed.  We do not derive concepts by "putting data bites of experience together."  Your last sentence makes no sense in light of your lack of understanding of her theory.  

 

Perhaps you should demonstrate an understanding of her theory before attempting to critique it. 

Edited April 5, 2014 by A is A

[Plasmatic]

A is A said:

Again, you don't understand her theory. Your invention of "bundling" does not adequately describe how concepts are formed.

To be fair, Hume had a bundle theory in ontology. Perhaps Frank is importing this.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

Edit: although he did say "my term"...

Edited April 5, 2014 by Plasmatic

[A is A]

A is A said:

To be fair, Hume had a bundle theory in ontology. Perhaps Frank is importing this.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

Edit: although he did say "my term"...

Interesting.  But it clearly confuses metaphysics with epistemology as if what a thing is is the only thing we can think about it.  When we think of the concept 'apple' we don't only think of one apple.