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Did Ayn Rand commit the fallacy of reification?

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The point is that - while I'm glad you are posting in the forum -- I've completely lost whatever point you are trying to make.

 

Can you just make a statement with out referencing what Dennet thought when Keynes interpreted Sraffa's position on Ramsay's quotation of Kant?

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Kahneman

Keynes

Say

Marshall

Wittgenstein

Russell

Ramsay

Sraffa

Dennett

Kripke

Chicago School of Economics

Aristotle

 

What exactly is your point?

 

edit:  forgot Machan

 

 

What's your point? These are all proper names...is Rand not worthy of mention?

It would seem, as the question appears to me anyhow, is - how are you trying to integrate these seeming disparate proper name droppings on your behalf, together:  into a single unified concrete? In other words: Are you just positing here mere tripe, or have you actual grief to gripe?

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Buddha said:

Can you just make a statement with out referencing what Dennet thought when Keynes interpreted Sraffa's position on Ramsay's quotation of Kant?

Weaver said:

It would seem, as the question appears to me anyhow, is - how are you trying to integrate these seeming disparate proper name droppings on your behalf, together: into a single unified concrete? In other words: Are you just positing here mere tripe, or have you actual grief to gripe?

Yes, I find this whole passive aggressive poking incomprehensible. I mean, if you (Bill) want to debate Oist premises lets just have at it in a thread titled in a way that names your beef and a post stating what you think any of these thinkers have to say that Oist should know and consider.

I have long wanted to discourse with someone who knows Wittgenstein, Russell, Frege, Husserl and Rand. Bring it on, grind the damn axe and lets see if your stone is hard enough to erode Rand's premises.....But enough drive by sniping already.

Edited by Plasmatic
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To the extent that perceptions of objects are bundled, then converted into thoughts, words completely describe the object, just as Aristotle, then Rand, said. If, oth, our brain tells us to see 'fish' for whale' as in Jonah, the word/thing relationship takes on a critical dimension, as Russell and Wittgenstain said.

I don't think this accurately describes Rand's position. She believed that consciously holding a complete description of a concept is impossible. According to her, words are like an interface; they allow all of their referent properties, known and unknown, to be condensed into a usable form. The mental act of retrieving a word necessarily omits from the conscious mind almost everything that word could be used to represent.

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In other words, we're trained by our cultures as to what sensational inputting even gets recognized.

Trained how?

If sensations are directed by one's culture then what is a culture and how does one acquire it?

 

Half of Rand's epistemology concerns the relationship between words and things, while the other half is about the formation of concepts. Both halves require some sort of vindication within the realm of brain studies.

Just thought you should know that this is an outright confession of introspective blindness.

 

Besides, there is no such thing as experimental data that is not grasped via perception and perception is the only way to ground meaning and justification without infinite regress period.

I agree.  Ignorance of this fact, whether voluntary or not, is the mistake I see Billy continuing to make over and over again.

 

The premise that perception is automatic and infallible is not a hypothesis, as such, and I do not accept the premise that philosophical topics are the type of subject matter requiring experiment-testing.

I do not agree with this.

 

Science informs philosophy, always has throughout history. A discovery doesn't reveal philosophical truths, but it isn't wrong to induce from a scientific discovery, then abstract details away to discover philosophical principles.

It deserves its own thread (and I'm tempted to give it one presently) but I'm with Louie on this one.

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Harrison said:

Plasmatic, on 23 Mar 2014 - 01:12 AM, said:

The premise that perception is automatic and infallible is not a hypothesis, as such, and I do not accept the premise that philosophical topics are the type of subject matter requiring experiment-testing.

I do not agree with this.

Eiuol, on 22 Mar 2014 - 8:45 PM, said:

Science informs philosophy, always has throughout history. A discovery doesn't reveal philosophical truths, but it isn't wrong to induce from a scientific discovery, then abstract details away to discover philosophical principles.

It deserves its own thread (and I'm tempted to give it one presently) but I'm with Louie on this one.

Thats fine, but you do realize you are rejecting the possibility of a non propositional base for justification in the self evident? If philosophy is not foundational then you are accepting an infinite regress.

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If philosophy is not foundational then you are accepting an infinite regress.

Not at all.

Literacy, for example, is a skill which requires certain information; that information was derived from the self evident and infallible testimony of the senses originally- right?  But the fact that it's derivative shouldn't stop you from applying that knowledge to your senses in order to read and write- right?

If so then in exactly the same way, scientific knowledge (which logically depends on philosophy) can be used to gain additional insights into philosophy.

 

So I suppose I could be accepting a circular sort of justification, except that nothing can contradict anything (since that would generate stolen concepts) and if there were to be a contradiction, philosophy should ultimately take priority over everything else- in the same way and for the same reason that the self evident takes priority over philosophy.

---

 

And that relation, in which derivative knowledge may enhance but not contradict its base, is also the relation I think sensations have with the inferences we draw from them (i.e. perception).

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
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I don't think this accurately describes Rand's position. She believed that consciously holding a complete description of a concept is impossible. According to her, words are like an interface; they allow all of their referent properties, known and unknown, to be condensed into a usable form. The mental act of retrieving a word necessarily omits from the conscious mind almost everything that word could be used to represent.

There are only several logical possibilities:

 

* Aristotle: Words adequately describe any object. In other words, there is no real epistemological issue in so far as our senses tell us the truth about what's out there. Therefore, the relationship word/thing is 'natural'.

 

* Kripke: words cause objects. Therefore words serve as causal referents because nothing exists without a name. Otherwise, we're dealing with what Aristotle called huile, or indistinguished matter.

 

* Russell: words describe everything that might be said about a thing. Indeed, these descriptors are not only infinitely regressive, but also contradictory.

 

* Wittgenstein: words only define things within a frame of reference (Bild). Words outside said frame are meaningless.

 

It's  more or less assumed that Rand's position was Aristotelian (Machan). That's because, again, of her mind- theory of "perception >> thought". In other words, the mind produces a representation of what's really out there:

 

We absorb sensory data, we bundle, we process by thought, we produce concepts by abstracting sensory particulars...etc....

 

What isn't accounted for is error and the stark reality that other people (a) take the same sensory data, but derive other accounts of abstracted truths and ( B) the process of selective perception gives different individuals different data, therefore different truths.

 

Of course, this isn't new: Kant cited the above in Hume as to why he was shaken out of his dogmatic slumber. Rational skepticism, then, begins with the discovery that other people use reason, too, but derive different conclusions.

 

Therefore, what you seem to be offering of Rand is a hedge. Condensing ' all referent properties' means (a) all that the mind possess at the time of condensation and ( B) all properties understood by the mind to be 'true' referents, as opposed to those that aren't. 

 

Lastly, again, the Randian assumption is that the mind works like an inductive machine by forming few generalizations (abstractions) from many sensations (perceptions). Then, concepts ...w

 

Well, only half true, as pre-existing thought guides what's perceived, after all.

 

BH

Edited by bill harris
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Not at all.

Literacy, for example, is a skill which requires certain information; that information was derived from the self evident and infallible testimony of the senses originally- right?  But the fact that it's derivative shouldn't stop you from applying that knowledge to your senses in order to read and write- right?

If so then in exactly the same way, scientific knowledge (which logically depends on philosophy) can be used to gain additional insights into philosophy.

 

So I suppose I could be accepting a circular sort of justification, except that nothing can contradict anything (since that would generate stolen concepts) and if there were to be a contradiction, philosophy should ultimately take priority over everything else- in the same way and for the same reason that the self evident takes priority over philosophy.

---

 

And that relation, in which derivative knowledge may enhance but not contradict its base, is also the relation I think sensations have with the inferences we draw from them (i.e. perception).

>>>scientific knowledge (which logically depends on philosophy) can be used to gain additional insights into philosophy.<<<

 

You can, I suppose rig up a daffy-nition of 'philosophy' which satisfies this statement. Perhaps, metaphysically, "Nature' is mind-independent."  Wow.

 

Obviously, the problem is that said statement is not limited to doing science as such. Rather, it informs our daily lives every minute. 

 

The second issue is that various scientists have held various metaphysical views of reality, yet have worked side-by side. perhaps the best example is Wigner, who actually believed that the grater part of QM was mind-dependent, D- matrix and all.

 

Lastly, we have the in-the-face-reality of Bacon's New Method', which explicitly rejects Aristotle for the sake of creating a new metaphysik consistent with his own method. 

 

BH

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Bill said:

 

 

t's  more or less assumed that Rand's position was Aristotelian (Machan). That's because, again, of her mind- theory of "perception >> thought". In other words, the mind produces a representation of what's really out there:

 

We absorb sensory data, we bundle, we process by thought, we produce concepts by abstracting sensory particulars...etc....

Um, this is not Rand's position at all. Oism is a presentational, not representational view of perception. Consciousness is identification not representation.

 

 

What isn't accounted for is error and the stark reality that other people (a) take the same sensory data, but derive other accounts of abstracted truths and (  B) the process of selective perception gives different individuals different data, therefore different truths.

 

Of course, this isn't new: Kant cited the above in Hume as to why he was shaken out of his dogmatic slumber. Rational skepticism, then, begins with the discovery that other people use reason, too, but derive different conclusions.

 

Therefore, what you seem to be offering of Rand is a hedge. Condensing ' all referent properties' means (a) all that the mind possess at the time of condensation and (  B) all properties understood by the mind to be 'true' referents, as opposed to those that aren't. 

 

Lastly, again, the Randian assumption is that the mind works like an inductive machine by forming few generalizations (abstractions) from many sensations (perceptions). Then, concepts ...w

 

Well, only half true, as pre-existing thought guides what's perceived, after all.

 

 

I hope you realize this is not an argument for such "rational skepticism" or "thought guides perception" premises. 

 

What is at issue is precisely the premise that the differences in categorization is a difference in method of identification, where the identification is a volitional-conditional process of method.

 

Edit: Can you provide what you think justifies this "thought guides perception" premise. Is it simply that "people have different truths from same data" ?

 

Edit:

 

 

Lastly, again, the Randian assumption is that the mind works like an inductive machine by forming few generalizations (abstractions) from many sensations (perceptions). Then, concepts ...w

No, abstraction is a synonym for concept in Oism. "Concepts are abstractions" ITOE. There is no separate process.

Edited by Plasmatic
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"What isn't accounted for is error and the stark reality that other people (a) take the same sensory data, but derive other accounts of abstracted truths and ( B) the process of selective perception gives different individuals different data, therefore different truths."

 

You really haven't read Rand, have you?

 

For it to be said that an INDIVIDUAL has obtained objective knowledge, what is required is that he has - to the best of his ability - reconciled and accounted for any known, contradictory information.  Example, Newton's knowledge was objective., but Einstein later provided a better description of gravity.  And you know what?  Einstein's ideas have flaw's too.

 

Objectivism (and objectivity) is not about achieving omniscient, flawless, never-to-be-amended TRUTH about the Universe.  All propositions are contextual, all definitions are contextual.   

 

Actually read FeatherFall's post #104 and think about it.

Edited by New Buddha
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Special knowledge can reaffirm the self evident but not justify it in any way. The special sciences can never reach back to that which it depends on to command it in any way.

I'm sorry.  In retrospect, the ambiguity was on my part.

Science cannot justify philosophy; the justification (or the commanding) only goes one way.  But I think the special sciences can elaborate.

 

With the analogy I provided, literacy does not justify nor dictate the images you see here.  It does, how ever, elaborate images into letters, words and paragraphs.

That's the relation I was attempting to describe between science and philosophy.

 

>>>scientific knowledge (which logically depends on philosophy) can be used to gain additional insights into philosophy.<<<

 

You can, I suppose rig up a daffy-nition of 'philosophy' which satisfies this statement. Perhaps, metaphysically, "Nature' is mind-independent."  Wow.

I will respond to this once you elaborate on reality's dependence on the mind.

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
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Taking the oft used example of color, similar shades of blue are viewed as different relative to one another, but introducing a foil of say yellow, or red - the differences are perceptually viewed as similar in contrast to the introduced foil. These color distinctions could easily go back to pre-writing time in my mind.

Supporting Miss Rand's measurement omission recognizing that the similarity of characteristic differs in quantity or magnitude, science confirms this for us without upsetting the fact that this is done perceptually. Since Newton's observations recorded in "The Opticks", the angular relationship he documented has been augmented by further investigations that have demonstrated much more of the light spectrum in quantifiable wavelength's. In this regard, science confirms this measurable aspect of this induction made philosophically.

Newton had to have a sound enough understanding of dealing with the evidence of the sense to undergird his approach to understanding the phenomenon he was investigating. In this sense, philosophy lays the foundations for the sciences to build upon.

On another token, Dr. Peikoff stated that Miss Rand did not think she could have come see reason as the means of survival without the industrial revolution - which could well have it's roots in the application of mathematics to physical phenomenon as laid out by Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others.

This seems to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the sciences.

Even in Harriman's recent release - the progress in chemistry reached an impasse which physics picked up on, which in turn, enabled chemistry to move forward.

And I'll wrap by saying, consider how all this knowledge is interrelated, interrelates with the philosophic principle of how all knowledge interrelates.

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"What isn't accounted for is error and the stark reality that other people (a) take the same sensory data, but derive other accounts of abstracted truths and ( B) the process of selective perception gives different individuals different data, therefore different truths."

 

You really haven't read Rand, have you?

 

For it to be said that an INDIVIDUAL has obtained objective knowledge, what is required is that he has - to the best of his ability - reconciled and accounted for any known, contradictory information.  Example, Newton's knowledge was objective., but Einstein later provided a better description of gravity.  And you know what?  Einstein's ideas have flaw's too.

 

Objectivism (and objectivity) is not about achieving omniscient, flawless, never-to-be-amended TRUTH about the Universe.  All propositions are contextual, all definitions are contextual.   

 

Actually read FeatherFall's post #104 and think about it.

>>>You really haven't read Rand, have you?<<<

 

>>>For it to be said that an INDIVIDUAL has obtained objective knowledge, what is required is that he has - to the best of his ability - reconciled and accounted for any known, contradictory information.<<<

 

If this is all that Rand is saying, then She's said nothing at all that's remotely interesting: who would not agree with the above? In other words, although yes, I've read her Epistemology, one would not have to read it to have agreed with her on the above.

 

Perhaps my gloss, then, is either putting words in her mouth or making her appear far more profound than she was. After all, i'm trying my best to place her in the company of Aristotle, Russell, Kripke...while you're reducing her to a melange of Ken Wilbur, Dr Phil, and Sarah Palin. 

 

At the very least, we can agree that you're using 'objective' in a rather louche sense. All it really means is 'subject independent'. So now you're offering up gravity as a 'subject-independent' idea? Wow! How insightful! My 12 year old niece can do better by citing Peyton List's 'gravy theory'.

 

BH,

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I came back to my keyboard to find post #118 posted, and the "Reply to the topic" filled in with the contents of post #118. This may shed some insight to the rash of double and triple posting observed lately.

Elaborating on the contents of post #118, in one of my earlier replies to the OP, I asked when some of the data reference by Binswanger had been published relative to when Miss Rand had published. While she published after some of the research Binswanger references, the publications are still not widely known or even necessarily accepted.

Binswanger's contention with the terminology used by Miss Rand, is not identified occurring within such a consideration.

His distinction between critters experiencing sensation as a mode of experience and of those experiencing percept is compelling. Did the data Miss Rand was privy to in 1979 when she concretized perception as a group of sensations include the scope and depth that Binswanger has availed himself to in his course of the investigation of the data?

Binswanger's distinction between the critter's having access to sensations and those having access to perceptions is compelling. The studies from the early 60's of Helms, and partner, about active/passive perception and the development of relating the perceptual data to the movement feedback loop have much to add. But if Miss Rand was not privy to these studies at the time of penning ITOE, positing a disagreement on the grounds of 'new' discoveries, at best, fails to take this aspect of the timeline into consideration.

Binswanger still presents a thought provoking book, which is still challenging me to reconsider how I've come to terms with "consciousness, as an active process".

Edited by dream_weaver
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Taking the oft used example of color, similar shades of blue are viewed as different relative to one another, but introducing a foil of say yellow, or red - the differences are perceptually viewed as similar in contrast to the introduced foil. These color distinctions could easily go back to pre-writing time in my mind.

Supporting Miss Rand's measurement omission recognizing that the similarity of characteristic differs in quantity or magnitude, science confirms this for us without upsetting the fact that this is done perceptually. Since Newton's observations recorded in "The Opticks", the angular relationship he documented has been augmented by further investigations that have demonstrated much more of the light spectrum in quantifiable wavelength's. In this regard, science confirms this measurable aspect of this induction made philosophically.

Newton had to have a sound enough understanding of dealing with the evidence of the sense to undergird his approach to understanding the phenomenon he was investigating. In this sense, philosophy lays the foundations for the sciences to build upon.

On another token, Dr. Peikoff stated that Miss Rand did not think she could have come see reason as the means of survival without the industrial revolution - which could well have it's roots in the application of mathematics to physical phenomenon as laid out by Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others.

This seems to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the sciences.

Even in Harriman's recent release - the progress in chemistry reached an impasse which physics picked up on, which in turn, enabled chemistry to move forward.

And I'll wrap by saying, consider how all this knowledge is interrelated, interrelates with the philosophic principle of how all knowledge interrelates.

Newton was able to extend his Optics into a viable general hypotheses through what  we now call 'abduction' . So if this is what you want to call 'philosophy', then fine. 

 

But Newton also believed in alchemy, so what's that called? Or how about his belief in god?

 

Babylonians and Greeks both had mathematics. For the former, it seemed to have been a grab-bag of methods applied to certain problems. As fr the later, we're well aware of certain philosophers' apparent desire to convert lots of how -to's into a few axioms, or 'worthies'.  That's just what philosophers do, ostensibly a Greek invention.

 

At its birth, chemistry had to prove the viability of molecules. Then came an explosion of knowledge, particularly in Germany, that occurred so fast that Americans had such a hard time keeping up with the translations that many simply went and learned German, instead.

 

The advent of Physical Chemistry and Quantum Analysis was due in great part to Pauling's solution to the benzine-halogen problem in the 20's. As even Einstein couldn't understand the solution as personally explained, it's rather obvious that Chemistry was employing certain quantum techniques not universally known in Physicsworld.

 

No, I don't believe the 'knowledge hypotheses' as anything more than its accumulation overtime. For example, the 'roots' of Bessemer having figured out how to cheaply inject carbon in to iron was based upon the access to huge quantities of coal, iron, and labor. 

 

in other words, what made the new industrial revolution of steel was not the understanding, which dates to the 1400's at least, but how to do it better, more efficiently.

 

BH

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Taking the oft used example of color, similar shades of blue are viewed as different relative to one another, but introducing a foil of say yellow, or red - the differences are perceptually viewed as similar in contrast to the introduced foil. These color distinctions could easily go back to pre-writing time in my mind.

Supporting Miss Rand's measurement omission recognizing that the similarity of characteristic differs in quantity or magnitude, science confirms this for us without upsetting the fact that this is done perceptually. Since Newton's observations recorded in "The Opticks", the angular relationship he documented has been augmented by further investigations that have demonstrated much more of the light spectrum in quantifiable wavelength's. In this regard, science confirms this measurable aspect of this induction made philosophically.

Newton had to have a sound enough understanding of dealing with the evidence of the sense to undergird his approach to understanding the phenomenon he was investigating. In this sense, philosophy lays the foundations for the sciences to build upon.

On another token, Dr. Peikoff stated that Miss Rand did not think she could have come see reason as the means of survival without the industrial revolution - which could well have it's roots in the application of mathematics to physical phenomenon as laid out by Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others.

This seems to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the sciences.

Even in Harriman's recent release - the progress in chemistry reached an impasse which physics picked up on, which in turn, enabled chemistry to move forward.

And I'll wrap by saying, consider how all this knowledge is interrelated, interrelates with the philosophic principle of how all knowledge interrelates.

Edited by bill harris
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Buddha said:

Weaver said:

Yes, I find this whole passive aggressive poking incomprehensible. I mean, if you (Bill) want to debate Oist premises lets just have at it in a thread titled in a way that names your beef and a post stating what you think any of these thinkers have to say that Oist should know and consider.

I have long wanted to discourse with someone who knows Wittgenstein, Russell, Frege, Husserl and Rand. Bring it on, grind the damn axe and lets see if your stone is hard enough to erode Rand's premises.....But enough drive by sniping already.

Buddah,

 

As I mentioned in another post, situating Rand's epistemology in the company of those who you cited was meant as a complement.

 

For my own purposes, i'm trying to figure out where she fits in. Therefore, your knowledge of these philosophers would be of great benefit.

 

With anticipatory thanks, Bill 

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Newton was able to extend his Optics into a viable general hypotheses through what  we now call 'abduction' . So if this is what you want to call 'philosophy', then fine. 

 

But Newton also believed in alchemy, so what's that called? Or how about his belief in god?

 

Babylonians and Greeks both had mathematics. For the former, it seemed to have been a grab-bag of methods applied to certain problems. As fr the later, we're well aware of certain philosophers' apparent desire to convert lots of how -to's into a few axioms, or 'worthies'.  That's just what philosophers do, ostensibly a Greek invention.

 

At its birth, chemistry had to prove the viability of molecules. Then came an explosion of knowledge, particularly in Germany, that occurred so fast that Americans had such a hard time keeping up with the translations that many simply went and learned German, instead.

 

The advent of Physical Chemistry and Quantum Analysis was due in great part to Pauling's solution to the benzine-halogen problem in the 20's. As even Einstein couldn't understand the solution as personally explained, it's rather obvious that Chemistry was employing certain quantum techniques not universally known in Physicsworld.

 

No, I don't believe the 'knowledge hypotheses' as anything more than its accumulation overtime. For example, the 'roots' of Bessemer having figured out how to cheaply inject carbon in to iron was based upon the access to huge quantities of coal, iron, and labor. 

 

in other words, what made the new industrial revolution of steel was not the understanding, which dates to the 1400's at least, but how to do it better, more efficiently.

 

BH

Am I suppose to pretend that what you are arbitrarily referencing in here actually ties in to the overall topic that has been being discussed since Binswanger's book came out? Just glancing over your replay reply tells me you're grasping at straws, trying to make your assessment as semi-plausible as you can. Sorry, I'm neither softwareNerd; able to address your insecurities on these issues; or Harrison, able to categorize your rationalizations for what they are. I'm simply a student here trying  my best to understand the material my senses have been provided with.

 

Edited: relay = reply

Edited by dream_weaver
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Am I suppose to pretend that what you are arbitrarily referencing in here actually ties in to the overall topic that has been being discussed since Binswanger's book came out? Just glancing over your replay tells me you're grasping at straws, trying to make your assessment as semi-plausible as you can. Sorry, I'm neither softwareNerd; able to address your insecurities on these issues; or Harrison, able to categorize your rationalizations for what they are. I'm simply a student here trying  my best to understand the material my senses have been provided with.

I was referring to # 121. Must I provide line-by-line citations?

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