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Does Objectivism integrate philosophy and science well?

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*No, pleople have a hard time with the notion that zero is just as good a number as any other one. Moreover that, say, 'negative' results on a Pap smear means that you're healthy.

 

In law, again, 'no result' for a DNA test means that, criminally speaking, you were not present.

 

Aside from the mathmatical reference, you appear to have stated my point in different terms.

 

These, in any case are just a few examples as to why null set is included as a real entity in basic set theory (ZFC). Disagreeing Objectivists are free to express themselves accordingly while tested, and flunk.. LIkewise, that because Born's Equation demonstrates in-your-face non- communitivity of basic arithmetic, all of QM makes no Aristotelian sense.

I have little use for basic set theory (ZFC) in my line of endeavors. Nor have I familiarized my self with Born's Equation. I do recall that at one time, it had been mathematically demonstrated that bumblebees cannot fly. Believe it or not, it was discovered that the math was wrong.

*Yes, epistemic justification follows logic.And the logic of photon polarization (spin) is that the second particle measured from an emission will always be opposite that of the first, although we don't know the spin of the first until it's measured.

 

Logically, then, the particles must talk to each other at a speed far in excess of their own velocity. But Feynman himself said that this was 'illogical'...So help me...i'm confused....

Epistemic justification starts with recognising that there is difference between infallible knowledge and falliblle knowledge. Trying to understand this by referencing QM might have something to do with the confusion.

* Aristotle saw that his fellow Greeks, et al, had demonstrated many ways of classifying the world of things. His 'meta', in this case, was simply to say that the essential way of classification is by causal reference, of which they're four.

 

The birth of Phenomenology, centered on Husserl's project, was in great measure a reaction to Wittgenstein's proclamation in the Tractatus that, in essence, all metaphysics is nonsense. In this sense, phenomenology tries (or tried) to chart a causal reference of subjective human experience. In other words, what are we, essentially, in terms of how we feel? A

 

Again, Sartre's answer was that we should acknowledge the answer is 'nothing' as a real outcome in so far that is has real consequences.

The reason you do not step out in front of a speeding truck is because you know that answer is not 'nothing' is the real outcome.

*Locke and Paine's 'naturalism' refers more to an application of Aquinas pace Aristotle: That humans were born free is evinced by the anthropology of the native americans, ostensibly a 'natural state as opposed to the chains of their civilization.

 

The missing link is the Salamanca School of c1560 which wrote of universal human rights

 

OTH a modern critique of existentialism wrote that humans are subject not only to biological inevitability but constrained by social laws as well. In the case of Sartre, it was the encounter with Marx via Althusser: "Class struggle is the motor of history".

 

As for Cicero, yes, he wrote as a Stoic that we must accept things we cannot change because they're written 'rerum natura', or facts of nature. Human activity must therefore engage the sphere of activity that's changable. Indeed, I find him compelling, too.

I was thinking more about how they laid the foundation for the discovery and implementation of man's rights, as a natural endowment.

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Aside from the mathmatical reference, you appear to have stated my point in different terms.

 

I have little use for basic set theory (ZFC) in my line of endeavors. Nor have I familiarized my self with Born's Equation. I do recall that at one time, it had been mathematically demonstrated that bumblebees cannot fly. Believe it or not, it was discovered that the math was wrong.

Epistemic justification starts with recognising that there is difference between infallible knowledge and falliblle knowledge. Trying to understand this by referencing QM might have something to do with the confusion.

The reason you do not step out in front of a speeding truck is because you know that answer is not 'nothing' is the real outcome.

I was thinking more about how they laid the foundation for the discovery and implementation of man's rights, as a natural endowment.

I cited ZFC as an example that the notion of nullity having real value has integrated itself into the philosophy of logic and set theory.

 

Born we-wrote the Heisenberg ;uncertainty equation' in a from which demonstrated mathematically that A do not equal A with respect to communitivity within his matrix algebra.

 

In terms of physics, the epistemology of infallable causation -- standing in front of a speeding truck-- is simply a probability of '1'. So for the sake of epistemological argument, yes, one might say that all non-1 probabilities are 'fallable'. Or 'uncertain' in the words of Heisenberg and Born.

 

And yes, again, people have a hard time grasping that 99.9% of all science deals with probalities less than '1'. That's because all want to be certain in a Humean sort of way.

 

This disjuncture between science and daliy commonalities/avoidences begain with Darwin. Mutations are gradual and probabalistic, only gradually leading to a new, adaptive outcome.

 

Re Locke and Paine: Their concern ,as written, was the freedom of citizens with respect to the crown. This involved the rightful ownership of property because under kingly domain, he owned everything. An excellent example of this would be the Doomsday Book of William the Normand, after Hastings,

 

The principle, as stated was that a farmer is entitled to the land that he/she works. For both, and Rousseau as well, the notion of any absentee ownership/rentier was unnatural. By this logic, half of America's farmland woud be owned by Mexican day-laborers.

 

The notion of property belonging to labor refers back to the old Roman law which , later, the Graccii Brothers struggled to uphold.

 

Likewise, again, Natural human rights began with the Salamanca school's reading of Aquinas. We like to say Locke-Rousseau-Paine because, with the exception of Binswanger, we all understand the intimate connection between the French and American Revolutions.

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I cited ZFC as an example that the notion of nullity having real value has integrated itself into the philosophy of logic and set theory.

 

Born we-wrote the Heisenberg ;uncertainty equation' in a from which demonstrated mathematically that A do not equal A with respect to communitivity within his matrix algebra.

 

In terms of physics, the epistemology of infallable causation -- standing in front of a speeding truck-- is simply a probability of '1'. So for the sake of epistemological argument, yes, one might say that all non-1 probabilities are 'fallable'. Or 'uncertain' in the words of Heisenberg and Born.

 

And yes, again, people have a hard time grasping that 99.9% of all science deals with probalities less than '1'. That's because all want to be certain in a Humean sort of way.

Thanks, but no thanks. I'll stick with what I know so far, and am still learning of Aristotelian logic. Appeals to mathematics, demonstration or even proof presuppose the validity of several different issues than what you have eluded with here.

 

This disjuncture between science and daliy commonalities/avoidences begain with Darwin. Mutations are gradual and probabalistic, only gradually leading to a new, adaptive outcome.

 

Re Locke and Paine: Their concern ,as written, was the freedom of citizens with respect to the crown. This involved the rightful ownership of property because under kingly domain, he owned everything. An excellent example of this would be the Doomsday Book of William the Normand, after Hastings,

 

The principle, as stated was that a farmer is entitled to the land that he/she works. For both, and Rousseau as well, the notion of any absentee ownership/rentier was unnatural. By this logic, half of America's farmland woud be owned by Mexican day-laborers.

 

The notion of property belonging to labor refers back to the old Roman law which , later, the Graccii Brothers struggled to uphold.

 

Likewise, again, Natural human rights began with the Salamanca school's reading of Aquinas. We like to say Locke-Rousseau-Paine because, with the exception of Binswanger, we all understand the intimate connection between the French and American Revolutions.

I'll have to look more into the School of Salamanca. It's nice to know that the reading of Aquinas may have contributed to not only natural rights theory but Austrian economic theory and just war theory as well. If Aquinas' writing has the power to influence the School of Salamanca, what influence do you think Aristotle's writing may have had on Aquinas? (Rhetorical question. There's no need to answer)

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Good that you asked, Craig24. The consensus merely tells you that other scientists approve. It's important as far as Science is concerned. However, you are asking philosophic questions. It is important that we connect philosophy to the scientific consensus (not vice versa, since our philosophy stems from Science in the first place). We learn to represent both sides equally. If no connection is possible, then we defend our reasoning through an argument to explain to the scientific consensus to follow our side.

 

P.S. As an example and a hot issue -- the climate change debates. There is the scientific consensus on climate change. Climate change is a scientific fact. Our job is to understand how humans are involved. We need to evaluate this fact in how it relates to humans. Is it bad to humans? Or can we adapt?

 

P.P.S. In other words, for me, the idea of climate change naturally leads to the idea of evolution.

Consensus is merely a general agreement shared within a group. A fact of reality does not care what the consensus of a group of people is. A fact of reality does not care if we connect philosophy to the scientific consensus or vice versa. Philosophy is the science that studies reality, man, and man's relationship to reality. A man is a member of a group. The group he is a member of is mankind. If the consensus of the group of men is "a fact of reality does care what the consensus of the group of men is", this does not alter the fact "a fact of reality does not care what the consensus of a group of men is."

 

Trying to grasp this by using the scientific consensus on climate change does not make this any easier, nor does it change it one iota.

 

Facts are what they are regardless of what any individual may think they are. Here, the question becomes: Are you looking for a method conducive to the identification of facts that takes into consideration the nature of reality and the nature of man's means of apprehending reality? Or do you plan on flitting among the vast array of conflicting consensus' out there - struggling to guess which ones may be true, and where they may lead?

Edited by dream_weaver
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Thanks, but no thanks. I'll stick with what I know so far, and am still learning of Aristotelian logic. Appeals to mathematics, demonstration or even proof presuppose the validity of several different issues than what you have eluded with here.

 

I'll have to look more into the School of Salamanca. It's nice to know that the reading of Aquinas may have contributed to not only natural rights theory but Austrian economic theory and just war theory as well. If Aquinas' writing has the power to influence the School of Salamanca, what influence do you think Aristotle's writing may have had on Aquinas? (Rhetorical question. There's no need to answer)

From the 'Organon', 'Peri hermeneis'. or 'Regarding interpretation' is the standard Aristotelian text that deals with propositions and language.. Most readers neglect the significance of Book 9 and the infamous 'problem of future contingents'; a sea battle either will or will not take place tomorrow.

 

Otherwise, this is more or less proof that Aristotle considered cases in which null and negative values are as real as positive assertions. Therefore, a general theory of logic (which Aristotle never developed) would have to account for all possibilities. This would include 'null-A',  Lukasiewicz, et al...

 

I disagree with Aquinas' use of Aristotle. Therefore, although deeply admired for their intent, this indicates that, regrettably, there's a serious flaw in the Salamanca arguments. Humans simply don't exist in a state of nature as 'naturally good' because the contrary is seen everywhere as well.

 

Aquinas bootlegged Aristortelian 'fusis' (what's natural is what's found in nature, everywhere, into the social realm in which various competing  philosophers state what's 'natural' for humans. and then deductively pound away.

 

We admire Salamanca for supporting the Indians against Spanish genocide, and Locke for opposing an idiotic king's claim to own everything in his realm. But we're a bit edgy about Nietzsche's natural superiority of the few, and sickened over Robbie George's claim that homosexuality should be made illegal because it's unnaturallly unable to procreate.

 

But the base argument is common to all: that we're better off listeninh to naturalist explanations than not.

Oth, I vote with Aristotle that humans are zoon politikon. We believe more or less what our society thinks is right, and the best way to change individuals is to change societal ethos. Claims of 'naturalness' are nothing more than non-reflection on how norms, customs and laws came to be.

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[...]

 

The P.S. deals with contextual usage. Generally, I use existence as a collective term of everything that exists (including that which is living), and existent to refer to specific entities.

 

The P.P.S. makes your claim of majoring in English come across as a love/hate relationship.

You said "every thing," thus breaking "everything" into an infinite spiral that consists of the same fragments "thing" (can be programmed as an infinite loop by adding one instance of "thing" to a number of "thing").

 

I claimed that I hate English as a feeling, not a logical conclusion. In other words, this was an instance of my joking or irony.

 

I can't tell if this reply was intended as an obvious joke toward Dante, or if it is just ironic.

It was meant as a hope based on reasoning presented in this thread. For some reason, you ignore the reasoning and concentrate on the meaning of my hope. You also misinterpret such hope as not a serious feeling. In that instance, I did not feel hope as a joke or an irony. I honestly felt it, and it matched my mental disposition. This was not an instance of my joking or irony.

 

The central nervous system refers to your brain and spinal chord.

 

The peripheral nervous system refers to all of the various nerves which permeate the rest of your body.

 

The human heart does, in fact, have its own dedicated neural net.  So do the intestines.  That these areas might exhibit consciousness is . . .  another matter.

 

This clearly does not contradict your post; I mention it simply because you might find it interesting.

If an organ is autonomous, then it operates subconsciously.

 

Are you looking for a method conducive to the identification of facts that takes into consideration the nature of reality and the nature of man's means of apprehending reality?

Yes.

 

Or do you plan on flitting among the vast array of conflicting consensus' out there - struggling to guess which ones may be true, and where they may lead?

 

There is only one valid consensus - that of Science. Just so you know, Objectivism is not within the philosophic consensus. It is in conflict with a lot more than you may even realize.

 

Additional reasoning:

A fact of reality does not care if we connect philosophy to the scientific consensus or vice versa.

A fact by itself does not care indeed. But people should care to connect to reality rather than only think of facts. The physical reality is constantly growing, and the scientific consensus reflects it well.

 

If the consensus of the group of men is "a fact of reality does care what the consensus of the group of men is", this does not alter the fact "a fact of reality does not care what the consensus of a group of men is."

There are new facts that contradict old facts. You should know that from history. And we are not talking about metaphysical "fact" as a word or a concept. We are talking about actual, physical, specific facts.

We are not talking about some metaphysical fact in your head. We are talking about physical facts that connect to reality. So far, I do not see how Objectivist facts connects to the new facts about reality. In other words, you are stuck in space and ignore the time as dimensions of facts. You are ignoring that the facts are specific, not abstract. In other words, you are stuck in words, ignoring the physical facts and reality.

 

Trying to grasp this by using the scientific consensus on climate change does not make this any easier, nor does it change it one iota.

You cannot apply your reasoning to physical reality so, since you do not identify physical reality. You are merely speaking of the metaphysical nature of "facts."

 

Facts are what they are regardless of what any individual may think they are.

Then we will not know the specific facts. Again, we are not talking about the definition of fact. The definition of it is: "something that actually exists; reality; truth." Fact as a word or a concept does not exist. It refers to what exists, though. It's like you are refering to existence from nothing. Just because you identify yourself with existence also does not change that you are still nothing. Not absolute nothing, though, I might add.

Edited by Ilya Startsev
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In order to resolve confusions, let us then differentiate between the two definitions of everything:
1) the total sum of all things as one undifferentiated thing (everything is everything);
2) the differentiation of every one undifferentiated thing (something is everything).

The first definition does not differentiate between questions "what thing?" and "which thing?", properties and existence are different, but inseparable.
The second definition differentiates between the two questions, yet properties and existence are the same (multiple 1-place relations).

Let me show you how I think in the following three situations, so you can show me how you think in the same situations.
Say, I am in a large store like Walmart. I have a lot of money and want to buy a lot of things. I contact the manager and walk through the store with him.

Situation 1:
I tell the manager that I want to buy every thing (def. 2) in this section of the store. If I point to some particular items (in a sequence), I think of every item as a concept "thing" that is automatically positioned on a space like they are on the shelves in the actuality. Thus, I have an unbounded sequence (thing, thing, thing, ...) or a sum sequence (thing + thing + thing + ...) in my head. I think of them at first as background-independent, but they are indeed located on a coordinate grid, but I do not think of it specifically. They are like points on the grid, differentiated by mere location (left, right, above, etc.). The "thing" concepts exist in my head as metaphysical properties of the physical things to which I refer. They are related by space. Overall, whatever is in my head is merely nothing, not an independently existing thing on its own. I choose to think conceptually by choosing the term "thing" and referring it to different things in real life.

Situation 2:
I want to buy everything (def. 1) in the section, and I am telling this to the manager without looking at any items. This way, it is represented as an undifferentiated sum of unique things (things that are not conceptualized, even though they may be visualized); the things are not differentiated by any properties, but are merely thought of as a collection in this section.

Situation 3:
I say that I want to buy everything (def. 1) in the store. This is the same as the previous situation, except the conceptual, spatial boundaries of the sum become the boundaries of the store in my mind. These boundaries may not reflect reality if I do not know or remember the spacial property (1-place relation only) of the store, yet I still think of it conceptually in order to have a context for my thought. In other words, multi-place relations with unique subsets are implied visually (i.e., an automatic space becomes its inseparable part) but not necessarily conceptualized, and so there is only one 1-place relation. However, if I add a time to my thinking, the concept of "everything" will include an additional time-relation within it. Thus, it will grow in size and duration, and will not be the same "everything." This can also be absolutized and complete simultaneously because it is visualized, not necessarily conceptualized. For example, I want to buy all things in all stores for all time. The amount of relations in the concept "everything" will increase and thus will change the concept without changing the word (this is an integration of conceptual/quantitative and visual/qualitative thinking).

Situation 4:
I say that I want to buy every thing (def. 2) in the store. The spatial boundary will be the same as in the previous situation, but involves some thinking about particular things I remember from the store. Yet each of these things is represented by a general concept "thing." So even though I may visualize things, I still choose to represent them as an abstract "thing" with 1-place relation recurring in a sequence, a series, or an incomplete set. Also, when thinking in such super-objectified manner about metaphysical existence, time is ignored, and the difference between what "is" and what "might" or "ought to be" disappears with it. I may visualize the future or a time-interval, but I will still conceptualize it the same way, and the sequence, series, or set will simply increase, but, if absolutized, it can never become complete and becomes an unbounded, potential infinity (a singularity). The smallest unit is "thing," whereas the larger or largest units are not differentiated because of conceptual/inscription limitations.

Now, my two questions to you:
1) Do these situations match the way you think? If not, where do they differ?
2) Which ways of thinking are better for you, situations 1 and 4 (def. 2, where "thing" is A in [(A, A, A, ...) or (A+A+A+...)] and (A=A=A=...)) or situations 2 and 3 (def. 1, where "thing" is A, and A=A)? Which way is more efficient? Which way more effective?
3) Do you think that there may be a choice involved in different, yet non-contradictory ways of thinking?

 

Reasoning (advanced):

You have told me this noun phrase: "every thing" (sic). You broke it, literally, and you broke your perception of reality as well (read this

http://www.amazon.com/Every-Thing-Must-Metaphysics-Naturalized/dp/0199573093: "Taking science metaphysically seriously, Ladyman and Ross argue, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects.") First of all, it's a fragmentation of the idea I originally told you. It means that you differentiate every undifferentiated thing.
I have told you this noun: "everything." It means an undifferentiated thing. If you mean the same undifferentiated thing as things, then the confusion stems from creating a subset that is the set as a part of the set (an infinite loop, or a circular argument).

I can now understand how the question "what thing?" and "which thing?" will not be the same to you. It's the same as asking two different questions: "what undifferentiated thing?" and "which differentiated thing?"

I will then ask you a different question: "in what context do you differentiate every undifferentiated thing?" I would answer this so: "in the context of nothing." This means that you do not sum the things, am I right? It means that you lack the function of addition. Because, how can you add things that are not added at the end? Either you add or you do not add. Hmm, or you simply put them in the series (mind that the series of the same thing over and over is not a continuum). Yes, you put them in an infinitely redundant set of things, like this: (thing, thing, thing...)

Then we have the following differentiation:
The Objectivist set of existence {thing, thing, thing...}
The Neo-objectivist sum(thing1, thing2, thing3...)

The difference is between a set and a sum. You perceive Existence as a set. I perceive Existence as a sum. A set means "A collection of distinct elements that have something in common." What do your undifferentiated things have in common? You can say: the word "thing," or metaphysical abstraction in your head. Nonetheless, thing equals thing, right? A=A. By the law of identity, you cannot differentiate a thing from a thing unless there is a non-contradictory differentiation through identification in a spatiotemporal context, that is, unless there is something in common, but not absolute sameness.

An object is a discreet, differentiated thing. I hope that your minds include more than just a set of nonexistent unidentified objects (or maybe an infinite series of such objects?). I never thought that your thinking was this dangerous. Not only are you living in an imaginary reality, but also that reality is impossible. The reality of unidentified objects does not exist except in your absolutely fragmented minds.

But you have told me that, for you, everything is every thing, not as a something, but also not as a total sum of things. Do you enjoy differentiating everything into unidentified things? Do you love to differentiate the undifferentiated? And you are telling me this and thinking about this (visualizing it? probably it's just a word, right?) while you are conscious. This is phenomenal because I cannot find a place for it in the model. It is not related to your body or mind. It is not in your environment. It is outside of any context. It is even not within nothing, right?

There are two absolute categories of things that exist: 1) the total sum of all, and 2) a specific, identified object. An unidentified thing within an unidentified context is nothing. An unidentified idea within your mind, an idea that is not represented in reality, is an idea not within your consciousness. Therefore, it is an isolated firing of your neutrons that is completely not represented in your reality by exactly such a firing. It is represented by something that does not have a realistic basis. It's like a metaphor: this neuron's firing is a thing. If you want to me rational and logical, please tell me that you do not believe that a neuron's firing is a thing. A neuron's firing is not materialized other than in electrons, which are also waves. But in addition to all other scientific ignorance, in this case you completely ignore the quantum physical explanation of waves. No one care about quantum physics, right? No one cares about the progress of science. You would rather retain Newtonian mechanics and live in the "perfect" era of 1900s. Let me tell you something: time does not stand still. We are living in a different world, in a reality that is based on quantum physics--not in some other, imaginary reality.

I don't care if you think that this "thing" of yours is physical, metaphysical, hyperphysical, superphysical, or whatever other name you would come up with. The fact remains that it does not exist. I would rather believe in God, the Source of our Universe, than believe in some faceless nonexistent demon Ayn Rand had created, called it existence exists, and said that we are completely dominated by and dependent on it. Yes, I also argue that existence exists can have a scientific basis in Neo-objectivism. The choice of what you want to believe is yours, but know that your "conviction" is a belief, and mine is a real conviction.

Let me explain this to you again, and please read every word I write. You are affected by the "metaphysical every thing" virus. You are not alone. There are also scientists who think this way, but they are not correct. Interpreting every thing by mechanical physics is plainly wrong. Interpreting humans and the human reality as every thing is extremely dangerous. If your mind is that fragmented, there can be no life on Earth. It all becomes a mindless self-destruction. It is sad to see if there are scientists like biologists and psychologists who are affected by this virus of "every thing." All of them fell in consciousness unto a level of Particle--Void only in classical mechanics, not quantum or wave mechanics. In other words, you see particles as classical objects, and this means they cannot become atoms, since atoms are not mere "solar system" type of objects. You cannot apply Newtonian physics to the subatomic level. Every particle is different qualitatively and cannot be like a body, which is similarly different. Even then you cannot think of your bodies as mere collections of particles without any binding. Your consciousness would not be! You would become the same kind of mystic materialists you have always been afraid of. What needs to be done is exorcism of this "independent particle" demon from human minds on the world scale. I can perform this exorcism, if you allow me. I need your consent and your confirmation that you are affected by the "every thing" virus and need it to be expulsed from your mind in order for you to live a normal and real human life.

Let me show you through the model by following this structure: Object becomes non-object in Context. "some kind of relationship" means specific information is missing.
Particle becomes a wave in Void
Atom becomes a bond in Field
Molecule becomes a lattice in Structure
Organelle becomes some kind of relationship in Cytoplasm
Cell becomes some kind of relationship in Matrix
Tissue becomes some kind of relationship in Pulse
Organ becomes some kind of relationship in Aura
Body becomes a relationship in Environment
Society becomes a union in Nature
Race becomes a coalition in World
Sphere becomes a network in System
Star becomes a constellation in Nebula
Hole becomes a dark/white energy in Cosmos
Source becomes some kind of relationship in Vacuum
Multiverse becomes some kind of relationship in Ratium
Omniverse becomes some kind of relationship in Limits
Existence becomes eternal and infinite existence in nothing, becomes APEIRON

In general, these relationships can also be viewed as: matter becomes energy in spacetime.

This is what you have done: you have created test particles http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Test_particles "whose physical properties (usually mass, charge, or size) are assumed to be negligible except for the property being studied, which is considered to be insufficient to alter the behavior of the rest of the system." The only property that you "study" is its existence. But it does not exist! Besides, you are humans (bodies, consciousness), not particles or abstract singularities or black holes!

This probably follows your reasoning: "This assumes that distances can be infinitely subdivided, so as to approach zero. If spacetime exists in discrete units, quanta of spacetime, then this assumption is invalid." - See more at: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=7659#sthash.ZQ3N5K6C.dpuf
Or this: “ “the continuity of space and time entails the existence of an actually infinite number of points and instants.”1 So the continuity of spacetime provides evidence of an actual infinite in our universe." - See more at: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=2061#sthash.GBx6hQ6F.dpuf
"this “assumes that space and time are composed of real points and instants, which has never been proven,” say Craig & Sinclair." - See more at: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=2061#sthash.GBx6hQ6F.dpuf

A metaphysical point or instant is not the same as a quantum of energy because these are different realities. It is a contradiction. You have both a quantum and a point to be the same and yet not be related to other quantums and points. Zero =/= quantum. A proton is not empty space even though its mass is negligible. A photon exists in a spacetime and it is a specific spacetime related and caused by other photos, but it is not in a superspacetime and not a superspacetime, where no particles can be possible. So, technically, superspacetime is nothing. Superspacetime is an empty spacetime. The actual infinite is therefore nothing.

If any of the above does not prove to you that it is merely your choice to believe in objective reality, then I have no idea how to show this to you further, and even if I did, it won't change anything unless you choose otherwise.

Listen to reason: "If one thinks of a geometrical line as logically prior to any points which one may care to specify on it rather than as a construction built up out of points (itself a paradoxical notion), then one’s ability to specify certain points… does not imply that such points actually exist independently of our specification of them… If one simply assumes that any distance is already composed out of an actually infinite number of points, then one is begging the question." - See more at: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=2061#sthash.GBx6hQ6F.dpuf

"But does not the potential infinite in these cases presuppose the existence of an actual infinite? How would you potentially divide something into infinitely many parts if there are not infinitely many parts already there to be divided?" - See more at: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=2061#sthash.GBx6hQ6F.dpuf

If you are dividing absolute nothing, you get an actual infinity/eternity. If you are dividing the spacetime of Existence (the nothing that is everywhere and everywhen), you are dividing a potential infinity/eternity.

So, at the end, we have this: Objectivists are not smart enough to grasp this Reason, and scientists may flout Reason when they choose. Either way you look, both sides do not want to come to a compromise (connection or something common), and I am seemingly powerless in this situation. I should just quit this.

"a physical distance is… potentially infinitely divisible does not entail that the distance is potentially divisible here and here and here…" - See more at: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=2061#sthash.GBx6hQ6F.dpuf

Everything is potential infinity. Nothing is actual infinity. Every thing is a mathematical abstraction, like numbers, that does not exist in actual reality.

"we know essential, immutable things do exist; for example, numbers. Yet I still suspect that a complaint about the infinite number of points would be that spacetime may be discrete, and those points may not exist in the physical universe." - See more at: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=2061#sthash.GBx6hQ6F.dpuf

Numbers are not thing, they are not objects; numbers do not exist as physical entities. We can choose to make them exist, but they inherently do not exist anywhere except than in our nonphysical minds by choice.

Objective reality and physical reality are not the same. Objective reality is a choice, physical reality is a thing. Choice and thing are not the same. They can connect and relate only by choice, but inherently objective and physical are separate. You can choose to identify objective reality with physical reality. However, currently, Objectivists are not identifying objective reality with physical. You are identifying objective reality with a metaphysical concept, a metaphysical reality, which is a choice of mind. I choose to be objective and choose to connect objectivity with the physical reality. You choose to live in numbers (and other Cartesian concepts like points, coordinates, and that, which is actually nothing, a choice to interpret reality, a choice that is no better than anybody else's). Although you may choose to argue and think that your life is real, your life (and argument) will still be a choice (not necessarily correspond with a thing). You consciousness is then identifying with a choice, not a thing. Your choice is in conflict with the thing, but it does not have to be. You can always materialize your choice.

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To sum it up on the most abstract level:

1) Physics and metaphysics conflict.
2) Actuality pertains to physical things.
3) There is 10^80 particles and 10^120 of their interactions in our Universe (from Seth Lloyd’s book Programming the Universe).
Therefore, there is no actual infinity of absolutely everything. Absolute nothing is actually infinite.

 

P.S. A particular nothing, like some limited space, can be summed with entities to become a thing. But the same cannot be said of the absolute nothing.

Edited by Ilya Startsev
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Maybe you will understand better this way:

 

Here is what Objectivism has epistemologically in a sequence:

1) Sensation, 2) Perception, 3) Conception.

 

It would be fine as it is, but what you think next is C=S+P+C, where sum is merely a way of transitioning to the next part. Therefore, you have this: S+P+(S+P+(S+P+(...))) ad infinitum.

 

I propose that C=/=S+P+C, and therefore have: S+P+C+S+P+C+... ad infinitum.

 

Please compare these models. Notice how your model moves away from S by creating an illusion of it in C.

My model is more scientific because it allows C to be changed. Hence each C particularly corresponds to S. However, in the absolute, C is only actually infinite when it is nothing, and it is potentially infinite when it is everything.

Edited by Ilya Startsev
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I would probably just tell the owner that I would like to buy all the merchandise in the store.

I asked the question about "the way you think." You wrote what you would say. Is what you say the same as what you think? If that is so, then it is still not clear what definitions you use.

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Here is what Objectivism has epistemologically in a sequence:

1) Sensation, 2) Perception, 3) Conception.

 

It would be fine as it is, but what you think next is C=S+P+C, where sum is merely a way of transitioning to the next part. Therefore, you have this: S+P+(S+P+(S+P+(...))) ad infinitum.

Are you saying that the Objectivist stance is that conception is merely S+P=C? S+P+C=C doesn't make sense, since how do you have two parts to conception of itself? And of course C can change, who claimed otherwise? On top of that, how does the distance of C from S creates an illusion of S in C? That may happen if you make no connection. In any case, C would be more than merely a sum, it seems to me the stance of Objectivist epistemology. An "absolute" C would be intrinsicism of knowledge, where knowledge is itself an object found outside yourself, which Objectivism rejects. That's why a sum of perceptions and sensations is insufficient for a valid conception of reality.

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Are you saying that the Objectivist stance is that conception is merely S+P=C? S+P+C=C doesn't make sense, since how do you have two parts to conception of itself?

No, a concept is still a concept, and therefore can include itself. In your case, you indeed include it, since you view of conception is a concept of "unit" and cannot be viewed in any other way. A "unit" consists of things, which are also concepts. That's why I have been having problems with your idea of "thing." On the most conceptual level, units are not differentiated from things. Think of a particle. A particle, to me, is a thing. Not thing=thing, but particle=thing. If you agree, then your "units" behave in the same manner as classical particles (points--an obsolete concept from classical mechanics) without any contextual relation to reality. In other words, they exhibit the same existential properties. A human body, however horrible that may sound to an Objectivist, would behave, as such a particle or a collection of such particles, nothing more nor less. You endorse this view. I do not because consciousness cannot be limited to such a "unit." Consciousness is free to identify with whatever it chooses.

 

Here is proof that S is also a concept in O-ism, from ITOE (1990:12): "It may be supposed that the concept “existent” is implicit even on the level of sensations—if and to the extent that a consciousness is able to discriminate on that level. A sensation is a sensation of something, as distinguished from the nothing of the preceding and succeeding moments. A sensation does not tell man what exists, but only that it exists." Notice that "a sensation"="a sensation of something." However, conceptually you look at it as sensation=sensation=a concept. In real life, nothing exists without anything. And you do indeed discriminate everything in every thing. If it only exists and is not differentiated otherwise (e.g., visually), it only means space, which is nothing. Thus her C overtakes S. Ibid.: "The building-block of man’s knowledge is the concept of an “existent”—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action." The latter two are only valid concepts when they pertain to an actually existing thing, not another concept. I have yet to see your definition of a thing. Remember that a thing can be either a thing only as a concept or an actual thing, but the actual thing seems to be missing from Objectivism.

 

And of course C can change, who claimed otherwise?

C changes in science. There, C is called a theory. Scientific theories grow, cease, get replaced, etc. Tell me about a change of C in Objectivism lately.

 

On top of that, how does the distance of C from S creates an illusion of S in C?

First of all, the distance is a concept whether it refers or does not refer to an actual thing. What exactly creates the illusion for you is still unclear. We can speculate, though, that it may be created by the distance conceptually, or that C does not relate directly to S, but only through concepts (in other words, it does not stop being C). We need to reconnect C to S by doing this: viewing the sensations as they come to a child without concepts; or re-creating C to support completely new and potentially contradictory S (e.g., climate change data).

 

That may happen if you make no connection. In any case, C would be more than merely a sum, it seems to me the stance of Objectivist epistemology.

The issue here is that you make a connection--not to an actual S, but to the S in the theory of concepts. C, for Objectivists, is indeed more than merely a sum; it's an infinite sum (unbounded potential, I might add, since you do not include absolute nothing). Yet, the issue is that you do not realize that it is a sum of mere concepts, and concepts are not actual things. So, you take C to be real--to include actual S--without realizing that C is a particular kind of nothing if not absolute, just as S is a particular kind of thing if not everything.

 

An "absolute" C would be intrinsicism of knowledge, where knowledge is itself an object found outside yourself, which Objectivism rejects.

An absolute C is absolute nothing. Knowledge is not an object, even though objectified through your type of thinking while within C. Just because you consider your C to be everything, it is still an unbounded sum of things looping in itself and that can never reach actual infinity and hence actuality. Hence--bingo!--the contradiction of Objectivism.

 

That's why a sum of perceptions and sensations is insufficient for a valid conception of reality.

Yes, S+P=/=C, but you found a better way! You made them all conceptual (metaphysical). Hence you can judge something as valid when in fact it is merely your choice of doing so.

 

P.S. I might add that the beginning, the sensational (actual) basis of your philosophy, is true. The only problem is in the end of it when we approach C and get subsumed by it.

Edited by Ilya Startsev
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Units are not concepts.

This is the problem, ITOE, 14: "Thus the concept “unit” is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology: units do not exist qua units, what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships." The concept "unit" is the same as S+P+C. These "certain existing relationships" are certain spatiotemporal contexts where things are integrated. In such contexts things become relationships. In other words, a unit is a thing only as far as it is a complete integrated reality (see my model). But Rand never said what complete contexts are; she ignored the nothingness of space, completely neglected time, and only dealt with conceptual natures of S and P. So, in Objectivism, "units" do not have relationships between themselves because they, literally, do not exist. Except as shown in my model. The question remains, what is a thing for Objectivists? Please, do not confuse existent with a thing; you are confusing metaphysical with physical. Let me give you an example of a "unit" as it can actually be: Society. Society is a unit that consists of Body--Environment. I want to stress that Society does not consist merely of Bodies. It consists of all the multi-place relationships. Similarly, Body is a unit that consists of Organ--Aura, and etc. in the same manner.

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I asked the question about "the way you think." You wrote what you would say. Is what you say the same as what you think? If that is so, then it is still not clear what definitions you use.

That is how I would express what I think about the examples used.

 

Definitions often have contexts to them, depending on how they are used in a sentence the context can be clear or confusing. If a word has multiple contexts to it, special attention to the surrounding words is required. Sometimes, selecting an entirely different word can get a point across much easier. As in my example, the difference between merchandise and inventory might be slight, but everything can create the confusion of the merchandise, shelving, cash registers, plumbing, electrical wiring, etc. Even asking for every thing in the store can raise the same issues.

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Units are not concepts.

Here i'm requesting an objectivist explanation:

 

In set theory a 'unit' is defined as an aggregate of two or more facts or things that have something in common.

 

Yet because we can find commonalities in any two things or facts, the number of units consists of a larger infinity than the infinite number of facts and things themself.

 

The same can be said of 'concept' if we're dealing with qualities of things-- ie 'money' for all objects used as purchasing power, etc...at the same time they might be classed with either 'worthless trinkets', or "status symbol."

 

In other words, the human use of concepts seems hyper fluid: things get aggregated and conceptualized according to moment to moment utility. My own opinionm is that this mental  adaptiveness is an evolutionay trait. Thisis why I'm of the school that says concept fundamentally ferers to meaning.

 

Yet to have a 'natural' concept would indicate a particular way of aggregation that's somewhat set in stone. Moreover, in point of fact, 'objectivism' outside of its Randian context means just that!

 

In any case, philosophies are what they are because the adherents feel that their way of grouping into concepts is more important than others. Or perhaps you disagree, and contend that the objectivist way is 'natural'?

Edited by frank harley
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Miss Rand notes that "unit" lies at the base of both the conceptual (as a unique perspective of an existent) and math (the number 1)

 

On the conceptual side, she uses an analogy with the concept like "man" being like an open ended set that includes every man that is, was and will be.

 

On the numerical side, Pat Corvini makes the case that every instance of 3 is exactly the same (relationship of a group of members  with one of its members taken as a unit),

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Miss Rand notes that "unit" lies at the base of both the conceptual (as a unique perspective of an existent) and math (the number 1)

 

On the conceptual side, she uses an analogy with the concept like "man" being like an open ended set that includes every man that is, was and will be.

 

On the numerical side, Pat Corvini makes the case that every instance of 3 is exactly the same (relationship of a group of members  with one of its members taken as a unit),

Thanks for the response. it would seem as if she's saying that 'unit' is a naturalized concept--ie gender and numbers are natural?

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That is how I would express what I think about the examples used.

 

Definitions often have contexts to them, depending on how they are used in a sentence the context can be clear or confusing. If a word has multiple contexts to it, special attention to the surrounding words is required. Sometimes, selecting an entirely different word can get a point across much easier. As in my example, the difference between merchandise and inventory might be slight, but everything can create the confusion of the merchandise, shelving, cash registers, plumbing, electrical wiring, etc. Even asking for every thing in the store can raise the same issues.

I think you are escaping the context of the situations. Buying the store as some business representative and buying everything in the store as a customer are different contexts, right? Why would you mix them when not required? Merchandise is a collection of things for sale in the store. I asked everything of merchandise or every thing of merchandise. Is this clearer now?

 

[...]

 

The same can be said of 'concept' if we're dealing with qualities of things-- ie 'money' for all objects used as purchasing power, etc...at the same time they might be classed with either 'worthless trinkets', or "status symbol."

 

In other words, the human use of concepts seems hyper fluid: things get aggregated and conceptualized according to moment to moment utility. My own opinionm is that this mental  adaptiveness is an evolutionay trait. Thisis why I'm of the school that says concept fundamentally ferers to meaning.

 

[...]

Compare to my understanding: the most fundamental nature of existence is conceptual, not sensational. By fundamental here I do not mean our reality.

 

Miss Rand notes that "unit" lies at the base of both the conceptual (as a unique perspective of an existent) and math (the number 1)

 

On the conceptual side, she uses an analogy with the concept like "man" being like an open ended set that includes every man that is, was and will be.

 

On the numerical side, Pat Corvini makes the case that every instance of 3 is exactly the same (relationship of a group of members  with one of its members taken as a unit),

So conceptual "unit" is unique to individual? "Man" being an open set is not unique to an individual. In fact, it is not unique, unless you just like picking different words for the fun of it. It seems that "unit" is a particular way Miss Rand thinks. She applies her thoughts mathematically, not visually. More so, her conceptual side refers to further concepts, like "man," where man is not an exact individual in a specific context, but merely an unbounded set of such individuals who may not exist. This is an instance when she took her conceptual side farther than the real.

 

There are no numbers in nature. Numbers are basically points on an imaginary coordinate grid. We may refer this grid to reality, but we may also not do so and keep it purely numerical. This is another instance where Rand goes beyond reality. I also want to note that people do not behave like numbers, unless they are machines, in which case the concept of "man" will have to be redefined. Differentially relationships may resemble numerical, but I think Rand ignores any kind of changes that are non two-valued.

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Since the post got separated:

Thanks for the response. it would seem as if she's saying that 'unit' is a naturalized concept--ie gender and numbers are natural?

Naturalized, as in: to introduce into common use or into the vernacular?

 

I've considered "unit" for example the letter 'A', as in one of these --->'A'<----, another one of these --->'A'<---- where each 'A' is considered or regarded by a mind as a "unit".

 

Edited: Added

Edited by dream_weaver
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I think you are escaping the context of the situations. Buying the store as some business representative and buying everything in the store as a customer are different contexts, right? Why would you mix them when not required? Merchandise is a collection of things for sale in the store. I asked everything of merchandise or every thing of merchandise. Is this clearer now? 

I'll grant the real estate deal provides for an extreme interpretation.

 

I'll also grant that to discuss things philosophically, extra diligence is required to seek precision and clarity.

 

Between dictionaries, thesauruses, concordances, lexicons, etc., words often have overlapping boundaries. Everything is implied using existence, in the broadest sense. When buying a new car, and the dealer asks what options you would like, stating you would like everything included amounts to all of the options. Only a fool might try to delineate every thing that existence implies, whereas the vehicle invoice is likely to contain every thing that is considered an option on it.

So conceptual "unit" is unique to individual? "Man" being an open set is not unique to an individual. In fact, it is not unique, unless you just like picking different words for the fun of it. It seems that "unit" is a particular way Miss Rand thinks. She applies her thoughts mathematically, not visually. More so, her conceptual side refers to further concepts, like "man," where man is not an exact individual in a specific context, but merely an unbounded set of such individuals who may not exist. This is an instance when she took her conceptual side farther than the real.

 

There are no numbers in nature. Numbers are basically points on an imaginary coordinate grid. We may refer this grid to reality, but we may also not do so and keep it purely numerical. This is another instance where Rand goes beyond reality. I also want to note that people do not behave like numbers, unless they are machines, in which case the concept of "man" will have to be redefined. Differentially relationships may resemble numerical, but I think Rand ignores any kind of changes that are non two-valued.

 

Conceptual beings, as far as we know, can regard existents as a unit. "Rocks" in a similar analogy, would be akin to a set consisting of {every rock that is, has ever been, or will be}. regardless of shape, size color, weight, texture, molecular composition, etc. While each rock has its own shape, size, color weight, etc., these measurements are implied but omitted until required to shed more light on a specific rock.

 

Numbers are more abstract, thus require more logical steps to arrive to a more comprehensive, or objective understanding of them. Multiplicity is one of the givens. Just look at a yard of grass, or a forest of trees, a pile of rocks, a flock of birds, Numbers move from the perceptually graspable 1 to 3?, 4?, 5?, 6?, 7? units an individual can grasp without moving into the counting system that enables the use of a method (counting) to convert the observed multiplicity into a single unit, i.e., a number. Number is a conceptual tool developed by conceptual beings to automatize this process.

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Greg,

 

When buying a new car, and the dealer asks what options you would like, stating you would like everything included amounts to all of the options.

All options within the context is reasonable.
 

Only a fool might try to delineate every thing that existence implies, whereas the vehicle invoice is likely to contain every thing that is considered an option on it.

I see a mix of contexts here again. Call me a fool, but I have done it: I have delineated "everything" that Existence implies. But you think of "every thing" differently, that is, you think of it within a specific context, but you forget that it is a metaphysical reality in your head. So which one is it: a metaphysical reality of concepts or an actual reality of things? Now, it would seem like you consider "every thing" from the given example to be exact things. Yet you call these exact things mere "thing"s. So which one is it: a closed collection of exact parts in the given situation or "every thing" in the situation? Forget about metaphysics, if you can.
 

"Rocks" in a similar analogy, would be akin to a set consisting of {every rock that is, has ever been, or will be}.

I thought a "unit" is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology. Then how would you know truly which rock is, has been, or will be? Knowledge may follow its method exactly, but knowledge may not reflect reality. For example, the shroud of Turin is considered to be the physical evidence of the existence of Christ. However, some people know that Christ never existed. You told me that a consensus is merely a general agreement shared within a group. So, how will you know then? Will Objectivism provide the true answer?
 

regardless of shape, size color, weight, texture, molecular composition, etc.

How do you know that it even exists then? You are not talking about rocks, you are talking about numbers! Only with numbers or some removed from reality concepts will you not need any specific property. Merely a "rock" would do. Do you want to know how it translates into reality? This way: Greg, you are merely a man. You may agree, but what you may also miss is that I am binding you to identify yourself only as a man and as no one else. It is a judgement upon your consciousness more than anything. The definitional judgement. Seemingly then, whoever rules the definitions (if not you), rules your consciousness.
 

While each rock has its own shape, size, color weight, etc., these measurements are implied but omitted until required to shed more light on a specific rock.

When do you know that you are required to shed more light on a specific rock? Maybe you have already abandoned your sense data and had become a full-on philosopher. So, empirical scientists with all their specific data will not matter to your exalted mind any longer. You have found the Truth, right? The funny thing is: after five months, I am still not sure what your "Truth" is.
 

Numbers are more abstract, thus require more logical steps to arrive to a more comprehensive, or objective understanding of them.

And symbols are even more abstract. And then you can just keep on climbing the abstraction ladder to get to the abstraction of abstractions that you even won't be able to ever explain to anyone. Hence S->P->C->C->C->C->... ad infinitum.
 

Multiplicity is one of the givens. Just look at a yard of grass, or a forest of trees, a pile of rocks, a flock of birds, Numbers move from the perceptually graspable 1 to 3?, 4?, 5?, 6?, 7?

What is also given but ignored is space. Conceptual space where all these objects are mere points, not things in themselves. They become things in themselves when you show all of their multi-place relations, not just the quantitative ones. Ah, Greg, I know the issue. Rand abandoned imagination that allowed freedom of visualization. You are unable to visualize metaphysical geometries. I am able, though. Visualization is more important to me than mere numbers. It's the quality that matters; quantity is merely the current paradigm that people accept above all else and hence one must match it in order to go with the flow. I am a visual thinker, Greg. I don't need quantifiable objects. I can think about actual infinity and see it in my mind. I was hoping that you may be able to do the same through what I have been writing here. Maybe you are just not ready for it.

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I think you are escaping the context of the situations. Buying the store as some business representative and buying everything in the store as a customer are different contexts, right? Why would you mix them when not required? Merchandise is a collection of things for sale in the store. I asked everything of merchandise or every thing of merchandise. Is this clearer now?

 

Compare to my understanding: the most fundamental nature of existence is conceptual, not sensational. By fundamental here I do not mean our reality.

 

So conceptual "unit" is unique to individual? "Man" being an open set is not unique to an individual. In fact, it is not unique, unless you just like picking different words for the fun of it. It seems that "unit" is a particular way Miss Rand thinks. She applies her thoughts mathematically, not visually. More so, her conceptual side refers to further concepts, like "man," where man is not an exact individual in a specific context, but merely an unbounded set of such individuals who may not exist. This is an instance when she took her conceptual side farther than the real.

 

There are no numbers in nature. Numbers are basically points on an imaginary coordinate grid. We may refer this grid to reality, but we may also not do so and keep it purely numerical. This is another instance where Rand goes beyond reality. I also want to note that people do not behave like numbers, unless they are machines, in which case the concept of "man" will have to be redefined. Differentially relationships may resemble numerical, but I think Rand ignores any kind of changes that are non two-valued.

>>> the most fundamental nature of existence is conceptual, not sensational. By fundamental here I do not mean our reality<<<<

 

I agree. To conceptualize is part of our DNA. Oth, there is nothing that assures us that our concepts will lead to science.

 

Speaking of which....my experience in science indicates that its practitioners have a really hard time with the c-word. Rather, a 'concept' to science is nothing but an idea, or generalized thought that hasn't found it's usable form as a hypotheses. to this end, a 'naturalized concept is one that corresponds to how nature works,by way of the possibiity of forming a hypotheses.

 

You've explained Rand's use of 'unit' quite well, thank you. That it does not correspond to set theory is fine,as i can easily adapt.

 

If numbers are not real, then you fall into the obligation of explaining your way out of the 'Wigner conundrum'. As a truly great QM Physicist, his later book questioned how QM can explain nature, insofar the match between QM results and the math is far too intimate. So if math is mind-dependent,  so is QM!

 

In other words, the results of QM would not exist independently of our minds...

 

A good example of his claim came ten years ago--after his passing-- with Dyson's discovery that the algorythmic sequence of spectral lines matched the infamous Z-function of Riemann, created in 1824!

 

In any case, yes, there's a strong argument for the naturalization of math--that it's discovered like everything else in nature. First developed by Quine, the latest is by Penny Maddy, who's actually out at U Cal irvine, a short walk from the Rand Institute, btw.

 

In fact, Dyson is convinced that Maddy offers the best epistemic explanation for his self-labeled 'discovery'. Wigner, for his part, died a hard -core Platonist.

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No, a concept is still a concept, and therefore can include itself.

That doesn't follow. A concept includes itself? You get circularity, where you need the concept before acquiring the concept. What makes more sense for what you mean seems treating a concept as the result of a function: f(S, P, C) = C, where the function simplifies or abstracts a concept by eliminating sensation and perception in the process. That is not the Objectivist view. You may eliminate that, but it would be bad thinking methodology.

 

However, conceptually you look at it as sensation=sensation=a concept.

Huh? Not at all... It says the concept "existent" is implicit on the level of sensation. It does not say the concept "existent" is explicit on the level of sensation. The rest is you

coming up with a narrative to argue against a misconception.

 

Tell me about a change of C in Objectivism lately.

There is none, just as Kant hasn't changed his theories since he's dead, perspectivism of Nietzsche hasn't changed since he's dead, Einstein's relativity hasn't changed. And just the same, Rand's theory of epistemology won't change since she's dead. Anything different would already be "not Objectivism". I have theories of my own that I think are not Objectivism. On the other hand, a theory of epistemology will change, just not *specific* theories on epistemology.

 

We need to reconnect C to S by doing this: viewing the sensations as they come to a child without concepts; or re-creating C to support completely new and potentially contradictory S (e.g., climate change data).

Yeah... that's an Objectivist view basically of how to make sure your concepts are valid, i.e. refer to reality. Well, percepts is more accurate.

 

 concepts are not actual things

.

Not material things, no, but they can be made into something connected/isomorphic/related to reality as a mental unit. See the previous quote, too.

 

Hence you can judge something as valid when in fact it is merely your choice of doing so.

Yeah, it is, so epistemology is figuring out what is in fact the best methodology for thinking. This is not metaphysical, it's a theory of knowledge. It's epistemological by being a method of using percepts and other elements to establish concepts and therefore knowledge.

 

She applies her thoughts mathematically, not visually. More so, her conceptual side refers to further concepts, like "man," where man is not an exact individual in a specific context, but merely an unbounded set of such individuals who may not exist. This is an instance when she took her conceptual side farther than the real.

Not true. The concept "man" consists of instances/units which are referred to by the word "man" in English, or whatever language applies to you. Those individual units are integrated into a concept by a volitional process of differentiation and similarity. They key point Rand makes is that during abstraction, all the underlying "parts" are still retained, yet not part of what you focus on. That makes the individuals always present at least implicitly acknowledged in any concept you use. Unless you came up with your concept by invalid or poor means, that's the theory Rand poses for all people.

Indeed, Rand herself acknowledges this is quite mathematical, but I'd argue that this is pretty tenable as a theory. "Visuals" are not really how anyone thinks, despite how it "feels" visual - it is mostly relational and conceptual, which are best described in visual terms. All Rand means by unit is noting an individual entity is grouped with other entities, so don't make it into something more than that.

No, numbers don't exist "out there" but they have a direct connection to reality. In fact, numbers and counting are basic concepts all children develop, so I'd say numbers tend to be isometric to material reality. Remember, Rand is no materialist, but it's not the same as saying she holds concepts as reified imaginary things. "Two-valued" change is not even part of  this, things can change on a range. Read ITOE further, especially where Rand discusses forming concepts of emotion, where changes of degree are crucial.

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