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Why cannot the future be random? (or: invalidating axioms?)

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DonAthos said

 

 

 

I believe that the contention has been made that when we discuss "axiomatic knowledge," which is sometimes held to be a special case -- when the premises in question are "axioms" -- there is no need to "check" them. But I disagree with this, because in coming to conceptualize or apply a given axiom (even one which, when properly understood, is true) to a specific situation, a person may yet make some error.

In order to demonstrate this, I've provided the example of a person who agrees that "free will" cannot ever be disproven, yet who conceives of free will incorrectly (and therefore comes to erroneous conclusions in application). This person must be willing to reexamine his concept of free will, despite holding it to be "axiomatic," despite his certainty, if he is to rid himself of his error. There is no other way to do it.

 

 

It makes no sense to say axioms must be checked for error cause they need to be conceptualized or applied.  How would misapplying an axiom make the axiom wrong?  Can you give an example of how an axiom can become wrong cause someone misapplies this?  Would someone misapplying 2+2=4 or the pythagorean theorem make these wrong? 
 If someone thinks the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other 2 sides cause God said so, then he is wrong.  But he is uttering nonsense that has no bearing on the status of the pythagorean theorem.
 If i misapply these in building a skyscraper they are not invalidated.  They are still true. My application was wrong.
 
But more importantly.  For someone to misapply something it has to EXIST.  Otherwise there is nothing to misapply.  It has to be a misapplication and not its opposite(IDENTITY.)  I have to be aware of it to misapply or apply(CONSCIOUSNESS.)
 
The axioms are presupposed in everything we do. Whether we are misapplying axioms or making a sandwich. 
Once you are conscious of something that exists then you are free to misapply or apply. 
-- But not before.
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Let's concretize the situation:

 

The concept of an Axiom, involves the idea that they are necessary but not sufficient for one to claim any and all knowledge.

 

Validation of the Axiom involves observation that the Axiom applies (is necessary) to each and every part of the totality of your knowledge, and in fact upon integration of all that knowledge, observation that it applies to any possible knowledge.

 

The Arbitrary is a claim to something for which no evidence has been observed.  Claims to the existence of an omnipotent spaghetti monster or the Devil fall into this category. Arbitrary claims fall short of the meaning of "possible" for which at least SOME evidence must exist tending to show the thing claimed to be a possibility.  I.e. unless some probability backed by evidence can be shown something has the status of Arbitrary, meaningless, and not possible.  When all of your knowledge contradicts an Arbitrary claim, I would say the Arbitrary claim should in fact be deemed "impossible". 

 

It is BOTH

 

1. an arbitrary claim; AND

2. a claim to the impossible

 

to claim that it is possible that some special scientific knowledge will be "discovered" which invalidates an Axiom (an axiom which has already been independently validated as necessary for the totality of all of your knowledge) thereby invalidating all knowledge we have heretofore possessed... and incidentally thereby invalidating the special scientific knowledge...(transforming it into mystic intuition or revelation?? after all knowledge no longer is valid...)

 

The claim that the discovery of such special scientific knowledge is possible is of on the same epistemological level as claiming the possibility of God, or that the Universe will end tomorrow, or that existence, identity, and consciousness are illusions... (nonexistent illusions of what non-consciousness neither of which are what they are?)

 

 

Keeping context: The analysis is not an empty rationalisation regarding some unknown unspoken Axioms of arbitrary origin.  We already have a set of Axioms we are confronted with and must take into account when speaking of Axioms. 

 

 

The Axioms discovered to be necessary for the claim to any and all knowledge include:

 

Existence

Consciousness

Identity

 

 

Keeping it concrete:

 

What possible nature and or type of special scientific discovery, i.e. what special knowledge could be "observed" for which we would suddenly exclaim knowledge is impossible?  Do not doubt this would be the logical result you would have to accept.  Think about it.  Without looking to any specific type of scientific discovery, which one of these Axioms is it "possible" could be controverted by "special knowledge" without actually invalidating all knowledge?

 

Some of you will see the black empty zero forming in your mind... a conceptual black hole or perhaps some amorphous undefined conceptual fog... and while staring into this void you will still have some sense or a FEELING that there is something there...     In the end these things do not amount to it but you will be still tempted to sheepishly say:

 

"It's possible..."

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:whistle:

 

Are you looking for a reply to your post? Would you like it to be polite and/or earnest? If so, do you think there might be a better way of asking?

The reason I didn't reply initially was because I thought that your post did not respond to what I had to say (if it was meant to, though honestly I do not know, as nothing I said was directly addressed). As far as I could tell, your post did not reflect an understanding of the argument I've been trying to develop. And so, apart from simply repeating myself in growing frustration, I didn't know how to proceed.

But since you've (perhaps) asked for feedback, and since I've had some time to allow myself to "cool off," let me briefly review your post.

 

The concept of an Axiom, involves the idea that they are necessary but not sufficient for one to claim any and all knowledge.

 

Validation of the Axiom involves observation that the Axiom applies (is necessary) to each and every part of the totality of your knowledge, and in fact upon integration of all that knowledge, observation that it applies to any possible knowledge.

 

I agree with this.

 

The Arbitrary is a claim to something for which no evidence has been observed.  Claims to the existence of an omnipotent spaghetti monster or the Devil fall into this category. Arbitrary claims fall short of the meaning of "possible" for which at least SOME evidence must exist tending to show the thing claimed to be a possibility.  I.e. unless some probability backed by evidence can be shown something has the status of Arbitrary, meaningless, and not possible.

 

I don't know whether, or to what extent, this (seeming) digression on the "arbitrary" truly relates to the ongoing discussion. I also have not given sufficient attention to the concept of the "arbitrary" to know immediately whether I agree or not with this explanation. But if you think it's important, I'll attempt to work through it a bit and relate it back...

If I were to claim that a woman in Finland is right at this moment eating an egg, it would be arbitrary for me to do so. I would have no particular evidence for my assertion. Yet is it "possible" that such a woman might be there, doing that thing? Yes, I think so; I think it's sensibly described as "possible" (if not "likely").

So... perhaps my understanding of "evidence" is inadequate here? Maybe my knowledge of people, and that people eat eggs, and knowing that there are a great many people in Finland (and subsequently women) qualifies as "evidence" in some sort of statistical fashion? I don't know. Or maybe you would claim that I would have no basis for making a claim like "a woman in Finland is eating an egg," lacking direct evidence of any specific person presently doing that specific thing. Yet, if we had any means to determine the truth of the matter, and if we were to wager beforehand, I would put my money on "a woman in Finland is eating an egg." Would you wager with me, against me, or would you beg off because you have "no sensible way to guess"? Or maybe I do not understand your use of "arbitrary" here?

Are the Devil or the Flying Spaghetti Monster the same sort of thing? As they are typically conceived, I feel comfortable ruling them out completely. If we allow for some (slightly altered) conception of a "devil" -- as for instance some space alien of great power, which manifests itself according to our popular conception of a devil (such as on an episode of ST:TNG, I believe) -- then I would indeed grant it the status of "possible" in the least sort of sense. To assert the existence of such a thing without evidence would indeed be arbitrary, and I'd be comfortable dismissing such a claim out of hand on that basis. (And further, I would wager against it existing, if Vegas had a line on it.) However, if someone had claimed to have met such a creature -- claimed to have proof of its existence -- and if this were a trustworthy person generally, I might have to give him and his claim some fair audience. It would be important, in this latter case, that I at least admitted to the idea that a (non-supernatural) "devil" were "possible" in the sense that "it could exist" (as opposed to a supernatural Devil, which I do not judge as possible at all); such a recognition is important, in my opinion, so that I am willing to examine and weigh the evidence presented fairly.

 

When all of your knowledge contradicts an Arbitrary claim, I would say the Arbitrary claim should in fact be deemed "impossible".

 

I believe that I would go further than this. I think that if any of your knowledge contradicts any other claim, then that other claim may be dismissed as untrue. I think that this is what logic both means and demands.

But the issue here is that it sometimes happens that a person believes himself to have some piece of knowledge, and is mistaken in that belief. Or he may be mistaken in his estimate of "contradiction" between what he knows and some other claim, or he may misunderstand the claim itself.

For instance, suppose a friend of mine claimed to have captured the Devil and locked it in his stable. (Forgive the mixed television references, but now I believe I'm referring to The Twilight Zone.) Well, on the one hand I would be comfortable in dismissing his claim, as I reject the very idea of the "supernatural." Yet I could so conceive of such a thing that I would also reject the possibility of a superpowered alien, which may yet exist. But this might well be a mistake on my part, if it happened that my friend actually had made first contact with this alien species and did in fact have him locked up. In such a case, I would have to be willing to investigate my friend's claim (and reexamine my own understanding) if I wanted to learn the truth, my own certainty (in dismissing the supernatural, and in judging his claim to have to do with that) notwithstanding. It is only by being willing to "check my premises" that I may cotton onto my own error. (Whether I would actually opt to investigate my friend's claim in any given instance is a separate matter; I am only speaking with respect to the epistemological status of my friend's claim, and I am not saying -- as I think some have mistaken -- that every possible claim warrants an investigation.)

 

It is BOTH

 

1. an arbitrary claim; AND

2. a claim to the impossible

 

to claim that it is possible that some special scientific knowledge will be "discovered" which invalidates an Axiom (an axiom which has already been independently validated as necessary for the totality of all of your knowledge) thereby invalidating all knowledge we have heretofore possessed... and incidentally thereby invalidating the special scientific knowledge...(transforming it into mystic intuition or revelation?? after all knowledge no longer is valid...)

 

This is true (though more "impossible" than "arbitrary," in my mind), provided that I've done the work of conceptualizing and validating proper axioms correctly, and am applying them correctly to a given scenario.

If I've made some mistake, however, I may trust that I will run into problems against some "special scientific knowledge." If and when I run into those problems, hopefully I will choose to "check my premises" so that I may correct the mistakes I've made, with respect to my conceptualizing and validating and applying axiomatic knowledge. For reality will not budge.

If, however, I take it for granted that "I cannot possibly be wrong," then in the (howsoever rare) case where I am wrong, I will not have the opportunity to discover that fact, which is... not ideal.

 

The Axioms discovered to be necessary for the claim to any and all knowledge include:

 

Existence

Consciousness

Identity

 

I agree.

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It makes no sense to say axioms must be checked for error cause they need to be conceptualized or applied.

But nonetheless, you went through a process to determine that an axiom is in fact an axiom. A big thing in philosophy is if you can have axioms without begging the question. In other words, not all axioms are actually axioms, that's why some beg the question. If I say "the Earth orbits the sun is an axiom", I'm right that the Earth orbits the sun,  but I'd be wrong to call it an axiom, or even call "orbits" axioms. So going around saying something is an axiom is not going to convince anyone that you are truly holding an axiom. All sorts of things really are treated as axioms, especially the existence of god, even more so if "god is everywhere" and "god is existence". Why do you say that is wrong? Doesn't some scientific knowledge add onto you knowing that god's existence is not an axiom?

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I just wanted to pop in to say that I'm working on a response. I find this particular type of disagreement fascinating.

 

I want every person who sees the different perspectives in this thread to consider this quote (including the "anonymous" user/users who keep viewing this exchange):

 

The impulse of the habit of reason almost pushed her to speak, to argue, to demonstrate the self-evident—but she looked at their faces and she saw that they knew it. In some terms different from hers, in some inconceivable manner of consciousness, they knew all that she could tell them, it was useless to prove to them the irrational horror of their course and of its consequences, both Meigs and Taggart knew it—and the secret of their consciousness was the means by which they escaped the finality of their knowledge.

Atlas shrugged

Think on it and how you would relate it to this thread......

Edit: I want to suggest that this issue is one of the most direct reasons other philosophers hate Rand!

Edited by Plasmatic
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DonAthos

 

I think your example of a woman eating an egg is not an appropriate example of the arbitrary.  There is enough evidence in reality to say such a thing is possible.... evidence about people, eggs, dietary habits etc.

 

Saying a supernatural entity could be tricking you into believing 2+3 is 5 when it is actually 6, is arbitrary and in fact is very similar to the flawed method of Cartesian doubt used by Descarte which relied on this "possibility" to doubt nearly everything.

 

 

It seems we agree that when all of your knowledge contradicts an arbitrary claim you should reject it, and deem it impossible.

 

 

Now as for your point, I must admit I do not know why you raise the issue of "if I made a mistake, however,"?  This kind of skepticism or "doubt" (recall the grand error/failure of Cartesian doubt) brings into the fray all kinds of irrationalities.  It is understandable that you may doubt your ability to interpret some specialized scientific knowledge or know whether a suspect has committed a crime based on limited evidence but there are some things you cannot doubt. Irrationalities crop up, especially if you do not limit the kinds of errors you deem possible.  Can you be wrong that 2+2 is 4?  i.e. 1 and 1 and another 1 and 1 is the same as 1 and 1 and 1 and 1? Can you doubt you exist or that a thing is what it is?

 

I know you "agree" with the three axioms but do you admit of a "possibility" of being wrong, not in general, but about THESE AXIOMS? 

 

If so, there is a problem with your logic.  This is precisely my point.  Keeping context, we are talking about THE actual Axioms.

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DonAthos

 

I think your example of a woman eating an egg is not an appropriate example of the arbitrary.

That's fine, and I think I anticipated that might be the case when I presented that example. I only wanted to start to probe the concept in your usage, and see where we might agree or disagree.

 

There is enough evidence in reality to say such a thing is possible.... evidence about people, eggs, dietary habits etc.

Yes, I agree.

I will say, in the interest of trying to "tie this back in," that this is also what I believe about error: I do not necessarily have any specific information about any woman eating eggs in Finland, but I do have evidence about people, eggs, dietary habits, just as you say. Similarly, I do not necessarily have specific information about any given man making an error (or myself making an error), but I do have evidence about people (again myself included) and the errors that we occasionally make. Though I don't know when or where, I am confident that I will make some error or errors in the future (just as I am confident that a woman in Finland is enjoying that egg of hers). Thus I try to orient myself towards catching and rectifying such errors as I make, if I am able.

 

Saying a supernatural entity could be tricking you into believing 2+3 is 5 when it is actually 6, is arbitrary and in fact is very similar to the flawed method of Cartesian doubt used by Descarte which relied on this "possibility" to doubt nearly everything.

I don't know who is saying that a supernatural entity is tricking anyone into anything, but I'm fairly sure that it isn't me. I also don't think that's a reasonable extrapolation of anything that I've said.

Further -- and I understand that this might be a separate point of contention for you or others, but I can only report what I believe to be true -- I'm not talking at all about "doubt." Knowing that people make errors is a crucial recognition to make so that an individual can admit this as a possibility when faced with an apparent contradiction. It is not the same thing as "doubting" oneself, or anything at all.

Honestly, I don't know what I'm meant to be "doubting" -- but that's not what I experience. In recognizing my own capacity for error, I consider myself to be no less certain than others about that which I believe to be true. I just think that it makes me better equipped to deal with errors, when they arise.

 

It seems we agree that when all of your knowledge contradicts an arbitrary claim you should reject it, and deem it impossible.

If one's knowledge is knowledge in fact -- if it is true -- then one may reject anything which contradicts said knowledge. Again, I don't know how this idea of the "arbitrary" factors into the discussion... I don't see that I need it. If some claim contradicts the true, then that claim is impossible.

I think that if there is something to be gained in a designation of the "arbitrary," it is for assessing claims which do not apparently contradict what one knows to be true. I.e. a claim that could potentially be true -- "is possible" -- but one for which there is no apparent evidence. It is not that we find such a claim impossible, but there is no call to believe it or take it seriously.

 

The claim that there exists some supernatural deity is impossible.  The claim that there exists some superpowered alien that may be mistaken by some for a deity is arbitrary.

 

Now as for your point, I must admit I do not know why you raise the issue of "if I made a mistake, however,"?

It is because I make mistakes from time to time and I would like to be able to deal with them. Thus I find our discussion incomplete without accounting for such a case.

Have you ever met a person who was incapable of recognizing his own error in anything? Who would never admit fault or wrongdoing? I would like to avoid being that sort of person, if it is in my power. If there are things that I believe which are not true, I would like to root them out. If there are mistakes that I've made, I would like to come to understand them and thereby understand how to avoid making similar mistakes in the future. I think these things are in my interest.

 

This kind of skepticism or "doubt" (recall the grand error/failure of Cartesian doubt) brings into the fray all kinds of irrationalities.

I think that if I were to say that the Devil may be causing me to believe that 1 + 1 = 2 when 1 + 1 might actually be 3, you would be right to take issue with that. I do not believe that "human beings (myself included) have the capacity to be wrong" is the same kind of claim at all. I think that if there is anything more certain than Finnish women eating eggs from time to time, it is that human beings are occasionally mistaken in what they believe to be true. No evidence for devils of any kind; plenty of evidence for human error.

 

It is understandable that you may doubt your ability to interpret some specialized scientific knowledge or know whether a suspect has committed a crime based on limited evidence...

We may need to get deeper on this idea of "doubt" and what it means, because this again strikes me as wrong.

I don't think I do "doubt my ability" to understand/interpret science or anything like that. Rather, I try to assess my knowledge and capacities as fairly as I'm able. With regard to much of specialized science, I know that I'm not particularly learned in those areas, so I try not to weigh in on many controversies within that field. At the same time, I fully believe that if I committed myself to studying such a field -- if I, for instance, became a scientist -- I could understand subjects within my field perfectly well.

When I do come to some conclusion with respect to science... again, I don't "doubt" myself or my conclusion. Yet I continue to recognize my capacity for error, so if/when I discover myself to have been mistaken, I'm prepared to amend my beliefs accordingly.

Where precisely does "doubt" factor in here?

 

...but there are some things you cannot doubt. Irrationalities crop up, especially if you do not limit the kinds of errors you deem possible.  Can you be wrong that 2+2 is 4?

No, I don't think I can be wrong that 2+2 is 4.

 

Can you doubt you exist or that a thing is what it is?

Can I doubt that I exist or that a thing is what it is? I don't know. Probably not sincerely. I don't doubt those things, at any rate.

 

I know you "agree" with the three axioms but do you admit of a "possibility" of being wrong, not in general, but about THESE AXIOMS?

I don't "agree" with the Objectivist axioms. I agree with them. I don't think I'm wrong about them and I cannot conceive of a situation that would ever lead me to think otherwise.

I'll go further: I don't think I'm wrong about anything that I currently believe to be true. That includes the present conversation in which I know that I am right in saying what I am saying, and in that you are wrong to disagree, insofar as you do. I am certain of these things.

However.

If over the course of our conversation you were to demonstrate some contradiction in my thinking or between my claims and evidence, such that I understood it, I would do my best to reassess -- as fairly as possible -- those things which I take to be true, and those things for which I argue, to see whether or not the mistake might be mine.

In fact, in having this conversation in the first place, I endeavor to temporarily set aside the fact of my own certainty so that I can understand your point of view and attempt to weigh it against my own. So that I can come to recognize such a contradiction in my own thinking, should it exist.

If I did not do this (and to the extent that I fail), here's what you could expect from me: that I would not take you or your claims seriously or respectfully; that I would not respond to your actual arguments or examples (and likely would avoid quoting you directly); that I would instead concentrate on "diagnosing" your error, or possibly instructing you as a teacher does a child, secure in the knowledge that, as I cannot be wrong, the error must lie with you.

Maybe you've seen that before? When two parties argue, each equally convinced that he cannot be the mistaken party, there is little recourse to discussion or reason. But when two parties are each willing to reexamine their own rationale in earnest, keen to find any errors that they might make or have made, even as they attempt to understand their partner's claims in their partner's terms, I am convinced that the man who is correct in the dispute (if either of them are correct) stands to lose nothing while the person who is wrong has everything to gain.

But what I have in mind is not alone for discussion; it is for any man who wishes to be right in his thinking, and who is willing to do the work required to achieve it. If I were to try to summarize the process I endorse, I could do far worse than this:

 

Contradictions do not exist. Whenever you think that you are facing a contradiction, check your premises. You will find that one of them is wrong.

I also like this:

 

Reality is the only validation of theory. If something is true in theory but wrong in practice, then the theory is false.

Edited by DonAthos
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I think your example of a woman eating an egg is not an appropriate example of the arbitrary.  There is enough evidence in reality to say such a thing is possible.... evidence about people, eggs, dietary habits etc.

 

The possibility isn't arbitrary, but that a woman in Finland is eating an egg is arbitrary since there is no evidence. Similarly, I'd reject a person's claim that the axioms are false as arbitrary. Still, I may be wrong to the extent that I misapprehended reality. However, in one case, it is metaphysically possible for a woman in Finland to be eating an egg, while it is metaphysically impossible that eggs are also not eggs. Knowledge isn't "out there" though, so that's why even metaphysically impossible is "possibly" wrong. Fortunately it is plainly validated all the time that A isn't also ~A, making it self-evident and axiomatic.

 

Can you be wrong that 2+2 is 4?  i.e. 1 and 1 and another 1 and 1 is the same as 1 and 1 and 1 and 1?

This is a logical positivist sort of argument. This is stated as an analytic truth, where it is true by logical necessity, verifiable by logic alone, absent observation.

 

On top of that, 2+2=4 isn't axiomatic.

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DonAthos

 

I have read your response in its entirety and I appreciate its substance.

 

The remaining disagreement we may have (if one can call it that) seems to be limited to what kinds of "errors" one can rationally say are "possible".  Put another way, what kinds of statements can be doubted as possibly false.  My impression of your position is that since acontextually and in general one can err, you conclude therefore that in EVERY specific context there must be some probability of error >0 (no matter how small).  I do not agree that the latter follows from the former and moreover that truths such as the Axioms are clear specific examples which confirm the latter cannot be true.

 

I raised the issue of Cartesian doubt and of examples of 2+2 = 4 to highlight what I see as a fundamental barrier separating those things which rationally can be claimed to be subject to the possibility of error and those things which cannot rationally be claimed to be subject to error.  Please note, I am not appealing to a rationalist's Omniscient standard of certainty when speaking of truth and error.  Objectivists are acutely aware of the errors that mystical mirage, implying the necessity of direct revelation, can give rise to.  This is why I have introduced the concept of the "arbitrary" here and now.  It has been very useful in other contexts and here I believe it is equally applicable.

 

 

I fully understand that you are raising the issue related to the fact that "Man is fallible" and can make mistakes and more contextually and specifically that you can make mistakes.  This is a reasonable conclusion.

 

As such, in general, it is rational to say, and I agree (and you can substitute my name for yours) that:

"DonAthos, in general, when approaching an average sort of problem, given an average level of knowledge of reality upon which a conclusion would need to be based using integration, induction, or deduction, it is possible that in reaching his conclusions regarding the problem he may be in error." 

[Please note I am trying to give you the gist of what I mean. You need not parse every word with a fine comb (as others here are wont to do).]

 

I agree that errors are possible.

 

BUT the truism "errors are possible" is not a universal absolute, certainly not a universal truth in the sense that "Every claim has a possibility >0 of being wrong".  Some claims have 0 probability/possibility of being wrong.  It is an appeal to the arbitrary to say, since errors are possible in many kinds of situation, errors are possible in ALL situations because the latter does not follow from the former and there is no evidence upon which the latter is based.  This is precisely why the rationalists such as Descarte had to introduce a hypothetical supernatural entity (read omnipotent injection of irrationality) in order to argue things like 5 might actually be 6, so we must doubt mathematics. 

 

My point is that the Axioms are precisely the kinds of truths which any statement which contradicts them relies on the invocation of the arbitrary.  What could be more arbitrary than making a claim that denies or doubts (to any level of probability) existence itself?

 

My point is, you can admit to yourself that you can make errors, but you cannot allow yourself to rationally entertain the idea that your acceptance of existence AS SUCH is an error.  You could be a complete moronic idiot wrong about everything in life almost all of the time, but your acceptance of existence could not be wrong. You can be wrong about a great many things but you CANNOT be wrong about THESE things.  The same goes for THE other Axioms. 

 

This, the contextual application of the concept "possible error" I think is an important distinction.  This is the heart of any disagreement we may have.

 

 

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I asked:
 

If a scientist walked up to you and said, " I have incontrovertible evidence that I am not standing in front of you and that evidence isn't ever incontrovertible".. Do you say, " it's only reasonable to hear his argument and if it happens to turn out that he was wrong, then...." ?

 
Don said:

No.

If I believe that I can fairly put some argument in the form of A = ~A, then I reject that argument, on that basis [........]
 
Can I reject his literal claim/conclusion of "I have incontrovertible evidence that...evidence isn't ever incontrovertible"? Yes [.......]
 
I know that I will not, in the end, conclude that A = ~A.......

 

If one's knowledge is knowledge in fact -- if it is true -- then one may reject anything which contradicts said knowledge. Again, I don't know how this idea of the "arbitrary" factors into the discussion... I don't see that I need it. If some claim contradicts the true, then that claim is impossible.

 

I don't "agree" with the Objectivist axioms. I agree with them. I don't think I'm wrong about them and I cannot conceive of a situation that would ever lead me to think otherwise.

 

 

 
This is a concession to the point that contradictions cannot exist as negations of identity and as such, are to be rejected without the need to hear the "evidence", and that you yourself accept this as incontrovertible. Yet you nestled the blue statement in between statements that presuppose you have listend to an "argument" an then reject them "in the end". All the rest of what you said further was irrelevant to this issue. That someone "might" say something interesting in their research besides the impossible has nothing to do with the question of how to treat refutations of the axioms-contradictions. That is a completely different argument. "I could be wrong" is not "I might learn something about something other than the metaphysical impossible."
 
So we have only the problem now of you coming to realize how to apply this consistently. Its clear that you don't know how to do this yet because you said:
 

But look, what if things could "potentially jump out of existence"?

I don't myself know how to respond to such a thing. Yet I'm not certain that the axioms, as such, deny the possibility of things (like subatomic "particles," or fields, or however we conceptualize them, though I will stick with "particle" for convenience's sake) behaving in such a way that we would sensibly describe them as "coming into existence" or "jumping out of existence"?

 
You are not certain because you don't truly understand the grounding of the self evident to meaning. The opposite of existence is non-existence. Where are these theoretical entities going to jump to and from? There is nothing besides existence.
 
You are firmly in the grip of empiricist skepticism. You want to reject dogma and rationalism but you have failed to understand the very basis for this distinction, of any distinction.
 
I am aware of your reasons and you have restated them numerously:
 
Don Said:
 
 

 

In doing so (forming a concept or using it) a person may make some error -- even when it comes to conceptualizing axioms [...]
 
whether some apparent "contradiction" is truly meaningless, or is a "slap in the face" which should alert him to his own mistaken viewpoint, is itself an assessment that an individual must make. It is the willingness to engage in that assessment that allows a mistaken man to correct his mistakes.[...]
 
As a man does not know ahead of time that he is mistaken (and that his confidence in his own conclusion, or "certainty," is unwarranted), it is wise for every man to be willing to reassess his own understanding and knowledge in the face of apparent contradiction[...]
 
I contend that in coming to knowledge, or in knowledge held, or applied, a man may be mistaken. Though I don't believe I've used this specific phrase, I think we may reasonably describe this as man being "error prone," and a counter position against any claim of "infallibility." [...]
 
Doubt likewise remains reserved for those situations where we have some actual cause for doubt (as opposed to a general approach).....
 
And yet the question which I seek to answer is -- when we meet some apparent contradiction (meaning that which we judge to be contradictory, as between, say, the claims of a modern physicist and our own beliefs, which was the initial context of the thread), do we assume that the error must lie in the claims of the physicist -- because we are certain in our beliefs, and determine prior to any subsequent investigation that we cannot be mistaken? Or are we willing to check our premises in recognition that this is potentially where the observed error/discrepancy lies? I say that we should be willing to check our premises, our certainty notwithstanding, because being human it is possible that we have made some mistake (even in the evaluation that something is certain).
 
 
I believe that the contention has been made that when we discuss "axiomatic knowledge," which is sometimes held to be a special case -- when the premises in question are "axioms" -- there is no need to "check" them. But I disagree with this, because in coming to conceptualize or apply a given axiom (even one which, when properly understood, is true) to a specific situation, a person may yet make some error.
 
In order to demonstrate this, I've provided the example of a person who agrees that "free will" cannot ever be disproven, yet who conceives of free will incorrectly (and therefore comes to erroneous conclusions in application). This person must be willing to reexamine his concept of free will, despite holding it to be "axiomatic," despite his certainty, if he is to rid himself of his error. There is no other way to do it.

 
Both the correct man and the incorrect man will consider himself to be "the correct man." Thus, when one considers himself to be "the correct man" -- when one believes himself to have conceptualized free will correctly, and applied it correctly, it is still good policy to be willing to reexamine one's own beliefs on the matter in the face of apparent contradiction. It is still wise to be willing to check one's premises.....

 

 

I believe that I would go further than this. I think that if any of your knowledge contradicts any other claim, then that other claim may be dismissed as untrue. I think that this is what logic both means and demands.

But the issue here is that it sometimes happens that a person believes himself to have some piece of knowledge, and is mistaken in that belief. Or he may be mistaken in his estimate of "contradiction" between what he knows and some other claim, or he may misunderstand the claim itself.

 

 

 


So you concede that you would reject a contradiction, a claim that A is not A, but that you do not think that your awareness of the self evident is necessarily valid. Make no mistake that you are confessing that you could be wrong that you exist, are conscious, and have identity. You've done this by equivocating on examples of direct awareness with application of that awareness.
 
The application of the self evident is a matter of learning to use language to represent your infallible perceptual content consistently. Your whole skeptical "open mindedness" to contradiction is really predicated on your doubt that you can rely on the use of language to convey meaning-the use of symbols to refer to direct perceptual awareness, present and past . Your a saying "maybe when he said "you don't exist", or "A is not A", he actually meant something else". But this is actually a rationalistic concoction that I'm sure you would never apply consistently. If you went to buy a car and agreed to 20,000 you wouldn't hesitate to sign a contract because "well, maybe when he said 20,000 he meant 20,000,000. Or maybe I am misreading this purchase agreement and it actually says I'm confessing to murder. Or maybe our deal is only apparently agreed on..."  
 
 
This whole discussion is doubting yours and others ability to be aware of your/their own awareness and to be able to use language consistently to refer to that awareness. The statement "existence does not exist" is an attempt to refute your direct awareness to the contrary. When some one say such nonsense you have no reason to assume that he means something else. That is an arbitrary doubt.
 
Now lets consider what Ms. Rand has to say about this:
 

You must attach clear, specific meanings to words, i.e., be able to identify their referents in reality. This is a precondition, without which neither critical judgment nor thinking of any kind is possible. All philosophical con games count on your using words as vague approximations. You must not take a catch phrase—or any abstract statement—as if it were approximate. Take it literally. Don't translate it, don't glamorize it, don't make the mistake of thinking, as many people do: "Oh, nobody could possibly mean this!" and then proceed to endow it with some whitewashed meaning of your own. Take it straight, for what it does say and mean.

 
Philosophical Detection
 
 
 

An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it.(10)
The foregoing is not a proof that the axioms of existence, consciousness, and identity are true. It is a proof that they are axioms, that they are at the base of knowledge and thus inescapable. This proof itself, however, relies on the axioms. Even in showing that no opponent can escape them, Ayn Rand too has to make use of them. All argument presupposes these axioms, including the argument that all argument presupposes them.
If so, one might ask, how does one answer an opponent who says: "You've demonstrated that I must accept your axioms if I am to be consistent. But that demonstration rests on your axioms, which I don't choose to accept. Tell me why I should. Why can't I contradict myself?"
There is only one answer to this: stop the discussion. Axioms are self-evident; no argument can coerce a person who chooses to evade them. Y
ou can show a man that identity is <opar_12> inescapable, but only by first accepting the fact that A is A. You can show that existence is inescapable, but only by accepting and referring to existence. You can show that consciousness is inescapable, but only by accepting and using your consciousness. Relying on these three axioms, you can establish their position as the foundation of all knowledge. But you cannot convince another person of this or anything until he accepts the axioms himself, on the basis of his own perception of reality. If he denies them, it is a mistake to argue about or even discuss the issue with him.
No one can think or perceive for another man. If reality, without your help, does not convince a person of the self-evident, he has abdicated reason and cannot be dealt with any further.

 OPAR

 The statement:

 

 I would expect that a scientist who studies subatomic particles would know far better than I -- and probably far better than anyone on this board, or perhaps within the greater Objectivist community.

So when we begin to argue against "bad physics" on the basis of our "axiomatic knowledge," I think it is at least suspect, and it might well point to a need to reexamine how we are conceptualizing our axioms, or applying them, which is, again, not an infallible process.

 

 

Is an abdication of the requirement to have a first hand understanding of the self evident basis for any knowledge, special or general. You are deferring to other men that which only you can validate. Knowing what existence, identity and consciousness is and how to apply that knowledge is your responsibility. No one is challenging what a particular existents identity is, but rather the denial of identity itself. No one is calling that denial "bad physics". It has been repeatedly pointed out that the scientists error referenced in the OP is "bad philosophy".

 

The possible is constrained by the actual. The actual is presented to you in direct perception. That is the foundation to all knowledge. You are doubting your ability to recognize a challenge to the self evident. I cannot do anything to help you fix that. You will have to learn this on your own.

 

I know you will object, "I know I exist, but.....maybe" Everything after the "but" is a contradiction to that claim. I'm certain of it!

 

I don't think I can say much more, I'll just be repeating myself. Only that philosophers hate Rand for her unassailable certainty and refusal to play games dancing around the self evident. They want more, they want proof, they want an argument where only direct awareness will do.

 

Don, I do think you'll eventually abandon this because you seem to be an honest man.

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The application of the self evident is a matter of learning to use language to represent your infallible perceptual content consistently.

 

Right, and axiomatic concepts are not perceptual content... I think Don would agree with me that "could be wrong" applies to failing to properly represent perceptual content. That's what I've been saying. I think Don has been saying the same thing, or similar. What looks like a concession to you I think is you coming/starting to understand the ideas being presented.

Edited by Eiuol
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Don, I do think you'll eventually abandon this because you seem to be an honest man.

I don't want to make too much of it, but in my experience such graciousness in the midst of a dispute is (too) rare, and I appreciate this sentiment.

I think that I've expressed myself about as well as I can, so I'll step back from the discussion -- at least for now. I'll continue to think about these matters, and thanks to you and StrictlyLogical and others for their participation and patience.

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Hi dream_weaver,

<snip>

And yet the question which I seek to answer is -- when we meet some apparent contradiction (meaning that which we judge to be contradictory, as between, say, the claims of a modern physicist and our own beliefs, which was the initial context of the thread), do we assume that the error must lie in the claims of the physicist -- because we are certain in our beliefs, and determine prior to any subsequent investigation that we cannot be mistaken? Or are we willing to check our premises in recognition that this is potentially where the observed error/discrepancy lies? I say that we should be willing to check our premises, our certainty notwithstanding, because being human it is possible that we have made some mistake (even in the evaluation that something is certain).

<snip>

In addition to the recognition of error as derivative, this (isolated, quoted paragraph) too is key. From the “virtual particles” coming into and exiting existence (a point Dr. Peikoff seems to address in OPAR):

An entity (read particle) may be said to have a cause only if it is the kind of entity that is noneternal; and then what one actually explains causally is a process, the fact of its coming into being or another thing's passing away.

 

It should not be assumed that an error lies in the claim of the physicist – not because Objectivism is certain in its stance – rather because subsequent investigation reveals the error of the physicist by applying a proper method of identification of facts – i.e.; via the method of non-contradictory identification. Checking ones premises is the step by step reduction of the claim(s) of the physicist back to the self-evident – the ultimate base of man’s knowledge, which is captured by and within the universal nature of three basic axioms recognized to be at the base of, and implicit within, all human knowledge.

 

To addendum your observation of graciousness – as John Galt, speaking for Ayn Rand observed:

When I disagree with a rational man, I let reality be our final arbiter; if I am right, he will learn; if I am wrong, I will; one of us will win, but both will profit.

Edited by dream_weaver
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Just in case their is some confusion. Are you thinking that "come into being" is an instance of something jumping from non-existence to existence? The checking of ones premises isn't something that happens every time we use a concept which we are conscious of the perceptual roots it was abstracted from. In the case of existence, if one hears another use the term in a sentence and requires a reminder they simply ask themselves "to what IN REALITY does this refer"... I suspect that this is clear to Weaver but in case anyone else was mislead by any ambiguity.

Edited by Plasmatic
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