Determinism seems...silly.

[William O]

Also, came across this if you're interested in reading on the subject (it's not too long): http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdspace.mit.edu%2Fbitstream%2Fhandle%2F1721.1%2F45195%2F26114938.pdf%3Fseque&ei=tksQVJG7F4_wgwTS6oGgBw&usg=AFQjCNGwIWOBaD8mv-IRU5l8gdCom6uPQA&bvm=bv.74649129,d.eXY&cad=rja

I second this recommendation. I came across it a few months ago and it cleared up all sorts of things for me.

 

However, it is not as good as his discussion of free will in his book How We Know.

 

Edit: On further reflection I feel I should expand on my last sentence since it might be misleading if you don't know exactly how Binswanger's thought developed.

 

"A Refutation of Determinism" is an early essay Binswanger wrote in order to get his B.A. from MIT. Accordingly, it is basically the same as Rand's arguments against determinism, albeit with significant useful elaborations. The Aristotelian account of causality is contrasted with the Humean account and determinism is argued to be self refuting. Pretty standard, although Binswanger does go into these issues in more detail and more insightfully than any other Objectivist philosopher I have seen - for example, his work is much more careful than Peikoff's in OPAR.

 

How We Know just came out recently, so it represents significant developments in Binswanger's thought. Most importantly, Binswanger has decided that the principles of Objectivism are most compatible with a kind of dualism - the mind is immaterial, although it is not an immaterial thing but an immaterial action, and consciousness is natural but operates according to different laws of nature than matter. So Binswanger rejects Cartesian dualism while embracing a weaker form of dualism that he argues would be acceptable to Rand.

 

Another significant development is that Binswanger rejects the claim that the determinist even has access to the vocabulary that would allow him to state the determinist position clearly. For example, if the determinist argues that we still make choices even though we don't have libertarian free will (and many determinists do claim this), then Binswanger would object that the determinist has no right to the concept of choice, which only makes sense under libertarianism.

 

So Binswanger's position in How We Know, while prima facie consistent with Objectivism, represents a significant change in the tone of the Objectivist response to determinism, and will not necessarily be acceptable to everyone who accepts the main tenets of Objectivism.

Edited September 11, 2014 by William O

[Iudicious]

 

 

and consciousness is natural but operates according to different laws of nature than matter.

 

Lolwut?

 

Could you elaborate on that? Because from what it sounds like to me, it sounds like bullshit mystical woo. 

 

I'll read the linked paper by Binswanger as soon as I get the chance. I'd just appreciate a short summary that elaborates a bit more on the particular quoted part.

[CriticalThinker2000]

Lolwut?

 

Could you elaborate on that? Because from what it sounds like to me, it sounds like bullshit mystical woo. 

 

I'll read the linked paper by Binswanger as soon as I get the chance. I'd just appreciate a short summary that elaborates a bit more on the particular quoted part.

 

Just an FYI, William is not referring to that paper, he's referring to Binswanger's views in his new book How We Know. I read How We Know and did not notice this. I think I would have definitely noticed it had it been stated explicitly like that (which is why I don't think it was). How We Know is an incredibly dense work of philosophy deserving of a LOT of study before I would personally be comfortable drawing a conclusion like that, or even refuting the claim that it implies this view.

[William O]

Lolwut?

 

Could you elaborate on that? Because from what it sounds like to me, it sounds like bullshit mystical woo. 

Well, consciousness is capable of initiating action of its own accord, whereas matter just responds to things deterministically. Consciousness is also capable of making choices and acting according to a deliberately chosen purpose. This isn't mysticism, just acknowledging that a full scientific understanding of consciousness will involve introducing some new laws of nature.

 

I'll read the linked paper by Binswanger as soon as I get the chance. I'd just appreciate a short summary that elaborates a bit more on the particular quoted part.

 

 

As I implied earlier, the linked paper doesn't discuss Binswanger's account of consciousness.

[William O]

Just an FYI, William is not referring to that paper, he's referring to Binswanger's views in his new book How We Know. I read How We Know and did not notice this. I think I would have definitely noticed it had it been stated explicitly like that (which is why I don't think it was). How We Know is an incredibly dense work of philosophy deserving of a LOT of study before I would personally be comfortable drawing a conclusion like that, or even refuting the claim that it implies this view.

He states his dualism explicitly on page 45: "matter and consciousness are two irreducibly different phenomena." He then goes on to argue against materialism in a variety of ways.

[CriticalThinker2000]

He states his dualism explicitly on page 45: "matter and consciousness are two irreducibly different phenomena." He then goes on to argue against materialism in a variety of ways.

 

OK, but he didn't explicitly say that consciousness adheres to different laws of nature, right? Anyway, I don't know enough about any of this to have an opinion.

[William O]

OK, but he didn't explicitly say that consciousness adheres to different laws of nature, right? Anyway, I don't know enough about any of this to have an opinion.

Yes, he did. On page 350, during his discussion of free will and determinism, he says: "To insist that consciousness must be governed by the specific form of causality exhibited by matter is to approach man with an arbitrary, a priori commitment to materialism."

[CriticalThinker2000]

Yes, he did. On page 350, during his discussion of free will and determinism, he says: "To insist that consciousness must be governed by the specific form of causality exhibited by matter is to approach man with an arbitrary, a priori commitment to materialism."

 

Very interesting, I'm going to have to go back and re-read that to grasp the relevant context. Thanks.

[Eiuol]

 

Well, consciousness is capable of initiating action of its own accord, whereas matter just responds to things deterministically. Consciousness is also capable of making choices and acting according to a deliberately chosen purpose. This isn't mysticism, just acknowledging that a full scientific understanding of consciousness will involve introducing some new laws of nature.

That's called magic. You have said here that consciousness is a SPECIAL SUBSTANCE with an identity of SPECIAL CAUSALITY to ALL of existence. This isn't just saying consciousness is a complex phenomena that cannot be analyzed via physics alone, it's saying consciousness exists in its own SPECIAL realm. I am using caps to emphasize that Binswanger is a dualist that is just as bad as any other dualist. Binswanger seems to think there is a correct version of dualism. Nothing initiates actions on its own accord, as causality happening isn't up to anyone. I don't decide to initiate the causal events happening. 

[William O]

That's called magic. You have said here that consciousness is a SPECIAL SUBSTANCE with an identity of SPECIAL CAUSALITY to ALL of existence. This isn't just saying consciousness is a complex phenomena that cannot be analyzed via physics alone, it's saying consciousness exists in its own SPECIAL realm. I am using caps to emphasize that Binswanger is a dualist that is just as bad as any other dualist. Binswanger seems to think there is a correct version of dualism.

I don't think it's correct to apply the term "substance" to consciousness, but that aside, Binswanger has dealt with your tacit objection that consciousness is different from everything else in existence. Specifically, he thinks that this kind of objection would apply to any observed distinction, e.g., blue things are special and different from everything else in the universe in respect of being blue.

 

Nothing initiates actions on its own accord, as causality happening isn't up to anyone. I don't decide to initiate the causal events happening. 

 

Please elaborate. Are you advocating determinism?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I don't get what you mean here. I don't think that would be an inference though, maybe more like a judgement of my honesty, but could you expand on your point?

Sure.  Any particular use of words is an action.

 

If volitional actions cannot be attributed to any cause except the volitional nature of the acting entity then what does "honesty" mean?

[Eiuol]

Please elaborate. Are you advocating determinism?

I don't use any terms related to determinism. It is a word that creates many problems of connotation. There's causality, that's as far as I go. Things are "determined" in that what happens is necessarily going to happen. By the information I've taken in perceptually and that there is a method - abstractly speaking - always used to make a choice as I did, I will end up making a decision. Things are "nondetermined" in that a decision is not a domino-effect of events. As an active process, decision making needs to be abstracted away from the physical mechanisms. 

 

There is no special causality, or special identity, or special existence. Binswanger is inventing a new metaphysical principle to suggest that some things don't operate along normal causal laws, and that as an irreducible primary, it can act on matter as non-matter, and itself does things matter cannot. So he's a substance dualist just like Descartes, where we're left wondering how this unique non-physical mind interacts with the physical body.

 

I haven't read the book, to be clear, but so far I see no value in doing so.

[CriticalThinker2000]

Yes, he did. On page 350, during his discussion of free will and determinism, he says: "To insist that consciousness must be governed by the specific form of causality exhibited by matter is to approach man with an arbitrary, a priori commitment to materialism."

 

That's called magic. You have said here that consciousness is a SPECIAL SUBSTANCE with an identity of SPECIAL CAUSALITY to ALL of existence. This isn't just saying consciousness is a complex phenomena that cannot be analyzed via physics alone, it's saying consciousness exists in its own SPECIAL realm. I am using caps to emphasize that Binswanger is a dualist that is just as bad as any other dualist. Binswanger seems to think there is a correct version of dualism. Nothing initiates actions on its own accord, as causality happening isn't up to anyone. I don't decide to initiate the causal events happening. 

 

Alright everyone holdya horses!    Before we go about arguing this don't you think we should really understand Binswanger's position? As I thought, that quote is very misleading when not in context. The Oist view of causality is that an entity acts in accordance with its nature. When Binswanger says that consciousness does not adhere to the same law of causality that matter does he is not contradicting this view. I thought very highly of this book and recommend it to everyone interested in this thread. I quote at length (brackets and errors mine):

 

 

The popular belief that there is a conflict between free will and causality stems from a mistaken conception of the law of causality. The proper view of causality, originated by Plato and Aristotle, recognizes that causality is a relation between the nature of an entity and its actions. An entity of a given kind has the properties it has, which gives it certain potentialities and no others. The actions possible to an entity are determined by its identity, by what it is.

 

There is nothing in this proper understanding of causality to clash with free will. Man, by virtue of his nature, has the potentiality of initiating a process of rational thought, but he does not have to actualize that potentiality.

 

However, as far back as the 17th century, the proper, Platonic-Aristotelian understanding of causality lost favor, and came to be supplanted by an arbitrary construct: the notion that causality concerns "events", not entities and their actions, and that every event is a necessitated reaction to previous events. Unfortunately it was Galileo that popularized the new event-to-event view...

 

[skipping over a quote from historian]

 

This notion of causality does lead to determinism. But the event-to-event view is wrong. We do not encounter any such thing as free-floating 'events'; actions are actions of entities. The event-to-event model of causality cannot be applied even to its proponent's favorite case: billiard balls...

 

[skipping over his example which is similar to the one I used above. You can't replace the billiard balls with eggs and expect the same thing to happen]

 

Accordingly, the proper understanding of the law of causality is that the actions of an entity are an expression of its identity; the interaction of entities is an expression of the identity of each. What an entity can do is determined by what it is. "The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action."

 

[Here he makes a footnote indicating that this MAY be at odds with Rand's view of causality, since he sees it as what an entity CAN do whereas some of her statements are phrased in terms of what an entity WILL do. This is, I think, where his 'dualism' is introduced. But I don't know exactly what that word 'dualism' means historically in philosophy and I'm not sure it's the right way to describe Binswanger's view.]

 

This understanding of causality represents an integration of three concepts that are irreducible primaries: "entity", "identity", and "action". We perceive entities acting. We form concepts for their actions by observing them act. We form "walking", for instance, by observing men and animals walking. The concept of "walking" includes the fact that legs are involved in an action. Thus, we know that a billiard ball cannot walk- the action would be a violation of its identity, since it has no legs (and lacks many other requirements)...

 

[skipping over some stuff]

 

Next, by observation and induction, we discover that the material world is governed by mechanical causation. Matter as such is inert; it cannot set itself in motion. As scientific knowledge progresses, we learn that even the self-generated actions of living organisms, in their physical (non-conscious) aspects are essentially like those of inanimate objects- ie. are deterministic. The difference is that living organisms possess an internal store of physical energy, and their structure enables them to route that energy to power different types of action.

 

The motions of material objects, and of the material aspects of living organisms, are subject to strict necessity: whatever they do they had to do. The same matter in the same circumstances will act the same way. But the form of causation applicable to man's consciousness is different- because man's consciousness is a different kind of phenomenon. The nature of man causes him to have the power of choice- fundamentally, the power to focus his mind or not. By virtue of his makeup, including the makeup of his nervous system, man has sovereign control over the operation of his conceptual faculty. When a man chooses to use that faculty to pursue conceptual understanding, the action is not causeless- his choice is the cause. The same applies when he lets himself drift passively or chooses actively to evade.

 

Free will is a specific form of causation, not a cancellation of causality, a form of causation that arises from and depends upon the functioning of one's nervous system and body, as one interacts with the world. [binswanger has a footnote here explaining that the relationship between mental activity and the brain is a scientific issue, and that all philosophy says is that consciousness can direct the body and the choice to focus is volitional.]

 

Can the choice to focus be explained causally? the answer depends on what one means by "explaining the choice". [Harrison, I draw your attention here because I think this may be part of what you're struggling with] The very existence of a choice between focus and non-focus can be explained causally: man, by virtue of his makeup, has such a choice; lower animals, which lack the conceptual faculty, do not have this choice. But the specific outcome of the choice- the fact that a given man chose to focus rather than not- can be explained only in the sense that one focuses for a reason: in order to be fully aware. But this reason is not a necessitating factor. It is only a potential reason; the actualization of that potential takes an act of will. At root, the actualization of that potential- ie. setting the goal of full awareness- is what the exercise of free will consists of. 

 

What one cannot do is "explain" the choice to focus (or not to) in the sense of specifying some antecedent factor that MADE one choose the way one did. This fact constitutes a philosophical problem only for those who equate causality with necessitation. And there is no way to justify that equation. Taking causality to mean necessitation is an over-generalization from the kind of causation applicable to matter. But consciousness is not matter; it is not inert, but active. [fascinating footnote here which I am shortening: A material object is the sum of its parts, and what a material object does is also describable as the sum of what each part does. Thus, the object's causal properties reduce to the causal properties of those parts. But consciousness is an organic whole, and the causal properties of consciousness are not reducible to the properties of its constituents (it has no constituents).] To insist that consciousness must be governed by the specific form of causation exhibited by matter is to approach man with an arbitrary, a priori commitment to materialism.

 

In an extemporaneous discussion of the issue, Rand said:

"The appearance of a conflict between causality and free will is due to taking causality to be only that which governs the material world. Consciousness is an existent having a nature different from that of matter. The law of causality implies, accordingly, that the type of action consciousness can take will be different."

 

Free will means choice, and free will is a phenomenon of consciousness. The nature of consciousness is different from the nature of matter, and the law of causality says that different natures entail different forms of action.

 

 

 

What I just quoted spans several pages. I don't know what constitutes fair use, but given that we are discussing Binswanger's views and only two of us seem to have read this book, I think that it's appropriate to quote him so he's not misrepresented. I also think all of that context is necessary to understanding that quote William posted. 

 

All that being said, I agree with him. I think that's some fantastic stuff.

[New Buddha]

He states his dualism explicitly on page 45: "matter and consciousness are two irreducibly different phenomena." He then goes on to argue against materialism in a variety of ways.

I haven't read his book, but the specific quote does not have to be interpreted as a support for dualism.  Think of it this way:  A living, healthy human being is conscious.  A dead human body is not conscious - it's just matter.  There is no "in between" state.  Consciousness is an either/or proposition - and in this sense, it can be understood to be "irreducible".

 

Edit.  I posted this prior to reading CT's post.  After having read the post, I see nothing in Binswanger's post that advocates Dualism.

 

CT, Dualism in Pre-Descartes philosophy  meant an immateriality of "divine spirit" or that actualization of potentiality in all things was "caused" by God's will.  Descartes, living in the time of Galileo (meaning, trying to stay out of jail)  posited that man did not need divine explanations for reaching conclusions - that he could understand the world independent of God.  And yes, he was branded an Atheist for daring to suggest such a thing.

Edited September 12, 2014 by New Buddha

[CriticalThinker2000]

Sure.  Any particular use of words is an action.

 

If volitional actions cannot be attributed to any cause except the volitional nature of the acting entity then what does "honesty" mean?

 

Honesty is volitional adherence to the facts. Dishonesty is volitional non-adherence to the facts, if I can put it that way. What would it mean to be honest or dishonest if you couldn't choose your views? Your views would be neither honest nor dishonest, they'd just be your views through no choice of your own. 

 

 

I haven't read his book, but the specific quote does not have to be interpreted as a support for dualism.  Think of it this way:  A living, healthy human being is conscious.  A dead human body is not conscious - it's just matter.  There is no "in between" state.  Consciousness is an either/or proposition - and in this sense, it can be understood to be "irreducible".

 

I think that you're right on target but what that quote does or does not imply is not obvious without the context to support it. And it does seem just wrong to compare this view to Descarte's view, though as I've stated several times, I'm not familiar with what the word 'dualism' has meant historically. 

[epistemologue]

"ALL OF SCIENCE IS WRONG LOL" - Harry Binswanger

Edited September 12, 2014 by epistemologue

[Harrison Danneskjold]

After reading the linked paper, I can explicitly identify my own view.

 

There's a point in the paper where Binswanger explains that certain variations of determinism attribute someone's beliefs to his sexual desires (Freudian determinism) or to his upbringing (environmental determinism), et cetera, but none of those things constitute a valid reason for believing anything and hence determinism contradicts knowledge.

 

That passage includes, for one thing, the implicit equation between justification and mental causation (which seems right to me) and, for another, a generalization about all different varieties of determinism.

 

If I were to provide such a statement for what I've been operating on, it would be:

Either a man believes X because it's supported by reason and because that's the nature of his psycho-epistemology (rational), OR a man believes X because it's supported by emotion and because that's the nature of his psycho-epistemology (not rational).

Essentially, I have thought of the choice to focus as necessitated by psycho-epistemology (instead of sort of quasi-guided by it) because I do equate 'causality' with 'necessity'.  I've been trying to analyze that but the alternative still just baffles me.

 

However, since entity-based causality is proper while event-based is not, wouldn't that be more compatible with pEpistemological determinism than with libertarianism?

 

 

Could you please elaborate on that?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

After reading the linked paper, I can explicitly identify my own view.

 

There's a point in the paper where Binswanger explains that certain variations of determinism attribute someone's beliefs to his sexual desires (Freudian determinism) or to his upbringing (environmental determinism), et cetera, but none of those things constitute a valid reason for believing anything and hence determinism contradicts knowledge.

 

That passage includes, for one thing, the implicit equation between justification and mental causation (which seems right to me) and, for another, a generalization about all different varieties of determinism.

 

If I were to provide such a statement for what I've been operating on, it would be:

Either a man believes X because it's supported by reason and because that's the nature of his psycho-epistemology (rational), OR a man believes X because it's supported by emotion and because that's the nature of his psycho-epistemology (not rational).

Essentially, I have thought of the choice to focus as necessitated by psycho-epistemology (instead of sort of quasi-guided by it) because I do equate 'causality' with 'necessity'.  I've been trying to analyze that but the alternative still just baffles me.

 

However, since entity-based causality is proper while event-based is not, wouldn't that be more compatible with pEpistemological determinism than with libertarianism?

 

 

Could you please elaborate on that?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Honesty is volitional adherence to the facts. Dishonesty is volitional non-adherence to the facts, if I can put it that way.

Thank you; that makes sense.  I was fumbling to understand how mental causation could be reconciled with libertarianism because non-determinate causality had not occurred to me.  I still don't get that, but I do see how everything else relates to it now.

Edited September 12, 2014 by Harrison Danneskjold

[Peter Morris]

After reading your post, I have no idea what you are saying or what your argument is.

 

Physical determinsm must be true since entities behave in accordance to their natures. It cannot behave in any other way. Hence, the idea of cause and effect.

 

I still have some difficulty with free will, but I guess I am at least a capatibilist. The brain is a physical system, and the mind emerges from its functioning, and since it is physical, everything in it is behaving in accordance with its nature, and the brain is also functioning in accordance with its nature in the only way that it can. It cannot not act based on the physical laws that govern it. That is why many say free will is silly. Your brain couldn't have done anything else, it had to do what it did.

 

The way I see it is that although this is so, it doesn't mean that we don't have the freedom to choose. Yet, it still bothers me, because the brain itself could not have done anything other than it did. I think it requires a narrower view of what free will is, and we still have it, but just not in any mystical sense that violates physical cause and effect.

Edited September 12, 2014 by Peter Morris

[William O]

I don't use any terms related to determinism. It is a word that creates many problems of connotation. There's causality, that's as far as I go. Things are "determined" in that what happens is necessarily going to happen. By the information I've taken in perceptually and that there is a method - abstractly speaking - always used to make a choice as I did, I will end up making a decision. Things are "nondetermined" in that a decision is not a domino-effect of events. As an active process, decision making needs to be abstracted away from the physical mechanisms. 

Connotations aside, can you identify any significant point of disagreement between you and the people conventionally called determinists? The things you're saying here strongly suggest determinism to me.

 

One reason why we use terms for philosophical positions is so that we can apply the knowledge we have gained about a philosophical debate to evaluate a position advocated by a specific person. If you don't adopt the label, then I'm left wondering if you disagree with the determinists somehow.

 

There is no special causality, or special identity, or special existence. Binswanger is inventing a new metaphysical principle to suggest that some things don't operate along normal causal laws, and that as an irreducible primary, it can act on matter as non-matter, and itself does things matter cannot. So he's a substance dualist just like Descartes, where we're left wondering how this unique non-physical mind interacts with the physical body.

 

I haven't read the book, to be clear, but so far I see no value in doing so.

 

He doesn't think that there is any problem about how the non-physical mind interacts with the physical body. Things with different properties interact all the time - round things interact with things that are not round, for example. You might think that a non-physical thing cannot interact with a physical thing because there is no surface on the non-physical thing where they can contact, but that is picture thinking rather than a rational objection to the interaction of mind and body.

[Eiuol]

One reason why we use terms for philosophical positions is so that we can apply the knowledge we have gained about a philosophical debate to evaluate a position advocated by a specific person.

I don't hold a position of determinism or not, the term isn't accurate for my position. I talk about free will on an abstract level, I do not equate it to what occurs on a level of concretes. That also applies to why I am not a reductionist - generally determinism is a form of reductionism where all phenomena are adequately explained by summing up component parts down to some fundamental level. Abstraction is important, yet I won't take a non-determinism position where some things are fundamental yet non-physical, namely, two fundamental "types" i.e. a dualist view. Nor will I say there are even two fundamental "types" of properties i.e. a property dualist view. Even more, I reject indeterminism, where causality is random essentially. So I reject any kind of view of causation besides the law of causality where entities necessarily act according to their identity.

 

You might think that a non-physical thing cannot interact with a physical thing because there is no surface on the non-physical thing where they can contact, but that is picture thinking rather than a rational objection to the interaction of mind and body.

That is literally magic. I need SOME real-world link so that non-physical can interact with physical. Descartes had the pinneal gland. Round things are physical, and while roundness is non-physical, it is always inherently part of a physical entity. If consciousness is inherently part of anything in reality, then it is constrained by physical laws, just as roundness is constrained by physical laws, and the wildly complex non-physical phenomena like biological respiration. We can abstract away physical laws, sure, as long as we remember those laws didn't really disappear.

The quoted passage above shows that the conclusion was assumed at the start: "What one cannot do is "explain" the choice to focus (or not to) in the sense of specifying some antecedent factor that MADE one choose the way one did. This fact constitutes a philosophical problem only for those who equate causality with necessitation." The whole QUESTION is if there are antecedent factors that necessitate the way one chooses. There is no explanation of this, hopefully it's explained further in the book. The problem is that although he shows free will need not contradict causality, there is quite a bit of science to discuss before Binswanger can say that antecedent factors cannot necessitate choosing to focus.

Not that science is "more important", but because the level of analysis here is detailed. There is good reason Rand wanted to study math and neurology [what nowadays we'd just call neuroscience] to understand man's mind better - deeper questions require deeper knowledge of reality. I think Peikoff said Rand wanted to study that, but I don't recall if she wrote it down or what. There's also good reason why modern philosophy of mind is basically now a hybrid of philosophy and science - I don't know if it's possible to distinguish "cognitive scientist" and "philosopher".

[KALADIN]

It seems, in the end, that it is impossible to articulate and defend determinism without concept-stealing, since determinism implies the impossibility of knowledge, and that is also impossible to scientifically articulate how an immaterial, non-physical entity, can have physical effects. So,free will is axiomatic as it can not be denied without the implementation and premise of a volitional mind, yet, as of now, there seems no way to explain the making of the "magic".

[Eiuol]

It seems, in the end, that it is impossible to articulate and defend determinism without concept-stealing, since determinism implies the impossibility of knowledge, and that is also impossible to scientifically articulate how an immaterial, non-physical entity, can have physical effects. So,free will is axiomatic as it can not be denied without the implementation and premise of a volitional mind, yet, as of now, there seems no way to explain the making of the "magic".

It is impossible for an immaterial, non-physical entity to have physical effects, period. This is the realm of the supernatural: God, ghosts, magic, ESP, etc. Non-material entities exist insofar as they are enabled by concretes, but we abstract away concreteness for purposes of concept formation. As for free will, it too is an abstraction. Epistemologically, free will and consciousness are irreducible, but metaphysically, they are not separate "things" of a special type different than concretes or matter even.

[Plasmatic]

There is no such thing as a "non-material entity" and Objectivism only deals with one type of materialism, the kind that denies consciousness, in it's literature

Edited September 13, 2014 by Plasmatic