What is the validation of "tabula rasa"?

[hernan]

As Gideon said: the context is human knowledge, a.k.a. conceptual knowledge.

So then this is merely a circular argument or definition. Tabula rasa includes only the conceptual knowledge. Anything which is not conceptual knowledge is not part of what Objectivists include in their tabula rasa mechanism.

There might be any amount of innate knowledge, any amount of human preprogramming, any amount of instinctive tendencies but these are deemed external to the Objectivist self.

Needless to say, this definition will not map well to the activity in the brain.

This makes about as much sense as claiming that "you" are the right hemisphere of your brain. That the left hemisphere is just some organ like the stomach.

Edited May 20, 2005 by hernan

[jrs]

Regarding semantics, grammar, and syntax:

I think that the need to communicate one's meaning clearly to other people (semantics) combines with conventions about the meanings of words and ways of combining words together to generate grammar and syntax. So clarity of communication is the criterion for good grammar and good syntax.

Regarding the burden of proof:

Objectivism holds that in a dispute over the existence of something, the burden falls on the one asserting existence. This is because existents have identity so one can specify what facts of reality show that they exist, but non-existents (God, gremlins, tooth-fairy, etc.) have no identity and so there are no facts of reality to which one can point to show non-existence. If the one who is arguing against existence mistakenly assumes the burden, then he will find that the "definition" of the non-existent keeps shifting like whack-a-mole -- as soon as you disprove one version, you are faced with another version.

The quality of the science and its conclusions depends entirely upon the philosophy of the scientist, whether implicit or explicit, and how consistently he adheres to that philosophy without fuzzying out, floating any concepts, or compartmentalizing.

What is implicit philosophy? And is it knowledge?

I think you said that percepts are not knowledge. And yet the axioms (which are concepts) are derived directly from perception. How does knowledge come from non-knowledge?

[JMeganSnow]

With all due respect to TomL, I think it is safe to assert that a child raised without the benefit of sex ed will still discover the joy of sex. A baby does not need to be tought how to cry when he's hungry.

Babies do actually have to be "taught" when to cry or not cry. Native Americans used to teach their babies not to cry by suffocating them. Children that recieve no benefit from screaming (when hungry or otherwise) rapidly desist in the practice.

"Knowledge" consists exclusively of abstractions. Perception etc. is properly termed awareness. "Cognition" does not descry knowledge, it is awareness.

E.g. I am aware of a sensation of pain; I know that the specific type of pain I'm experiencing means that I've accidently put my foot to sleep by cutting off the blood supply. Babies can experience pain; they have no knowledge of what is causing the pain or how to fix it.

[JMeganSnow]

I think you said that percepts are not knowledge.  And yet the axioms (which are concepts) are derived directly from perception.  How does knowledge come from non-knowledge?

Everything in the universe comes from something that is NOT what it is in its final stage. Adults come from children, and children are not adults, how do you get adults from not-adults? Do you mean this is some kind of metaphysical error? It is the claim that you can get something from NOTHING that is a mistake, not that you can get a different TYPE of something from a something of another TYPE.

[hernan]

Babies do actually have to be "taught" when to cry or not cry.  Native Americans used to teach their babies not to cry by suffocating them.  Children that recieve no benefit from screaming (when hungry or otherwise) rapidly desist in the practice.

They don't "have to be" taught. They can be taught. This is the critical difference. Regardless of what you define as the slate (whether it's just the higher brain functions or the brain entirely) it's not the case that a baby is clueless about this crying thing until it is taught.

"Knowledge" consists exclusively of abstractions.  Perception etc. is properly termed awareness. "Cognition" does not descry knowledge, it is awareness. 

E.g. I am aware of a sensation of pain; I know that the specific type of pain I'm experiencing means that I've accidently put my foot to sleep by cutting off the blood supply.  Babies can experience pain; they have no knowledge of what is causing the pain or how to fix it.

This definition of "I" is what I'm beginning to suspect.

It may be that you've so narrowly defined "I" that you've externalized all lower cognitive functions, the parts of the slate that are not blank. This is fallax tabula rasa. (As Dennet says, "if you make yourself small enough, everything is external".)

In particular, your definition of "senses" is so expansive that you have no basis for criticizing Kant's observation that, being informed through unique senses we each have a unique view of the world.

[IdeaSave]

[...] Locke was truly on the extreme nurture side of the nature-nurture debate, and took the position that the mind completely programs itself.

Does that mean that man has the hardware (the brain) but not the software (mind, i.e., ideas) before birth? If so, that is exactly what tabula rasa means. The nature of the brain and the rest of the nervous system make consciousness possible via the senses, but all of the content of consciousness is acquired after birth, and that happens volitionally, i.e. the mind _does_ completely program itself.

The nature of the brain is such that it supports certain operations (integration and differentiation are the fundamentals), but those operations are neither automatic nor automatically correct.

[...] However, given Rand’s lack of specificity on the meaning of “tabula rasa” and Nathaniel Branden’s essay in The Objectivist Newsletter (Oct., 1962) ruling out the possibility of any instinctual behavior -- in animals or humans -- I am not convinced that Rand’s position was dissimilar to Locke’s.

So what is unspecific about "Tabula rasa means no innate ideas"? I can't imagine, even in theory, how that could be made more specific without leaving philosophy and going into the biological workings of the brain.

An instinct is an inborn, automatically performed pattern of behavior, such as ducks flying south for the winter, or bears hibernating. Man demonstrably has no such behaviors. I don't have Branden's article with me, but I would be amazed if he claimed that not even animals have instincts, since it is quite obvious that they do.

The bottom line is that Rand was very specific and clear about the meaning of tabula rasa, and the (correct) claim that man has no instincts in no way conflicts with the concept of tabula rasa.

Mark Peters

[Eric Mathis]

Does that mean that man has the hardware (the brain) but not the software (mind, i.e., ideas) before birth? If so, that is exactly what tabula rasa means. The nature of the brain and the rest of the nervous system make consciousness possible via the senses, but all of the content of consciousness is acquired after birth, and that happens volitionally, i.e. the mind _does_ completely program itself.

If the mind completely programs itself, then humans have the ability to program themselves not to need sleep. Try it sometime.

No one is arguing that ideas exist in the human mind before birth. If you wish to define “content” as nothing more or less than concepts, then, sure, man’s brain is tabula rasa. However, there is ample evidence that the mind is pre-programmed to perform certain behaviors, ranging from language formation, to sexual reactions, to expressive acts, to protective responses. Babies, for example, are invariably frightened by and react to sudden loud noises. In this sense the slate is not truly blank, anymore than a hard drive pre-loaded with a word processing program is blank.

An instinct is an inborn, automatically performed pattern of behavior, such as ducks flying south for the winter, or bears hibernating. Man demonstrably has no such behaviors. I don't have Branden's article with me, but I would be amazed if he claimed that not even animals have instincts, since it is quite obvious that they do.

From Branden’s essay: “But the concept [of instincts] is no less misleading when applied to animals. ‘Instincts’ explain nothing.”

The bottom line is that Rand was very specific and clear about the meaning of tabula rasa, and the (correct) claim that man has no instincts in no way conflicts with the concept of tabula rasa.

No, because it is not clear whether in her view tabula rasa refers strictly to ideas or to something more general.

Edited May 20, 2005 by Eric Mathis

[hernan]

From Branden’s essay: “But the concept [of instincts] is no less misleading when applied to animals. ‘Instincts’ explain nothing.”

The whole "instinct" debate is a red herring anyway. Modern science, as in science of the last, oh, 50 years, doesn't use the term instinct not because it is invalid but because it is too crude. Historically, behaviors were divided between learned and instinctive. But scientists have a much better understanding now not only of how the brain works and how hormones and other chemicals affect it but also of the interaction between genes and environment.

There are many lower animals, for example, that learn which plants to eat and breed on from their parents but the process of eating and breeding is invariant within the species.

If you want to have an informed discussion on this topic, as opposed to whipping dead horses, I suggest avoiding the term "instinct".

Edited May 20, 2005 by hernan

[softwareNerd]

Hernan,

When you introspect, do you find that your ideas about instincts, learning, hormones and such are simply the product of something that was innate in you anyway? If not, what was innate in you and what wasn't?

[IdeaSave]

If the mind completely programs itself, then humans have the ability to program themselves not to need sleep.  Try it sometime.

What the heck does sleep have to do with the tabula rasa issue? You are equating "programming the mind" with "programming our inborn biological needs". People can no more "program" sleep away than they can "program" away digestion, breathing, a heartbeat or any other biological function.

No one is arguing that ideas exist in the human mind before birth.  If you wish to define “content” as nothing more or less than concepts, then, sure, man’s brain is tabula rasa.

Then you have no issue with the Objectivist view.

However, there is ample evidence that the mind is pre-programmed to perform certain behaviors, ranging from language formation, to sexual reactions, to expressive acts, to protective responses.

And none of that, even if it is true, is relevant to what Objectivism denotes by "tabula rasa".

[...] it is not clear whether in her view tabula rasa refers strictly to ideas or to something more general.

You keep saying this despite the fact that it isn't true, as I and others in this thread have repeatedly pointed out.

The Objectivist view of "Tabula rasa", as the literature makes crystal clear, means "no innate ideas", period. Why you won't accept that is beyond me. Perhaps you haven't read much of the literature, or you want to discuss some other concept of tabula rasa?

Mark Peters

[hernan]

Hernan,

When you introspect, do you find that your ideas about instincts, learning, hormones and  such are simply the product of something that was innate in you anyway? If not, what was innate in you and what wasn't?

I appreciate what you are asking but I think this is a misleading question. This line of thought will lead you to a wrong conclusion.

Our behaviors are a result of many factors but among them are the genetic impressions of evolution. Some things we do are more influenced by this than others, for example our sexual behavior and eating habits. I don't doubt that my sense of physical beauty is strongly influenced by "innate ideas".

On the other hand, I do believe that curiosity is an innate characteristic of humans. So in that sense even my ideas about learning and hormones are influenced by "instincts".

It is pointless to try to sort behaviors between innate and learned; it doesn't answer the question, for example, whether Kant was right about perception and Rand too critical of him as I originally argued.

I am constantly struck with the impression that Objectivism is locked in a time warp; there seems to be this urge to debate philosophy in terms of the science that was available to Rand when she was forming her ideas.

Maybe you should ask yourself: how would Rand respond to recent scientific discoveries if she were here today? Would she insist on a debate about "instincts"? Or would she read up on the latest models of human bahavior and adapt her philosophy to them?

Edited May 20, 2005 by hernan

[JMeganSnow]

This definition of "I" is what I'm beginning to suspect.

It may be that you've so narrowly defined "I" that you've externalized all lower cognitive functions, the parts of the slate that are not blank. This is fallax tabula rasa. (As Dennet says, "if you make yourself small enough, everything is external".)

In particular, your definition of "senses" is so expansive that you have no basis for criticizing Kant's observation that, being informed through unique senses we each have a unique view of the world.

What on earth does "externalized lower cognitive functions" mean? Do you mean that I'm somehow claiming that my consciousness operates external to me? How would this work? Does it crowd into someone else's head, or does it float around in the air somehow? Ouch.

I haven't defined "senses", btw, I have simply delineated the difference between sense data, the raw materials of conceptualization, and actual conceptualization. I have not stated how the senses function or what their identity is, I have merely said, "I have some sense data, it's different from what I DO with the sense data".

In order to demonstrate that humans have innate ideas you simply need to show them using an abstraction that they could not have formed by a process of abstraction.

[Eric Mathis]

What the heck does sleep have to do with the tabula rasa issue? You are equating "programming the mind" with "programming our inborn biological needs". People can no more "program" sleep away than they can "program" away digestion, breathing, a heartbeat or any other biological function.

In post 71 you wrote, ". . .the mind _does_ completely program itself." Now if sleep is a function of the mind and the mind “does completely program itself,” why can't sleep be programmed? If sleep is not a function of the mind, what part of the body controls it?

Then you have no issue with the Objectivist view.

And none of that, even if it is true, is relevant to what Objectivism denotes by "tabula rasa".

You keep saying this despite the fact that it isn't true, as I and others in this thread have repeatedly pointed out.

The Objectivist view of "Tabula rasa", as the literature makes crystal clear, means "no innate ideas", period. Why you won't accept that is beyond me. Perhaps you haven't read much of the literature, or you want to discuss some other concept of tabula rasa?

I’ve read enough of Ayn Rand to know that she intended tabula rasa to encompass more than just ideas. To wit: she declared that man’s “emotional mechanism” was also tabula rasa. (See “The Objectivist Ethics,” VOS, p. 28.) I’ve also read enough about human biology and psychology and had enough experience with very small children to know that man’s emotions are not exclusively the products of experience or self-programming. I have already mentioned the universal fright effect of sudden loud noise on infants.

[hernan]

What on earth does "externalized lower cognitive functions" mean?  Do you mean that I'm somehow claiming that my consciousness operates external to me?  How would this work?  Does it crowd into someone else's head, or does it float around in the air somehow?  Ouch.

I haven't defined "senses", btw, I have simply delineated the difference between sense data, the raw materials of conceptualization, and actual conceptualization.  I have not stated how the senses function or what their identity is, I have merely said, "I have some sense data, it's different from what I DO with the sense data".

In order to demonstrate that humans have innate ideas you simply need to show them using an abstraction that they could not have formed by a process of abstraction.

How about the "innate idea" that sex is good or that hungry is bad.

[FaSheezy]

'Sex is good' and 'hungry is bad' are not "innate ideas". It is the result of conceptualization and the emotional response to the pleasure-pain mechanism of your body. Sex feels good and is pleasurable, therefore you connect it with the idea that it is good. Being hungry is painful and does not work towards the progression of your life so you identify it as bad. You cannot evaluate something as good or bad without a standard of value, you would be realizing a fact of reality and then responding to it somehow. Or maybe I do not understand the concept of "innate idea". It does not seem possible to have an innate idea about anything with that idea having any kind of meaning.

[hernan]

'Sex is good' and 'hungry is bad' are not "innate ideas".  It is the result of conceptualization and the emotional response to the pleasure-pain mechanism of your body.  Sex feels good and is pleasurable, therefore you connect it with the idea that it is good.  Being hungry is painful and does not work towards the progression of your life so you identify it as bad. You cannot evaluate something as good or bad without a standard of value, you would be realizing a fact of reality and then responding to it somehow.  Or maybe I do not understand the concept of "innate idea".  It does not seem possible to have an innate idea about anything with that idea having any kind of meaning.

It depends entirely on what "you" is in that sentence. That's the problem I alluded to earlier. There seems to be a bias among Objectivists against including lower cognitive functions in the concept of self.

It is not simply that "sex feels good" and that people somehow stumble upon this good feeling like they might a formula for making gunpowder. Long before you can reason about the ill effects of radical weight loss you'll cry for mama's milk.

Honestly, I'm trying to figure out how to map the brain to the Objectivist concept of self and what is considered an idea vs. something else.

Be careful though about attaching "meaning" to the definition of an idea. Meaning entails language and therefore narrows the space of ideas. I don't need to attach meaning to sex to experience it but I do to communicate or reason about it.

Edited May 20, 2005 by hernan

[softwareNerd]

Our behaviors are a result of many factors but among them are the genetic impressions of evolution. ...

It is pointless to try to sort behaviors between innate and learned; ...

Okay, so you're saying that any and all your views and your resultant actions may just be your glands, and it's pointless to sort out which is which. Fair enough.

[hernan]

Okay, so you're saying that any and all your views and your resultant actions may just be your glands, and it's pointless to sort out which is which. Fair enough.

Nice try. I dont' think that science has progressed far enough in this field to make definitive statements and even if it had there are complex interactions in every individual situation. Just because you understand fluid dynamics doesn't mean you can predict the weather.

My point is simply that the glandular influence is not zero. That's good enough for this discussion.

[jrs]

I think [TomL] said that percepts are not knowledge. And yet the axioms (which are concepts) are derived directly from perception. How does knowledge come from non-knowledge?

Everything in the universe comes from something that is NOT what it is in its final stage. ...  Do you mean this is some kind of metaphysical error?

No, I was asking a question. Although personally, I would consider percepts to be knowledge, I was hoping for a response something like this:

<<The axioms and other first-level concepts are obtained from percepts by induction. Whether that induction occurs or not is under volitional control. So a person who never chose to perform induction would remain tabula rasa (until his early death).>>

Is this correct? And is the participation of volition a crucial element in your definition of knowledge?

[softwareNerd]

Nice try.

Try? Why would you call it a "try"? It's science, right? Science of the B.F.Skinner type? Science of the Freudian type? Science of the 30's where some people thought the mystery of the universe lay in solving the square-root of minus X?

I'll let fictional "scientist", Dr. Floyd Ferris have the last word (from my side of the table):

What you think you think is an illusion created by your glands, your emotions and, in the last analysis, by the content of your stomach.

That gray matter you're so proud of is like a mirror in an amusement park which transmits to you nothing but distorted signals from a reality forever beyond your grasp.

[hernan]

Try? Why would you call it a "try"? It's science, right? Science of the B.F.Skinner type? Science of the Freudian type? Science of the 30's where some people thought the mystery of the universe lay in solving the square-root of minus X?

Yes, indeed, science is an errable process. In fact, scientists have been, *gasp*, wrong! Therefore you should just ignore what they say. God created the universe in seven days and that's that. Ooops, I mean, humans are tabula rasa and that's that.

Edited May 21, 2005 by hernan

[IdeaSave]

In post 71 you wrote, ". . .the mind _does_ completely program itself."  Now if sleep is a function of the mind and the mind “does completely program itself,” why can't sleep be programmed?  If sleep is not a function of the mind, what part of the body controls it?

You are confusing "mind" and "brain", which means, fundamentally, that you are confusing the volitional with the non-volitional.

The need for sleep is not volitional, it is built in. Within certain limits, we can delay or induce sleep volitionally, but ultimately sleep will win out. Sleep is in the same basic category as breathing and digestion.

Thinking, which is the process by which we acquire mental content, is volitional. We are unconditionally in control of that process - we can always choose to think or not.

Because of this, it is an error to suggest that because we don't "program" sleep we do not really program our minds.

I’ve read enough of Ayn Rand to know that she intended tabula rasa to encompass more than just ideas.  To wit: she declared that man’s “emotional mechanism” was also tabula rasa. (See “The Objectivist Ethics,” VOS, p. 28.) 

This is also a mistake. Our emotional mechanism _is_ tabula rasa, but that's because our emotions derive from our _ideas_, specifically, from our subconsciously held value judgments. Because of the tabula rasa nature of the mind, there are no such judgments in our minds at birth. Our emotional mechanism is tabula rasa _because_ our cognitive mechanism is.

I suggest that you read about the Objectivist view of emotions and their relationship to thought to get a better understanding of this.

I’ve also read enough about human biology and psychology and had enough experience with very small children to know that man’s emotions are not exclusively the products of experience or self-programming.  I have already mentioned the universal fright effect of sudden loud noise on infants.

Our emotions are _entirely_ the product of experience and self-programming. The biological starting point for them is the built-in pleasure/pain mechanism. I'm no expert on infant development, but I believe there is something called the "startle reflex" in humans which explains the universal fright effect you mentioned. I suspect that as man evolved, it was advantageous to his survival that he react quickly to loud noises, and hence that response got built in as a reflex.

Becoming startled in response to a loud noise doesn't mean that the infant is experiencing an emotion. In the beginining, not even crying in response to hunger means that.

Mark Peters

[Eric Mathis]

Our emotional mechanism _is_ tabula rasa, but that's because our emotions derive from our _ideas_, specifically, from our subconsciously held value judgments. Because of the tabula rasa nature of the mind, there are no such judgments in our minds at birth. Our emotional mechanism is tabula rasa _because_ our cognitive mechanism is.

Our emotions are _entirely_ the product of experience and self-programming.

Prove it.

The biological starting point for them is the built-in pleasure/pain mechanism. I'm no expert on infant development, but I believe there is something called the "startle reflex" in humans which explains the universal fright effect you mentioned.  I suspect that as man evolved, it was advantageous to his survival that he react quickly to loud noises, and hence that response got built in as a reflex.

Becoming startled in response to a loud noise doesn't mean that the infant is experiencing an emotion. In the beginining, not even crying in response to hunger means that.

An emotion is simply a mental state that arises subjectively, or, more technically, “feelings about a situation, person, or objects that involves changes in physiological arousal and cognitions.” (http://allpsych.com/dictionary/e.html) To state that there is no emotion present in an infant that cries in response to a loud noise is simply to ignore the evidence. Of course, one can prove anything by redefining the terms under discussion. Thus if you state categorically, “our emotions derive from our _ideas_,” then it must logically follow that there are no emotions prior to idea formation. But no one in the fields of biology and psychological research is defining “emotion” in this highly restrictive fashion. Furthermore, such an assertion completely ignores the effect of chemical imbalance on emotional states.

[hernan]

An emotion is simply a mental state that arises subjectively, or, more technically, “feelings about a situation, person, or objects that involves changes in physiological arousal and cognitions.” (http://allpsych.com/dictionary/e.html)  To state that there is no emotion present in an infant that cries in response to a loud noise is simply to ignore the evidence.  Of course, one can prove anything by redefining the terms under discussion.  Thus if you state categorically, “our emotions derive from our _ideas_,” then it must logically follow that there are no emotions prior to idea formation.  But no one in the fields of biology and psychological research is defining “emotion” in this highly restrictive fashion.  Furthermore, such an assertion completely ignores the effect of chemical imbalance on emotional states.

I'm beginning to wonder if the Objectivist attraction to tabula rasa is based out of fear of the implications of a non-blank slate. At several points in the discussion the concern raised was that if it were conceded that the slate was not blank then that would imply that we were not truly free and morally responsible. Of course, that's a fallacious argument in and of itself (to deny a reality for fear of it's implications). But the fear is unfounded in any case.

Dennet, who I mentioned previously, addressed this question head on in Freedom Evolves. He argued that we don't lose free will when we give up our soul in exhange for a naturalistic model of human behavior.

Similarly, there seems to be a fear of conceding that Kant may have had at least a small point about the variety of perspective. One doesn't have to agree with all that Kant argued, and certainly one doesn't have to buy into all the crap that followed in Kant's name. Just give Kant his due on this one small point and move on.

[dougclayton]

At several points in the discussion the concern raised was that if it were conceded that the slate was not blank then that would imply that we were not truly free and morally responsible.

Oddly, although you tangentially reference "several points," what you quote is not only the post directly above you, but it seems to come from someone who agrees with you. I've been reading this thread as it's been ongoing and don't recall anyone suggest that. Could you quote those posts that actually back up your statement?