What is the validation of "tabula rasa"?

[hernan]

Oddly, although you tangentially reference "several points," what you quote is not only the post directly above you, but it seems to come from someone who agrees with you.  I've been reading this thread as it's been ongoing and don't recall anyone suggest that.  Could you quote those posts that actually back up your statement?

Sorry for my laziness. Here is one:

Everyone wants to justify their evasions in the name of "instinct" or "automatic knowledge" or "biological urges". 

[IdeaSave]

Prove it.

This sort of response barely deserves this comment: the view I named _has_ been proven, in _spades_. The claim that emotions are entirely derived from one's subconsciously held value judgments (with the built-in pleasure/pain mechanism at its biological root) is extensively documented and validated in the Objectivist literature.

I suggest that you read that literature and gain a decent understanding of it before continuing your participation in this forum.

An emotion is simply a mental state that arises subjectively, or, more technically, “feelings about a situation, person, or objects that involves changes in physiological arousal and cognitions.” (http://allpsych.com/dictionary/e.html).

So why do you get to take this viewpoint for granted? Why do you get to take an arbitrarily selected dictionary definition of "emotion" for granted? Do you know what philosophic premises that view depends on? Do you know whether those are valid or not?

You demanded proof from me of the Objectivist view (when that proof is readily available to you without my help), so I assume that you know the proof of the above view, since surely you don't hold a double standard.

Why is it then, that you made no attempt even to _try_ explaining it? Why is it that you just _asserted_ it without any attempt at all fully to explain it or argue for it? Providing a link to a dictionary definition doesn't cut it.

In a forum on the philosophy of Objectivism, it is reasonable to expect participants to actually learn about the philosophy - if not beforehand, then at least in response to somebody who says "Oh, that topic is covered in the literature, you should go read it."

To state that there is no emotion present in an infant that cries in response to a loud noise is simply to ignore the evidence. 

To state the blazingly obvious: to claim that an infant is experiencing an emotion when it cries in response to a loud noise is to make a _positive_ claim, and hence the burden of proof is entirely on _you_.

[...]

But no one in the fields of biology and psychological research is defining “emotion” in this highly restrictive fashion.  Furthermore, such an assertion completely ignores the effect of chemical imbalance on emotional states.

Quite franky, I don't give a d**n about how biologists or psychologists define "emotion", because that concept fundamentally is a _philosophic_ term. Biologists or psychologists can properly have their own more specialized definition, since the context is more specific, but they are not allowed to assert such a definition and just ignore the philosophic base.

Mark Peters

[Eric Mathis]

This sort of response barely deserves this comment: the view I named _has_ been proven, in _spades_. The claim that emotions are entirely derived from one's subconsciously held value judgments (with the built-in pleasure/pain mechanism at its biological root) is extensively documented and validated in the Objectivist literature.

You have not proven that all emotions “derive from our _ideas_” except by recourse to a definition that is highly idiosyncratic. You dealt with the example of an infant’s fright response to loud noises by simply declaring it not to be an emotion. By comparison, I could “prove” that man has ESP by declaring that hearing is not one of the five senses.

I suggest that you read that literature and gain a decent understanding of it before continuing your participation in this forum.

I have read all of Rand’s works. But I have yet to see proof for the claim that man’s emotional mechanism is tabula rasa.

]So why do you get to take this viewpoint for granted? Why do you get to take an arbitrarily selected dictionary definition of "emotion" for granted? Do you know what philosophic premises that view depends on? Do you know whether those are valid or not?

I look forward to your demonstration that the definition of emotion that you use is any less arbitrary than mine.

To state the blazingly obvious: to claim that an infant is experiencing an emotion when it cries in response to a loud noise is to make a _positive_ claim, and hence the burden of proof is entirely on _you_.

I have given you a widely recognized definition of emotions. And the example I provided of the crying infant is consistent with that definition. You are welcome to define “emotion” to mean whatever you choose, and then “prove” that only a very limited number of human responses are authentic emotions. For example, one could say all emotions are grounded in sexual desire, and then declare that any human response which cannot be related to sex is not really an emotion. In short, there can be any number of arguments which are internally consistent but that don’t advance our knowledge of the world one bit.

Quite franky, I don't give a d**n about how biologists or psychologists define "emotion", because that concept fundamentally is a _philosophic_ term. Biologists or psychologists can properly have their own more specialized definition, since the context is more specific, but they are not allowed to assert such a definition and just ignore the philosophic base.

Providing a purely philosophical argument for the nature of emotions without referring to any biological data is about as useful as a philosophical argument for the elements of the physical world without reference to chemistry.

[dougclayton]

I have quoted in full the entire paragraph you reference:

If sex to you is a reflex, then our conversation is ended.  Sex for man is a celebration, and celebration cannot be reflexive.  It requires awareness of something to celebrate.  If the sex YOU have is not celebratory -- that's not my fault, but don't tell me I'm an animal just because you are.  Everyone wants to justify their evasions in the name of "instinct" or "automatic knowledge" or "biological urges".  But for man -- with volition -- none of these things apply to the actions he takes, or to the content of his subconscious mind as far he programs it, explicitly, himself.

I don't see how this supports your contention that "at several points in the discussion the concern raised was that if it were conceded that the slate was not blank then that would imply that we were not truly free and morally responsible." Could you explain how TomL's claim that people want to rationalize their evasion amounts to "fear of the implications of a non-blank slate" on his part? As I see it, he is explaining people's tendency for defense mechanisms, not "deny[ing] a reality for fear of it's implications". That's a pretty hefty accusation.

[hernan]

I have quoted in full the entire paragraph you reference:

I don't see how this supports your contention that "at several points in the discussion the concern raised was that if it were conceded that the slate was not blank then that would imply that we were not truly free and morally responsible."  Could you explain how TomL's claim that people want to rationalize their evasion amounts to "fear of the implications of a non-blank slate" on his part?  As I see it, he is explaining people's tendency for defense mechanisms, not "deny[ing] a reality for fear of it's implications".  That's a pretty hefty accusation.

So, what did he mean? Perhaps what he meant was "earthlings taste good, begin the invasion at once" but as I read his statement in the context of our discussion he was warning that people use non-tabula rasa to evade and therefore we should stick to tabula rasa which allows no such evasion.

Even if I'm right, I'm not sure why that amounts to a "hefty accusation". Indeed, if I'm correct in everything I've said here in this thread I wouldn't consider it a "hefty accusation" against Objectivism.

I'm just trying to figure out why tabula rasa is so important to Objectivism as to override curiosity about the science. Why build a model of human cognition that doesn't map to the brain? Why not give Kant credit where credit is due?

The more I read here, the more I appreciate Dennett's naturalistic approach.

[IdeaSave]

You have not proven that all emotions  “derive from our _ideas_”  except by recourse to a definition that is highly idiosyncratic. [... rest of non-responsive comments deleted for irrelevancy...]

As I stated, the proof is in the literature. I appreciate that you admit that the Objectivist view of emotion has been proven. "Highly idiosyncratic" is simply a code word for "unpopular", so I'm sure you'll understand when I say that I care about conformance to reality, not conformance to the views of others.

It takes about thirty seconds of introspection for an adult to see that his emotions derive from his value judgments. That same adult will also note that he cannot introspect to discover what a crying infant is experiencing, let alone what the cause is. For that, he will have to abstract from his existing view of what an emotion is and what causes it.

I await your presentation and validation of that view.

Mark Peters

[Eric Mathis]

As I stated, the proof is in the literature. I appreciate that you admit that the Objectivist view of emotion has been proven.

Since you form your view of emotions through introspection, without taking stock of any real world data, it is hardly surprising that you would conclude falsely that I have admitted that your view of emotions has been proven.

"Highly idiosyncratic" is simply a code word for "unpopular", so I'm sure you'll understand when I say that I care about conformance to reality, not conformance to the views of others.

Fine. You could define “snake” as a winged creature with a flat bill and take great pride in the fact that your view conforms to reality and not to the views of others.

It takes about thirty seconds of introspection for an adult to see that his emotions derive from his value judgments. That same adult will also note that he cannot introspect to discover what a crying infant is experiencing, let alone what the cause is. For that, he will have to abstract from his existing view of what an emotion is and what causes it.

Then you obviously have no knowledge of people who suffer from depression or other emotional disorders that are not related to holding certain ideas or value judgments. You are obviously unfamiliar with decades of medical research that has provided a range of antianxiety agents, antidepressants, antipsychotics, and antimanics.

[IdeaSave]

[...] You are obviously unfamiliar with decades of medical research that has provided a range of antianxiety agents, antidepressants, antipsychotics, and antimanics.

I'm quite familiar with all of that. What this comment actually reveals (as if it weren't already obvious) is that you equate emotions solely with chemical reactions happening in the blood stream, and you are completely ignoring the obvious fact (available through introspection) that one's values are the controlling factor.

The causal sequence in an emotion is this: event -> automatic, instantaneous evaluation of the event according to the person's subconsciously held value judgments -> automatic generation of physiological changes -> conscious awareness of event's significance (the accuracy of which depends on the person's self-knowledge). Since the latter is an event itself, it can reinforce or dampen the whole sequence.

But since you know the Objectivist literature so well, you already knew all of that. And cleary, there is nothing even remotely valid about it - which must be why you dismiss it with such confidence.

That there are drugs that duplicate, mimic or otherwise affect the physiological changes in no way invalidates this explanation. Neither does the existence of people with physical abnormalities that do the same thing.

Mark Peters

[edited by me to expand the last paragraph]

Edited May 24, 2005 by IdeaSave

[Hal]

It takes about thirty seconds of introspection for an adult to see that his emotions derive from his value judgments.

Do you think that introspection is the primary arbiter here, or just an important one? While I would certainly say that introspective evidence is something to take into account, it would be madness to write off a theory simply because it contradicted what you claim to have discovered 'introspectively'.

[Eric Mathis]

I'm quite familiar with all of that. What this comment actually reveals (as if it weren't already obvious) is that you equate emotions solely with chemical reactions happening in the blood stream, and you are completely ignoring the obvious fact (available through introspection) that one's values are the controlling factor.

Not at all. Please note that in all of my replies I have never ruled out values or ideas as a source of emotions. My point is simply that they are not the one and only source.

The causal sequence in an emotion is this: event -> automatic, instantaneous evaluation of the event according to the person's subconsciously held value judgments -> automatic generation of physiological changes -> conscious awareness of event's significance (the accuracy of which depends on the person's self-knowledge). Since the latter is an event itself, it can reinforce or dampen the whole sequence.

But since you know the Objectivist literature so well, you already knew all of that. And cleary, there is nothing even remotely valid about it - which must be why you dismiss it with such confidence.

I have dismissed only the unsupported contention that the emotional mechanism is tabula rasa at birth and that all emotions “derive from our _ideas_”

That there are drugs that duplicate, mimic or otherwise affect the physiological changes in no way invalidates this explanation. Neither does the existence of people with physical abnormalities that do the same thing.

Your acknowledging that “physiological changes” and “physical abnormalities” affect or incite emotions sounds to me like a concession that emotions are not entirely derived from ideas/values.

[IdeaSave]

Do you think that introspection is the primary arbiter here, or just an important one? While I would certainly say that introspective evidence is something to take into account, it would be madness to write off a theory simply because it contradicted what you claim to have discovered 'introspectively'.

Introspection is the only arbiter.

The science used to discover the physical symptoms that accompany an emotion doesn't explain the emotion out of existence, nor does it invalidate what we can observe through introspection. What we get introspectively is directly observable, whereas the science is highly abstract and indirect. To claim that the latter refutes the former is a violation of the hierarchy of knowledge.

And seriously, how often do you have to resort to scientific studies about hormones and glands to know what you are feeling and why you are feeling it? Never, right? Only the person who doesn't know himself at all can fail to answer those questions.

Those who claim that chemical/hormonal changes _cause_ emotions (any emotion, not necessarily all) are ignoring what everyone can plainly see. Note that to make such a claim even seem semi-plausible, they have to use borderline cases and/or abnormal individuals.

An "emotion" that is caused solely by chemical changes isn't an emotion all - it's a _sensation_. It's the intellectual factor, the value judgments I've been talking about, that distinguishes "emotion" from "sensation". The "emotions are/can be caused by chemical changes" crowd fails to make this distinction.

Mark Peters

[Hal]

Introspection is the only arbiter.

The science used to discover the physical symptoms that accompany an emotion doesn't explain the emotion out of existence, nor does it invalidate what we can observe through introspection.

We dont observe the causes of our emotions - we observe the emotions and then create hypothesis' to explain what we think caused them. Example: I feel a sense of hatred upon meeting a person. I assume that this is caused by the fact that he looks very much like someone who once attacked me. This seems far-fetched - perhaps it is odd to class this is a 'hypothesis' when it is so obviously correct. But in a lot of cases, the non-trivial ones, it will not so obvious.

I feel a sense of unease after sleeping with a girlfriend - this may confuse me at first as I have no real idea what is causing it. What should I do? Well, I might engage in some soul searching and come up with a plausible explanation - perhaps I will say that this unease is due to me having nagging doubts over where the relationship is going. But is this correct? Well, what is the criteria by which I can judge this hypothesis to be correct? In the case of a scientific hypothesis (such as in physics), I have the option of testing it against the external world to see whether it conforms to reality. But how can I test my belief that my unease is caused by my lack of knowledge about the relationship, and not by (say) a childhood incident which caused me to harbour a deep fear of committment? Perhaps my unease is actually caused by a subconscious fear that my parents would not approve of the girl I have chosen. Or maybe my unease is connnected with general dissatisifaction with life, rather than with this relationship in particular. How is it possible, on the basis of introspection alone to choose between these competing explanations? What is the criteria by which one can be judged as correct, other than saying that I 'just know' what the right answer it (and it is obvious that I could be mistaken). This isnt skepticism, I'm not saying that "it is theoretically possible that people could be wrong ergo introspection is invalid!", I'm saying that in this case, it is unclear what being right even consists in. Unless there are some standards by which some judgements can be classed as false while others are correct, it doesnt even make sense to talk of being 'right'.

Or lets consider a fear of spiders. Can we introspectively say what is the cause of this emotion (is this even an emotion? If not, why - we would surely call a fear of a bully an emotion). Perhaps we hypothesise some kind of 'value judgement' concerning spiders, such as an incident in childhood which caused me to dislike them. But then an evolutionary psychologist tells me that fear of spiders is 'innate' and can be explained as a result of natural selection. How do I decide between the competiting explanations?

A person feels depressed. One of his friends tells him this is in response to his value judgements. Another tells him it might be phsiological. How can he tell, on the basis of introspection alone, which of his friends is correct? What can he appeal to in order to decide?

I am generally attracted to white girls as opposed to black girls. Suppose someone asked me to provide a reason. I might answer by suggesting that I grew up in a largely white neighbourhood watching 'white television', hence all the girls around me at the crucial stage when I was going through puberty were white, hence this created a lasting preference. But again, this can only be a hypothesis - there are several other possible explanations and no way to decide between them on the basis of introspection alone.

You say that you can tell by introspection that an emotion is caused by a value-judgement. How do you do this? You make it sound like the easist thing in the world. Suppose you have investigated a cause of an emotion and then decided that value judgement X is responsible. What is the criteria for you being right here? What is the difference between 'thinking you are right' and 'actually being right' - what can you appeal to in order to support your hypothesis, in the way a scientist can appeal to experiment, or a judge to witness testimony?

What we get introspectively is directly observable, whereas the science is highly abstract and indirect. To claim that the latter refutes the former is a violation of the hierarchy of knowledge.

The latter doesnt refute the former, but they must work together. Often I feel that my room is hot when a thermometer tells me it is actually cold, but I do not say that the thermometer is wrong while my 'directly observable' perception of temperature is correct. Rather I would say something like "although it is true that I feel cold, I have mistakenly identified the cause of this sensation. It is not that the room is cold, but perhaps it is because my body temperature is high. If this continues, I shall go see a doctor."

Noone is suggesting that introspection should be ignored. But to instantly claim that all science which opposes a particular introspective judgement is 'wrong' is a very premature claim. Introspection can be wrong in the same way that science can be wrong, and if scientists believe they have found evidence to suggest that our 'common sense' is wrong in a particular case, it should be given the hearing it deserve.

And seriously, how often do you have to resort to scientific studies about hormones and glands to know what you are feeling and why you are feeling it? Never, right?

I think more people SHOULD consider this to be perfectly honest. I think if people were less prepared to rely exclusively on introspection, 'common sense', and English grammer, and more open to integrate scientific explanations into their assessment of themselves and their experiences, they would be a lot better off. I think that fields such as evolutionary psychology and neuroscience can potentially contribute a great deal to how we understand and conceive of ourselves, but I dont think this constiutes a rejection of introspection any more than the invention of telescopes constituted a rejection of unaided sight.

In any case, science has ALREADY seriously influenced the way we view ourselves. Look at how Freud's work on the unconscious has shaped the standard idea of personhood and 'mind' for instance, or the way in which evolutionary theory has caused a lot of people to analyse their sexual preferences in a new way. The very language and concepts we use to both think and describe ourselves has been significantly altered by the last 150 year of psychology and related sciences.

Only the person who doesn't know himself at all can fail to answer those questions.

I would say that people who genuinelly wish to know themselves will do their best to consider all available evidence, both introspective and otherwise, rather than writing off most of it due to conflicts with cherished beliefs.

An "emotion" that is caused solely by chemical changes isn't an emotion all - it's a _sensation_.

I would say this is playing games with langauge - you're in danger of making your claim completely trivial ("emotions are caused by value judgements because I use the term 'emotion' to mean everything which is caused by a value judgement"). If you really want to take this approach, then the question becomes "how do we distingish between an emotion and a sensation?". Let's say I feel something (take any of my above examples, like the unease or whatever). How can I tell, on the basis of introspection alone, whether it is an emotion or a sensation (by your definition)? Let's say I take a drug (MDMA) and it causes in me a feeling of pleasure which is similar to one which I get under circumstances where I can explain the feeling due to my value judgements - lets say it is the same feeling in both cases (do you believe this is even possible? I dont think the answer is obvious and I'm unsure myself. Maybe the question is fundamentally flawed). How would you tell that one is an 'emotion' and the other a 'sensation' when they are almost exactly alike?

Or let's take an anti-depressant. This 'removes' my emotion (sensation? Again, how do we tell?) of being depressed. Is this not as clear a case of chemicals altering our emotions as you could possible wish for?

Edited May 25, 2005 by Hal

[IdeaSave]

[...]

I would say this is playing games with langauge - you're in danger of making your claim completely trivial ("emotions are caused by value judgements because I use the term 'emotion' to mean everything which is caused by a value judgement"). If you really want to take this approach, then the question becomes "how do we distingish between an emotion and a sensation?".

Out of all that you wrote, the above is the key issue.

There is a fundamental mistake you're making in this. The mistake is that the question "How do we distinguish between an emotion and a sensation?" presupposes an answer to two other questions: "What is an emotion?" and "What is a sensation?", so we can't start with that question. We have to start with the two presupposed questions - but those are precisely the issue of contention.

The frustrating thing about this thread is that _every_ participant learned the answers to those questions many, many years ago, but that knowledge is simply being tossed aside.

The following is all covered in the Objectivist literature. Since the participants in this thread have claimed to be familiar with that, I didn’t think it necessary to talk about it. In some cases, I was less than motivated to, to say the least. To those who do know the literature: please correct this account if I’ve gotten something wrong.

People learn what hunger, satiation, hot, cold, etc. are very early on in infancy by experiencing them – we learn what “feelings” are in the broadest sense. The built-in pleasure/pain mechanism leads us implicitly to evaluate some as good and some as bad because they _feel_ good or bad, and causes us to react physically in a corresponding way, e.g., crying in response to “bad” things.

Over time, we learn that there is a connection between those feelings and things in the physical world, things that make them happen or make them go away. This leads us to pursue things that bring pleasure, and avoid things that bring pain. Once we reach the conceptual level, this becomes more sophisticated.

We learn concepts for these things, and how to use those concepts to aid our pursuit/avoidance – we ask for a cookie, or say “No!” to broccoli, etc. We learn that there are feelings that happen no matter what (e.g., "hunger"), and feelings that happen because of our choices (e.g., good feelings after choosing to build a tower of blocks). We also learn that the things that lead to such feelings in us won’t necessarily lead to them in others.

This leads us to make countless “I like this” or “I don’t like that” judgments - value judgments, and purposefully to act to get what we like and avoid what we don’t. Increasingly, we orient our action towards what gets/avoids those things in the future instead of merely right now. We also increasingly connect what we feel to these likes and dislikes, to our choices instead of just to the unchosen, to the volitional instead of just to the non-volitional.

At some point, we become consciously aware of that. In order more effectively to pursue the good and avoid the bad, and to deal with the feelings themselves, we need to differentiate explicitly between feelings like “hunger” and feelings that derive from our choices. That differentiation is necessary because the non-volitional is fundamentally different from the volitional.

The result of that is the concept “emotion”.

So, Objectivism doesn’t hold that emotions come from value judgments because it is “convenient”, and insisting that they do isn’t “playing games with language”. Objectivism holds that view because that’s the way reality is. There is nothing arbitrary about putting non-volitional feelings under the concept “sensation” and volitional ones under the concept “emotion”. We do that legitimately because of the fundamental difference between volitional and non-volitional.

To reject this is not to reject the Objectivist concept of "emotion", but to reject the Objectivist view of concept formation, and by implication, to _every_ fundamental principle of the philosophy.

So how do you tell the difference between an emotion and a sensation? The answer thus is also not arbitrary: you do it by observing whether what you feel is connected to your values or not.

Mark Peters