Reblogged: Objections to the Axioms (Part 5)

[Roderick Fitts]

Objection: The Axioms Equivocate on Their Content

This objection concerns exactly what it is that the axioms are explaining and implying.  It highlights a seeming equivocation:[…]In the Logical Structure of Objectivism, David Kelley makes the following observation:

Very well. Now consider what Rand draws from these very same axioms:

To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence. Whether its basic constituent elements are atoms, or subatomic particles, or some yet undiscovered forms of energy, it is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the law of identity. All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe—from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life—are caused and determined by the identities of the elements involved. 

In other words, she draws from these axioms: (1) that the universe is permanent and can neither be destroyed nor created; (2) the universe is not ruled by will or chance, but by the ‘law of identity’; (3) everything that happens is caused by the ‘identities’ of the elements involved. She also implies that the basic constituents of the universe, whatever they may happen to be, are non-mental (i.e., atoms, particles, or forms of energy). How does Rand draw all these things from these axioms when, according to Kelley

(who, in this instance, is being entirely orthodox) these axioms only assert that ‘something’ distinguishable exists?[1]I’ll sum up this objection as:“Objectivism equivocates between axioms not specifying content (e.g. specific identities, specific actions), and inferences about reality that supposedly follow from the axioms (e.g. the universe cannot be created or destroyed, reality isn’t ruled by chance).”

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[William O]

Wow, great post. I would not have thought of answering the objection that way.

[Plasmatic]

What about the axiomatic concept (though not the primary 3) entity which does state something about what type of things exist?..."to be, is to be an entity" 1976 lectures

Existence----------Identity----------- Consciousness

Entity--------------Identity----------------Unit

Existence is identity ---------Consciousness is identification

Perception (the given)---------- Conception

Edit:

Why are my post showing up as structured differently than my actual submission? I have all the concepts aligned under each other and when I post they get moved..."consciousness is identification" is supposed to be on the same line.

Edited August 15, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Eiuol]

What about the axiomatic concept (though not the primary 3) entity which does state something about what type of things exist?...

Was it called axiomatic? I mean, I don't see how you'd call it an axiom as opposed to a really basic concept. Even then, it only would say entities exist, but isn't at all specifying all that can exist.

[Plasmatic]

Louie asked:

Was it called axiomatic? I mean, I don't see how you'd call it an axiom as opposed to a really basic concept. Even then, it only would say entities exist, but isn't at all specifying all that can exist.

We have been over this. Entity is an axiomatic concept, not an "axiom", however.

The concept of “entity" is an axiomatic concept, which is presupposed by all subsequent human cognition, although it is not a basic axiom In particular, the grasp of “entity," in conjunction with the closely following grasp of “identity,” makes possible the discovery of the next important principle of metaphysics, the one that is the main subject of the present section: the law of causality.

And Ms. Rand does make such a specification as I have personally shown you several times. Edited August 15, 2015 by Plasmatic

[dream_weaver]

Mr. Fitt's series has been focused on objections to the axioms, in particular Nyquist's objections, and a few other that were suggested to him on Facebook.

[Plasmatic]

Yes, axioms, qua axioms. I think that a really beneficial activity would be to spend some time learning what objections many students of Objectivism have to this particular axiomatic concept. The problem is that very few seem to have mined its importance in the Oist metaphysics in the first place. Not doing so leads many to an impoverished view of the Oist metaphysics.

Edited August 15, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Eiuol]

Entity is an axiomatic concept, not an "axiom", however.

And Ms. Rand does make such a specification as I have personally shown you several times.

This seems like equivocation. The sense of axiom implied by "entity" is not the same as what Rand means by a basic axiom like "existence". "Entity" does of course make a specification as you say, but the blog post isn't about those kinds of axioms. The post is focused on the basic ones. You said here "entity" isn't a basic axiom, so I don't know how your statement that "entity" is axiomatic has anything to do with the blog post.

[Plasmatic]

Louie said:

This seems like equivocation. The sense of axiom implied by "entity" is not the same as what Rand means by a basic axiom like "existence". "Entity" does of course make a specification as you say, but the blog post isn't about those kinds of axioms. The post is focused on the basic ones. You said here "entity" isn't a basic axiom, so I don't know how your statement that "entity" is axiomatic has anything to do with the blog post.

The equivocation is yours. The axiomatic concepts of existence, identity and consciousness and the axiomatic concept entity are axiomatic concepts. However, axioms are propositions that are comprised of axiomatic concepts.

The point of my post is that arguments like the one from Kelly are the result of an impoverished view of the Oist metaphysics that results from not understanding what Oism says about the relation of the collective noun-abstraction-concept existence to the particulars that the concept is used as a short hand to refer to. All existents reduce to the metaphysical primaries that comprise them, entities. That is why the conceptual developement Ms. Rand lays out for "existent" starts with entity.

There are no non-entity metaphysical primaries. None.

Edit:

Example:

"The axiom of identity does not assert that all objects are composed of form and matter, as Aristotle said."

Kelly could not even make this statement without the synonym for entity, object....

Edit:

"Things are what they are (identity) and have to act accordingly" (causality)

What is the concept that action presupposes and is required to get from identity to causality? ...... Here's a hint, "thing" is a synonym....

Edit:

"Identity plus causality" and what goes in between and, in fact, technically is synonymous with identity because all existence reduces to these primaries?

Edited August 15, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

I just realized that the OP is not the whole article. Reading the whole thing now.

Edit:

Roderick said:

"Answering the second part requires a fuller grasp of the laws of identity and causality. The law of identity states that A is A; that things are what they are. The law of causality states that entities are the cause of action, that actions are actions of entities. Combining the laws gives a more detailed view of the law of causality: the identity of the entity or entities involved cause and determine the action or actions. An entity of a certain kind will act in certain ways, and only in those ways. Entities can neither act apart from their identities, nor against their identities. (Apart from an entity’s identity or nature, it is nothing and can do nothing; an action in contradiction of a thing’s nature is impossible because contradictions as such are impossible.)

This is the way in which the law of identity rules the universe; it is also the answer to part three of Nyquist’s objection. “Since things are what they are, since everything that exists possesses a specific identity, nothing in reality can occur causelessly or by chance,” Leonard Peikoff remarks in his essay criticizing the “Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy.”[8] Every action is caused by the nature/identity of the entity acting, and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity will carry out the same action when subjected to the same circumstances). Such being the case, it is the fact of identity that makes the universe orderly, lawful, uniform.

That reality is lawful and orderly due to identity and causality excludes other proposed candidates, such as “will” or “chance.”

The answer to the whole dilemma here is contained in this passage. All you have to do is reduce the concept entity.....The concept that "is presupposed by all subsequent human cognition".....

Roderick said:

This doesn’t mean that the “material realm” gets a free pass. She said in an old Epistemology Workshop that,

[…]For instance, we couldn’t say: everything is material, if by ‘material’ we mean that of which the physical objects on the perceptual level are made—‘material’ in the normal, perceptual meaning of the word. If this is what we mean by ‘material,’ then we do not have the knowledge to say that ultimately everything is sub-subatomic particles which in certain aggregates are matter. […][11]

And here is the rub!

Ms. Rand also said in that workshop:

[....] “materials” is not a separate metaphysical category, because materials cannot exist except in the form of entities of some kind, nor can entities exist without materials. That is, physical entities. Prof. B: But in what way is that different from the relation of attributes and entities? Or relations and entities? AR: “Materials" is an abstraction we use to denote what all physical entities have in common. The things which we call physical entities are all made of some kind of material. But you can’t consider one without the other.

And :

How would you project a physical object which had no length? You couldn't.

It is impossible to meaningfully propose a non entity primary.

Edited August 15, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Eiuol]

The equivocation is yours. The axiomatic concepts of existence, identity and consciousness and the axiomatic concept entity are axiomatic concepts. However, axioms are propositions that are comprised of axiomatic concepts.

"although it is not a basic axiom In particular".

 

The blog post is about the bolded kind, which according to Rand in the same sentence doesn't refer to a concept like "entity". If you finished reading the blog post, you'll probably see what I mean. I am not disputing the presupposition of entities for cognition. I'm saying that I agree with the blog that those three axioms make no claims about the contents or form of existents. "Entity" is not basic in this context, but it is basic in terms of human cognition, so are axiomatic in that sense. It's not very clear what you mean. Besides, the blog post is focused on the propositions, not axiomatic concepts per se.

Edited August 15, 2015 by Eiuol

[Plasmatic]

Louie said:

"although it is not a basic axiom In particular".

You still haven't seen the equivocation between axiom and axiomatic concepts....

Edit: you did say :

Besides, the blog post is focused on the propositions, not axiomatic concepts per se.

And yet Roderick himself makes the same point?? I just quoted Roderick himself touching on my very point! How is the article not about what I am saying then???

louie said:

according to Rand in the same sentence doesn't refer to a concept like "entity"

What sentence are you referring to? Please quote it.

Louie said:

. "Entity" is not basic in this context, but it is basic in terms of human cognition, so are axiomatic in that sense. It

Entity is basic in the fullest sense possible. The sense that gives rise to the very possibility of "human cognition", the objective sense! logical hierarchy is constrained by metaphysical facts. (As I have explained many times.) Cognition starts with entities because there is nothing else to perceive. Because entities are "the only metaphysical primaries"... Edited August 15, 2015 by Plasmatic

[dream_weaver]

Plasmatic,

 

She not only said by combining to two segments from the workshop, it is explicitly in the section on concept formation:

 

Concepts of materials are formed by observing the differences in the constituent materials of entities. (Materials exist only in the form of specific entities, such as a nugget of gold, a plank of wood, a drop or an ocean of water.)

 

I think I recall either Peikoff or Binswanger mentioning bringing up the category of materials with her when she was developing the material (not in a primary entity sense) for ITOE as an aside in one of their presentations.

Edited August 15, 2015 by dream_weaver

[Plasmatic]

Could you restate that?

Edited August 15, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Eiuol]

 

And yet Roderick himself makes the same point??

Which point?

 

Please quote it.

"The concept of “entity" is an axiomatic concept, which is presupposed by all subsequent human cognition, although it is not a basic axiom"

 

The sense that gives rise to the very possibility of "human cognition", the objective sense! logical hierarchy is constrained by metaphysical facts."

Right, I said in the context of human cognition, it makes sense to call it an axiom. In a logical hierarchy though, I'd put "entity" after "existence" because "existence" is wider than "entity", so it couldn't be basic in that context.

In other words, my reasoning is based on this, in the conclusion:

"It is true that the axioms do not assert specific natures or forms of existence or specific identities; they state merely that something exists and whatever exists is what it is.  That is what the axioms of existence and identity say when considered separately.  The statements that Nyquist quotes from Rand come after the axioms are integrated with new information, new observations, a new context, such as the notion of “time” and causality in relation to the idea of “chance.”  These integrations flesh out the axioms and law of causality more fully, but that’s not the same thing as saying that Objectivism swaps claims in the case of axioms."

"Entity" would have to come afterwards, much like "causality". I agree that "entity" is as basic as it gets when we talk about cognition.
 

[Plasmatic]

Louie asked:

Which point?

The excerpted part in #10 starting with ""Answering the second part requires a fuller grasp of the laws of identity and causality. "

Louie said:

"The concept of “entity" is an axiomatic concept, which is presupposed by all subsequent human cognition, although it is not a basic axiom"

That quote says that the axiomatic concept entity is not a basic axiom. I specifically said it was not an axiom.

The point that Roderick and I have in common is that the objections made about Oist axioms require one to have a knowledge of the rest of Oist metaphysics, especially entities.

Louie said:

Right, I said in the context of human cognition, it makes sense to call it an axiom. In a logical hierarchy though, I'd put "entity" after "existence" because "existence" is wider than "entity", so it couldn't be basic in that context.

Entity is not an axiom it is an axiomatic concept. The problem is that the meaning of existence is "nothing but" the entities the concept economizes. The concept "existent" is just an epistemic device like separating existence and identity though they are the same thing. Actions,attributes and relations are nothing but the entities they were isolated from in abstraction.

[dream_weaver]

Could you restate that?

Let me try it this way: 

 

Roderick said:

And here is the rub!

Ms. Rand also said in that workshop:

 

 

She had written this prior to the workshop in the chapter on Concept Formation in ITOE:

Concepts of materials are formed by observing the differences in the constituent materials of entities. (Materials exist only in the form of specific entities, such as a nugget of gold, a plank of wood, a drop or an ocean of water.)

[Eiuol]

That quote says that the axiomatic concept entity is not a basic axiom. I specifically said it was not an axiom.

 

...

Entity is not an axiom it is an axiomatic concept. The problem is that the meaning of existence is "nothing but" the entities the concept economizes. The concept "existent" is just an epistemic device like separating existence and identity though they are the same thing. Actions,attributes and relations are nothing but the entities they were isolated from in abstraction.

Right, they're not axioms in the same sense. When someone says "axiom" here, they use the word to refer to "axiomatic concepts", or to refer the three axioms which are better described as "axiomatic propositions". When you say axiom, it looks like you only mean "axiomatic proposition", we both make the distinction though. It's a second claim of mine to say that as an axiomatic concept, "entity" isn't as broad as "existence" so isn't basic outside the context of cognition.

 

Either way, I figure the overall point of the blog post is about how the axiom of identity does not itself specify the form all existents must take. So, clearly, we're not talking *about* axiomatic concepts, but it looks like you were just saying "entity" would help in replying to the objection - it initially seemed like you disagreed. If you agree with the blog post and its reasoning, then we're in agreement.

[Plasmatic]

Louie said:

Right, they're not axioms in the same sense. When someone says "axiom" here, they use the word to refer to "axiomatic concepts",

I don't see why an Oist would make this equivocation, particularly after explicit differentiation has been made repeatedly. Lets leave that be though.

Louie said:

When you say axiom, it looks like you only mean "axiomatic proposition"

That is generally how I try to practice a rational approach to language, to say what I mean. I am not a fan of using context as a license to equivocate or be lazy with words.

Edited August 16, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Eiuol]

I don't see why an Oist would make this equivocation, particularly after explicit differentiation has been made repeatedly. Lets leave that be though.

Yeah, most people use the word axiom for two different but related concepts as far as I've seen. It's only equivocation if they're treated as identical.

Edited August 16, 2015 by Eiuol