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Question on Value and Ultimate Value

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VWA

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Well, I am in complete agreement with Obj Meta and Epi so I am not looking for any super natural explanations.

It's the root of Obj Ethics that I find wonky.

You think it's wonky to identify life as the proper standard of value?  Wow.    

Edited by Craig24
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So the Ultimate Value, the final end goal, of Obj Ethics, is the achievement of happiness. Life is only a means to that end.

So why is happiness so important? Why is the achievement of this emotional state more superior to the near infinite other ideals a human mind can conjure up and pursue?

I don't mean to intrude--and I apologize if I'm speaking out of turn--but I don't believe that Rand seeks to answer the question you're asking. If a person is uninterested in happiness, or does not wish it for himself, then I don't think she would insist upon the Objectivist Ethics for that person, or argue for its benefit to him.

Rather, based on my understanding of Rand (which comes from reading her a long time ago, so take that caveat along with the usual ones), she assumes that the purpose of ethics/philosophy is human happiness, or "life," or, in Eiuol's parlance, "flourishing." Rand's observations are more that life and happiness are real, and can be achieved in a particular way (or can best be achieved) accounting to the nature of man--that this is objective knowledge and results in an objective ethics for all those who want to be happy.

But those who do not prefer living to death or happiness to suffering, or those who actively seek suffering and death? I think Rand would say that a thousand other philosophies would better serve those ends (whether the majority of practitioners of those philosophies realize it or not). She is speaking more to the person who wants a long, happy life, and believes that some road will get him there, when in fact it is a dead end. She means to provide a better roadmap.

If you don't wish to be happy or survive or flourish, it's not hard to achieve your ends. But if you do want those things, ah, now that's a challenge...

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The choice of "choosing life" is not some binary clear-cut choice. There is an infinite number of types of life an individual can choose to lead.

 

Well there certainly area number of types. But when we are talking about the "choice to live" being implied in making any choice per se, we are talking about a binary choice of literally choosing life over death. That's it. Then, we need an additional teleological account of human nature to get from choosing life to choosing life as a specific entity, with a specific nature. We talk about "the choice to live" but that's really just a shorthand because you can't choose "life" in the abstract, but life as a particular kind of entity, one that utilizes reason as a means of survival and has certain needs and interests, and so if we incorporate that understanding into our conception of an ultimate end, we end up with not bare survival or surviving long enough to suicide bomb yourself, but a thick conception of human flourishing. This account, by the way, is not unique to Rand, but follows the account of the vast majority of the Greek tradition, so this is far from some wonky "objectivist life."

As far as choosing an "Objectivist life" I don't even know what that means. Saying "it's a life according to objectivist ethics" is circular. That doesn't tell us what that is. It seems to me there is no such thing in any individualist account of ethics. There are facts about human nature based on biology that provide a valid naturalist understanding of what constitutes the general parameters of human flourishing. Then there are individualistic potentialities that every one has that are going to be specific to that person's nature and context. You can make some long term principles for general guides to self actualization based on the generalities of human nature (virtues), but there is no singular "life according to" this kind of ethics, it kind of defeats the point.

Edited by 2046
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If all our actions stem directly from pre-programmed instincts from birth like all other animals in nature, in that case then yes, sustaining and pro-creating life is then selected by default to be the Ultimate Value, based on objective biologic and psychological make-ups.

The reality is however we have this ability called volition to freely choose above our base biology through sheer power of will, in which case life is only an Ultimate Value if we choose it to be.

We're not discussing whether it's a choice or not, we're discussing whether it's an objective choice, or a subjective one. I explained why I believe it to be a choice based in reality, while all the others (like the example you gave) clearly aren't. A choice based in reality is an objective choice.

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You think it's wonky to identify life as the proper standard of value?  Wow.    

Hmm, where have I see a similar argument before.

"You think it's wonky to identify Bible as the proper standard of value? Wow."

And that's why I don't take things for granted.

But those who do not prefer living to death or happiness to suffering, or those who actively seek suffering and death? I think Rand would say that a thousand other philosophies would better serve those ends (whether the majority of practitioners of those philosophies realize it or not). She is speaking more to the person who wants a long, happy life, and believes that some road will get him there, when in fact it is a dead end. She means to provide a better roadmap.

I agree with what you said in the 2 previous paragraphs.

But this last paragraph, just because an individual didn't choose the kind of happiness one would achieve by following Obj Ethics does not automatically constitute them actively seeking suffering and death. Suffering and death can be stumbled upon the path in the pursuit of any ideals, Obj included.

Take this example: A devoted scientist has developed the ability to travel through a black-hole. He can pass through the singularity unscathed and safely arrive on the other side, which his theory tells him is another universe completely different from ours. But he cannot travel or communicate back in anyway, and it's almost guaranteed that he will die in a year's time once he gets to the other side due to running out of life-support. But to this man, to be able to glimpse and study the greatest mysteries of the universe is his ultimate goal. So he leaves Earth and the Obj-happy life he has, travels through the blackhole, studies the greatest mysteries of the universe, and dies to suffocation in a year. He didn't die happy, as he would if he stayed on Earth, lead a productive life, and raised a family (in accordance with his biological nature), but he died content knowing he achieved his own chosen purpose in life.

Now, is this man actively pursuing happiness? Is he actively seeking suffering and death? Or is he seeking something else entirely?

Edited by VWA
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Now, is this man actively pursuing happiness? Is he actively seeking suffering and death? Or is he seeking something else entirely? 

You could make the case that he's pursuing happiness consistent with Objectivism. One would have to know him and his motivation, but since its just an example, why not? 

I'd like to ask another question (I know I'm asking more questions than I am providing replies, but I think it helps the overall discussion). The intent of my question is to see if you're asking about having a standard in the first place, or if it is specifically about the Objectivist notion of "life as a standard". 

My question is this: do you think that any standard (i.e. any starting point) must be either arbitrary or subjective? For example, if someone said they were going to choose a state of constant fear, sorrow  and anxiety -- actual, not horror-movie style where you know it is finite and unreal -- would that be just as justifiable as the "Objectivist bundle" or your travelling scientist?

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I say wonky because while Obj Meta and Epi is derived from self-evident, the root of Obj Ethics is not.

Given the objective nature of reality and its laws, reason is there as a tool to tell us how to efficiently and effectively reach from our present state to the ultimate desired future state.

Reason doesn't tell us what the ultimate desired future state should be.

The root of Obj Ethics states/implies the ultimate desired state is happiness.

Is that self-evident?

So far the responses either takes this question for granted and imply yes, or give a false dilemma that if an individual's ultimate goal isn't happiness, it must be misery and death.

Edited by VWA
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I say wonky because while Obj Meta and Epi is derived from self-evident, the root of Obj Ethics is not.

Given the objective nature of reality and its laws, reason is there as a tool to tell us how to efficiently and effectively reach from our present state to the ultimate desired future state.

Reason doesn't tell us what the ultimate desired future state should be.

The root of Obj Ethics states/implies the ultimate desired state is happiness.

Is that self-evident?

So far the responses either takes this question for granted and imply yes, or give a false dilemma that if an individual's ultimate goal isn't happiness, it must be misery and death.

It's not self evident because self evident means (basically) right in front of your face. Since philosophy is foundational, and ethics is a derivative of M and E, it requires argumentation. You can't point at ethics and go "see." It should be reducible to self evident facts, but not self evident on its own.

But like I said, it can be thought of as axiomatic, not in the same way that Rand means the term, but in a way that mainstream philosophers mean the terms. In making a decision to act, you make a decision that action itself is preferable to non action. This is axiomatic in the sense that any attempt to deny it includes the preference for life. And once someone has expressed a choice or preference, then the argument for ethical principles takes the shape of an "If X, then Y" statement, "If you want X, then you should do Y." It's not self evident, but it is a hypothetical imperative with binding force. As Irfan Khawaja says in his review of Viable Values:

The key to understanding the "choice to live," as I see it, is to think of the binding force of an ultimate value by analogy with the binding force of a logical axiom, on the Aristotelian conception of an axiom (cf.VV, p. 107) [...]

At Metaphysics IV.3, Aristotle enunciates the PNC: "A thing cannot be and not-be at the same, in the same respect." This is an undeniable and foundational truth; its truth is merely re-affirmed in the attempt to doubt or deny it. Note, however, that the Principle is not a categorical injunction to engage in thought. In fact, it says nothing at all about thought, nor is it a prescription of any kind. It merely states a fact about the world—one that becomes a guide for thought when and only when one chooses to think. In choosing to engage in thought, one sees in one's own case that if one is to do so successfully (i.e., at all), onemust obey the Principle without exception. [...]

One can escape the PNC-- if one is willing to pay the price. The PNC binds all thought; one way to evade it, then, is simply to stop thinking. [...] It doesn't apply to a non-thinker. On the other hand, its non-application to the non-thinker is hardly a threat to its logical or epistemic authority. A non-thinker can't raise an objection (or even have one), and thus cannot constitute a problem for the PNC. [...]

The analogy to moral obligation applies as follows. As a matter of non-prescriptive fact, life can only be kept in existence by a constant process of self-sustaining action. Moreover, life is unique in this respect: it's the underlying generator of practical requirements that explains why there are practical requirements at all, themselves requiring self-sustaining action. So life is the ultimate value. Life's conditional character, however, is not by itself a prescription. It's simply a fact about the world. The fact by itself generates no categorical duty to keep one's own life (or anyone else's life) in existence, or indeed, to value or do anything at all. Life's conditional character becomes a guide for action when and only when one chooses to value and live, i.e., chooses to engage in goal-directed action [...].

 In choosing to live, one is conditionally bound by the requirements of life. [...] f I will life as an end, I must will the means to it; if I refuse to will the means, I must give up the end.

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In making a decision to act, you make a decision that action itself is preferable to non action. This is axiomatic in the sense that any attempt to deny it includes the preference for life. And once someone has expressed a choice or preference, then the argument for ethical principles takes the shape of an "If X, then Y" statement, "If you want X, then you should do Y."

 

I agree physically-alive fits as an axiom. To take or plan to take any physical actions as opposed to non-action, you express a choice/preference to be physically-alive as opposed to be physically-dead.

To stay physically-alive however, nutrients/hospitable environment are absolute requirements, Obj Ethics is not.

Obj Ethics is one way to stay physically-alive in order to achieve some end result

If you are looking to stay physically-alive to achieve some other result, then Obj Ethics isn't a necessity.

There is nothing axiomatic about Obj Ethics/Obj-life.

 

Edited by VWA
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    I agree with what you said in the 2 previous paragraphs.

But this last paragraph, just because an individual didn't choose the kind of happiness one would achieve by following Obj Ethics does not automatically constitute them actively seeking suffering and death.

Nor did I say that it so "automatically constitutes them." But I *am* saying that happiness is a real phenomenon (as is physical survival) and that achieving happiness (like survival) requires objective knowledge and subsequent action. Rand sees ethics as being that area of philosophy which deals with these matters, motivated by a desire to achieve happiness, etc. Subsequently, the Objectivist Ethics are those ethics Rand believes consistent with her Metaphysics and Epistemology; they are her answer to the question "how can man be happy?" Or "how can man flourish?" Questions like "why should I want to be happy?" or "why should I prefer life to death?" are fine to ask, but they are not what Rand seeks to answer via her ethics. She assumes that you want to be happy. If you don't, her essays telling you what she believes you need to do in order to be happy won't necessarily serve your purpose(s). She wasn't trying to write advice for everybody; someone bent on achieving his own suffering/destruction won't gain much by her writings on ethics.

Now I think, based on your initial reply to me, that you're apt to take this as me saying that "someone who doesn't follow the Objectivist Ethics is bent on his own destruction." Again, I'm not. But if Rand is correct--if she has identified how man must behave, principally, in order to flourish, to "live," to find happiness on Earth--then those who do not follow the Objectivist Ethics are going to court their own destruction to the extent that they deviate from doing those things that a man must do in order to flourish, whether they "actively seek" such destruction or not.

    Suffering and death can be stumbled upon the path in the pursuit of any ideals, Obj

    included.

Of course you're right, and a car crash can happen at any point when you're on the road. Still, if I were teaching someone how to drive, I would recommend ("generally speaking," or principally speaking) that they stop at red lights and drive on the green, rather than the reverse. This is because there are certain outcomes we wish to avoid, other outcomes we would prefer, and I believe that our choices help to make the difference between them. (Someone who wishes to get into an accident, or who does not care whether he does or not, won't profit much from my driving advice. Someone who flouts my advice is courting an accident whether or not he realizes the fact, and whether or not he wants one, and irrespective of the fact that "accidents can happen even if you're following all of the rules of the road.")

The Objectivist Ethics don't promise an existence free from suffering, let alone death. If anyone makes such a claim, I'd... lol, well, I'd probably leave such a person be, so that reality can disabuse him of his notion, rather than hurt myself trying to argue the point. Yet if we can recognize the general causes of suffering, and if we can take action to avoid them, I'd say that's probably an "ideal" worth pursuing.

Take this example: A devoted scientist has developed the ability to travel through a black-hole. He can pass through the singularity unscathed and safely arrive on the other side, which his theory tells him is another universe completely different from ours. But he cannot travel or communicate back in anyway, and it's almost guaranteed that he will die in a year's time once he gets to the other side due to running out of life-support. But to this man, to be able to glimpse and study the greatest mysteries of the universe is his ultimate goal. So he leaves Earth and the Obj-happy life he has, travels through the blackhole, studies the greatest mysteries of the universe, and dies to suffocation in a year. He didn't die happy, as he would if he stayed on Earth, lead a productive life, and raised a family (in accordance with his biological nature), but he died content knowing he achieved his own chosen purpose in life.

Now, is this man actively pursuing happiness? Is he actively seeking suffering and death? Or is he seeking something else entirely?

I think softwareNerd's answer to this was right on the money, that "you could make the case that he's pursuing happiness consistent with Objectivism." Honestly (and since she's not likely to gainsay me), I think Rand would read the character you describe as a hero. Probably, I would, too. Since you'd presumably disagree (having provided the example ostensibly to argue against the Objectivist Ethics), it might elucidate the discussion to dig into this discrepancy more deeply. (And how is that for some alliteration!?)

There's potentially more to say here, regardless. For instance, "man's nature," though it is often misunderstood this way, does not mean "in accordance with his biological nature" in the sense of "it is good to procreate." There are no context-free absolutes that Objectivism proposes for an individual's life, no "it is good to marry" or "it is good to work a 9-to-5 job" or "it is good to live to see ninety." All of those things may be good, of course, but they depend on the myriad specifics of a given individual's life, and that individual's ability to assess the same.

That your proposed character eschews these sorts of things, defying convention, in the name of his true passion...? Well, I'll just say that under other circumstances, I could easily see a Roark or a Galt doing likewise.

Edited by DonAthos
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I agree physically-alive fits as an axiom. To take or plan to take any physical actions as opposed to non-action, you express a choice/preference to be physically-alive as opposed to be physically-dead.

To stay physically-alive however, nutrients/hospitable environment are absolute requirements, Obj Ethics is not.

Obj Ethics is one way to stay physically-alive in order to achieve some end result

If you are looking to stay physically-alive to achieve some other result, then Obj Ethics isn't a necessity.

There is nothing axiomatic about Obj Ethics/Obj-life.

 

Miss Rand portends to provide the proof of her ethics in her speech "Faith and Force" by citing from John Galt's speech. She opens with "Man's mind is his basic tool of survival."

If you are looking to stay physically-alive to achieve some other result, can it be done without using this basic tool of survival?

Obj. Ethics isn't about laying out a set of dictates governing how you should set your table, or which leg you should put into your trousers first, rather it provides an identification of what is it about the nature of man that makes such a science as ethics necessary at all. To the extent other ethical theories work in practice, one would be able to find aspects of her observations there-in.

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I agree physically-alive fits as an axiom. To take or plan to take any physical actions as opposed to non-action, you express a choice/preference to be physically-alive as opposed to be physically-dead.

To stay physically-alive however, nutrients/hospitable environment are absolute requirements, Obj Ethics is not.

Obj Ethics is one way to stay physically-alive in order to achieve some end result

If you are looking to stay physically-alive to achieve some other result, then Obj Ethics isn't a necessity.

There is nothing axiomatic about Obj Ethics/Obj-life.

 

Right so once you do choose to act, as opposed to not act, then you can see how that commits you to normative principles. So if I understand you right, you're saying what about someone that chooses not to act, or someone that chooses actions for a short term that will ultimately lead them to death?

Well Rand's ethics are a hypothetical imperative. so for someone that chooses not to act, then Rand has nothing to say to them. You wouldn't say the principles of logic aren't axiomatic because they don't apply to a person who chooses not to express a thought?

As far as people who choose to live for other ends, Rand would not say they have avoided her ethics, she would say they have accepted life as a rational being, but are mistaken in the means they choose, and thus will not achieve what they themselves have chosen. This is what Rand means when she says every act of immorality is a contradiction. You choose life, but then act against it. So let's take an example:

1. Joe wants donuts. 

2. Flapping your arms will give you donuts.

3. Joe should flap his arms.

That's the basic structure of Randian ethics, an "if-then" statement. So let's say that Muhammad convinces Joe that flapping his arms won't get him donuts, but blowing himself up will.

1. Joe wants donuts.

2. Flapping your arms will give you donuts.

3.  Joe should flap his arms.

4. Joe does not flap his arms. Instead, Joe blows himself up.

5. Joe does not receive donuts.

Under this donut-ethic, listening to Muhammad was immoral. It didn't result in Joe getting what he himself accept as an ultimate end. Replace donuts with "life" and "flapping your arms" with "living as a rational being" and you have Randian ethics.

So in the example of a suicide bomber, it's not that they've chosen death because they secretly agree with Rand, but just go ahead and bomb anyway because they are evil. She would say as long as they are choosing action, they have in fact chosen life as an ultimate end, they do think they are acting for their long term happiness and flourishing, just in another realm. Allah will bless them and reward them in paradise. So Rand would say they are morally destructive because they have embraced life as an ultimate end, but have rejected the means to securing it. Random ethics would prescribe rationality as a cardinal virtue and a humanistic, secular account of happiness to such people.

Edited by 2046
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I think softwareNerd's answer to this was right on the money, that "you could make the case that he's pursuing happiness consistent with Objectivism." Honestly (and since she's not likely to gainsay me), I think Rand would read the character you describe as a hero. Probably, I would, too. Since you'd presumably disagree (having provided the example ostensibly to argue against the Objectivist Ethics), it might elucidate the discussion to dig into this discrepancy more deeply. (And how is that for some alliteration!?)

Okay, let's switch that scientist with a suicide-bomber, whose ultimate value is to assassinate 5 high-ranking infidels in his country. This man decides to leave his de-facto obj-happy life and brings down those high-rank infidels; dying in the process.

Would you also say this guy is a hero as well? If not, what's objectively different between the two examples?

Both are pursuing a subjective ideal of their choosing. Both are utilizing reason to achieve their ideals in the most efficient/effective way possible.

And if there is no objective way to evaluate the near infinite number of ideals possible for a man to select as his ultimate purpose, then whatever "destruction" is caused by lack of consideration for Obj Ethics is a non-issue. Because in both cases of the Scientist and the Suicide-Bomber, unless Obj Ethics provide them a more efficient/effective way to achieve their ultimate goal, any breach is simply meet with a "So?".

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Miss Rand portends to provide the proof of her ethics in her speech "Faith and Force" by citing from John Galt's speech. She opens with "Man's mind is his basic tool of survival."

If you are looking to stay physically-alive to achieve some other result, can it be done without using this basic tool of survival?

Reason is man's basic tool to achieve anything (survival included), I agree.

Reason tells a man how to efficiently/effectively get from point A to point B. That's it, nothing more nothing less.

Reason doesn't tell a person what the final destination should be, only intermediate destinations of how to get there.

A fanatic suicide-bomber looking to take out as many civilians as possible with his life will also have to utilize reason to achieve that. But I doubt such an example would qualify as adhering to Obj Ethics.

Edited by VWA
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@2046

If a suicide bomber's ultimate aim is say something else, and blowing himself up to kill civilians is his means of achieving that, then yes, in this case it is very possible he is wrong, in that suicide-bombing won't achieve what he wanted.

But what if his ultimate aim is to just kill those people, full stop?

That's the point here. Objective judgement of right and wrongs can only be passed based whether an action will contribute to or go against an ultimate ideal/goal an individual picks. But there is no objective standard to issue a judgement on the near infinite number of ideals a man could pick as his ultimate ideal/goal. The sort of life a person achieves by following Obj Ethics is just one ideal among a sea of uncounted others.

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Reason is man's basic tool to achieve anything (survival included), I agree.

Reason tells a man how to efficiently/effectively get from point A to point B. That's it, nothing more nothing less.

Reason doesn't tell a person what the final destination should be, only intermediate destinations of how to get there.

 

What limts reason, such that it cannot enable a person to discern final destinations from the intermediate ones?

Edited by dream_weaver
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Okay, let's switch that scientist with a suicide-bomber, whose ultimate value is to assassinate 5 high-ranking infidels in his country. This man decides to leave his de-facto obj-happy life and brings down those high-rank infidels; dying in the process.

Would you also say this guy is a hero as well? If not, what's objectively different between the two examples?

Both are pursuing a subjective ideal of their choosing. Both are utilizing reason to achieve their ideals in the most efficient/effective way possible.

The answer to any scenario you'd care to provide (as is the case with the scientist) is going to ultimately depend on the specific context. In fiction, one could probably create an assassin--or perhaps even a suicide bomber--who is heroic, yes. Could this happen in real life? I doubt it, though without knowing the specifics, I guess I find the attempts against Hitler's life fairly heroic. And I'm sure they were dangerous enough.

This isn't a matter of some arbitrary reassignment of "ultimate value," which instead remains a flourishing life (and this would be the challenge in writing our assassin or suicide-bomber as a hero; the world would likely have to be awful to such a degree that no better is possible than whatever is gained by the elimination of those Hitlers--not just "infidels," but true monsters--who hold humanity down). This isn't a question of replacing one's own life as the standard of value, and one's achievement of happiness, with X, where X can be anything. When it comes to having some driving passion like science to your scientist, or architecture to Roark, it is more like achieving one's happiness through X. Happiness is both the motivation and the result, while X is the means. It remains a subordinate value.

When deciding on the pursuit of some given value, or choosing among competing values, the question for any individual is: will it make you happy? As I've said before, happiness is something real. It can't just be found any old way. Were I to make the choices that your scientist did, or a suicide bomber would, I would be exceedingly unhappy. Those would constitute deep sacrifices for me. It would be sacrificial, too, if I were to try to be an architect; that's not my passion. I cannot just pick anything, do anything. So my pursuit of happiness requires some thinking, some knowledge, both about myself--and about the nature of happiness. It requires some knowledge about the nature of man (because man's happiness is part and parcel to this).

Now you might ask something like, "well, what if it makes you happy causing others pain?" In return, I'd ask does it? Does that stand to make a person happy, in reality? How so? This is not necessarily a simple question, and I think Rand would have disagreed that the results of such a pursuit would constitute true happiness. Here's a quote that may be relevant (from "The Objectivist Ethics"):

Happiness is that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one’s values. If a man values productive work, his happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his life. But if a man values destruction, like a sadist—or self-torture, like a masochist—or life beyond the grave, like a mystic—or mindless “kicks,” like the driver of a hotrod car—his alleged happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his own destruction. It must be added that the emotional state of all those irrationalists cannot be properly designated as happiness or even as pleasure: it is merely a moment’s relief from their chronic state of terror.

Perhaps your real issue lies here? Perhaps you disagree with Rand, and believe that happiness is infinitely malleable, and may be achieved in any which way? Or perhaps you would (mis)identify "a moment's relief" as happiness?

But in identifying "life" as the standard of value, Rand is laying out what she believes to be the actual means for a man to achieve happiness, given man's nature. If someone yet believes himself to find happiness through the destruction of others, and will not be dissuaded of this by either argument or reality, then it may no longer be an ethical question we're discussing, but a political one.

And if there is no objective way to evaluate the near infinite number of ideals possible for a man to select as his ultimate purpose, then whatever "destruction" is caused by lack of consideration for Obj Ethics is a non-issue. Because in both cases of the Scientist and the Suicide-Bomber, unless Obj Ethics provide them a more efficient/effective way to achieve their ultimate goal, any breach is simply meet with a "So?".

It's no longer clear what you're asking or attempting to challenge. If you're asserting that someone may make something other than their own happiness or their own life a priority, act accordingly, and then ask "so what?" if told that they're going to suffer and die in the process, well obviously.

But I don't want to suffer and die (or at least, no more than I eventually must, and not more quickly). I want to live a life full of adventure, pleasure, love, and etc. I want to be happy. Thus I must choose my subordinate values and my actions carefully; it is their contribution to my flourishing life, or lack of the same, that constitutes the means by which I evaluate them. I believe that my choices will materially impact my experience of life, and so I wish to make them with care.

The person who isn't interested in that? Ought not be an Objectivist. The Objectivist Ethics aren't meant to be a guide for anyone to achieve anything; they are specifically a guide for a man who wishes to achieve happiness.

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@DonAthos

The point I'm making is is that reason cannot be used to determine what the ultimate goal should be for an individual, only how to get there once a goal is chosen.

The way you are passing judgement on the suicide-bomber presupposes he either already have picked happiness as his ultimate goal (whether in Heaven or on Earth), or that happiness is somehow an ultimate intrinsic value everyone should pursue.

I'm not saying a suicide-bomber's objective should be respected. If your ultimate goal is something along the line of a happy life as proposed by Obj Ethics, then reason dictates that to achieve your goal, it is imperative to take out enemies that threatens such a goal with extreme prejudice.

But the same logic applies to the bomber, or any other individuals with different aims.

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How do you ascertain they are simply intermediate, for that matter?

If the purpose of a goal/objective is to achieve something else, then they are intermediate. In these cases you can answer the question "why" with "because 'next step'" And also in these cases, reason can be used to pass down objective judgments of right and wrong based on whether these intermediate goals will logically lead to the "next step".

If a goal/objective isn't chosen as a means to achieve something else, but an end in itself, then in this case that's a final destination/ultimate goal. For these you cannot answer the question "why" because there is no next step (they are "just because", or as software like to say "duh")

Edited by VWA
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@DonAthos

The point I'm making is is that reason cannot be used to determine what the ultimate goal should be for an individual, only how to get there once a goal is chosen.

And the point that I'm making is that the ultimate goal of Objectivist Ethics is individual happiness. To the best of my knowledge/recollection, there is no argument that Rand makes for life being superior to death or happiness to suffering. (So if that's as much as you're saying, you're right. But no one's trying to argue the opposite... I don't think.) I think Rand makes several points that are, perhaps, related (such as that the very concept of "value" implicitly relies upon life, and so to pursue some supposed value while working against life is self-contradictory), but if someone isn't interested in happiness then the Objectivist Ethics aren't directed at that individual. At the same time, if someone isn't interested in happiness, then they probably don't need much in the way of ethical philosophy to guide them; happiness can be hard to come by, but suffering is widely available.

Rand isn't trying to talk anyone into wanting to be happy; she assumes people want to be happy and is endeavoring to describe how she believes they may achieve it.

The way you are passing judgement on the suicide-bomber presupposes he either already have picked happiness as his ultimate goal (whether in Heaven or on Earth), or that happiness is somehow an ultimate intrinsic value everyone should pursue.

Rather, I think most suicide bombers will not be interested in their individual happiness. Or, as you identify, that they'll be operating on the belief of some realm-after-death where they imagine they'll be happy, or that God will smile upon them, or etc., none of which I believe to be real. I don't think they'll achieve happiness either, which goes some way to explaining why I don't plan on becoming a suicide bomber.

I feel like you want someone to make an argument that the suicide bomber who doesn't care whether he's happy or not (because suicide bombing is his ultimate value) ought to reject his ethics and adopt the Objectivist one instead. Or you think that such an argument has been made somewhere. But no one, Rand included, is trying to make such an argument, I don't think. The suicide bomber is free to suffer, should he so choose. But if he wants to be happy, he'll need some help--and that's where the Objectivist Ethics comes in.

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@DonAthos

I feel like you want someone to make an argument that the suicide bomber who doesn't care whether he's happy or not (because suicide bombing is his ultimate value) ought to reject his ethics and adopt the Objectivist one instead. Or you think that such an argument has been made somewhere. But no one, Rand included, is trying to make such an argument, I don't think. The suicide bomber is free to suffer, should he so choose. But if he wants to be happy, he'll need some help--and that's where the Objectivist Ethics comes in.

I don't think such an argument has been made or is even possible to make. (On the off chance there is such an argument I would be very interested in hearing it of course)

But no, what bugs me is this view that happiness is a state that is somehow intrinsically all important, that it (and it's opposite, suffering) alone can serve as an ultimate scale to judge everything else.

Any ideals subjectively selected by a human mind as his ultimate goal can act as a scale to judge everything else. And every action can be objectively judged as to be contributing towards that ultimate goal, or going against it.

If the definition of Ethics is defined as a set of guidelines to guide an individual's action in life toward happiness, where by happiness is already embedded in the definition itself as the ultimate goal, then that's that.

But if the definition of Ethics is defined as simply a set of guideline to guide an individual's actions in life, full stop (which is what most dictionary states), then Obj Ethics is wonky, and Ethics is ultimately, subjective.

Edited by VWA
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Some people do define ethics as -merely- a set of guidelines to -any- kind of end. What Objectivism does is identify man's nature as a rational animal, then defines ethics as a guide to live according to that nature. It is not a subjective selection, saying man has a nature is not at all subjective. Besides, intrinsic value doesn't apply here, I think what you can gather from Don and 2046 is that happiness and life are values insofar as people choose to live originally on an a-rational basis. Call that "subjective" if you want, but it's more precise to say it was selected on a non-rational basis, which Rand says is originally chosen based on seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Ethics is about living according to one's nature, as does a lot of Aristotelian-based ethics.

You seem to be thinking of ethics as the goodness/badness of specific actions, so quite literally, "one's nature" isn't part of it. That's one way to think of ethics, but our starting point here is that man has a specific nature, not specific actions.

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