TheZigs Posted June 28, 2016 Report Share Posted June 28, 2016 (edited) Hello all I was reading ITOE recently, and encountered the section in which Rand describes no one trait as contingent. The example she used specifically was man as a rational animal. She said that, though it is true that the referent for the concept "man" includes rational animal, all of the traits of man are included in the concept man. We can agree that men, at least normal ones, have two arms and two legs. The question then follows: are men lacking arms and/or legs no longer men in the same way that something no longer capable of rational thought would be a man? Does having one's arm cut off invalidate one's status as a member of mankind? Thank you for your replies. Zigs Edit: I did some more thinking, and wonder if perhaps the best answer is an additional descriptor. Because said armless person fits every other criterion for a an, would "armless person" be the descriptor, and so on and so forth? But then, once again, the question becomes where we have to stop with these descriptions and start a new concept. Is it two differences? Five? One hundred? Obviously any number is arbitrary. Edited June 28, 2016 by TheZigs Adding more Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Reidy Posted June 28, 2016 Report Share Posted June 28, 2016 Included in the concept is not the same as included in the definition or essential or necessary. Rand's statement means that the concept subsumes all the particulars that fall under it and encapsulates all our knowledge of them. Thus armless people would be included in man because they satisfy the definition. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
William O Posted June 30, 2016 Report Share Posted June 30, 2016 Quote But then, once again, the question becomes where we have to stop with these descriptions and start a new concept. Is it two differences? Five? One hundred? Obviously any number is arbitrary. This part of your post, at least, is concerned with the problem of borderline cases, which Rand solved by arguing that essences are epistemological. You may be interested in the relevant section in OPAR, if you haven't read it already. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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