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Mental Entities and Causality

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Eiuol

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On November 20, 2016 at 9:59 AM, MisterSwig said:

Rather in the mental and concrete senses--keeping in mind that by concrete we don't mean a physical entity, but a mental one.

Here it is laid out. There is no such thing as a mental concrete. You fundamentally misunderstand the role of words/language as providing concepts with concreteness. Introspection without  language/concepts is limited to animal level consciousness. (And I mean language above first-level concepts and into abstractions) 

Seriously, answer my first question in this thread clearly and you should see a problem for your formulation.

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11 hours ago, Eiuol said:

(it looks like, but I'm unsure) Rand meant Prof. F's error was somewhat Platonic

Before moving on to Plasmatic's objections, I want to acknowledge this point. It seems like Rand may have been calling someone else's idea "somewhat Platonic," and not her own. Though I too am confused by what she meant. Thus I'm compelled to retract my earlier statement.

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1 hour ago, Plasmatic said:

Are you saying that mental phenomenon are a separate ontological realm inhabited by mental entities but that is causally dependent on the physical?

Yes. But I'm not prepared to say that more than one mental entity can exist in this realm at the same time. It seems like entities cycle through this realm one at a time based on whatever automatic processes are occurring between the brain and our mind. But it's this cycling aspect over which we have developed some mental control by focusing, choosing, and willing. That's as far as I can go, I think, concerning the nature of the mental realm. I'll consider your original question and see if I have an answer.

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17 hours ago, Plasmatic said:

Anyone can reduce this treatment of "mental entities" as causal agents of some non physical kind to absurdity by asking themselves "what final act in the process of abstraction "transforms concepts into mental entities"?

If finally naming a concept with a word transforms it into a mental entity, how does that make absurd the idea that such entities act? I'm not following you.

Naming something does not tell you what kind of thing it is. It only tells you that it's a thing. In fact it doesn't even tell you if the thing being named is real or make-believe. That you must determine by direct awareness and reason.

We are attempting to distinguish two types of perceivable things: physical entities and mental entities. Yes, the terminology is problematic. But that's been established.

To attack the idea of mental causation, don't you need to address the introspective evidence for volition (free will) which I have presented? Do you not experience yourself willing your body to move? What do you think goes on here?

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39 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

To attack the idea of mental causation, don't you need to address the introspective evidence for volition (free will) which I have presented? Do you not experience yourself willing your body to move? What do you think goes on here?

I am not attacking mental causation as such. Your formulation of mental causation as performed by some set of mental entities within the physical entity possessing consciousness is what I object to. 

Also, you are dropping the context of the absolute necessity of using words as "perceptual concretes" in order to transform concepts into mental entities. This is what enables us to treat concepts as though they were perceptual concretes, without forgetting that they are not, that the words are nearly symbols that are substituted for all of the concrete units in the class.

Abstractions do not happen to man. Man performs abstraction.

ITOE:

"In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of Visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts. Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, ie, that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.  [...]Words transform concepts into (mental) entities; definitions provide them with identity. "

 

Don't forget that "concepts serve as units and are treated epistemologically as if each were a single (mental) concrete—always remembering that metaphysically (i.e., in reality) each unit stands for an unlimited number of actual concretes of a certain kind. " ITOE 

You are treating the  epistemological sense of concepts as though this is a metaphysical status apart from the concretes they are substituted for.

Edited by Plasmatic
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34 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

If finally naming a concept with a word transforms it into a mental entity, how does that make absurd the idea that such entities act? I'm not following you.

It makes absurd the notion that this sense of "mental entity" is a ontological distinction justifying dualism. It makes no sense to say that perceptual concretes must be used in order to treat a concept as a concrete and thats what makes concepts "mental concretes" in a metaphysical sense. Mental entities are epistemic but we can treat them "as if" they were concretes by substituting real concretes in language. We can treat concepts "as if" they were concretes only because we use concretes to symbolize them.

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24 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

To attack the idea of mental causation, don't you need to address the introspective evidence for volition (free will) which I have presented? Do you not experience yourself willing your body to move? What do you think goes on here?

Does an infant require concepts to gain control of their body moves, transitioning from rolling over, to crawling, to walking,...?

I think there is a link between the "mental somethings" and the role philosophy plays in forging the course of one's life. This, however, examines "mental causation" from a different perspective.

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39 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

To attack the idea of mental causation, don't you need to address the introspective evidence for volition (free will) which I have presented? Do you not experience yourself willing your body to move? What do you think goes on here?

Me willing my body to move is directly experienced introspectively and that does nothing for your attached dualism to this process. I am the entity doing the causing.

Edited by Plasmatic
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15 hours ago, Eiuol said:

Only the entity acts, i.e. the whole thing.

I might pick at that statement, but let's assume it to be exactly true for the sake of argument. If indeed only the whole human entity acts, then every part of it must act too, including its consciousness and the products of its consciousness. Otherwise, you must mean that only part of the entity acts.

Perhaps we are not in agreement regarding what is meant by act. I don't mean that a mental entity has a mind of its own and suddenly decides to do this or that action. Nor do I mean that it is physically affecting something else. I mean that it is used by our volitional faculty to cause a change in our body. It is not physical action. It's mental action.

Edited by MisterSwig
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1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

If finally naming a concept with a word transforms it into a mental entity, how does that make absurd the idea that such entities act? I'm not following you.

According to Rand, the last step of concept formation is picking a word. Before that point, it isn't a distinct concept. The content may be perceptual, or conceptual as a series of words, but it isn't a single -thing- and not a distinction. It is not even a mental existent. So, quite literally, you'd be creating some metaphysical substance that isn't physical, from absolutely nothing at all. As if a word were enough to transform this 'nothing' into some substance. That 'nothing' is made up of nothing at all, not even your proposed mentities!

Do keep in mind that Rand said mental entities are metaphorical as far as being entities. Or as Plasmatic said, we treat these as if they were entities. We must remember they are not concretes.

WHY is it that awareness has both introspective and extrospective content? I don't know. It is arbitrary to propose mentities, though, just as proposing "God made it so" is arbitrary. It isn't bizarre or weird to think of inside your head as an experience, and volition as the way your whole self chooses to do something. 

And again, you called mental entities perceivable... You are implicitly proposing a sixth sense, some special and unknown sense organ to perceive mentities that no one in existence can see except you. Unless ESP is real...

As you see, we start to have a subjective notion of reality where some entities exist for you, but not for me. It gets weird.

Edited by Eiuol
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30 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

Me willing my body to move is directly experienced introspectively and that does nothing for your attached dualism to this process. I am the entity doing the causing.

Anything more to add to that? How do you integrate the existence of concepts, thoughts, etc. into your "will to action" view? Why do we even need a nervous system running through our entire body, if all that's required for bodily control is willpower? 

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1 hour ago, Plasmatic said:

It makes absurd the notion that this sense of "mental entity" is a ontological distinction justifying dualism.

Is it dualism if one realm is existentially dependent upon the other, and they interact with each other?

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53 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

And again, you called mental entities perceivable... You are implicitly proposing a sixth sense, some special and unknown sense organ to perceive mentities that no one in existence can see except you.

But I've already described the units of the concept mentity. They are the same units Rand classified as mental entities. Do you not perceive thoughts, concepts, memories, and emotions? I'm not asking you to use my term. I threw it out there hoping to resolve some confusion in the usage of words.

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2 hours ago, dream_weaver said:

Does an infant require concepts to gain control of their body moves, transitioning from rolling over, to crawling, to walking,...?

A human needs concepts to gain volitional control. My guess is that babies move reflexively (and possibly mimetically) until shortly after they learn words. Then it's a combination of reflex, parroting, and choice. But I haven't studied much child development, so I'm probably missing something there.

Rand stated that "volition begins with the first syllogism."

IMG_20161121_150114.jpg

(For the New Intellectual, p. 8)

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2 hours ago, Plasmatic said:

Abstractions do not happen to man. Man performs abstraction.

Interesting. How would you respond to the following refinement...

Only some mental entities can be used causally by us via our volitional faculty. Concepts and memories are probably not causal. Yet certain types of thoughts ("open the door", "pick up the fork", etc.) can be used to affect bodily movements.

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48 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Do you not perceive thoughts, concepts, memories, and emotions? I'm not asking you to use my term. I threw it out there hoping to resolve some confusion in the usage of words.

No - I am aware of mental states, but I don't perceive them. If we are talking about Rand, we know she didn't think conceptual awareness is a form of perception. I see no reason to say she's wrong about that. You seem to call it perception due to awareness of mentities, yet offer no way or means to perceive them. Ask yourself, do you sense mentities as you sense a hamburger in your mouth? If you don't sense them, then what are you doing?

By the way, infants think A LOT prior to their first word. To treat them as empty robots is not warranted. Besides, it's a scientific claim that first requires a proper philosophic definition.

 

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40 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

A human needs concepts to gain volitional control. My guess is that babies move reflexively (and possibly mimetically) until shortly after they learn words. Then it's a combination of reflex, parroting, and choice. But I haven't studied much child development, so I'm probably missing something there.

Rand stated that "volition begins with the first syllogism."

IMG_20161121_150114.jpg

(For the New Intellectual, p. 8)

You went from mental causation to volitional control.

Within the passage cited note that "The process of abstraction, and of concept-formation is a process of reason, of thought: it is not automatic nor instinctive nor involuntary nor infallible." This has to apply to forming the first concept as well.

If abstraction and concept-formation is not involuntary, then to what does "[t]he preconceptual level of consciousness is non-volitional" refer to, since volition begins with the first syllogism?

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4 hours ago, dream_weaver said:

Does an infant require concepts to gain control of their body moves, transitioning from rolling over, to crawling, to walking,...?

Learning to walk, climb stairs, etc. is a goal directed activity on the part of the infant - nurtured by caring adults of course.  Think of how a child is enticed to come to a toy, or a parent with open arms, or chase a dog.  For infants, this is not what would be considered abstract conceptual thinking, concepts come quite a bit later, but it does require a level of thinking on the child's part.

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50 minutes ago, New Buddha said:

Learning to walk, climb stairs, etc. is a goal directed activity on the part of the infant - nurtured by caring adults of course.  Think of how a child is enticed to come to a toy, or a parent with open arms, or chase a dog.  For infants, this is not what would be considered abstract conceptual thinking, concepts come quite a bit later, but it does require a level of thinking on the child's part.

Does learning to walk fall under "mental causation" or "volition (free will) or "volitional control" (which I would want to equate with volitional consciousness, given the accompanying citation)?

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33 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

Does learning to walk fall under "mental causation" or "volition (free will) or "volitional control" (which I would want to equate with volitional consciousness, given the accompanying citation)?

I've posted a link to the following paper in other posts, but some participating in this post may not have see it before.  It falls in line with much of my thoughts regarding the role consciousness/volition plays in organisms.

What is Consciousness For? Lee Pierson and Monroe Trout Copyright © 2005

Abstract: The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we know, no valid theoretical argument that consciousness is needed for any function other than volitional movement and no convincing empirical evidence that consciousness performs any other ultimate function. Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction.

1. Our Hypothesis Our primary hypothesis is: The ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. Consciousness evolved as a platform for volitional attention; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. Volitional movement (including any automatized components) is the sole causal payoff, the “cash value” of volitional attention and thus of all conscious processes. There is no adaptive benefit to being conscious unless it leads to volitional movement. With volition, the organism is better able to direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction. (Neural processes alone, as we shall see, cannot perform this function as effectively as can neural processes combined with consciousness.) Without the adaptive benefits of volitional movement, consciousness would probably never have evolved.

Since the ultimate adaptive purpose of consciousness is to manage volitional motor movement consciousness is properly classified as part of an animal’s motor control system. (Plants do not need consciousness because they are “planted.”) There appear to be two fundamental types of animal movement: automatic and volitional. Although volitional and automatic movements are both implemented by non-conscious neural processes, volitional movements, unlike automatic movements, are initiated consciously. To elaborate on the meaning of our primary hypothesis: 1) Volitional action (i.e., nondeterministic, non-algorithmic, non-automatic, non-random action that is freely-willed in the “libertarian” sense) exists. 2) All conscious organisms, if unimpaired, are capable of some kind of volitional action. 3) Volitional action does not merely require consciousness; it is the raison d’être of consciousness. 4) Conscious organisms can volitionally override some of their neural processes. 5) Non-volitional movements do not require conscious involvement. 6) Consciousness is the top manager of the brain; it does not work on the neural assembly line.

Edited by New Buddha
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I would add to the above, that speech is also a learned, motor-controled activity.  Even when we read silently, or speak/think sub-vocally, we are engaging micro-movements of speech anatomy.

So to is body language and facial expressions, etc.  A child can learn that pointing or grasping for something will result in it's being brought to him.  And later, words such as "Juice!" accomplish the same thing.  All of these involve learned, motor control.

Edited by New Buddha
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26 minutes ago, New Buddha said:

I would add to the above, that speech is also a learned, motor-controled activity.  Even when we read silently, or speak/think sub-vocally, we are engaging micro-movements of speech anatomy. 

Do you think this, and your previous post to this, is the manner in which Miss Rand is using volition as it pertains to what she means where she is discussing volitional consciousness and how it arises with regard to "mental somethings", a.k.a. "mental entities", a.k.a. "concepts"?

Edited by dream_weaver
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47 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

Do you think this, and your previous post to this, is the manner in which Miss Rand is using volition as it pertains to what she means where she is discussing volitional consciousness and how it arises with regard to "mental somethings", a.k.a. "mental entities", a.k.a. "concepts"?

I do agree with the following from ITOE, with one caveat:

"In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of Visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts."

Written language is a fairly new invention among humans (less than 6,000 year old).  And while writing is unique to humans, writing itself, is not necessary for conceptual thought.  Language IS, however.  And, as noted above, speech has a motor-control component - in addition to the visual and auditory.  Body language and facial expressions fall into this as well.  The blind use Braille (touch) and the deaf, sign language.

 

The externalization of writing, along with mathematics, graphs, diagrams, blueprints, mechanics, geometry, etc., allow us to vastly expand our, otherwise, fairly limited, perceptual-based problem solving mechanisms - i.e. our "Crow Epistemology".

I don't know if this answers your question above, however.

 

 

Edited by New Buddha
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3 hours ago, dream_weaver said:

You went from mental causation to volitional control...

If abstraction and concept-formation is not involuntary, then to what does "[t]he preconceptual level of consciousness is non-volitional" refer to, since volition begins with the first syllogism?

I'm thinking that volition is an advanced type of choice. We start as infants with the simple choice to focus or not on external objects. Then later we learn how to think or not about those objects. Then we figure out how to act or not in relation to those objects. That would be volition. At each stage our developing faculty of choice expands our ability to control ourselves and our environment.

Gotta run. I'll return to this when I get back from vacation in a couple days.

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On 11/21/2016 at 11:23 PM, New Buddha said:

I don't know if this answers your question above, however.

It helped to clarify the division between motor-control and volition, as Miss Rand used it in regard to thought. The investigation of the "motor-control" needs to be relegated to biology or a subdivision within, keeping the philosophic consideration of volition separate.

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