Mental Entities and Causality

[New Buddha]

4 hours ago, dream_weaver said:

The investigation of the "motor-control" needs to be relegated to biology or a subdivision within, keeping the philosophic consideration of volition separate.

Why?

[dream_weaver]

1 hour ago, New Buddha said:

Why?

Why not? Philosophically, the law of causality, Rand stated it as: the law of identity applied to action. Philosophically, it doesn't state what the identities of the particulars are, but only that each particular acts in accordance with what its particular identity is.  The nature of inanimate matter is studied by physics, the nature of animate matter is studied by biology.

Edited November 23, 2016 by dream_weaver

[Plasmatic]

This podcast is suspiciously reminiscent of this thread:

swig, are you Steve Patterson?

[Plasmatic]

On November 23, 2016 at 5:05 PM, dream_weaver said:

Philosophically, it doesn't state what the identities of the particulars are, but only that each particular acts in accordance with what its particular identity is.  The nature of inanimate matter is studied by physics, the nature of animate matter is studied by biology.

Except that "they" are entities....

[Eiuol]

2 hours ago, Plasmatic said:

Except that "they" are entities....

Quite literally, Rand directly labels them as a more metaphorical usage of the term mental entity. She used the term to note that they are distinct "somethings" (phenomena of consciousness to use Rand's description earlier of mental entities; phenomena are not concretes). She also says the term "entity" is valid in other usage - if we remember our context. Here entity is okay, if we remember these are not concretes (as you do). I think on page 158 of ITOE or near there. I don't disagree with your positions in this thread, though.

[Plasmatic]

51 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Quite literally, Rand directly labels them as a more metaphorical usage of the term mental entity. She used the term to note that they are distinct "somethings" (phenomena of consciousness to use Rand's description earlier of mental entities; phenomena are not concretes). She also says the term "entity" is valid in other usage - if we remember our context. Here entity is okay, if we remember these are not concretes (as you do). I think on page 158 of ITOE or near there. I don't disagree with your positions in this thread, though.

Louie, I have no idea what you want to say here.  My point to Greg is about causality as a principle being about entities as the cause of action. You responded by reiterating points that I have made in this thread and then saying you don't disagree with me. But the point you are talking about "Rand directly labels them" is not the same subject as my response to Greg involves. The primaries (entities) the principle of causality pertains to are not the "metaphorical" (epistemological) kind I have had cause to admonish you on so many times in past discussions.

What are you talking about?

[Eiuol]

1 hour ago, Plasmatic said:

What are you talking about?

I'm talking about how they (mental entities) -aren't- entities and Rand -says-. If my post doesn't make sense, please let me know which part does not make sense. The topic is about causality. Causality is entity-based. Mental entities are not what cause anything, precisely because they are not entities in a metaphysical sense. They -are- entities in an epistemological sense. I may be confused what your sentence says, I thought you were referring to motor control as an entity or mental content. If not, my bad.

The thread is an offshoot of my thread essentially of me looking to clearly define entity in the metaphysical sense, and if the "universe" might be. I am positive what you admonished me for was primarily a communication issue (I still don't know for sure if you think atoms can be called objects [regardless of if entity and object -must- be synonyms at all times and all usage]).

Edited November 29, 2016 by Eiuol

[StrictlyLogical]

58 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

I'm talking about how they (mental entities) -aren't- entities and Rand -says-. If my post doesn't make sense, please let me know which part does not make sense. The topic is about causality. Causality is entity-based. Mental entities are not what cause anything, precisely because they are not entities in a metaphysical sense. They -are- entities in an epistemological sense. I may be confused what your sentence says, I thought you were referring to motor control as an entity or mental content. If not, my bad.

The thread is an offshoot of my thread essentially of me looking to clearly define entity in the metaphysical sense, and if the "universe" might be. I am positive what you admonished me for was primarily a communication issue (I still don't know for sure if you think atoms can be called objects [regardless of if entity and object -must- be synonyms at all times and all usage]).

Do you make decisions based on information prior to acting?  Can having different information or a mistaken belief affect what conclusions you reach before you do anything?

Does your admiration for a kind of culture or familiarity with a custom affect what restaurant you choose?  Does your memory of what you liked to do eat at a buffet affect your decisions about what you choose to eat the next time you go back?

In what sense do you mean it when you say "mental entities are not what cause anything"?

Why can't you observe a chain of causation in the act of being a cause of your own action? 

Edited November 29, 2016 by StrictlyLogical

[Plasmatic]

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

I'm talking about how they (mental entities) -aren't- entities and Rand -says-

And Since I have made this very point so many times here, why are you saying this to me while also saying you don't disagree?

[Plasmatic]

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

I may be confused what your sentence says, I thought you were referring to motor control as an entity or mental content. If not, my bad

Yes, you must be confused.

[Eiuol]

49 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Do you make decisions based on information prior to acting?  Can having different information or a mistaken belief affect what conclusions you reach before you do anything?

Does your admiration for a kind of culture or familiarity with a custom affect what restaurant you choose?

 

Yes, much in the same way kicking makes a ball move. But the kick is not an entity in the same sense as a ball is. The foot causes the ball to move. I talked about this earlier. That's what I mean; only concrete entities act, their attributes/actions/traits aren't the things "doing". My experiences are part of myself as the entity, but don't act independently or "adhere" to me. I respond to differing information with my integrated body.

Plasmatic, if I'm confused, it's because you didn't say what "they" refers very clearly. Would you clarify? It was a minor nitpick for Swig's sake so he doesn't take it the wrong way, not as a major idea.

[MisterSwig]

After scrutinizing the history of objections on this thread, I will now provide a more comprehensive rebuttal, in an attempt to correct and refine my view of the existence and causality of mental entities. The main objections arrived on three fronts, coming from three different people. I'll address each critic individually.

1. Eiuol's Objections and a Defense of Introspection

Eiuol began by saying, "Mental entities don't exist, as there is nothing in reality that is a non-physical concrete." He subsequently revised his position: "I'd rather only say 'existents' but mental entity is okay, since introspective content is distinct." Having sort of accepted the terminology, he then reaffirmed his objection to mental causation. "The mental realm is real. But it isn't immaterial causality." "To propose a unique mental realm of a unique causality is to reify abstractions, or even to disembody the mind." "There is only one kind of causation, and that this is always reducible to the perceptual level through our sense organs."

Eiuol initially presented several objections, some of which would later be expounded upon by itsjames and Plasmatic. However, I consider his most important position to be that "if volitional causation is not physical, then it's literally unreal." For, if this is true, then mental (non-physical, immaterial) causation is simply impossible, rendering any further discussion pointless.

In rebuttal, I begin, quite seriously, by asking: if volitional causation is physical in nature, how then is volition possible? Isn't physical causation deterministic? How could free will exist without a non-physical type of causation?

To me, introspective evidence for a mental type of causation seems overwhelming. Therefore, to sustain an attack upon it, I imagine that hardened critics will attempt to undermine the validity of introspection itself. Having already agreed that "introspective evidence is distinct," Eiuol later dismissed the suggestion that introspection is a sort of perception. "This isn't perception though, perception is through sense organs." "You are implicitly proposing a sixth sense, some special and unknown sense organ to perceive mentities that no one in existence can see except you." "I am aware of mental states, but I don't perceive them ... do you sense mentities as you sense a hamburger in your mouth?"

If introspection is indeed "awareness without perception," then it's no longer a valid means of human knowledge, since our knowledge of anything real arrives via perception of that which is real. In this way introspection is considered detached from reality, and thus essentially treated as a mystical revelation.

On one hand, Eiuol seemingly reduces the conflict to his unperceived awareness versus mine. Yet on the other hand, he increases the conflict to everybody's awareness versus mine, boldly stating that "no one in existence" can see mental entities except me. Apparently he dropped the earlier shared context that mental entities were distinct; and now he adopts this new context of revealed awareness and rhetorical omniscience, in which he safely reverts back to his original position that mental entities don't exist, since any opponent who appeals to introspection can now be ignored and even ridiculed as a delusional pariah.

Perhaps I'm being ungenerous, and Eiuol does not intend to undermine introspection as a valid means of knowledge. In which case, I offer the following refinement of my view of introspection.

I believe that introspection results from the same reality and the same human nervous system which enables extrospection. Something in reality affects the nerves, which then transmit information, via the nervous system, to our brains for processing into percepts, and ultimately into conceptual knowledge. The important difference, however, is the kind of something in reality which affects the nerves. In extrospection the kind is physical in nature. Light affects the nerves in our eyes. Sound vibrations affect the nerves in our ears. Odors, in our noses. Flavors, on our tongues. And the nerves in our skin are affected by all sorts of physical things, from a cut with a knife to a change in the temperature. Clearly, when it comes to extrospection, our nervous system is a marvelous source of raw information about reality. Why then shouldn't we expect the same sort of amazement when it comes to introspection? Like extrospection, introspection provides direct awareness of something in reality. Only, here, the something happens to be mental in nature. Our brain produces and sustains the mind (mental things), and why shouldn't nerves in the brain be affected by it? And why shouldn't the brain then process this information in a similar manner as data delivered by nerves elsewhere in the body?

Of course, this view raises difficult questions. For example, how can a mental thing (the mind) possibly affect a physical thing (a nerve)? Certainly that is a question to which I have no solid answer. Nevertheless, I offer the above paragraph as suggesting a possible validation for introspection as a rational means of knowledge, rather than merely attacking it as unconnected to perception.

2. The Argument of itsjames and Another Defense of Introspection

After Eiuol presented his initial objections, itsjames submitted his take: "When you call something an 'entity', or even when you say 'content' (as in 'mental content'), you're suggesting that the thing you are talking about is somehow being perceived first, and is identified afterwards. But the point is that the moment you 'perceive' the memories, concepts, etc. in your mind, you know that you are creating them. There is no separation there." "You are only aware of these 'mental entities' so long as you are in the process of creating them ... Hence, they are not entities, because they are not grasped as being independent things." "We are the ones who act, not the mental 'entities' in our heads."

I'm partly sympathetic to this argument, because it contains some points with which I absolutely agree. Yes, I am saying that mental entities are perceived before identified. Yes, I agree that we perceive mental entities only while we are also creating them. And, yes, I even acknowledge that mental entities are not grasped as independent things, if by "independent" it is meant "self-sustaining," since we have already established that mental entities are not physical things.

What I cannot accept, however, is the conclusion that "there is no separation" between the creation and perception of mental entities. Perhaps I am again being ungenerous to my critic, but such a position seems to equate our creating mental entities with our perceiving them, in both a temporal and a spatial sense, as if both actions occur at the exact same time and place in the human brain. It therefore appears to leave no room for any process of introspection whatsoever.

If perception of mental entities is inseparable from the creation of them, then introspection is an empty concept with no meaning and no purpose. It's not even mystical awareness. It's nothing.

I believe that introspection provides a psychological separation between subject and mental object. It is essentially: us experiencing our mental things. Our mental things are created by our brains. They are distinct parts of us. But they are also dependent parts. They depend upon us to create them and sustain their existence. Without introspection, we would lose the ability to distinguish ourselves from our mental creations. And we would therefore be unable to consider the finer interactions between our body and mind. Rather than look closer inward, we would eventually default to a non-introspective view, such as: "We are the ones who act, not the mental 'entities' in our heads." For, without introspection, we would have no means of psychologically separating ourselves from our mental entities: "they are not entities, because they are not grasped as being independent things."

Introspection provides man with the ability to grasp mental things. And by rationally considering these things we determine their specific natures. It is highly problematic (perhaps erroneous) to apply the standard of physical things to the mental realm. But let's consider an analogy. Similar to a speech, a thought is a distinct yet dependent thing. As long as we keep speaking, the speech exists in the physical realm. Likewise, as long as we keep thinking, the thought exists in the mental realm. Neither the speech nor the thought are self-sustaining, independent things. They will dissipate once the force sustaining them stops. Yet, despite all this, they are still things with a particular nature, a nature which allows them to affect other things as part of a causal chain. Our own speech affects our own eardrum, which affects our own cochlea, which affects our own auditory nervous system. Perhaps a similar causal chain exists from our own thoughts to our own nervous actions. Maybe there is a specialized cranial nerve, or set of nerves, whose nature includes being affected by the mental realm. Perhaps this is only imagination. But we will never know the truth if we undermine or abolish the introspective evidence that suggests such possibilities.

Perhaps itsjames does not intend to do away with introspection as a means of knowledge. In which case I have one additional point about the introspective evidence.

The fact that we simultaneously create and perceive mental entities, and are aware of doing it, does not prove that these two actions are inseparable. It simply means that we experience them simultaneously. Consider that when we give a speech, we seemingly create and perceive it simultaneously, because sound waves travel so quickly through the air that we do not notice the infinitesimal amount of time it takes for our voice to reach our ears. It is only through a process of reason that we can separate the two events. Considering the mental example, we could also reason that for a mental something to be perceived, it must first be created, despite our inability to detect any temporal or spatial differences that might be involved. Otherwise, it seems that we would not be talking about perception anymore. We would be talking about something akin to Eioul's position: introspection as awareness without perception.

3. Plasmatic's View of My View and a Closer Look at Concepts

While Eiuol and itsjames objected generally to mental entities and mental causation, Plasmatic focused much of his attack specifically on my understanding of concepts.

"You are dropping the context of the absolute necessity of using words as 'perceptual concretes' in order to transform concepts into mental entities. This is what enables us to treat concepts as though they were perceptual concretes, without forgetting that they are not, that the words are nearly symbols that are substituted for all of the concrete units in the class." "You are treating the epistemological sense of concepts as though this is a metaphysical status apart from the concretes they are substituted for." "There is no 'mental realm' if you intend to mean by that a ontological category apart from concretes ... It follows from swig's view that abstraction is a taking out from the physical into a platonic, spiritual realm."

If Plasmatic is correct, then I am doing something very wrong. I don't want to be in the position of pulling a Platonic, spiritual realm out of the physical one. My intention is not to posit any sort of transcendent realm of perfect Forms. On the contrary, my goal is to describe a dependent realm of fallible, human origination. It is a realm which must be discovered through a process of introspection and rational, scientific consideration. It cannot be understood by remembering a prior life in Form Heaven.

Perhaps I can best answer Plasmatic by attempting to clarify what I mean by a concept as a mental entity. Which is this: a concept is a concrete thing in our mind that, due to its complex mental nature, we cannot retain without the aid of a perceptual, representational symbol, such as a word or picture. I believe my view here is basically consistent with Rand, who explained: "So the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept. And a concept is a mental entity; it cannot be perceived perceptually. That's the role played by words." (ITOE, p. 163)

It's a very particular distinction, and there are seemingly conflicting passages regarding it in ITOE: "Words transform concepts into (mental) entities." (p. 11) And in OPAR: "A concept without a word is at best an ephemeral resolve; a word without a concept is noise." (p. 79) People, including myself, often blur the line between a concept and the symbol representing it. So, to be more precise, when I claim to perceive a concept introspectively, I mean that I'm aware of the symbol representing the concept, similar to how I'm aware of it extrospectively. Only, in the mental realm, I'm silently imagining the symbolic word or picture, instead of seeing them with my eyes or hearing the word with my ears.

Plasmatic insists that: "There is no such thing as a mental concrete. You fundamentally misunderstand the role of words/language as providing concepts with concreteness." But this too misses the subtle distinction that words don't actually provide concepts with concreteness. Remember that we are talking about concretes in relation to abstractions. Abstractions don't exist. But concretes do. And a concept exists in the mind of man, not as an abstraction, but as a real mental integration. It is a mental thing. Words, therefore, are only perceptual concretes symbolizing the mental concretes (concepts).

But even if I'm wrong, and it is the word that ultimately makes a concept an entity, the concept's nature would still be that of a mental concrete, according to Rand. "Prof. D: Now every entity, mental and otherwise, is a concrete existent. AR: That's right." (ITOE, p. 171) So why should we haggle over this terminology, when we could be considering each other's introspective evidence and conclusions about it?

I suspect that Plasmatic and I are working off two different interpretations of what Rand had to say in ITOE. It seems that some of what she wrote about words and concepts in the original work, particularly chapters 2 and 3, needed to be reformulated and clarified in the Appendix. I favor the workshop material, since it came later in Rand's life, and I suggest reading the section titled, "The Role of Words." (p. 163) Though I fear this will be a point of contention between Objectivists for some time to come.

[New Buddha]

Much of the problems in this post are centered around a misunderstanding of causation (whether Mechanics or Metal) and stem people adopting a "folk-lore" understanding of causation - as did Aristotle.  Newton smashed this with his Third-Law of Motion -- and thus freed science from Medieval Scholasticism.

 

1)  Suppose you have two beakers ( A & B ) each containing a chemical compound which, when combined, produce a   substance.  Does it matter if you pour beaker A into B?  Or beaker B into A?

2)  Suppose a cue-ball hits an 8-ball.  Is this any different than if the 8-ball hits a cue ball?

3)  Suppose a cue-stick hits a cue-ball which hits an 8-ball.  Is this any different than if an 8-ball hits a cue-ball which then hits the cue-stick?

4)  Libet assumed that a neuron cell CAUSED a muscle cell to move.  But, per the examples above, he did not grasp that both the neuron and muscle cells were COUPLED.  Each acted in accordance with it's own nature and with Newton's Third Law. 

 

[MisterSwig]

On 11/28/2016 at 10:36 AM, Plasmatic said:

swig, are you Steve Patterson?

I am not this person. Never heard of him until now. I read one of his blog posts just now on free will. He's not even certain if it exists. 

[StrictlyLogical]

7 hours ago, New Buddha said:

Much of the problems in this post are centered around a misunderstanding of causation (whether Mechanics or Metal) and stem people adopting a "folk-lore" understanding of causation - as did Aristotle.  Newton smashed this with his Third-Law of Motion -- and thus freed science from Medieval Scholasticism.

 

1)  Suppose you have two beakers ( A & B ) each containing a chemical compound which, when combined, produce a   substance.  Does it matter if you pour beaker A into B?  Or beaker B into A?

2)  Suppose a cue-ball hits an 8-ball.  Is this any different than if the 8-ball hits a cue ball?

3)  Suppose a cue-stick hits a cue-ball which hits an 8-ball.  Is this any different than if an 8-ball hits a cue-ball which then hits the cue-stick?

4)  Libet assumed that a neuron cell CAUSED a muscle cell to move.  But, per the examples above, he did not grasp that both the neuron and muscle cells were COUPLED.  Each acted in accordance with it's own nature and with Newton's Third Law. 

 

NB

Newton's third law is a law of motion.  You seem to be arguing that all of causation is to be equated with it. Is that true?

If not, your raising it implies at least that you espouse a generalized version of it, something like:

"When two things interact, they affect each other"

This is not the case when two things "interact" indirectly in a chain of causation.

 

A few observations more or less related to the above:

I.  To say "a cue ball hit an 8 ball" is to say that they collided and also that you observe it occurring from the reference frame of the 8-ball, that generally the 8-ball is stationary in relation to the table, which is stationary wtf to the building, the same wrt the surface of the Earth.  There is also the implication, given that we all know that when we are not playing pool, the pool balls come to rest due to friction, and that generally speaking the case that any pool ball moves relative to another is a result of taking some or one of the pool balls (all of which were previously stationary wrt the Earth), and imparting extra momentum to them or it.  The statement "a cue ball hit an 8 ball" conveys the fact that in the collision it was the cue ball which was imparted with the extra momentum prior to the collision.  The statement "he hit the cue ball with the 8 ball" equally conveys the fact, although we know at one time both the 8 ball and the cue ball were stationary wrt the Earth, extra momentum was imparted to the 8 ball first. 

It is one thing to say that the reference frame with which one analyzes the collision does not matter, momentum and energy are conserved (taking all things like sound and heat into account).  It is another to say that statements such as "the cue ball hit the 8 ball" and "the 8 ball hit the cue ball" mean exactly the same thing.  They do not.

II.  To understand that during an interaction where A  B affect each other, and that A causes something about B and that B causes something about A is NOT to misunderstand causation.  B's acting on A does cause the effected changes of/on A, and A's acting on B does cause the effected changes of/on B. 

It is correct to state that the car caused the dog to die.  It is also correct to state the dog's being in the path of the car caused it to slow down a little, and cause the damage to its radiator.

III.  In an indirect chain of causation A can effect B without B affecting A.  This is trivially and obviously true when A interacts with C and a first time, and then C interacts with B at a later time.  It is valid to attribute a causal connection between A and B, A's interaction with C affected C such that C had an interaction with B which affected B.

My shining a flashlight on little leaf imparts energy to the leaf.  The flashlight loses energy when it produces a photon, the photon transfers that energy to the leaf upon absorbtion, but nothing happens to the flashlight when the photon hits the leaf.  The state of the flashlight is the same whether or not the leaf is even there.

The flashlight causes the leaf to absorb more energy, but the leaf causes ABSOLUTELY nothing to happen to the flashlight.

 

 

 

[New Buddha]

SL,

I don't disagree with a single thing you said.  However, the root of Determinism (and the mis-understanding of causation with regards to a "mind vs. body" problem) lies in a folk-lore view of causality, such that that if D "causes" E, then a C must have "caused" D, and a B must have "caused" C, etc. (i.e. leading to an infinite regress).  And, in the other direction, if we could (scare quotes intended) "in theory" know the state of all particles F, G, H, .... etc. then we could "predict" the "future" to an infinite degree of precision.  You are probably familiar with Laplace's Demon:

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes. — Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities

This is a flawed understanding of casualty, not only with regards to Mechanics, but especially when applied to Free Will.  But, it IS a position naively held by many modern day Determinist (such as Dennett).  (And, while we're at it, it lies at the root of Marxism, Centralized Planning, Behaviorism, etc. - all Determinists).

Determinists (since the mid-1800's) have defined Free Will as a violation of conservation of energy/momentum - and thus, a violation of causality.  They define free will along the lines of a pin-ball that can somehow change direction, mid-bounce between two bumpers,  without a "cause".  And, they define living organisms as nothing more than "pin-balls" moving from a state of A to B to C, etc., in a stimulus-bond relationship.  Reacting instead of Acting.  But neither pin-balls, bumpers or living organisms are merely reacting - they are also acting - each in accordance with it's own nature.

As you pointed out, the 8-ball is "at rest" with regards to an Observer - but it is, in fact, on a planet that is rotating about it's axis, which is in orbit about the sun, etc.  For our everyday purposes, we can disregard a great deal of what is happening in the collision. When we model a collision between two billiard balls, each ball has a vertical and horizontal vector - even the ball "at rest" (i.e. it's coefficient of friction is it's horizontal vector).  The axial rotation and orbits are disregarded as having minimal (if not immeasurable) influence on the collision.  So too can we disregard the temperature, elasticity, etc. if both balls are of the same material.  Mechanics does not care which body is in motion.  From a modeling standpoint (but not from an Insurance Adjuster's standpoint), a building "hits" an earthquake, every bit as much as an earthquake "hits" a building.

Living organisms ACT - at both the cellular level and the organism level.  Long before a central nervous system even exists, an embryo's muscles are in motion - twitching and oscillating and distributing fluids, nutrients and oxygen around to promote growth.  Even when you are sitting still or asleep, your muscle cells are still contracting and relaxing.  This even happens to muscle cell in a petri dish.  The same goes for neurons.  Neurons aren't just sitting around, waiting for some stimulus to respond to.  All living cells are acting, constantly, in accordance with their nature.

It is incorrect to discuss "mental entities" as CAUSING muscles to move, without understanding "both sides of the equation", i.e. that the muscles and neurons are coupled.  Neurons don't cause muscles cells to behave like muscle cells anymore than muscles cells cause neurons to behave like neurons.  Believing that neurons cause muscles cells to act leads to a Homunculus (an infinite regress), some form of Cartesian Dualism/Divine Intervention (Occasionalism) or Physical Influx (which leads to Determinism) and violations of the conservation of momentum/energy.

 

Edited December 2, 2016 by New Buddha

[dream_weaver]

4 hours ago, New Buddha said:

However, the root of Determinism (and the mis-understanding of causation with regards to a "mind vs. body" problem) lies in a folk-lore view of causality, such that that if D "causes" E, then a C must have "caused" D, and a B must have "caused" C, etc. (i.e. leading to an infinite regress).

I have an Encyclopedia of the World written in the late 1800's by John Ridpath that has an interesting take on how Greek Mythology was evolved over time from even earlier "folk-lore" or relocated "common-knowledge". I don't know where Ridpath got his analogy, but one example he used was the Greek goddess who ate her children may have been come about from passing knowledge of the Sun rising and evaporating the dew from the grass as people moved from area to area where the dialects differed in the pre-writing era.

The roots of Determinism go back into Greek philosophy. Consider Epicurus reviving and modifying Democritus, one of the earlier atomists views on a mechanistic front, from where the Epicurean Swerve was answer to the Sophist's asking how to explain free-will under such all encompassing mechanism.

[dream_weaver]

23 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

If introspection is indeed "awareness without perception," then it's no longer a valid means of human knowledge, since our knowledge of anything real arrives via perception of that which is real. In this way introspection is considered detached from reality, and thus essentially treated as a mystical revelation.

 Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward—a process of apprehending one's own psychological actions in regard to some existent(s) of the external world, such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc. (ITOE2 p. 29)

The experience of the voice inside one's head is experienced by practically everyone. Consider Helen Keller, exampled in the "Role of Words" appendix.

[P]rior to the time of learning this type of physical symbol [tactile], she was not able to grasp or deal with anything [conceptually], as far as could be observed. Therefore I wouldn't say the symbol has to be auditory or visual.

Tactilely, visually, or the inner (audible) speech is referred to as conceptual awareness.

[C]onceptual awareness is the only type of awareness capable of integrating past, present and future. Sensations are merely an awareness of the present and cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment; percepts are retained and, through automatic memory, provide a certain rudimentary link to the past, but cannot project the future. It is only conceptual awareness that can grasp and hold the total of its experience—extrospectively, the continuity of existence; introspectively, the continuity of consciousness—and thus enable its possessor to project his course long-range.

So before dismissing introspection as mystical revelation, or invoking neurology as a round-about justification, it doesn't require a bolt of lightning out of the blue to introspect for this inner voice. This inner voice utilizes concepts, and you are aware of these thoughts existentially.

As to the content of the inner voice being attached or detached from reality, this is where volition kicks in.

[MisterSwig]

14 hours ago, dream_weaver said:

it doesn't require a bolt of lightning out of the blue to introspect for this inner voice. This inner voice utilizes concepts, and you are aware of these thoughts existentially.

The inner voice uses concepts, if by "concept" you mean the symbols used to represent concepts. When I want to actually think about a specific concept, instead of using it in an automatized way, I usually end up cycling through vague mental images which also represent the concept. Then I can consider those mental images using more words that help redevelop my understanding of the original concept. During this introspective process, I could also try to fix any problems with my understanding by comparing it to reality and other introspective content, such as memories or emotions, and also by evaluating its objectivity.

Note that the inner voice, while usually dominant, is not the only content of introspection. We also are frequently aware of mental images, particularly in the (non-lucid) dream world, which we conceptualize, as mental images, only after the fact. Weirdly, I had a dream last night that a kangaroo was running with a herd of deer. It saw me and charged. Then it flipped me a middle finger and left. This, of course, was experienced as if it were reality, in color, until I woke up and realized that it was only a dream in my mind. I then started immediately recalling and conceptualizing the imaginary events until I lost most of the particulars and couldn't retain them consciously anymore. So the larger plot of that weird dream, especially the initial scenes, was totally forgotten, probably gone for good, because it overwhelmed my conceptual abilities upon waking. I believe that dreams may offer a glimpse into a pre-conceptual existence and how hard (or impossible) it is to form concepts while stuck in a perception-focused state of awareness.

Regarding Helen Keller, she had all of her senses until 19 months of age, according to Wikipedia. And before being taught a tactile language, she learned many home signs, which helped her communicate simple ideas to family members. Whether home signs are symbols for concepts is debatable, I guess. But the larger point, of course, is that conceptual symbols do not need to be auditory or visual in nature. Keller did very well once she learned tactile symbols. Which, I believe, only reinforces my point that a concept is a mental entity in its own right, regardless of the kind of symbol representing it. But the more complex the concept is, the harder it is to retain in memory without a sophisticated system of symbols.

Edited December 3, 2016 by MisterSwig

[StrictlyLogical]

I agree with each of you in one way or another.  You each recognize an aspect of reality which is in a sense true.  Recently I have come to believe a particular integration on the subject which although far from providing all the answers, resolves the apparent contradictions and dichotomies as presented in this thread.  I will try to present a succinct summary of it in due course.

[Eiuol]

Okay Swig, a few points to start off with on my thinking here.

Your recent post isn't evidence of your proposed mentities. The only issue I have is using metaphorical language as if it were a proving a point.  Metaphors are only good for explaining a perspective, not proving one.  For one, no one has LITERAL images or LITERALLY cycles through images like a ViewFinder. Now, yes, there is something going on, and "images" are a common way to talk about a tricky topic, but remember that these are not real pictures or images. No one really knows the total representational or abstract process in detail, yet the images are whatever you want them to be, essentially. As you said, we -conceptualize- these images AS images only after the fact.

For the record, I think dreams are a glimpse into the pre-conceptual world, as something that is neither conception nor perception. Bees for example, are able to remember and retain a mapping of the world around their hive. And that's with a pathetically dumb brain and no concepts!  

I do not deny the causal efficacy of mental states and mental content described as a mental entity. By efficacy, I mean that it makes a difference the sort of information any conscious being has for its action, and that it is analogous to how kicks have a causal efficacy to move a ball. Just because there are no mental literal objects doesn't mean I think nothing mental is happening, or that I am an epiphenomalist.

I deny that there are metaphysically concrete mental entities or mental content made up of a unique substance. Quite literally, you are proposing a form of causality based on extrasensory perception.

Why do I say extrasensory? This is where the disagreement stems from. You've insisted that you -perceive- mentities. I do not know why you do. When people say perception in philosophy, they absolutely do not mean introspection or what one imagines. It refers to sense organs or the process of sensing the world around oneself. Some think perception may be "fooled", but still talk about the external world. To say you perceive mentities is to also say they are external to yourself. But... they aren't. No one ELSE besides you can see the mentities in your head, as we'd expect - thus are not really mentities by your definition. Part of what makes say, a pumpkin, concrete is that others are able to perceive it by some means. To -perceive- mentities would imply that it is (in principle) possible to literally read minds.

Let me pause here for a moment. You seem to find it deeply problematic to label introspection as "awareness without perception." I don't. So I'll rephrase it as "a piece of awareness that is not itself perception". It is an awareness of mental activity and action. It is an active process of analyzing or engaging one's (distinct) mental content. One reason I offer to agree with me is that introspection is not like sensing a hamburger, or the smell of tomato sauce, or how cold it feels outside. To be sure, all of these are awareness. At the same time, awareness is more than noticing some external object.  Awareness is also partly experiential.

Moving on from there... Awareness that isn't perceptual is valid to use as a means to knowledge, as far as the information you get is valid. (Reason is valid too, and it isn't perception.) But awareness is not ITSELF causal. One doesn't create their awareness. One doesn't choose to be aware. In other words, introspection is not causal, nor is perception. Both are passive. The causal, active part is choosing and acting to focus. One manipulates mental content with forms of focus - not awareness.

Does the content need to be ITSELF causal? I don't see why. Does the content need to be ITSELF a metaphysical object? It is more sensible to say it is a type of experience, a characteristic of an entity, just as color is a characteristic but not ITSELF a metaphysical object. This prevents introspection from becoming mystical revelation, and instead it is an entity being aware of itself directly. We'd also be agreeing with Rand that characteristics don't "adhere" to entities.

P.S. The workshop material is good as clarification, as well as to see how Rand talked about ideas that she was perhaps tweaking slowly. Remember though, Rand didn't like to publish her own stuff that she did not edit. The tradeoff with the appendix is that it is raw and only edited for grammar and readability.

P.S.S. See this thread for more on my thoughts related to perception in contrast with processes and states. http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?/topic/29349-rational-recurrence-perceptual-capacities-part-2/

Edited December 4, 2016 by Eiuol

[dream_weaver]

On 11/20/2016 at 11:54 PM, itsjames said:

I think the disagreement Eiuol and I (at least me) have with MisterSwig is not just a matter of the terminology. MisterSwig seems to believe that these "mental entities" are grasped initially as being independent things whose dependence and full nature is discovered later on. I think that these "mental entities" can only be grasped as dependent things, in a sense -- things that we have created, or maybe things that we have done. So, I think the issue lies in how these things are initially grasped.

51 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

I do not deny the causal efficacy of mental states and mental content described as a mental entity. By efficacy, I mean that it makes a difference the sort of information any conscious being has for its action, and that it is analogous to how kicks have a causal efficacy to move a ball. Just because there are no mental literal objects doesn't mean I think nothing mental is happening, or that I am an epiphemalist.

I deny that there are metaphysically concrete mental entities or mental content made up of a unique substance. Quite literally, you are proposing a form of causality based on extrasensory perception.

 

On 12/1/2016 at 9:42 PM, MisterSwig said:

I'm partly sympathetic to this argument, because it contains some points with which I absolutely agree. Yes, I am saying that mental entities are perceived before identified. Yes, I agree that we perceive mental entities only while we are also creating them. And, yes, I even acknowledge that mental entities are not grasped as independent things, if by "independent" it is meant "self-sustaining," since we have already established that mental entities are not physical things.

It is pretty clear that Mr. Swig is not proposing "mentities" as a physical thing.

What intrigues me on this quest (mental entities and causation), is captured in two passages by Miss Rand, and two by Dr. Peikoff.

In chronological order:

Spoiler

You ask whether Atlas Shrugged represents the present or the future. The answer is: both. To be exact, the action of Atlas Shrugged takes place in the near future, about ten years from the time when one reads the book. The philosophical and political trends which are destroying the country in my novel, exist today and dominate our culture. Their practical results have not yet reached the stage portrayed in Atlas Shrugged, but we are moving in that direction. However, a trend can be stopped and changed. History is determined by men's philosophical convictions. It is philosophy that brought the world to its present state, and it is only philosophy that can save it—a philosophy of reason, individualism and capitalism.

The Letters of Ayn Rand The Later Years (1960-1981) [August 24, 1963]

Spoiler

The fact that philosophical ideas, particularly moral philosophy, determine the course of history; the fact that altruism is an evil doctrine aimed at and achieving nothing but destruction; the fact that altruism is the major cause of the disintegration of the modern world; and the fact that altruism is incompatible with capitalism—all these are broad, abstract principles, which many people find it difficult fully to grasp and to concretize in terms of current events.

The Objectivist—August 1969 Books—Poverty Is Where the Money Is, by Shirley Scheibla Reviewed by Ayn Rand

Spoiler

Philosophy determines essentials, not details. If men act on certain principles (and choose not to rethink them), the actors will reach the end result logically inherent in those principles. Philosophy does not, however, determine all the concrete forms a principle can take, or the oscillations within a progression, or the time intervals among its steps. Philosophy determines only the basic direction—and outcome.

In order to grasp the role of philosophy in history, one must be able to think philosophically, i.e., see the forest. Whoever sees it knows that history is not the domain of accident.

Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand Epilogue—The Duel Between Plato And Aristotle

Spoiler

The intellectuals are ignorant of philosophy's role in history—because of philosophy. Having been taught by philosophers for generations that reason is impotent to guide action, they regard the mind and its conclusions as irrelevant to life. Having been taught that philosophy is a game, with no answers to offer, they do not look to it for answers. Having been taught that there is no system to connect ideas and no causality to connect events, they do not look for system or causality, but treat social developments as random, unrelated occurrences. Having been taught that abstractions have no basis in reality, they brush them aside and focus only on concretes, whether of the moment or of the century.

Men who hold such ideas are unable to take ideas seriously. They cannot believe that ideas are the motor of history.

The Ominous Parallels 16 - "A Republic—If You Can Keep It"

History is determined (caused) by men's philosophical convictions.
Philosophical ideas, particularly moral philosophy, determine (cause) the course of history.
Whoever sees the forest, i.e., thinks philosophically, knows that history is not the domain of accident (a-causal).
[Today's] intellectuals are ignorant of philosophy's role in history. They cannot believe that ideas are the motor (mover) of history.

The mental "something"s play a role in this while keeping in mind that

[c]hoice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation.

The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy by Leonard Peikoff

[MisterSwig]

38 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

You've insisted that you -perceive- mentities. I do not know why you do.

Because I'm directly aware of them, and I believe that to be aware of something directly, it must be available to your perceptual capabilities, no matter how or where it exists. A thought or a dream is a product of the brain, and we are aware of these things. So either we are automatically aware of something our brain produces, or we are not automatically aware of it. I believe the latter view. And I'm trying to explain why.

I'm curious to know your answer to my initial question about how free will would be possible if volition were physical causality?

[MisterSwig]

13 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

The mental "something"s play a role in this

I like this connection you make. Philosophical ideas determine history in the sense that volition is a causal force of nature. If people are routinely taught and accept a bad philosophy, then those bad thoughts will be the mental entities that fill their minds and choices, and therefore cause bad actions.

[dream_weaver]

5 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

volition is a causal force of nature

I'm using volition here in the sense as I think Rand uses it when she states that volition begins with the first syllogism.

To address your related question to this asked to Eioul about how free will would be possible if volition were physical causality? Volition, as an axiomatic concept, is akin to consciousness being an axiom.

Whatever the ultimate explanation of biological phenomena—whether life derives from some as yet unknown (but nonmystical) element combining with matter as we now understand it, or from some special combination of known material ingredients—in either case, it will not alter the existence or the identity of a living organism; just as an explanation of consciousness, should such be forthcoming, would not alter its existence or identity. An explanation does not erase the reality it explains. No discovery in physics or biology can erase the difference between the living and the inanimate; no future knowledge can invalidate this knowledge.

Objectivism:The Philosophy of Ayn Rand Chapter 6—Man

Whatever explanation of volition (syllogistically) that should be forthcoming, would neither alter its existence nor identity.