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Mental Entities and Causality

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Eiuol

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22 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

But the whole point is to find a neutral ground from which I can attack the supernatural position. I'm not neutral regarding supernaturalism. I'm neutral regarding the battlefield, which is the mental realm. And the opposition doesn't have to be a supernaturalist either. He could be a materialist or determinist, or whatever other brand of thinkers want to join in the discussion. 

But you are begging the question of the neutrality of the ground when the existence of a causal "realm" itself what is being argued. In this case you want your realm to be assumed as uncontested. It is your concept of this "realm" that is being argued against.

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23 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

It is a formulation uncontrained by proper hierarchy where the metaphysical is separated from the man made so as to keep causal order clear.

Would you mind fleshing out this point a little, please? So I have a better idea of what you mean. Thanks.

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5 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Would you mind fleshing out this point a little, please? So I have a better idea of what you mean. Thanks.

Consciousness is metaphysically given. Concepts are man made.  The directness of conscious awareness is metaphysically given. The method one uses to direct ones consciousness is man made.  You want others to take your method of formulating your introspective content as if it were metaphysically given and offer their own formulations as the same. 

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28 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

But you are begging the question of the neutrality of the ground when the existence of a causal "realm" itself what is being argued.

Ah, then we are not working with the same definitions. The mental realm simply means the mind. You can define it however you want, causal or not, physical or not. That's all part of the debate. I was assuming that, as Objectivists, we agreed that the mind exists, in some manner, and is fundamentally different from the physical. If that's wrong, then let's re-establish our baseline. I don't want my version of the realm to be assumed. I'm trying to make arguments for it.

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28 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Ah, then we are not working with the same definitions. The mental realm simply means the mind. You can define it however you want, causal or not, physical or not. That's all part of the debate. I was assuming that, as Objectivists, we agreed that the mind exists, in some manner, and is fundamentally different from the physical. If that's wrong, then let's re-establish our baseline. I don't want my version of the realm to be assumed. I'm trying to make arguments for it.

Seriously? The majority of this thread is about two different formulations over the ontology of mind. You claim that it is a separate, if dependent, non physical "realm" that "causes" stuff to happen to things..... Everyone else is objecting to your treating consciousness as "fundamentally" "non physical" and as something that causes things on a par with primary entities, as given within Objectivism. I find it hard to believe you aren't aware that this is what others are debating. 

How are you "making arguments for" something you assume others already agree with?????

Edited by Plasmatic
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17 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

I was assuming that, as Objectivists, we agreed that the mind exists, in some manner, and is fundamentally different from the physical.

No. This is wrong.

There are the chemical elements (atoms), electromagnetism, gravity and the strong and weak nuclear forces.  Everything, including consciousness, has to be grounded in these.  There is no evidence to postulate any other "substance" or "realm".

Edited by New Buddha
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26 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

Everyone else is objecting to your treating the "fundamentally" "non physical" nature of consciousness as given in Objectivism.

Even if that's true, it doesn't change the widely accepted understanding of mental realm as meaning that which pertains to the mind.

Since when do Objectivists believe that consciousness is a physical thing? Maybe I'm at the wrong forum.

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5 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Even if that's true, it doesn't change the widely accepted understanding of mental realm as meaning that which pertains to the mind.

Since when do Objectivists believe that consciousness is a physical thing? Maybe I'm at the wrong forum.

Name any place where Rand made a claim that consciousness was non physical.

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28 minutes ago, New Buddha said:

There are the chemical elements (atoms), electromagnetism, gravity and the strong and weak nuclear forces.

Are you saying that nothing can be fundamentally different from anything else, because everything has something in common? If we ever discover the basic, raw stuff of the universe, a rock would still be fundamentally different from water. One is a solid, the other is a liquid.

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8 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:

Are you saying that nothing can be fundamentally different from anything else, because everything has something in common? If we ever discover the basic, raw stuff of the universe, a rock would still be fundamentally different from water. One is a solid, the other is a liquid.

Both rocks and water are composed of chemical elements.  Solid and liquid (and gases) are just different states, relative to temperature.  Rocks are formed under intense pressure and heat, and were at one time in a liquid state.

If this is the base from which you are starting, with regards to science, then it's going to be impossible to bring you up from fermions and bosons to particle physics to chemistry and biology - in no small part because I'm nowhere near an expert in most of the fields that would need to be covered (I have an architectural/engineering background) and it would take a very very long time.

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3 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

Since when do Objectivists believe that consciousness is a physical thing? Maybe I'm at the wrong forum.

It isn't any type -thing-, it is a process akin to how your hand has the capacity to grasp. You can think of consciousness as a characteristic OF a physical thing.

It seems to me your reasoning is like this:

Consciousness is some type of thing. It is not a physical thing. Consciousness is not nothing. Therefore, it is a non-physical type of thing. "Mentities" being metaphysical things follows this reasoning as well.

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1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

It isn't any type -thing-, it is a process akin to how your hand has the capacity to grasp. You can think of consciousness as a characteristic OF a physical thing.

It seems to me your reasoning is like this:

Consciousness is some type of thing. It is not a physical thing. Consciousness is not nothing. Therefore, it is a non-physical type of thing. "Mentities" being metaphysical things follows this reasoning as well.

Eiuol:

Putting your conception of consciousness aside, can you in general give some examples of other "characteristics" of physical things which exhibit no causal consequences whatever?  

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SL, I'll reply to both of your posts directed at me now.

Let me start by clarifying what I mean by physical causality. I am using it as a synonym for entity-based causality, that is, any causal event can be reduced to  entities. In other words, the events are real, but can be taken down to the perceptual level as we would do to validate our concepts. (Some events may be tricky to talk about, e.g. as in Michotte experiments, but that's best saved for later if you want to discuss that https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_jKNlC2YKo). As real as events are, they always the process of two or more entities interacting.

Characteristics are similrly reducible to the perceptual level. Red has no independent existence from entities. Neither does it "adhere" to an entity as if red ITSELF were painted onto entities.

So, I'm not saying mental existents do not matter to us as conscious entities. They are causitive in that context - but are reducible to entities specifically. I only mean to say they are not the "final stop" in the process of reduction. If the mental existents were the "last stop", in principle there is no way for them to interact in or with existence, thereby rendering them supernatural (beyond or above the world as we know it, a Platonic realm). Or, if Swig insists that he isn't going supernatural, he is making a mistake about what reduction is, even for concepts.

Characteristics all work this way. They sure as hell matter to the nature of an entity, its causal nature, they may even change, but cannot and do not exist as causal entities that act upon other entities. It's not the redness of a rose that lets you perceive red, it is the rose that exhibits its nature as -being- red.

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24 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

as in Michotte experiments, but that's best saved for later if you want to discuss that https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_jKNlC2YKo).

Did you know that the video following the above link is a lecture by David Kelley, entitled The Perception of Causality?  

 

Edited by New Buddha
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50 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

Reduction is an action performed by human entities.

Right - I was emphasizing what one would do when analyzing causality. All that ultimately matters is that the entity acts, no matter how complex an event is.

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2 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Process of reduction?  What in reality are you referring to by that?

FYI - We're dealing with a bunch of reductionists. I suggest schooling yourself on the subject before re-entering the arena. There's a great, old article about it in The Objectivist anthology called "Biology Without Consciousness--And Its Consequences" by Robert Efron. I suggest taking the time to read it carefully.

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6 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

FYI - We're dealing with a bunch of reductionists. I suggest schooling yourself on the subject before re-entering the arena. There's a great, old article about it in The Objectivist anthology called "Biology Without Consciousness--And Its Consequences" by Robert Efron. I suggest taking the time to read it carefully.

I generally dismiss the subject of non reducibility or reducibility as a conflation of metaphysics with epistemology, a confusing of the study of nature with nature itself.  I have yet to hear any account which fully integrates what is known, the axiom of identity, and also adheres to Rand's razor.  "Concepts are not to multiplied beyond necessity." And "nor are they to be integrated in disregard of necessity."

I suggest you formulate exactly what in reality you mean to refer to when you speak of "realm" while subjecting it rigorously to Rand's razor for its validation. There is a sense which is valid, you only need to present it persuasively and diplomatically. 

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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I JUST found this, it is very close to the integration I was slowly introducing in this thread.

I have not had the time to analyze it fully but at first glance it seems to state the solution to the so called mind-body problem which I ascribe to:


A Dual-Aspect Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

by Roger E. Bissell (a scholar of Objectivism)

 

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I JUST found this, it is very close to the integration I was slowly introducing in this thread.

I have not had the time to analyze it fully but at first glance it seems to state the solution to the so called mind-body problem which I ascribe to:


A Dual-Aspect Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

by Roger E. Bissell (a scholar of Objectivism)

I have not read the paper thoroughly (let alone analyzed it), but I've read enough to know that there are some... aspects of the Dual-Aspect Approach which appeal to me and my understanding of mind, and others which I think are questionable at least.

Near the end of the paper, Bissell asserts that mind is "inefficacious." While holding consciousness/mind to be "real," whatever that is left to mean (which is how he differentiates his position from that of reductive materialism*), he yet relegates it to the role of impotent observer (of brain processes), without a role to play in causation.

Having excused the mind from volition, one is forced to wonder what Bissell believes this implies for "free will" generally... He writes of this implication:

Quote

What is being questioned here is essentially whether there really is any form of causation operative in living organisms other than action-reaction, mechanistic causation.

Well, yes, this is rather the central question with respect to volition... it is nice to see it acknowledged. But there are no answers forthcoming. Instead Bissell then does some handwaving about "efficient" vs "final causation," meant to imply that free will may be salvaged somehow, being implied by the data. But if the mind is not itself efficacious -- if it does not direct or cause, but merely observes -- then it is hard to source what other "form of causation" Bissell might find in living organisms.

______________________

* "Reductive materialism" being a term Bissell refers to in his essay, so if anyone has any quibbles with his use of that term, they can contact the author.

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28 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

I have not read the paper thoroughly (let alone analyzed it), but I've read enough to know that there are some... aspects of the Dual-Aspect Approach which appeal to me and my understanding of mind, and others which I think are questionable at least.

Near the end of the paper, Bissell asserts that mind is "inefficacious." While holding consciousness/mind to be "real," whatever that is left to mean (which is how he differentiates his position from that of reductive materialism*), he yet relegates it to the role of impotent observer (of brain processes), without a role to play in causation.

Having excused the mind from volition, one is forced to wonder what Bissell believes this implies for "free will" generally... He writes of this implication:

Well, yes, this is rather the central question with respect to volition... it is nice to see it acknowledged. But there are no answers forthcoming. Instead Bissell then does some handwaving about "efficient" vs "final causation," meant to imply that free will may be salvaged somehow, being implied by the data. But if the mind is not itself efficacious -- if it does not direct or cause, but merely observes -- then it is hard to source what other "form of causation" Bissell might find in living organisms.

______________________

* "Reductive materialism" being a term Bissell refers to in his essay, so if anyone has any quibbles with his use of that term, they can contact the author.

I'm not sure you get the point of what is being proposed - I think you are implicitly still thinking in terms of a type of dualism, which like a false dichotomy is being replaced with something else here. 

Bissell is proposing an integration of mind and body but proposing that we can distinguish two aspects of that integrated whole. You are trying to divide the thing itself which has been reintegrated... back into two.

Although he does not state it in so many words, these aspects seem more or less like particular viewpoints of the integrated whole... how it is experienced or appertained.  It's early goings but I will continue to digest this one. 

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10 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

FYI - We're dealing with a bunch of reductionists. I suggest schooling yourself on the subject before re-entering the arena. There's a great, old article about it in The Objectivist anthology called "Biology Without Consciousness--And Its Consequences" by Robert Efron. I suggest taking the time to read it carefully.

I literally explained in my earliest posts in this thread that saying why what I've explained is not reductionism. I made it clear also that by reduction I mean an epistemological process, and that this would indicate how in fact causal action is based on entities - a fact pertaining to metaphysics. A reductionist view would deny that consciousness exists, or say that it is only physical. I explained that consciousness is also experiential, and that is not physical (because that's a characteristic). That the non-physical exists as a characteristic or experience doesn't mean it is an entity, or separable from an entity, or has a causal force that acts on entities on its own.

See the lecture Buddha linked.

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Swig

12 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

FYI - We're dealing with a bunch of reductionists. I suggest schooling yourself on the subject before re-entering the arena. There's a great, old article about it in The Objectivist anthology called "Biology Without Consciousness--And Its Consequences" by Robert Efron. I suggest taking the time to read it carefully.

For the most part Oist usually have a very limited understanding of the general discussion that exist on the topic of The Philosophy of Mind. Ms. Rand herself had a extremely limited conception of " materialism" in that she basically was only referring to what is called an "eliminative reduction". One can be a non-eliminative materialist. 

If you automatically see someone say they are a materialist, or physicalist and assume that means that the mind doesnt exist, [edit: or that the mind is causaly inefficatious] then you have a problem understanding the general subject and the range of differences within this genus.

And in case you didnt know, technically the Objectivist view is a non-eliminative one but nowhere claims that the mind is non-physical.

EDIT:

Its very important that everyone learn the difference between a causal reduction and an eliminative reduction...

Edited by Plasmatic
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