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Mental Entities and Causality

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Eiuol

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49 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I'm not sure you get the point of what is being proposed...

Perhaps not. I have erred before, even unawares, and it is likely that I will again.

49 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Bissell is proposing an integration of mind and body but proposing that we can distinguish two aspects of that integrated whole.

I believe in an integration of mind and body -- that "mind" and "brain" (or "body" more generally) are two aspects of the same entity -- and that we can distinguish between these aspects. But I cannot support this: "...consciousness (or mental processes) and mind are causally inefficacious" (p. 32).

I believe that the mental aspect of one's brain processes is efficacious. That when it appears to us as though we are directing our actions via consciousness, we are. These acts of consciousness are realized via brain processes, and execute in further brain processes, but they are causal, not merely observational or "epiphenomenal."

This is what allows for "final causation": it is the efficacious, causally potent nature of consciousness which allows our brain processes to be goal directed. (And this is why people historically have mistaken many natural processes which appear to be the result of "final causation," such as the structure of the human eye, as proof of some greater consciousness at work.)

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23 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

I think this paper is useful on John Searle's criticism on property dualism theory:

 http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf

Searle attacks a different form of peoperty dualism which is not in part influenced by Objectivism, as Bissell's IS.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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3 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

Perhaps not. I have erred before, even unawares, and it is likely that I will again.

I believe in an integration of mind and body -- that "mind" and "brain" (or "body" more generally) are two aspects of the same entity -- and that we can distinguish between these aspects. But I cannot support this: "...consciousness (or mental processes) and mind are causally inefficacious" (p. 32).

I believe that the mental aspect of one's brain processes is efficacious. That when it appears to us as though we are directing our actions via consciousness, we are. These acts of consciousness are realized via brain processes, and execute in further brain processes, but they are causal, not merely observational or "epiphenomenal."

This is what allows for "final causation": it is the efficacious, causally potent nature of consciousness which allows our brain processes to be goal directed. (And this is why people historically have mistaken many natural processes which appear to be the result of "final causation," such as the structure of the human eye, as proof of some greater consciousness at work.)

Give it a chance... I do not think it is actually as bad as you think...

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7 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Searle attacks a different form of peoperty dualism which is not in part influenced by Objectivism, as Bissell's IS.

Certainly. Nevertheless, the paper provides a very relevant discussion of much the same content Bissell is trying to provide an answer for.

Edited by Plasmatic
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Just now, StrictlyLogical said:

Give it a chance... I do not think it is actually as bad as you think...

LOL, I'm open to argument, I promise. :)

But I can only respond to arguments as they are made, and I can only respond as best as I am able. My current stance is thus, but when I see that I have made some error, I will amend myself accordingly.

So, I did not look up whether Rand had anything to say on the subject of "final causation" before composing my previous reply, but probably I should have. This is from "Causality Versus Duty" (P:WNI):

Quote

In order to make the choices required to achieve his goals, a man needs the constant, automatized awareness of the principle which the anti-concept “duty” has all but obliterated in his mind: the principle of causality—specifically, of Aristotelian final causation (which, in fact, applies only to a conscious being), i.e., the process by which an end determines the means, i.e., the process of choosing a goal and taking the actions necessary to achieve it.

When Rand writes that "final causation...applies only to a conscious being," it seems to me that she also relates such final causation to the phenomenon of consciousness (i.e. that consciousness is causal; that it is efficacious). Though perhaps I mistake her meaning?

But I'll put it to you: do you think this (Rand's quote, or "final causation," or free will) can be reconciled with Biddle's claim that "consciousness (or mental processes) and mind are causally inefficacious"?

I'll further note that I don't believe my arguments overthrow everything Biddle writes in his essay; but I do believe he is mistaken near the end, and that he fails to understand the implications of his claims regarding mind/consciousness being causally inefficacious on the "final causation" he yet finds supported by evidence, and on free will more generally.

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6 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

LOL, I'm open to argument, I promise. :)

But I can only respond to arguments as they are made, and I can only respond as best as I am able. My current stance is thus, but when I see that I have made some error, I will amend myself accordingly.

So, I did not look up whether Rand had anything to say on the subject of "final causation" before composing my previous reply, but probably I should have. This is from "Causality Versus Duty" (P:WNI):

When Rand writes that "final causation...applies only to a conscious being," it seems to me that she also relates such final causation to the phenomenon of consciousness (i.e. that consciousness is causal; that it is efficacious). Though perhaps I mistake her meaning?

But I'll put it to you: do you think this (Rand's quote, or "final causation," or free will) can be reconciled with Biddle's claim that "consciousness (or mental processes) and mind are causally inefficacious"?

I'll further note that I don't believe my arguments overthrow everything Biddle writes in his essay; but I do believe he is mistaken near the end, and that he fails to understand the implications of his claims regarding mind/consciousness being causally inefficacious on the "final causation" he yet finds supported by evidence, and on free will more generally.

Honestly, I do not think you have chewed the substance of his paper long enough nor in enough detail. 

I for one am not going to engage in reckless speculation until I have deeply thought about the paper.

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28 minutes ago, Plasmatic said:

Certainly. Nevertheless, the paper provides a very relevant discussion of much the same content Bissell is trying to provide an answer for.

upon a first impression it would seem what Searle and Bissell point out about reality (to be distinguished from perhaps how they say it and what labels they may use) are very much in agreement... this is a pleasant (tentative) surprise.

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12 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

upon a first impression it would seem what Searle and Bissell point out about reality (to be distinguished from perhaps how they say it and what labels they may use) are very much in agreement... this is a pleasant (tentative) surprise.

Honestly, Ive seen several occasions were Oist seem to be restating Searle without mentioning it....

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1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Honestly, I do not think you have chewed the substance of his paper long enough nor in enough detail.

And yet I stand by what I've written. When you can address my position substantively, I shall of course listen. But until then, I believe that I've chewed the substance of his paper both long enough and in enough detail to reach the conclusions I have, whether they are liable to be undone by further study or not.

1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I for one am not going to engage in reckless speculation until I have deeply thought about the paper.

I don't think anything I've said can be described as "speculative" (reckless or otherwise) and I've certainly not asked you for anything like it. I do not want your reckless speculations: I want your considered opinions. So please do think deeply (and to the best of your ability) -- take whatever time you need -- and when you have, and when you can make a civil reply as to the substance of my critique, I'll be more than happy to consider what you have to say. Perhaps I will even find myself agreeing with you and recanting my earlier statements, which is not something I fear, but invite. I relish the prospect of being proven wrong through patient and friendly reasoning.

___________________________

As to substance, I have now also read the Searle, and I find it susceptible to the same critique. Biddle asserts that consciousness is "real" (in some fashion), though not efficacious, and Searle holds that there is a first-person experience of reality, but that consciousness (of itself) yet has no causal power (its causative power being completely described by its constituent elements: neurons, by name, but also, one supposes, the molecules which comprise the neuron). This amounts to the same thing and portends the same result for volition, which is to say that it does not exist. Both Biddle and Searle may dismiss epiphenomenalism by name, yet the content of their arguments comes to the same end.

When I regard the mind and the brain (or body), I agree that we are looking at two aspects of the same stuff, aspects of one indivisible entity: "mental processes" and "brain processes," in Biddle's terminology, or perhaps "consciousness" and "chemicals." Both Biddle and Searle would criticize the notion that consciousness and chemicals are separable, and rightly so. It is that the chemicals are conscious. But they go too far in asserting that this fact of consciousness (which they both concede) then plays no role in the cause and effect of the chemicals (i.e. that "consciousness [or mental processes] and mind are causally inefficacious").

It is as though positing awareness in a billiard ball which, when struck by the cue ball, "decides" to pocket itself in the corner. This is what "volition" is reduced to, given Biddle and Searle's arguments, and consciousness is merely the billiard ball's (albeit "real" and "irreducible") awareness of its inescapable motions.

Anyone disinclined to accept my analysis is invited to critique it... though certainly I would expect a period of deep thought first. ;)

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4 hours ago, Plasmatic said:

Regarding Efron's paper: "Biology without consciousness"

No one here has argued for eliminating consciousness by reducing it to biology. No one....

I know. Because you're trying to reduce it to physics. I'm done correcting your evasions for the time being. I need a break from this ridiculous thread. Anyone who thinks that Ayn Rand would have taken Dual-Aspect theory seriously is living in a fantasy world. You can look up the quotes yourself where she refers to consciousness as the "soul" and the "mind" and often draws the distinction between matter (material) and consciousness, clearly placing them in separate conceptual categories. True, we may at some point find a common existential unit between the two realms, but that will never change the fact that one is mental in nature and the other is not. I don't care what you call the physical world. It's not the mental one.

And for those struggling with understanding what's wrong with Dual-Aspect theory, here's a clue. It's neo-reductionism dressed up to look like a kind of mind-body integration. But it's main purpose is to further destroy important concepts. In this case it wants to fool you into believing that a process of an entity is actually only an "aspect" of one. In this way the mind (consciousness) becomes a mere "aspect" of the brain. Thus, the mind is reduced to the physical entity level, which reduces it to the science of physics.

Of course, the neo-reductionist gives lip-service to "mental processes," but read more closely and you'll see that he doesn't mean what you think he means. 

"... mental processes are actually mental physical brain processes."

You see, there is this thing called a "brain process," but we can't actually see that "underlying" process. All we can see are the two "forms" of that process (or two "aspects") which manifest themselves as the "physical brain process," which we detect extrospectively, and as the "mental brain process," which we perceive introspectively.

And ya'll are accusing me of being the Platonist?

Once I recover from the shock of Objectivism being infiltrated by reductionism, maybe I'll return to the forum. But I need a little break from this nonsense.

Edited by MisterSwig
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2 hours ago, DonAthos said:

Searle holds that there is a first-person experience of reality, but that consciousness (of itself) yet has no causal power

This is not Searle's position.  From the Searle paper:

What is the difference between consciousness and other phenomena that undergo an ontological reduction on the basis of a causal reduction, phenomena such as colour and solidity? The difference is that consciousness has a first-person ontology; that is, it only exists as experienced by some human or animal, and therefore, it cannot be reduced to something that has a third-person ontology, something that exists independently of experiences. It is as simple as that.

Searle is, as Plamatic notes, critiquing eliminative materialism.  Behaviorism eliminated consciousness - or more accurately - reduced consciousness to only measurable behavior, observable by an "objective" third-party.  The default premise (and flaw) behind this position is that first-party introspection/observation of consciousness must be subjective, and therefore non-scientific.

This is "positivism" which dominated much of the early 20th C. scientific method.

Add Edit:  Searle is not an Objectivist.  So when you read him, you must take into account the broader academic context in which he worked.  He is not writing for Objectivist.  He is critiquing the positions taken by Behaviorists, Quine, Churchland, Dennette, Eccles, Penrose, etc.  So you also need to understand their positions to get the most from Searle.

His well know Chinese Room Experiment was critiquing the Turing Test which essentially takes the position that the "behavior" of an AI program (i.e. being able to fool a person) is what consciousness is.

Edited by New Buddha
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Why do so many equate "physics" with nature?  Even those who purport only to reject reducibility to physics end up rejecting nature... as such.  Those against materialism throw out all material of which nature and everything consists... 

I dare say seems like a sort of infection of the force: "luminous beings are we. Not of this crude matter"

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1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

I know. Because you're trying to reduce it to physics. I'm done correcting your evasions for the time being. I need a break from this ridiculous thread. Anyone who thinks that Ayn Rand would have taken Dual-Aspect theory seriously is living in a fantasy world. You can look up the quotes yourself where she refers to consciousness as the "soul" and the "mind" and often draws the distinction between matter (material) and consciousness, clearly placing them in separate conceptual categories. True, we may at some point find a common existential unit between the two realms, but that will never change the fact that one is mental in nature and the other is not. I don't care what you call the physical world. It's not the mental one.

And for those struggling with understanding what's wrong with Dual-Aspect theory, here's a clue. It's neo-reductionism dressed up to look like a kind of mind-body integration. But it's main purpose is to further destroy important concepts. In this case it wants to fool you into believing that a process of an entity is actually only an "aspect" of one. In this way the mind (consciousness) becomes a mere "aspect" of the brain. Thus, the mind is reduced to the physical entity level, which reduces it to the science of physics.

Of course, the neo-reductionist gives lip-service to "mental processes," but read more closely and you'll see that he doesn't mean what you think he means. 

"... mental processes are actually mental physical brain processes."

You see, there is this thing called a "brain process," but we can't actually see that "underlying" process. All we can see are the two "forms" of that process (or two "aspects") which manifest themselves as the "physical brain process," which we detect extrospectively, and as the "mental brain process," which we perceive introspectively.

And ya'll are accusing me of being the Platonist?

Once I recover from the shock of Objectivism being infiltrated by reductionism, maybe I'll return to the forum. But I need a little break from this nonsense.

What is neo reductionism?  

All integration is attempting is consistency with nature and adherence to the identity of  man as part of existence. 

Is there any sub portion of the natural system which is the conscious person which in structure or function is anything other than itself I.e anything other than in accord with its nature in context?   Is there any level of subdivision right down to the tinyest stuffs where there is any departure of those stuffs from their natures?   Does any part or sub part of man act contrary to its nature?  The fact is, there is only existence, and identity is its nature.  Recognition of this fact and that man is a natural system is not reductionism and certainly not reduction to "physics".

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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57 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Why do so many equate "physics" with nature?  Even those who purport only to reject reducibility to physics end up rejecting nature... as such.  Those against materialism throw out all material of which nature and everything consists... 

I dare say seems like a sort of infection of the force: "luminous beings are we. Not of this crude matter"

Most people have no formal training in physics, so they equate it with Determinism.  This is what I called a "folk-lore" understanding of causation.

Remember, prior to Newton the "official' explanation for why a bullet travels through the air is because Nature abhors a vacuum and that air rushes into the vacuum and "pushes" the bullet.  It wasn't until Newton observed (and mathematized) that when the bullet goes to the left, the gun goes to the right.

The opposite of Free Will is NOT Determinism -- no more so than the opposite of Existence is Non-Existence.

The word Determinism should follow "luminiferous ether" and other such words into the same wastebasket.

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2 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

You can look up the quotes yourself where she refers to consciousness as the "soul" and the "mind" and often draws the distinction between matter (material) and consciousness, clearly placing them in separate conceptual categories.

Right, there is a conceptual distinction and category. That's as far as it goes. To say that that therefore, the mind must exist as an entity that acts on other entities, does not follow. The mental realm is not one of a distinct mental substance (that's what a mentity by your definition is, or else it is literally no thing), and I see no reason to say so. The realm you're thinking of is more like Wonderland, a mental realm with similar impossible misadventures and absurd events, which we perceive through a looking glass.

You seem to get stuck on what perception means in the context of Objectivism as well the meaning of reduction to the perceptual level for concepts, and what Plasmatic deemed causal reduction. So, by now, I think you've strawmanned the position you are arguing against.

And I don't know what's so bad about calling consciousness a characteristic or aspects of an entity. Processes are a characteristic more or less - they are what entities do. I mean, are you saying processes are entities too?

Edited by Eiuol
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Yes indeed. Swig's last response consisted entirely of strawmen. It is clear from his last response that he has not comprehended the actual statements of pretty much anyone in this thread. Rather then address what people actually have said in this thread, he has gone on to insult people with accusations of evasion and make strawman comments about things they have not said. He is one of these Objectivist who thought they knew something about Objectivism but never actually tried to compare this isolated idea to the whole of the Objectivist literature.

To to speak of Rand using the word soul or spiritual and then draw the conclusion that what she meant was similar in some ridiculous way to descartes's view of the soul and substance dualism is preposterous.

Those Objectivist like Craig Biddle who think that consciousness in Objectivism is somehow "non-physical" and that the idea that consciousness is physical is "reductionist" in the only since they know of, which is materialist who eliminate consciousness reductively, will have to deal with statements made by Dr. Peikoff made in front of Ms. Rand in the 76 lectures, like this:

Quote

"Q. In precisely what way are mind and body combined to produce man?


Should science have been seeking an answer to this question for which no good answer can now be given. Or can you give a satisfactory metaphysical answer? 

A "I do not ask such a question. I do not know what is unclear about the relation of mind and body or consciousness and the body. Consciousness is a faculty that we possess under certain conditions. What makes the questioner believe that there is anything to learn about how it is related to the body? Maybe at omniscience all there is to say is that we have a brain and a nervous system and under certain conditions we have the faculty of consciousness. Just as when you have a physical eye and an optical nerve -you have a working apparatus - you have the capacity to see as a result. Now the assumption here is that there has to be some kind of metaphysical glue of an unidentified kind that sticks together mind and body which of course comes from Descartes and completely false premises. I have no knowledge that there is any such thing and that there is therefore any unanswered question."

Edit: Here is another relevant Q and A:

Quote

Question: Is one's consciousness an entity?

My answer would be there are contexts in which you can refer to it as such. It is something. And we speak of consciousness as performing certain processes. But in this primary sense no strictly consciousness is not an entity. It is an attribute of an entity. It is a faculty possessed by certain living organisms.  The entity is the living organism, man."

The Philosophy of Objectivism

Lec 3 143:00

Edited by Plasmatic
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4 hours ago, MisterSwig said:
9 hours ago, Plasmatic said:

Regarding Efron's paper: "Biology without consciousness"

No one here has argued for eliminating consciousness by reducing it to biology. No one....

I know. Because you're trying to reduce it to physics. I'm done correcting your evasions for the time being. 

Lol! I just wanted to point out this little gem of context dropping which led to swig's accusation of evasion. If Efron's paper was titled "Physics without Consciousness" I would have said, " No one here has eliminated consciousness by reducing it to physics". 

Swig clearly demonstrates the inability to think that a reduction of consciousness to the physical can be anything other than an elimination of consciousness. 

Yes, consciousness is instatiated in physical causation AND it exist in a qualitatively first person experience.  That is not an elimination of consciousness any more than saying an animal must posses a physical stomach in order to perform digestion.

To say there is no separate metaphysical stuff called consciousness is not to eliminate it! 

Edited by Plasmatic
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Don said:. 

13 hours ago, DonAthos said:

Having excused the mind from volition, one is forced to wonder what Bissell believes this implies for "free will" generally... He writes of this implication:

Does this sound like Bissell is excusing the mind from volition?

Quote

Thus, upon the currently available psychological, biological and physical evidence, it would seem that man's free will, his capacity to direct his actions as an organism (especially his conscious actions), is a fact. It certainly cannot be dismissed so easily as some are willing and anxious to do. Most importantly, in this context, man's freedom of will is thoroughly compatible with the Dual-Aspect theory of mind. It is not the mind, nor the will, which chooses man's actions. These are merely man's capacity to act mentally and to chcose those actions. The cause of man's actions, according to the Dual-Aspect theory, is man, as a minded, willing organism

I object to his trying to prove free will from the special sciences but he clearly is not rejecting volition. "Man as a minded willing organism"....

Edited by Plasmatic
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7 hours ago, Plasmatic said:

Don said:. 

Does this sound like Bissell is excusing the mind from volition?

I object to his trying to prove free will from the special sciences but he clearly is not rejecting volition. "Man as a minded willing organism"....

Careful, I don't think Bissell is actually trying to "prove" free will, let alone prove it based only on the special sciences.

He is alleging:

1.  The available evidence from science supports a kind of free will (i.e. it does not disprove it).

2.  Therefore, this free will ought not be dismissed as it is by some others.

3.  Dual-Aspect is compatible with free-will.

4.  Free will does not does not choose for a man, it is his ability to choose.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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2 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Careful, I don't think Bissell is actually trying to "prove" free will, let alone prove it based only on the special sciences.

I don't know. When Bissell says (emphasis added) that, "upon the currently available psychological, biological and physical evidence, it would seem that man's free will, his capacity to direct his actions as an organism (especially his conscious actions), is a fact," it seems to amount to a claim that the special sciences prove free will. For those are precisely the grounds upon which he is here saying that "free will...is a fact"; he does not need to use the word "prove" to mean the same thing.

Perhaps he does not understand the impact of his theory on free will, yet wishes to preserve the latter doctrine? Regardless, saying that "man's freedom of will is thoroughly compatible with the Dual-Aspect theory of mind" does not make it so, and I disagree with Bissell that his claim -- that "consciousness (or mental processes) and mind are causally inefficacious" -- is compatible at all (let alone "thoroughly") with volition. It is maybe even understandable why Bissell takes refuge in the special sciences to make his case; for if our introspective experience of ourselves (including every experience of "choosing"), which is "consciousness," is causally inefficacious, then what would be left to make the case for human free will?

When Bissell writes (paraphrased), "My theory is totes compatible with free will, y'all -- so don't even worry!" Still we must be able to analyze, assess, and stand not amazed. He may not understand the impact of his theory on free will, but it falls upon us to do so, if we wish to understand and assess his position.

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2 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Careful, I don't think Bissell is actually trying to "prove" free will, let alone prove it based only on the special sciences.

I have to disagree. His statement clearly says what his view of the facts is "based on".  Besides he is a Kellyist, who believe top down correction of philosophy in principle.

Edit:

The very difference between proof and validation is predicated on the validated facts being self evident. Clearly the special science facts he points to are not a species of the self evident kind.

Edited by Plasmatic
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He clearly is only asserting a "fact" claiming some evidence for it.  This does not amount to claiming that the "fact" has been proven true by virtue specifically of that evidence.  He might be reprimanded for claiming that it is a fact but he may have his own reasons... for example philosophical ones which he knows his opponents (who are swayed more by special sciences) would not likely see as having much weight.

If the motivation and context are not enough I must conclude that we simply must not be reading the same thing.

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