Mental Entities and Causality

[StrictlyLogical]

2 hours ago, DonAthos said:

I don't know. When Bissell says (emphasis added) that, "upon the currently available psychological, biological and physical evidence, it would seem that man's free will, his capacity to direct his actions as an organism (especially his conscious actions), is a fact," it seems to amount to a claim that the special sciences prove free will. For those are precisely the grounds upon which he is here saying that "free will...is a fact"; he does not need to use the word "prove" to mean the same thing.

Perhaps he does not understand the impact of his theory on free will, yet wishes to preserve the latter doctrine? Regardless, saying that "man's freedom of will is thoroughly compatible with the Dual-Aspect theory of mind" does not make it so, and I disagree with Bissell that his claim -- that "consciousness (or mental processes) and mind are causally inefficacious" -- is compatible at all (let alone "thoroughly") with volition. It is maybe even understandable why Bissell takes refuge in the special sciences to make his case; for if our introspective experience of ourselves (including every experience of "choosing"), which is "consciousness," is causally inefficacious, then what would be left to make the case for human free will?

When Bissell writes (paraphrased), "My theory is totes compatible with free will, y'all -- so don't even worry!" Still we must be able to analyze, assess, and stand not amazed. He may not understand the impact of his theory on free will, but it falls upon us to do so, if we wish to understand and assess his position.

Ok Let's get to it:

A.  Is man a part of nature and thoroughly natural?

B.  In principle can man know nature or is nature (or some part of it) unknowable?

C.  Is the mind-body problem a false dichotomy?

D.  Does consciousness reside anywhere other than within man's skull?

E.  Do you agree that what exists in a man's skull is a natural complex system of entities in action, i.e. a complex structure engaged in processes?

Before we proceed can we agree on the natural complex system being a "brain", since "everything that is and happens in his skull" is awkward?

Edited December 6, 2016 by StrictlyLogical

[DonAthos]

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Ok Let's get to it:

By all means.

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

A.  Is man a part of nature and thoroughly natural?

Yes.

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

B.  In principle can man know nature or is nature (or some part of it) unknowable?

Yes, in principle man can know nature.

Is some part of nature unknowable...? I've had conversations with Harrison, for instance, where I've argued that, accounting to volition, man's behavior is not predicable in the fashion that purely mechanical (i.e non-conscious) systems are predictable -- so we can only ever know so much about the future, given our present circumstances. There are perhaps other minutia which we could quibble over, but I'm not certain it would speak to your purposes to try to ferret them out at present.

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

C.  Is the mind-body problem a false dichotomy?

Yes.

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

D.  Does consciousness reside anywhere other than within man's skull?

No.

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

E.  Do you agree that what exists in a man's skull is a natural complex system of entities in action, i.e. a complex structure engaged in processes?

This sounds fine. I know that there are some (for instance, Plasmatic) who have a very formal understanding of what constitutes an "entity" -- and I don't mean that as any criticism (quite the contrary), but only as a caution that I would not trust myself to decide whether a man is a "natural complex system of entities" or a singular entity with parts (which are not strictly entities in themselves) that could yet be regarded separately, or etc.

What I'm trying to say is that this use of language sounds fine to me, so long as it's understood that I cannot swear to their technical accuracy. But I agree with what I take to be the meaning.

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Before we proceed can we agree on the natural complex system being a "brain", since "everything that is and happens in his skull" is awkward?

Yes, that's fine.

[StrictlyLogical]

1 hour ago, DonAthos said:

By all means.

Yes.

Yes, in principle man can know nature.

Is some part of nature unknowable...? I've had conversations with Harrison, for instance, where I've argued that, accounting to volition, man's behavior is not predicable in the fashion that purely mechanical (i.e non-conscious) systems are predictable -- so we can only ever know so much about the future, given our present circumstances. There are perhaps other minutia which we could quibble over, but I'm not certain it would speak to your purposes to try to ferret them out at present.

Yes.

No.

This sounds fine. I know that there are some (for instance, Plasmatic) who have a very formal understanding of what constitutes an "entity" -- and I don't mean that as any criticism (quite the contrary), but only as a caution that I would not trust myself to decide whether a man is a "natural complex system of entities" or a singular entity with parts (which are not strictly entities in themselves) that could yet be regarded separately, or etc.

What I'm trying to say is that this use of language sounds fine to me, so long as it's understood that I cannot swear to their technical accuracy. But I agree with what I take to be the meaning.

Yes, that's fine.

The following are questions regarding a complete and functioning human brain which is at the moment conscious.

A2.  Is the whole of the brain in any way other than what it is?  Is its nature anything other than what its nature is?  Does it "disobey" identity?

B2.  Does the whole brain function in any way other than in accordance with its nature, in accordance with its identity in context?

C2. Is there any metaphysical subportion of the brain, whether complex of simple, large or small, which is in anyway other than what it is?  Which has a nature anything other than what its nature is? Which "disobeys" identity?

D2. Is there any metaphysical subportion of the brain, whether complex of simple, large or small, which funtions in anyway other than in accordance with its nature, in accordance with its identity in context?

E2. Can any single brain be and do what it is and does according to identity and causality, but also be and do something more?

Edited December 7, 2016 by StrictlyLogical

[DonAthos]

28 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

A2.  Is the whole of the brain in any way other than what it is?  Is its nature anything other than what its nature is?  Does it "disobey" identity?

No. (Nothing does.)

28 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

B2.  Does the whole brain function in any way other than in accordance with its nature, in accordance with its identity in context?

No.

28 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

C2. Is there any metaphysical subportion of the brain, whether complex of simple, large or small, which is in anyway other than what it is?  Which has a nature anything other than what its nature is? Which "disobeys" identity?

No.

28 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

D2. Is there any metaphysical subportion of the brain, whether complex of simple, large or small, which funtions in anyway other than in accordance with its nature, in accordance with its identity in context?

No.

28 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

E2. Can any single brain be and do what it is and does according to identity and causality, but also be and do something more?

No.

[Eiuol]

50 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

The following are questions regarding a complete and functioning human brain which is at the moment conscious.

[...]

Aren't these rather trivial? Aren't you just asking if he believes in the law of identity? The topic, after all, is what the nature of the mind is, on an Objectivist forum. So... it doesn't make any point, better to skip to what is under contention. In other words, "A is A" doesn't say what A is or if Don is mistaking A for B.

[dream_weaver]

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

Aren't these rather trivial?

While we are waiting for StrictlyLogical to continue delineating his train of thought here, I was wondering if this post dropped through the crack in all the recent excitement.

[Eiuol]

On 12/4/2016 at 10:52 AM, dream_weaver said:

"Mental entities" is what she directed the metaphorical aspect to. She does go on to point out that it is still a "something" as opposed to a "nothing", with a "mental something" being the nearest to an exact identification.

Yup, I missed this. Yes, absolutely there is a something, though I only take it to mean that it is a recognition of internal events, and those events are something. I think Swig proposes mentities because he doesn't see how it is possible to be aware of an internal state without that state being a whole entity. It's just the fact of the matter we're aware of ourselves.

Based on that, an idea guiding us is the way information is gathered about the world so that our bodies act. It's the process by which the world is grasped so that we "react" to it. Of course, it's more than a reaction, as it includes concept formation and induction. The best way to describe this for now is a metaphor. Combustion guides and gets a car going in a sense, but it's the moving pistons that get the car on its way, the mechanics of the engine go at the same time. Combustion doesn't happen "before" the car moves as much as it happens the exact moment the car starts going even if just for a split second. It just so happens that our combustion includes first-person awareness and choice.

[New Buddha]

So Eiuol,

You started this post.  Any input?  Was anything answered?

[StrictlyLogical]

DA and DW

I'm revisiting the direction I was taking... I initially liked the integration of dual aspect but now I am not so sure that any duality is warranted... not even of aspect.  In any case, thank you for your ideas and patience with my own journey... I have still much to consider.

[dream_weaver]

10 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

DA and DW

I'm revisiting the direction I was taking... I initially liked the integration of dual aspect but now I am not so sure that any duality is warranted... not even of aspect.  In any case, thank you for your ideas and patience with my own journey... I have still much to consider.

Leonard Peikoff, in Chapter 1 of OPAR writes:

Even if, someday, consciousness were to be explained scientifically as a product of physical conditions, this would not alter any observed fact. It would not alter the fact that, given those conditions, the attributes and functions of consciousness are what they are. Nor would it alter the fact that in many respects these attributes and functions are unique; they are different from anything observed in unconscious entities. Nor would it alter the fact that one can discover the conditions of consciousness, as of anything else one seeks to know, only through the exercise of consciousness.

A scientific observation of brain activity transpiring with conscious activity could show the brain is integrally connected to/with consciousness. So what? Positive correlation would be confirmation for what the current evidence points toward, moving the conclusion from probable to certain (albeit, not from personal, first-hand, validation). Meanwhile, the physical activity of the brain that occurs during seeing, hearing, tasting, etc., is not the seeing, hearing, tasting, etc., in the conscious sense, it simply coincides/parallels with it.

From the perspective of consciousness and exercise of reason, an individual would have to use his consciousness to follow the chain(s) of reasoning that leads to such a conclusion in order to validate it.

Spoiler

 

To further complicate matters, consider introducing the dual aspect of listening/hearing to the dual aspect of consciousness/brain activity:

Dory: Oh look! Brain activity.

Marlin: Shush. I'm listening.

Dory: But that's what the brain activity indicates; that you're listening.

Marlin: No. The brain activity indicates that I'm hearing you talking. In order to see what the brain activity of listening looks like, you need to stop talking.

Dory: Oh, I see what you're saying now. (slight pause) Oh look! Brain activity.

Marlin: (Sigh.)

 

 

[StrictlyLogical]

Eliminative materialists claim consciousness is an illusion.  That the apparent duality is solved by repudiating consciousness.

Dualists of all types I think have the converse illusory view that nature itself, including structure function, identity and causality, somehow cannot itself simply be conscious "on its own".  That alongside this neutered "nature" (some narrow and implicit parody of mechanistic materialism) must therefore "exist" something else parallel, over and above, and/or coincidentally with it... and this other stuff, realm, or aspect is where we can place consciousness. 

Reality as a whole is a unity of identities, it simply is.  Entities are their attributes, not parallel to them. This requires a further reconciliation and/or integration for which I do not yet have the solution... but I'm starting to believe that the idea of duality itself must be the illusion because of the way we introspect and extrospect.  But these are different types of things we DO in one reality, not dual "aspects" of reality as such.

 

 

[Eiuol]

14 hours ago, New Buddha said:

So Eiuol,

You started this post.  Any input?  Was anything answered?

It was an offshoot of my "could the universe be an object?" thread, so I wasn't seeking an answer to a question. I split the thread is all.

But, I wanted to talk about it in order to better talk about causality. So, what I gained is more clarification to my own thinking. The value in the thread is that there are lots of thoughts on what -is- the causal nature of the mind. I wasn't at all a dualist in any sense before, so the clarification is in what way body and mind is unified. SL's post most recently sums up well how I see mental causation ought to be framed for discussion.

[New Buddha]

1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

But these are different types of things we DO in one reality, not dual "aspects" of reality as such.

The "dual aspect" which Bissell is writing of is not Dualism in the Cartesian sense of "physical" stuff and "mind" stuff.  From the paper:

This Dual-Aspect theory holds that a so-called mental process, and the physical process of the brain with which it is intimately associated, are not two distinct processes, but rather are two aspects of one and the same brain process. The two aspects of that brain process are the mental aspect and the physical (electro-chemical) aspect.

and this: (formatting is screwed up).

First, the Dual-Aspect theory holds that mental processes are actually certain physical brain processes as we are aware of them introspectively, i.e., that "mental" refers to the fully real, introspectable aspects of those particular physical brain processes. Our awareness of them is the form in which we are aware of certain brain processes introspectively, just as our awareness of the physical aspects is the form in which we are aware of those brain processes extrospectively. It has been the error of reductionists to grant a cognitive monopoly to extrospection.

 

Here, Bissell says much the same thing that Searle says with regards to first-party and third-party ontology.

Edited December 8, 2016 by New Buddha

[StrictlyLogical]

3 hours ago, New Buddha said:

The "dual aspect" which Bissell is writing of is not Dualism in the Cartesian sense of "physical" stuff and "mind" stuff.  From the paper:

This Dual-Aspect theory holds that a so-called mental process, and the physical process of the brain with which it is intimately associated, are not two distinct processes, but rather are two aspects of one and the same brain process. The two aspects of that brain process are the mental aspect and the physical (electro-chemical) aspect.

and this: (formatting is screwed up).

First, the Dual-Aspect theory holds that mental processes are actually certain physical brain processes as we are aware of them introspectively, i.e., that "mental" refers to the fully real, introspectable aspects of those particular physical brain processes. Our awareness of them is the form in which we are aware of certain brain processes introspectively, just as our awareness of the physical aspects is the form in which we are aware of those brain processes extrospectively. It has been the error of reductionists to grant a cognitive monopoly to extrospection.

 

Here, Bissell says much the same thing that Searle says with regards to first-party and third-party ontology.

You quoted me and I feel I need to respond.

What I meant by my statement:

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

But these are different types of things we DO in one reality, not dual "aspects" of reality as such.

I am referring to introspecting and extrospecting.  I'm saying we DO both of these things, but the fact that they are different, use different apparatuses (perceptual versus introspectual?) does not logically entail a dual aspect of metaphysical reality.  I can look though a screen of a futuristic brain scanner and see the processes and structure of myself which make up "listening", I might not identify or understand it fully (I'm not omniscient) but I can perceive is WHAT (part of me) is being and doing the listening, I might turn my attention inward and then introspectively appertain my listening, WHAT I introcieve (as opposed to perceive) is WHAT part of me is being and doing the listening, the forms of the perception through extrospection and the interception? through introspection (there aren't enough words or I do not know them) is different but their object is the exact same thing in reality.  In fact neither the subject nor the object are different when we look at ourselves, only the ROUTE of and the FORM of our self-consideration are different (of course we activate different apparatuses to do so - perceptual and interceptual?). 

This problem reminds me of Rand's criticism of Kant, that in essence his mistake was the conclusion that because we have a form a perception we cannot perceive, because we have a form of knowledge we cannot know.  Of course this is a valid criticism.

Our problem is that because we have two forms of grasping the natural reality which is our existence, we tend to multiply that very existence... because we know through two forms we mistakenly attribute two forms to reality as such.

Edited December 8, 2016 by StrictlyLogical

[New Buddha]

SL,

I believe that in the first part of the paper Bissell is only critiquing the method employed by cognitive science (i.e. eliminative materialism/Behaviorism) in the early and mid part of the 20th C. where ONLY extrospection could be pursued as scientifically "objective".

What I see to be the real weakness in his paper is where, later, he puts forth the "ego" as the "thing" doing the "introspection".  This leads to some variation of the Cartesian Theater of the Mind (see pic below), and an infinite regress.  Maybe this is what you mean by:

5 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

That alongside this neutered "nature" (some narrow and implicit parody of mechanistic materialism) must therefore "exist" something else parallel, over and above, and/or coincidentally with it... and this other stuff, realm, or aspect is where we can place consciousness. 

If so, then I agree with you.

[StrictlyLogical]

2 minutes ago, New Buddha said:

SL,

I believe that in the first part of the paper Bissell is only critiquing the method employed by cognitive science (i.e. eliminative materialism/Behaviorism) in the early and mid part of the 20th C. where ONLY extrospection could be pursued as scientifically "objective".

What I see to be the real weakness in his paper is where, later, he puts forth the "ego" as the "thing" doing the "introspection".  This leads to some variation of the Cartesian Theater of the Mind (see pic below), and an infinite regress.  Maybe this is what you mean by:

If so, then I agree with you.

Agreed. 

Note also one cannot be aware of that very awareness... as soon as we reflect on awareness we have "instantiated" a further awareness.  One must FIRST be aware of a thing, and then one can be aware of the awareness of the thing, and THEN aware of the awareness of the awareness etc. (and soon we will hit the limit akin to a crow epistemology... "what was I aware of being aware of being aware of...?) but it is not like we can set up two mirrors in our mind which create an instantaneous infinite self-reflecting awarenesses...

So introspection IS finite, just like perception and extrospection and hence ALSO not "internally" omniscient.  Looking in does not constitute being infallible, and totally aware of ALL your natural brain structure and activity... it is selective and limited just as looking outward is.

Introspection is just that, intro-spection... it is what you do, and literally a subpart of you observes, introspectively, other subparts of you.  Because of finiteness and identity, it must in some sense be that different things can only be carried out simultaneously (ultimately) by different parts.

As for Ego, IMHO it is not a disembodied mote, or a sizeless, timeless, unity somehow outside of your brain but "somewhere" in your skull.  The ego is a complex functioning subsystem spread across the volume of the brain and across time and it is not the totality of you but only a part of you and how you experience reality.

[StrictlyLogical]

One more weakness of Bissel is identifying consciousness with only a process... this is the root of his identifying it as causally inefficacious.  IF consciousness were a disembodied process which did not cause or entail changes to structure of the brain this might be valid.

BUT as far as I know, no brain simply processes, the way a simple machine as an entity might remain static, and yet be put into motion.  By virtue of the nature of brain processes, chemicals, electrical activity etc, structure actually is changing.  Memories are being stored, areas are flooded with different chemicals and electrical charge densities are shifting, etc. as such his conclusion is unwarranted unless he is ready to accept changes to the structure, position, densities of charge etc. of a complex system of entities is not causally efficacious. 

As far as subdividing various mental activity as intentional versus passive, observational, or experiential, I see no difference in principle why natural structure and processes would for any of these somehow magically abstain from any structural, entity interaction type activity, not for even a small fraction of a second... somehow allowing some particular activity to be causally inefficacious.

In this sense, I agree with DonAthos, consciousness, as a real mental activity, and like all mental activity, is not merely an inefficacious process, but an complex interaction of a functioning system of entities.

 

Sorry for hogging... I'm done for now.

[dream_weaver]

Between this post and this last one, StrictlyLogical, you have me wondering if I'm a closet dualist.

With research done by Jeff Hawkings regarding neural networking, and others who have been able to generate images resembling photos from mapping neural activity, the relationships developed by conscious examination of the activity going on in the brain is seductive to say the least, and rather compelling given the accompanying explanations.

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I am referring to introspecting and extrospecting.  I'm saying we DO both of these things, but the fact that they are different, use different apparatuses (perceptual versus introspectual?) does not logically entail a dual aspect of metaphysical reality.

Introspectual? Neologism? Try cognitive awareness, available only to those equipped with a conceptual consciousness.

[StrictlyLogical]

40 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

Between this post and this last one, StrictlyLogical, you have me wondering if I'm a closet dualist.

With research done by Jeff Hawkings regarding neural networking, and others who have been able to generate images resembling photos from mapping neural activity, the relationships developed by conscious examination of the activity going on in the brain is seductive to say the least, and rather compelling given the accompanying explanations.

Introspectual? Neologism? Try cognitive awareness, available only to those equipped with a conceptual consciousness.

You almost flatter me...:)

I wanted term that was directly symmetrical with "perceptual apparatus".  Alas. 

 

This thread has facilitated important changes to my own views and hence is the most valuable kind of discussion that I can have.  I have gained more because I started on the wrong path. Thank you all!

Edited December 9, 2016 by StrictlyLogical

[dream_weaver]

52 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I wanted term that was directly symmetrical with "perceptual apparatus".  Alas. 

I'd offer up cognitel or cognitol, but it appears they've already been taken.

Edited December 9, 2016 by dream_weaver

[New Buddha]

1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

others who have been able to generate images resembling photos from mapping neural activity,

I remember reading something along this line.  Do you have a link?

I just found this (but haven't read it yet) but thought of you.

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.357.5855&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Many types of thinking, in particular language comprehension, entail the use of mental imagery. Understanding a text on architecture or automobile design seems impossible without mental imagery.

Edited December 9, 2016 by New Buddha

[dream_weaver]

5 minutes ago, New Buddha said:

I remember reading something along this line.  Do you have a link?

I would have to look for it. Usually, though, I run across most of the initial science stuff via https://www.sciencedaily.com/.

 

[dream_weaver]

Here's one such example, New Buddha: Mental picture of others can be seen using fMRI, finds new study

[StrictlyLogical]

Sorry all, I have something else to add that is relevant.

 

Inefficacious Nothing

A claim to any existent with no causal consequences in reality is an assertion of the arbitrary which moreover is equivalent to attempting to assert the existence of "nothing" as a thing possessing identity.

 

Often whenever the subject of the arbitrary comes up in discussions, I am reminded of the extreme version of the illogical assertion of an existent in the absence of evidence:  the illogical assertion of an existent for which there COULD never be evidence.

E.g.  You are having a discussion about God, it turns to a discussion about a spaghetti monster in the sky, soon it turns into a discussion of a polka dot elephant which has no interaction what-so-ever with anything; with no particle, no field, no system, no natural portion or whole of reality "as we know it".  Let me be clear, this is a case not only for which the arbitrary alleged fact HAS no evidence (which is bad enough) it is a case for which the arbitrary alleged fact by definition COULD NEVER cause, produce, or be linked with any evidence for it.  This is the arbitrary, so to say, on a "whole 'nother level". 

In the former case, in the act of dismissing it (at the moment) out of hand, one "could" suspend a sort of "permanent infallible" skepticism, i.e. one could still retain in the back of one's mind that the current dismissal is required on an evidentiary basis, but should the fellow want to speak to you again claiming new evidence, it is not unreasonable to at least agree to hear it.

The complete incoherence of stating something "exists", for which there never could be any evidence is arbitrary not only beyond knowledge, i.e. what you personally know from evidence, but beyond existence, the universe, and everything (I know I don't need three terms for it but it sounds better) for eternity.  It actually borders on straining what it means to exist, not just what can be known from evidence.

If some ghost field, particle, or entity, had no effect on anything at all, what would it mean for it to exist?  The proponent arguing its existence might say well.. it has identity.  But what would that identity consist OF?  Would it have any attributes or properties?  Certainly none that affect reality, so no mass (as reality "knows it"), no position (as reality "knows it"), no charge (as reality "knows it") no color, etc, etc. We would never see any effect of it direct or indirect, and nothing in the universe would be any different whether or not it existed or did not exist... sounds a lot like an instance of "nothing" as an existent.  

A so called identity possessing non-causal attributes or properties making up its so called identity is divorced entirely from existence and might literally as well be nothing.  It's relevance, participation in, and its "being" to reality is exactly the same as nothing.  Using Rand's razor, it IS nothing, it is a zero, it is not an existent.

 

Inefficacious Consciousness

To assert that consciousness is causally inefficacious IS to assert the existence of an arbitrary non existent.  No evidence of it in reality could exist... it would be arbitrary to assert its existence BY DEFINITION.  We ourselves would not be able to know it, observe it, or speak of it, let alone make decisions based on it or say or write about it.

If there were some aspect or existent which was wholly non-casual, it could not affect my actions, as that would be an example of causality in the universe.  It could not affect my memories or my thoughts or my feelings or my knowledge or my intuitions because all of these affect my actions, I DECIDE to ACT BASED on them, and by definition there can be no causal link between its existence and reality.  Whatever non-causal existent it were it simply could not inform any part of my consciousness, and I never would have been able to identify it, think of it, nor speak of it.  It would wholly be of Kant's fictitious noumenal world - that which I know not.

 

By uttering the statement, X is causally inefficacious, one invalidates X as arbitrary and equivalent to "nothing". 

Any object we have thought about and discussed here, caused various glowing screens to light up with various words and sentences. Since we cannot trace the origin of ANY part of this discussion to that which is causally inefficacious, by discussing consciousness, introspection, clearly neither of these is causally inefficacious.

[Edit:  I think we have an instance of the of reaffirmation through denial: here the causal efficacy of ANY existing object under discussion cannot be denied as soon as one purports to discuss it.]

[As a last note "imagination" is real ... and it is causally efficacious... we have ample writings directed to the arbitrary as evidence for that...]

Edited December 9, 2016 by StrictlyLogical

[DonAthos]

I have something to add which is not strictly relevant, but I make no apologies for it.

5 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Sorry all, I have something else to add that is relevant.

There is no need to apologize for participating in a discussion here (even if you'd considered yourself, or declared yourself, quit of it). I've seen this before -- this sense that asking a question or making an argument, or etc., somehow places a burden on the community or others. But that's exactly what the forum is here for; that's why these threads exist; and others participate, to the extent that they do, by choice.

When you add things to our conversation -- and especially relevant things -- it is a benefit you bestow. No apologies for that are necessary or warranted.