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Ontology via Contrast: a proposition concurrent with Objectivism?

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A.C.E.

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Ontology via Contrast is the idea that, at a fundamental level, entities exist entirely through contradistinction within the plenum universe.


This proposition might become clearer if provisionally tacked-on to the three familiar ‘laws of thought’:  


• Law of Identity: A is A
• Law of Non-Contradiction: A is not non-A
• Law of the Excluded Middle: A or non-A 
+
◦ Proposition of Contradistinction: A is A because of non-A 


469934227_AIsA(Equilaterals285x229).gif.a30008ecc1894300caeb55349557aeb7.gif


Strictly speaking it doesn’t belong amongst the three classical ‘laws of thought’ because its validity can’t be judged by axiomatic logic alone, it’s ultimately an empirical issue. It intersects the bounds between metaphysics and physics.  

The basic proposition is that ‘difference’ — perhaps the broadest term possible to describe physical reality — necessitates the hewing-out of both ‘figure’ and ‘ground’ reciprocally. An entity simply ‘is’ on account of its contrast with ‘whatever-it-is-not’ — its delineating surrounds (the rest of the universe too if considered holistically).
This idea implies a further fusing of existence with identity: identity as contrast; existence as contradistinction. There’s no prioritizing of relations over relata entailed here, rather entity/attribute/differentiation would all effectively be the same thing at this fundamental level.    


This proposition would have some profound consequences for the way we conceptualize reality ‘out there’ — but I don’t want to bog this topic down by unravelling those concomitant implications just yet, it would be too premature a digression down that beguiling Rationalist path!

 

  

Main question 
Under an Objectivist remit, could this notion be rejected on metaphysical grounds (thus foreclosing such an enquiry in physics)?


I look forward to your thoughts. 
If anyone does chip in I’m sure to eventually post my responses or follow-up questions here, allowing for a good clear-headed day or so. 


NB, if such a hypothesis already exists within the fields of ontology/mereology/physics, likely with its own established appellation, I haven’t yet come across it (nor anything similar on this forum) and would welcome enlightenment.  

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It is noted that your use of the term "because" implies either causation or implies deductive logical necessity (it could also imply an empirical perception based sort of necessity).

That there ARE a plurality of entities rather than a single entity is self-evident... and it is likely that nothing would be evident or conscious if only a singular undifferentiated and undifferentiable entity existed.. in fact it strains coherent conceptualization to ponder what a universe of a single thing would or could be, but that is because such a thing is a non-existent fiction, which we, being part of a non-fictional reality, are not a part of.  To think about "what if" in that fashion is incoherent and irrational, so I will stick to what it IS for the actual universe.

The actual universe consists of a plurality, it is a fact that there is at least an A AND there is at least an A2 which is not A.  Given this fact, A is not non-A, or A is not A2, is not "because" of anything, A simply IS A, A2 IS A2, and A is not A2.  As such it really is not causation nor any logical necessity linking A is A and A is not non-A... they are separate independent entities and their separate "existences" are separate identifiable facts.

Now, given a universe filled with As, Bs, Cs, and XYZs, it is the task of consciousness to identify what IS and what ARE.  Part of that involves differentiation. In the sense that if some X were really I, j  and k, then in order to identify I,j, and k in X, we have to be able to distinguish them from each other, otherwise we are limited to seeing the amorphous undifferentiated X.

In that sense, discovery that any A is A in a wider context including one of the multitudinous non-As, i.e. the identification of A, requires the ability to distinguish A from those non-As.  This would be impossible if we could not perceive the differences, or if we could not conceptually differentiate them, with use of concepts which integrate those perceptions.

It appears to me ACE is a sort of empirically based sort of necessity.  i.e. We can only identify that A is A because we can identify that A is not non-A.

Those Ghost like neutrinos, particles with travel (almost?) at the speed of light, interact so weakly with matter, and weigh hardly anything at all, are identified through a very complex and indirect method of differentiation... so our knowledge of them depends on much

but their existence is simply a sheer fact of reality.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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Good. 
After my customary week-long maceration, I’ll first address William O, then StrictlyLogical…


William O 
Yes, it’s my own formulation, not seen articulated elsewhere. 
Thanks to your question I started digging around a little deeper. It seems to chime somewhat with Process Philosophy. But not hook, line and sinker — only the notion that process is an essential aspect to ‘being’. Unlike staple Process Philosophy, ‘my’ Contrast Ontology doesn’t regard process as primary. It still views entities as fundamental, yet on an equal footing as process (any process which amounts to reciprocal differentiation in spacial–temporal identity) — two sides of the same coin: two necessary aspects of existence. 

Also, more towards the physics side, similarities might be drawn with Structural Realism, particularly the more recent Ontic Structural Realism. However, like Process Philosophy, OSR appears to aggrandise relations at the expense of relata.


Yet I want to indicate that ‘Ontology via Contrast’ conveys a more (ridiculously) simple account of fundamental reality than the above approaches. These two tentative affiliations are just to provide some footholds, some orientation for further discussion. 

The idea might well feature in other academic guises as yet unknown to me. 


StrictlyLogical 
Regarding Rand’s Razor: is the concept ‘Ontology via Contrast’ integrated in disregard of necessity? 

If it turns out that contrast does indeed have a bearing on existence/identity, then that would be a necessary fact, meriting its own integrated concept. 
As it stands, ‘Ontology via Contrast’ is a mere hypothesis and so the razor just hovers in anticipation I suppose. 
But if it can be shown to be an erroneous concept in some way, then by all means, let’s shave it clean off. 

 


Your second post contained about six points that I’ll address next. 
Then I’ll conclude by offering an even simpler way of thinking about ‘Contrast Ontology’. 

 

1. My choice of term ‘because of’ (A is A because of non-A)  

Good question as much hinges on this. 

By the term I intend “deductive logical necessity”, something akin to ‘A is A as an innate and unavoidable consequence of non-A’. After toying around with various combinations of subordinating conjunctions and verbs, for brevity’s sake I plumped for ‘because of’ (despite the unfortunate implication of hard causation in the billiard ball bumping, sequential sense). 
I’d certainly welcome a less equivocal yet succinct phraseology here.

Anyhow, the GIF in my first post might be a better way of grasping how the black figure A exists because of the surrounding white background (and, crucially, vice versa). 

 

2. “…it could also imply an empirical perception based sort of necessity…”

I’m focusing my attention firmly on “deductive logical necessity”, not on “an empirical perception based sort of necessity”. So it’s the metaphysics/ontology of ‘contrast’ in existence, physical reality ‘out there’ rather than how that GIF interacts with our consciousness that I’m interested in at the moment. Metaphysics (edging towards fundamental physics) rather than epistemology.

 

3. Plurality of entities? 

‘Ontology via Contrast’ doesn’t deny a plurality of entities. 
The non-A might very well be a rich plurality of entities; the Bs, Cs to XYZs of the rest of the universe (and the A itself may likewise be subdivided into a multiplicity of constituent entities on further investigation, by way of the same contrasting part–from–whole method). 

NB, level/scale of analysis plays a decisive role in contextually defining the number of entities: at a macro-level there are relatively few, zooming into a a micro-level a greater plurality tends to emerge.  

 

4. “…it is likely that nothing would be evident or conscious if only a singular undifferentiated and un-differentiable entity existed”

Agreed  — and according to ‘Ontology via Contrast’ such a monistic whole wouldn’t actually ‘be’ anyway — under ‘Contrast Ontology’ existence entails differentiation.
There’s nothing in ‘Ontology via Contrast’ that implies a singular undifferentiated entity, indeed quite the opposite. 


5. “…A simply IS A…” 

A is A — true — but the ‘Ontology via Contrast’ proposition would have a beef with the insistent addition of “simply”. It suggests that A exists independently in too absolute a manner. 
That stance echoes William Thomas & David Kelley’s definition of entity (The Logical Structure of Objectivism, p.25): 

“Entities are existents that exist independently of other existents.” 

The ‘Ontology via Contrast’ proposition would not so much refute that description out-right, but expands it by adding a caveat of contingency: 

Entities are existents that exist inter-dependently of other existents (yet are effectively independent depending on level/scale of analysis). 

Moreover, the effective independence of an entity is earned by passing through objective level/scale contingent thresholds. 

 

6. ‘Ontology via Contrast’ as “empirically based sort of necessity”? 

Yes, contrast is necessary for our consciousness: differentiating ‘things’ out of “the amorphous undifferentiated X” is fundamental for hewing-out our epistemology (including abstractions via contrasts, inferring the existence of “ghost-like neutrinos” and the like). 

However, as I mentioned before, I’m focusing here on metaphysical rather than epistemological ontology: reality ‘out there’ — is it itself hewn-out of reciprocal contrast (at a fundamental level)? 
That’s what I want to bring the discussion back to. 

 


So thank you William O and StrictlyLogical, by answering your questions I have clarified my own thoughts and hopefully addressed your questions semi-adequately at least. In addition I hope I’ve been able to make this notion of ‘Contrast Ontology’ a little less fuddled for everyone. 

 


A simpler way of thinking about ‘Contrast Ontology’ perhaps… 
Objectivist metaphysical axioms: 

Existence, Identity, Consciousness.

 

Under a ‘Contrast Ontology’ purview, these could be re-cast (without necessarily usurping the original axioms): 

Existence = Difference

Identity = Contrast

Consciousness = Differentiation (the process of identification, essentially via contrast)

 

Helpful?

 

 

Main question again… 
Under an Objectivist remit, could ‘Contrast Ontology’ be rejected on metaphysical grounds?


I’ll pen something here again in a few days time, either responding to any issues raised or developing the proposition’s ramifications. 


 

Edited by A.C.E.
Adding a needed ‘of’
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I am getting mixed messages (I think)...

On the one hand you state that the term is a kind of "deductive logical necessity" on the other you state you are "focusing on metaphysical rather than epistemological ontology".  If you understand what Objectivity means to an Objectivist, you will see how this could be confusing: To an Objectivist it cannot be both.  The realm of logic is squarely in epistemology and what is really "out there" (metaphysics) does not include "logical necessity".

 

Note, IF you are speaking of metaphysics, Objectivism holds that things simply are what they are.  It is meaningless to speak of things "necessarily" or "having" to BE.  If it IS it IS.  We do not and could not perceive anything under existence, which "causes" existence to exist.  Such a concept is self-refuting.. as that anything, by its own existence would need something under it, or need to be "under itself".  One must enter a fantasy world of irrationality cut off from perception of reality in order to hold any musings as to "that which causes existence".  Existence IS that which IS and there is no thing under it.  That is the sense and meaning of "simply" in this context.

 

Also, as to your "Existence = Difference", if you understand what we call "stolen concepts", notice that the concept "Difference" presupposes things which exist as well as differences in reality (which also exist) between them.  This is an attempt to formulate/define something based upon something which presupposes it, which is circular.  Equivalently, the formulation tries to deny "existence" as more fundamental than "difference" while relying on the fact (what "difference" actually is) that "existence" is more fundamental than "difference".

 

As for Rand's razor, I cannot as of yet in our discussion discern the proposed concept which would need to be slashed away, nor does there seem to be any phenomena requiring integration of a new concept or anything requiring a new explanation....  

I suppose my retort is:

"Contrasts and differences can be identified BECAUSE "A is A" and "A is not non A" and because we can identify these facts"

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Dear StrictlyLogical, 


Compliments — you have successfully and significantly shifted my way of thinking about ‘Contrast Ontology’ — welcome progress on tricky nitty-gritties, so well done! 


I’ll explain this major shift in the conclusion as I think it is worthy of particular focus. 


You are absolutely right on well-nigh every point, although a degree of misinterpretation as to the ‘Contrast Ontology’ position remains (due in part to my lack of clarity and confusing word choices). If your interpretation had been a genuine reflection of the position, then even these criticisms would have been fully justified. 

 


I derived seven points that I’ll now address in order of occurrence…


1. Mixed message in ‘deductive logical necessity’ 
Sorry, yes this phrase should be consigned to epistemology, it should never arise in discussions around the metaphysics of existence. 

I see why I employed it, I lifted it directly from your first post:

Quote

It is noted that your use of the term ‘because’ implies either causation or implies deductive logical necessity (it could also imply an empirical perception based sort of necessity).


I made the mistake of reproducing that either/or choice in my explanation, selecting the least ‘causation-heavy’ provided phrase, rather than assert my own meticulously metaphysical explication. 


2. The incoherence of terms like ‘necessity’ in metaphysical descriptions 
Yes, sloppiness again I’m afraid. I tinged pure metaphysical definitions with shades of teleology through the unnecessary addition of terms like ‘necessarily’.   


3. Quibble with a preposition like “under”  
You are entirely correct that there is no ‘under’ to existence. 
But ‘Contrast Ontology’ also refutes the conjure of ‘underneath-ness’ (or any preposition suggesting otherness). It stresses correlational parity. It is more of a re-presentation of the natural corollary of identity with existence. 

Perhaps my ‘two sides of the same coin’ analogy prompted double-sidedness rather than the intended image of dynamic unification.  


4. Sometimes “simply” will not do
‘Existence simply is what it is’ — I think this use of the term, which I take to be your use, is fine (and a legitimate retort to those who muddy the waters for unconstructive ends). I view it as a way of emphasizing the straightforwardness of the ostensive stance — all well and good. 

Where the word irks the ear of ‘Contrast Ontology’ is on those occasions in which it is employed to shut-off further analysis of an entity’s possible existential relationship with its wider context. 
For example, whilst gazing at the GIF at the top of this thread, if one insists “black A simply is”, then here it seems one is evading the work done by the surrounding white background which is arguably essential for A’s very existence (both epistemologically and metaphysically).  


5. Stolen concept  
Yes you are quite right, ‘Existence = Difference’ seems set up to be a perfect example of a concept filching.
However, as stated in the parentheses, the concept ‘Difference’ was not introduced in order to usurp ‘Existence’ as axiom. So I plead ‘not guilty’ to statutory theft as such; it is more akin to ‘Existence’ allowing ‘Difference’ into sharing the same glorious throne — although that picture did trouble me, leading to the conclusion at the end of this post.  

Anyway, it was a deliberately provocative formula. The presuppositional circularity is easily exposed when written down in this over-simplified way. 
I certainly won’t be using that exact ‘Existence = Difference’ formulation again. 


6. Discerning the concept and assessing its conformity to facts (prior to any razoring) 
The proposed ‘Contrast Ontology’ concept, loosely stated, is the hypothesis that ‘being different’ has something essential to do with ‘being itself’ (at some fundamental physical level).  

There is no conclusive evidence. As with the other great cosmological conundrums, it might be beyond empirical provability. 
Nonetheless, there is an array of allusions in a variety of fields that point suggestively in its direction. Here is my cursory hotchpotch…


Evidence from our own senses
My GIF shows reciprocal figure/ground dynamics. 
Granted that this experience of flipping As is an epistemological illustration, but there’s a real metaphysical question about the degree to which these contrasting spaces mutually define each other. 
Am I alone in finding that the GIF (along with Rubin’s vases, etc.) ushers me into an expedient frame of mind, wondering whether such a ‘creative trick’ might have some deeper bearing on fundamental physical formation? 


Reality suggests complexity from simplicity
The sciences across the board tend to reveal complex systems as being derived from ridiculously simple yet well-arranged constituent parts, to an extent that makes the adage ‘more than the sum of its parts’ ring true. 
It looks like ‘Contrast Ontology’ represents the most (ridiculously) simple description possible of ‘thingness’ at the most fundamental level of physics. 
Might its very simplicity help bolster, rather than work against its candidacy as feasible hypothesis?  


Fundamental physics and the correct balance between holistic and atomistic explanations
Without seeking to negate atomic theory nor embrace mystic holism, real progress in physics has tended to come from integration (to echo The DIM Hypothesis); investigating how apparently diverse existents actually hang together into a larger whole.
Perhaps ‘Contrast Ontology’ requires more of a holistic than atomistic conceptualization, or rather any atomistic part will/has/had an essential relationship with ‘what-it-is-not’. 
Might its very integrated-ness help rather than hinder its candidacy?  


A better mathematical fit with facts about the world:  
Mereology is the mathematical organizing of reality into parts and wholes and seems to mirror reality more authentically as a categorizing methodology than Set Theory. ‘Contrast Ontology’ sits well with mereology, as it itself is all about wholes forming parts and parts forming wholes. 


Information theory
The idea that information is mathematical, probabilistic, can be conveyed most simply by bits and bytes. These 0s/1s are essentially binary oppositions — it all works via ontological contrast. 


Neuroscience of predictive processing
The ideas of information theory transposed to the brain; the on/off firing patterns of neural circuitry and associated prediction errors  — essentially based on ontological on/off contrasts (where non-firing carries just as much potential meaning as firing). All just differences that make a difference. 


It’s neat
It's worth saying that ‘Contrast Ontology’ is economical, there’s no extra complications, it has elegance. 
Also — if there’s some grain of truth to it — it promises to shed light on a sweep of cosmological conundrums.

(non of this is proof of course, just presenting a favorable picture)

 


7. StrictlyLogical’s “final retort”  

Quote

Contrasts and differences can be identified BECAUSE ‘A is A’ and ‘A is not non-A’ and because we can identify these facts.

 

Nothing at all wrong with that. 

(Man’s own ability to identify these facts, although neither here nor there regarding the primacy of existence, does describes our epistemological relationship true enough.)


However, a zealous strain of ‘Contrast Ontology’ would deem this expression as only half-right, as not spelling out the whole story, as being too one-way. To the contrary it would embrace circularity, ensuring that there was a dynamic two-way formation (dare I say ‘dialectic’) between entity A and its contrast with not-A. 

But on reflection, this strong incarnation of ‘Contrast Ontology’ can’t hold without some sort of Platonic realm of transient, unattached ‘difference/contrast’ existing apart from things. 

 

 

Provisional conclusion 
I now think my major mistake was in coupling ‘Contrast Ontology’ to the axiom of Existence. 

Existence itself ought to be left well alone. 

Instead, if this proposition attaches itself to the axiom of Identity, it immediately seems far more reasonable I think: ‘Contrast Ontology’ as offering a ‘basic mechanics’ of Identity. 


Objectivism does stress an equivalence between these two axioms: “Existence is Identity” — yet they remain separate concepts for a reason. Identity is where the action takes place so to speak, Existence ‘simply’ is.

 


At this juncture I would like to return to a thought that StrictlyLogical’s initial post brought up. This might get to the crux of the issue, yet via an indirect route… 

Quote

That there ARE a plurality of entities rather than a single entity is self-evident… and it is likely that nothing would be evident or conscious if only a singular undifferentiated and undifferentiable entity exited. in fact it strains coherent conceptualization to ponder what a universe of a single thing would or could be…

 
Agreed, ‘Contrast Ontology’ views such an undifferentiated monistic whole as unable to ‘acquire’ identity because there is an implicit lack of externality/internality through which to be contrasted with. 

Existence is concomitant with Identity — the latter entailing ‘difference of some sort’ according to ‘Contrast Ontology’ (version 2.0).

 

 

Main question again for all (re-tweaked)… 
Could ‘Contrast Ontology’ (apropos the axiom of Identity) be rejected on metaphysical grounds under an Objectivist remit?

 

+ Thanks for reading through this longish reply. 


 

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I've read through your response and I must admit I am still at a loss to even grasp what you are proposing.  It is as thought the concept itself, when thrown at my brain simply does not stick...

I will address some more specifics of your post farther below and offer more commentary but first I want to hone in on your latest reformulation:

8 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

The proposed ‘Contrast Ontology’ concept, loosely stated, is the hypothesis that ‘being different’ has something essential to do with ‘being itself’ (at some fundamental physical level).  

First, "being itself" is somewhat of a redundancy.  I do not mean to be facetious and I know similar sounding statements are often made, but observe that "being" cannot mean anything other than "Its being what it is".  To "Be" other than itself is ab initio a contradiction, "self" is inherent in the term "be".  Only once one has followed the road down some kind of floating abstract insanity could one entertain anything being, anything other than what it is... its being IS its Is. lol.

Observe also that a thing "being different" is only a fragment, whose completion is a thing "being different from something else"...Now observe that the something else, its attributes, properties, and the sheer fact that the something else IS, has nothing to do with the sheer fact that the thing IS.  No thing borrows its IS-ness from anything else, at least not entities.  Some existents have properties or attributes which are inseparable from the entities, which do not exist apart from the entities but are distinguishable as properties.  An electron's charge and mass for example go along with the electron in a paired fashion, but it would be a leap to claim the electron creates its properties... (this leads to all sorts of detached philosophizing like conjecturing abut entities without any properties)... its better to say (and I believe Rand says something similar to this) things are their attributes.

Differences, assuming they are perceivable, are what allow us to see the fact that the thing and the something else are not one and the same, but what you mean by "has something essential to do with" is nebulous and elusive, and my Spidey senses are tingling at the term "essential".

I really think you have to nail down just exactly what you are trying to say.  Is it about metaphysics?  Is it about perception?  It is about concept formation? What exactly is it THAT you are claiming?

8 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

Evidence from our own senses
My GIF shows reciprocal figure/ground dynamics. 
Granted that this experience of flipping As is an epistemological illustration, but there’s a real metaphysical question about the degree to which these contrasting spaces mutually define each other. 
Am I alone in finding that the GIF (along with Rubin’s vases, etc.) ushers me into an expedient frame of mind, wondering whether such a ‘creative trick’ might have some deeper bearing on fundamental physical formation? 

In this particular example one might state that each pixel in the screen is set to a different color which forms a pattern, a number of them together are black while another are group is white.  Each pixel is driven separately to display its own color.  What you see looks as though a group of pixels affect another group but that is not what is happening (I know you know this). 

I tried to go through your other points but I am at a loss to analyze them in the context of your idea because I cannot form the concept in my mind.

 

Are you talking about how we perceive things?

Are you talking about how things interact?  Sometimes A and B interact and they are each affected by the other in ways which conserve certain physical quantities but which might redistribute them... A solid object displaces water... defines the shape of the water ...?

Are you drawing a distinction between a thing and its absence, rather than between a thing and some other thing?

Are you stating that it is incoherent to try to conceive of two things being exactly the same in every respect? (i.e. what then would be the justification of trying to claim that there ARE two things)...

 

 

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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On 9/28/2018 at 4:00 AM, A.C.E. said:


469934227_AIsA(Equilaterals285x229).gif.a30008ecc1894300caeb55349557aeb7.gif

 

On 10/13/2018 at 6:40 AM, A.C.E. said:

Evidence from our own senses
My GIF shows reciprocal figure/ground dynamics. 
Granted that this experience of flipping As is an epistemological illustration, but there’s a real metaphysical question about the degree to which these contrasting spaces mutually define each other. 
Am I alone in finding that the GIF (along with Rubin’s vases, etc.) ushers me into an expedient frame of mind, wondering whether such a ‘creative trick’ might have some deeper bearing on fundamental physical formation? 

Yes, here you are alone.   

There are not even any 'A' figures there, just pixels.  The 'A's are constructs of our visual apparatus.  Your mistake is just naively accepting that what is seen is what exists, forgetting that the visual sense exists and has its own identity.  

As far as ontology goes, yes it is true that the bare fact one thing exists and another thing exists requires and implies some difference or contrast must exist between them or they would not be two separate things but the same thing.  That tells us nothing about why that difference exists, or why that particular difference and not another.  

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Thanks StrictlyLogical

Thanks Grames 

 

I’ve obviously made a dog’s dinner of presenting this ‘Contrast Ontology’ bumf haven’t I! 
That’s a pity because I think it contains a core contention for metaphysics at its breach into ‘the ultimate constituents’ of physics. 

 

In this fourth post I’ll focus on setting out what I mean by ‘Ontology via Contrast’ by running through a few pressing questions. 
Then I’ll address Grames and StrictlyLogical’s specific points — all legit concerns. 

 

 

Q: What’s the focus of ‘Ontology via Contrast’?
A: Just the metaphysics–physics of existence/identity.
 

In ‘Contrast Ontology’ we are entirely in ‘blind’ Metaphysics-land; more precisely, on the boarder between the logic of ‘what is allowed’ and nudging fundamental theoretical physics. 

So please disregard all mention of the conscious/epistemological/perceptual/identification side of things for now. 

NB, here it would be amiss of me not to mention that there is a kind of ‘Contrast Ontology’ at work at the heart of the ‘consciousness side’ too, but that is best parked for now, a topic pencilled-in for a later date.

It now looks like a misjudgment to have posted that flipping GIF as it seems to have only added confusion around that very issue, and I can now see why (more on that later).

 

 

Q: So what the heck is ‘Contrast Ontology’?  
A: It is a hypothesis that posits the reciprocal nature of identity (at a fundamental physical level).
 

Premise: there is a fundamental level where the identity of an entity effectively becomes entirely contextual. 


By fundamental level I’m thinking about a sub-sub-subatomic scale, way below the complexities of the Standard Model, towards an ever-simpler integration of forces/particles/waves.* 

By identity I’m using the standard Objectivist bundle: an entity’s characteristics; its attributes, actions, relations). 

By contextual I mean reciprocally inter-dependent on the identity of its spacial/temporal surroundings.

 

* That already assumes a lot that we don’t know, but please bear with me as ‘ever-simpler integration’ is not a premise for ‘Contrast Ontology’, more like scene-setting. After all, reality may turn out to be fractal-like in the sense that complexities could emerge at all scales, no matter how infinitesimal. Furthermore, ‘Contrast Ontology’ might be at work to some extent at scales, after all everything has an outside which effectively delineates it. 

 


More scene-setting for this supposed ‘fundamental physical level’… 
This is to help conjure up ‘Contrast Ontology’ in action. 
If I’m successful you will at least get the rudimentary concept — either to ‘raise up’ or ‘razor off’ as seems fit. 


Obviously this fundamental level is a wholly different realm to what we are used to; no ‘light’ as we know it, no ‘dark’ too, no temperature, no sounds, etc. Realize that we can only picture it circuitously. It’s an odd realm, but not illogical. 

Whilst down at this imperceptible micro-scale, let’s take the opportunity to expunge one common misconception: discrete particles in a void. 
Objectivism, following Aristotle, does a fine job of logically discounting the existence of an absolute void. However, its innate partner-in-crime has the knack of lingering around: the notion of an absolutely independent and irreducible physical particle. Note that this is not the same thing as a metaphysical ‘entity’ which is a context-relative category (dependent on apt level/scale of analysis).  

The notion of a continuous plenum helps resolve this, packing-in ‘particles without a gap’ so to speak — the universe as ‘lumpy porridge’ (rather than envisaging lone ‘spheres of discrete something-ness’ moving around a background of ‘nothing-ness’ (1s and 0s).  

 

What is the structure/mechanism of this lumpy porridge when zooming-in? 

On closer inspection we must jettison the charming porridge analogy of solider versus more liquified parts (<1s to >0). Basic reality seems constituted by simpler yet more thoroughgoing differences, something rather akin to electromagnetic positive and negative charge (+1s versus −1s) — but perhaps far simpler than that. 

Whatever is the structure/mechanism of the micro-scale it is way beyond our current knowledge, but at least this conceit allows us entertain the more fertile notion of each part acting dynamically; as attraction against repulsion or energy resisting entropy — of interactions and (ex-)changes. 

Furthermore, we might specify this interacting structure as ‘a field of competing forces’ rather than ‘solid particles’. This doesn’t mean that different forces are any less deserving of the term entity. After all, any force which is forcible enough to preclude other neighboring forces from encroaching on its threshold ‘bounds’ is being/acting as an entity. By simply doing so it delineates its difference against externality. 


I have just tried to pour a lumpy yet zesty porridge made up of dynamically interacting forces into your mind — is it sticking a bit?
If it’s just slopping about, here’s a supplementary thought experiment that might help get there…


What if the ‘fundamental level’ is where an entity effectively ‘has’ a single characteristic (to borrow a term from mereology, such an entity might be called a ‘simple’)?

 

Now are you closer to envisioning a circumscription of identity via an external contrast?


NB, this is not a necessary premise for ‘Contrast Ontology’. Such ‘simples’ might not exist, but it does he me in imagining the mechanics, where some characteristics (like the aforementioned positive/negative charge) can be reciprocally ‘exchanged’ between entities, or at least change another entity’s character. 
‘Contrast Ontology’ does presuppose that to be possible. Consequently the fundamental level could be seen as being constituted by entities undergoing ‘requited property fluctuations’, arguably transfiguring identities. As ontology pertains to identity as much as entity, it is this reciprocal activity that I would point to as a prime example of ‘Contrast Ontology’ — a pity it’s not possible to actually witness. 

 

 

Crystal clear or still as murky as mud? 
Food for thought or utter Rationalist rot?

It’s not easy to get across so do let me know if it requires further explanation. 

 

 

Q: Back to Earth — Where did the ‘Contrast Ontology’ concept come from?  
A: From an assortment of inferences (Objectivism obliquely included).
  

As I said in my reply to William O, it probably already exists elsewhere in physics/philosophy, with its own technical appellation. I’d welcome any pointers on that front from anyone here. 

In my previous post I listed some of these allusions from science, maths, information theory, etc.
Here it might be more fruitful to show hints towards it from within an Objectivist text. 

A particularly intriguing source has been the Appendix to Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (second edition) and those Epistemology Workshops that Rand conducted from 1969–1971 with an alphabet soup of professors. This is a gem for understanding Rand’s perspective on the borderlands between metaphysics and fundamental physics, although it leaves some answers tantalizingly hazy.  
Here is an exchange under the subheading “Properties of the Ultimate Constituents” which whet my appetite, skirting the issue. Rand has just been talking about how “the ultimate stuff” cannot be action divorced from entity…


Prof. B: So you are saying that the ultimate constituents need not be particles, like solid balls, but whatever they are, one is not to refer to them as being actions without entities.

AR: Exactly. And I was also objecting to your saying they will have to have extension, for instance, or shape. We can’t claim that.

Prof. F: But suppose we agree that whatever they are, they will have identity—they will be what they are and so on. But mustn’t we also say something else: that we cannot define this identity solely in terms of their relationship to other objects?
For instance, suppose that one of the ultimate properties of an entity is charge. Suppose you couldn’t find any way of defining “charge” except in relationship to other entities. Now wouldn’t that be grounds, metaphysically, for saying therefore charge is not an ultimate property of matter?

AR: I am not sure I even understand the logic. Why?

Prof. E: Presumably he would argue that a property which is defined in terms of a relationship between two entities presupposes and is a consequence of the attributes of that entity which give rise to that relationship. And therefore, if charge is definable only in terms of an entity’s relation to others—its effects on them—then charge couldn’t be a primary, it would have to be a derivative from something else in the entity that gives rise to that kind of effect.

Prof. F: Thank you. That’s exactly what I meant.

Prof. E: But then we are in bad shape here, because to grasp what the ultimate entities are, you have to strip off their actions, their potentialities for action, and their relations to other entities—then by what means would you ever get to know what they are?

AR: Not only that, you are obviously making advance conditions for what that primary has to be. You are being Hegelian or Rationalistic in that sense. You cannot say philosophically what conditions you will ascribe to that which is not known. We cannot know by what means we will grasp something not known today.  
[…]
You see it isn’t the job of philosophy to tell us what exists, it’s only to tell us what has to be true of everything that exists [identity] and what are the rules by which you can claim knowledge. And in regard to the constituent elements of the universe, all we can say is that they would have to have identity. That we can prove. Any other conclusions we cannot draw philosophically.

Prof. F: So then philosophy should leave open the possibility that the ultimate properties of things are relational properties?

AR: No, because you are using a term from our present level of knowledge. “Relational properties” are what? Properties arising out of the relation of two entities. In calling something a relational property, you are implying the existence of entities. But now if you say the ultimate particles or elements will be defined as relational, what does that mean? You are applying a concept from our present level of knowledge to a level on which you deny it suddenly. What is a “relational property”—relation of what?

Prof. F: Two ultimate elements to one another.

AR: But then it isn’t a relational property.

Prof. E: You’ve already made reference to the elements. 

AR: You made reference to the elements. The only meaning it could possibly have is that you will observe it only through a relationship. Let’s say that ultimately, through ten super-microscopes, you establish that you can only observe this ultimate particle by means of its relationship to another particle. That’s possible. But then you will still have implied the entity.

 

She is adamant throughout about the primacy of entity over action, relation. Also, whatever the universe is ultimately made of, that ‘stuff’ will have identity. She is aware that the ‘ultimate stuff’ might well be beyond our current conceptual grasp and she is quite open to it being something challenging to grasp like “solid flows of energy” (to quote her from a preceding passage) or even be without extension or shape. She cautions against “making advance conditions for what that primary has to be”. 


I don’t think that ‘Contrast Ontology’ as a hypothesis would contradict anything she had said here; it’s onboard with everything. Yet it would accentuate the possibility of ‘a creative fluidity’ with regard to identity. 


Now then, can anyone offer “advance conditions” against ‘Contrast Ontology’?

 


Q: Am I promoting ‘Contrast Ontology’ as some sort of theory of everything’?  
A: No, at this stage I just want to know if it could be refuted on metaphysical/logical grounds.
  
This topic is my first post on the forums. I’m using these forums to try an iron out any issues I have with understanding Objectivism, starting with metaphysics and working my way through all five branches, slowly but steadily. Ignoring any issue would be evasion. The validity or not of ‘Contrast Ontology’ is the first such hurdle that I want to overcome before moving on. 

 

 


Now to address the specific points raised by Grames and StrictlyLogical…


The major bone of contention: that flipping GIF 
The GIF was really only intended to usher readers “into an expedient frame of mind” in order think purely metaphysically. It was not meant as a concrete example of ‘Contrast Ontology’ — I’m afraid there aren’t any such examples, more’s the pity. 
The reason I used it, apart from attention-grabbing, was that tricky metaphysical conceptualizations need to be brought back and rendered in terms of our own perceptual experience in order to count as knowledge — that’s all I attempted to do with it (obviously failing, even trailing a false scent). 


I totally agree with you both that the ‘white’ (all on) pixel clusters in the GIF not actually forming the ‘black’ (all off) pixel clusters and that it is our integrated visual cortex that lends the impression of one mutually forming the other. Moreover, a pixel would be a perfect example of absolute independence regarding the way it operates: its input isn’t wired to its neighbor. As mentioned before, the GIF was meant to stimulate the imagination towards ‘a real metaphysical question’, an illusion for the mind to ponder and think about the possibility (or not) of simple spacial contrasts reciprocally defining one another (like these As seem to do, yet transposing that to an envisioned fundamental physical level). 
On re-reading I admit that the wording of the original was indeed ambiguous. Plus I’m certainly sorry that the GIF backfired so spectacularly — Peikoff was right after all about images hindering explanations wasn’t he! 

But a pertinent question here might be whether you conceptualize the ‘ultimate stuff’ of physics as something akin to pixels; atomistic, ultimately operating discretely, independent of one another? 
If that is the case then ‘Contrast Ontology’ would certainly seem jarring. 

 


StrictlyLogical made a number of further points (in order of appearance)… 

 

1. ‘Being itself’ 

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

First, "being itself" is somewhat of a redundancy

Yes I, myself, can see that unwarranted doubling-up is annoying, and good metaphysical discourse does require a much higher standard of precision.

In my defense it was only used here for semantic reinforcement.   

 

2. “Being different as a fragment…” 

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Observe also that a thing "being different" is only a fragment

Being different is a relational property, it entails other entities in the first place with which to be relational to — yes, absolutely. 
This works fine when an entity entails an array of attributes/relations/actions — a rich entity. 
However, if the relational property is the main defining property (or a relational ‘simple’ if feasible), then to my mind that would make it less of a fragment, more like a whole. I’m thinking along the lines of Rand’s example of “a solid flow of energy” (quoted above) as ‘simple’ entity that can only be described in singular, relational terms.   
 

3. “IS-ness”  

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

No thing borrows its IS-ness from anything else, at least not entities.

Good, but attributes have arguably been known to be ‘swopped’ around between entities; heat transferal would be an obvious example for objects above a minimal scale (or ‘charge’ as previously cited). 
If (and it’s a big IF) single-attribute entities are what makes up the universe at a fundamental level/scale, then what exactly happens to the concept of “IS-ness” if these attributes transfer around promiscuously? 
Importantly, existence (entity) is not the locus for where this work is done, so in the last analysis “IS-ness” of the entity is intact, yet ‘identity’ (characteristics) might have effectively been ‘exchanged’ — as long as an entity doesn’t lack identity I think we’re good. 

But I would say that ‘Contrast Ontology’ — if true — would compel us to consider “IS-ness” differently, in a more integrated and contextualized way.  



4. Electrons don’t “create” their mass/charge  

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Some existents have properties or attributes which are inseparable from the entities, which do not exist apart from the entities but are distinguishable as properties.  An electron's charge and mass for example go along with the electron in a paired fashion, but it would be a leap to claim the electron creates its properties...

I’m no physicist (can you tell?) but ‘Contrast Ontology’ certainly does not claim creative powers for entities, nor does it promote properties or attributes over entities. 



5. All entities have properties 

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

(this leads to all sorts of detached philosophizing like conjecturing abut entities without any properties)... its better to say (and I believe Rand says something similar to this) things are their attributes.

Yes, Rand writes (ITOE p.264): 

“There are no attributes without entities, there are no actions without entities”

Also I think the inverse of Rand’s quote would be true: there are also no entities without attributes, or for that matter entities completely bereft of activity (no?). 



6. Essentialism  

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Differences, assuming they are perceivable, are what allow us to see the fact that the thing and the something else are not one and the same, but what you mean by "has something essential to do with" is nebulous and elusive, and my Spidey senses are tingling at the term "essential"

Yes, but I was deliberately stating the ‘Contrast Ontology’ concept loosely — too loosey-goosey perhaps. I wasn’t evoking Platonic idealism if that’s what gave you marvelous tingles. By ‘essential’ I just meant ‘central/consequential/basic’.   
“Nebulous and elusive”? Perhaps a wee bit harsh, it could be said to be ‘honestly vague’ because I frankly don’t know how the mechanics of ‘Contrast Ontology’ might work in detail (that foray above into positing positive/negative charge was only meant as a tentative place-holding example for an underlying dynamism in nature). 

 

7. “A solid object displaces water…” 

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Are you talking about how things interact?  Sometimes A and B interact and they are each affected by the other in ways which conserve certain physical quantities but which might redistribute them... A solid object displaces water... defines the shape of the water ...?

Partially yes, spacial displacement, as long as it shapes not one but both forms, is an appealing illustration that begins to get at the idea. But really ‘Contrast Ontology’ is not just concerned with shape but all characteristics of identity, and functions at a much more fundamental level.  



8. Absence 

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Are you drawing a distinction between a thing and its absence, rather than between a thing and some other thing?

No, I’m thinking about a thing ‘shaping’ another’s characteristics in a profound way (and vice versa). 



9. Identical twins 

On 10/13/2018 at 9:11 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Are you stating that it is incoherent to try to conceive of two things being exactly the same in every respect? (i.e. what then would be the justification of trying to claim that there ARE two things)...

No, although that scenario would be incoherent if ‘every respect’ included space/time position — as well as being not doubled-up in that same space/time position. 
(I’m sure there’s another thread for that issue somewhere)

 

 

 

Well, I hope this little lot has helped clear things up a tad. 

Thanks again for your replies, and your patience.  

 

 

 

So back to my main question… 
Do you think ‘Contrast Ontology’ can be refuted on metaphysical grounds according to Objectivism?
 

 

NB, at this point I’m thinking that ‘Contrast Ontology’ might be more aptly renamed ‘the identity as contrast hypothesis’ (at long as it doesn’t forfeit its ontological bite). 


 

Edited by A.C.E.
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Very well organized post.  Much of it alludes to what you are getting at.  I think to the degree your allusions point to your concept I can "allude" to a philosophical response to it which I'll try to be clear about at the end.

A few comments chronologically

3 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

Q: So what the heck is ‘Contrast Ontology’?  
A: It is a hypothesis that posits the reciprocal nature of identity (at a fundamental physical level).
 

Premise: there is a fundamental level where the identity of an entity effectively becomes entirely contextual. 


By fundamental level I’m thinking about a sub-sub-subatomic scale, way below the complexities of the Standard Model, towards an ever-simpler integration of forces/particles/waves.* 

By identity I’m using the standard Objectivist bundle: an entity’s characteristics; its attributes, actions, relations). 

By contextual I mean reciprocally inter-dependent on the identity of its spacial/temporal surroundings.

 

* That already assumes a lot that we don’t know, but please bear with me as ‘ever-simpler integration’ is not a premise for ‘Contrast Ontology’, more like scene-setting. After all, reality may turn out to be fractal-like in the sense that complexities could emerge at all scales, no matter how infinitesimal. Furthermore, ‘Contrast Ontology’ might be at work to some extent at scales, after all everything has an outside which effectively delineates it. 

Your foray into fundamental physics, in my humble opinion, is somewhat misguided.  Physics is a study of that which is.  In fact any science is a study of that which is, how things behave, change, transform, interact, their properties attributes etc... Science does not and cannot get under ISness.  As I remarked previously one cannot get under "being" to discover "what" causes it, because one immediately would have to now deal with the "what" and its ISness... so to speak.  There is a point by definition one has to take simply as the base, and it is what you identify with being.  All the talk of fundamental physics can only ever be about what we observe existence to exhibit, not any explanation (why) of existence as such, or any notion of a cause for existence as such.

A bit more on this later.

3 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

More scene-setting for this supposed ‘fundamental physical level’… 
This is to help conjure up ‘Contrast Ontology’ in action. 
If I’m successful you will at least get the rudimentary concept — either to ‘raise up’ or ‘razor off’ as seems fit. 


Obviously this fundamental level is a wholly different realm to what we are used to; no ‘light’ as we know it, no ‘dark’ too, no temperature, no sounds, etc. Realize that we can only picture it circuitously. It’s an odd realm, but not illogical. 

This is teetering toward rationality and smells Kantian.  There are no different realms.  Reality is simultaneous and whole.  Your exposition of "no ‘light’ as we know it, no ‘dark’ too, no temperature, no sounds, etc." is markedly suspect for an Objectivist.  That said I have no quibble having a discussion with you if you are not one...

You have an "experience of light" by virtue of your perceptual apparatus, in its particular form, being acted upon by the existent which we refer to as "light".  The same for dark and for sound.  An existent such as sound is not a fundamental particle but it is no less an existent in reality which has measurable properties.

So this part of the scene setting bears little fruit.

3 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

Whilst down at this imperceptible micro-scale, let’s take the opportunity to expunge one common misconception: discrete particles in a void. 
Objectivism, following Aristotle, does a fine job of logically discounting the existence of an absolute void. However, its innate partner-in-crime has the knack of lingering around: the notion of an absolutely independent and irreducible physical particle. Note that this is not the same thing as a metaphysical ‘entity’ which is a context-relative category (dependent on apt level/scale of analysis).  

The notion of a continuous plenum helps resolve this, packing-in ‘particles without a gap’ so to speak — the universe as ‘lumpy porridge’ (rather than envisaging lone ‘spheres of discrete something-ness’ moving around a background of ‘nothing-ness’ (1s and 0s).  

This claim, philosophically speaking, is without merit.  There is literally no philosophical reason to posit a continuous plenum nor to philosophically discount discrete particles in a void.  I realize some people had that opinion, or conjectured that it was a fact of reality, but it never amounted to anything more than opinion and conjecture.

Obviously there is no nothing.  Nothing is not a thing. 

Now, IF we think of space as a "thing" which by definition is "occupied by other things", then the idea of this "thing" being empty, starts to feel like it is actually "occupied" by some kind of "nothing".  But of course nothing does not and cannot occupy anything... so this hanging empty "thing" containing only that which cannot be contained, in fact that which is simply NOT, starts to look rather odd.  This error is in part because of a reification of space and moreover its being seen as "needing" occupation.  This idea of space is unfounded. 

One can formulate the idea of space merely as a relationship between things, and not as a thing itself.  Now, IF we were to accept the idea that space and time are in fact relationships between entities and nothing more, then the fact that the relationships do not currently have a particular configuration is of no consequence.  Let me explain the relevance.

Consider A, B, and a C somewhere in between them.  Consider the case where C may move anywhere between A and B.  When the relationship between A and C is "near", A and C interact more strongly and B and C interact more weakly (assume some force inverse to "distance relationship".. say each of A and B repels C, and C can be pulled to one side and let go so that it oscillates) when B and C are "near", B and C interact more strongly and A and C interact more weakly.  Even in a universe with space only as relationship, there are knowably different states of A,B,C based on those relationships, and although only one state exists at any one time we know that other states were and in future are possible.  Now, take C being exactly at the halfway point as a "C-centered" state.  We can know this state of ABC and "label" that in terms of the spatial relationship because if only for a moment we observed it.  Now consider comparing the "C-centered" state with a state where C is no longer centered.  Well currently the ABC system does not exhibit the relationship such that C is halfway. One might be tempted to ask the questions: What is the status of the "spatial position" represented by the "center" as such? What does that mean about the "center"? and Is it empty? BUT such questions are premised on the reification of space. IF space is only about the relationships between ABC the proper way to look at the "unoccupied" center is that it is not a thing to begin with, and currently the relationships which can and did occur (with C in the center) simply is not reflected in the state of ABC.  More clearly, space as a relationship is defined by AB-relationship, CA-relationship, and CB-relationship, there is no relationship to an empty center point because there is no entity currently which has that center point relationship to A and B.  Now this does not mean we should throw out the concept of the "C-center" position altogether, after all we observed it exhibited in the past, and we know that the relationship can obtain in the future, we just have to be mindful of how we have chosen to define space.

There simply is no need to fill any empty point because in a relational sense, without reifying space, there is no empty point in reality.  That is what it means to take space merely as relational and not an entity itself.

IF space and time are merely relational of entities and not a real independent entity itself screaming to be occupied, then there is no reason whatever to posit a plenum.

This scene setting also is not persuasive.

 

3 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

What is the structure/mechanism of this lumpy porridge when zooming-in? 

On closer inspection we must jettison the charming porridge analogy of solider versus more liquified parts (<1s to >0). Basic reality seems constituted by simpler yet more thoroughgoing differences, something rather akin to electromagnetic positive and negative charge (+1s versus −1s) — but perhaps far simpler than that. 

Whatever is the structure/mechanism of the micro-scale it is way beyond our current knowledge, but at least this conceit allows us entertain the more fertile notion of each part acting dynamically; as attraction against repulsion or energy resisting entropy — of interactions and (ex-)changes. 

Furthermore, we might specify this interacting structure as ‘a field of competing forces’ rather than ‘solid particles’. This doesn’t mean that different forces are any less deserving of the term entity. After all, any force which is forcible enough to preclude other neighboring forces from encroaching on its threshold ‘bounds’ is being/acting as an entity. By simply doing so it delineates its difference against externality. 


I have just tried to pour a lumpy yet zesty porridge made up of dynamically interacting forces into your mind — is it sticking a bit?
If it’s just slopping about, here’s a supplementary thought experiment that might help get there…


What if the ‘fundamental level’ is where an entity effectively ‘has’ a single characteristic (to borrow a term from mereology, such an entity might be called a ‘simple’)?

 

Now are you closer to envisioning a circumscription of identity via an external contrast?


NB, this is not a necessary premise for ‘Contrast Ontology’. Such ‘simples’ might not exist, but it does he me in imagining the mechanics, where some characteristics (like the aforementioned positive/negative charge) can be reciprocally ‘exchanged’ between entities, or at least change another entity’s character. 
‘Contrast Ontology’ does presuppose that to be possible. Consequently the fundamental level could be seen as being constituted by entities undergoing ‘requited property fluctuations’, arguably transfiguring identities. As ontology pertains to identity as much as entity, it is this reciprocal activity that I would point to as a prime example of ‘Contrast Ontology’ — a pity it’s not possible to actually witness. 


 

 

Crystal clear or still as murky as mud? 
Food for thought or utter Rationalist rot?

It’s not easy to get across so do let me know if it requires further explanation. 

Not rot, but tending to Rationalism.

Basically your entire discussion about being, is premised on things which are, whether they are things extended in space, or not, whether they are things interacting according to properties or transforming into other things or reacting to other things... they are still things that already ARE.  As such they cannot form the explananda for BEING as such.

Suppose the universe were made of paired monads which were such that each monad in a pair had to be the opposite "charge" of the other, and moreover that a collision of pairs of monads sometimes flipped the charge of one, which would always physically cause the other monad of the pair to flip.  Would this be metaphysical reciprocity?  Does the identity of anything here depend upon anything else here?

No.

IF such pairs of monads existed, then part of their identity is that they are a pair and always are pairs of opposites and flipping one causes a flip in the other... THAT is the identity of each monad in the pairs of monads, and that does not depend on the "context" of any other identity, the existence of triads of monads, for example.

Even the simple example of particle annihilation, a positron and an electron happen to come together in the right way to convert their mass into pure energy, the particles cease to be, their charges nullify, and a photon with the same energy as the sum total is the result.  Prior to and after the interaction, each particle is itself, its being is not dependent upon the being of any other.  Certainly each particle exhibited behavior in consequence of the other (interaction of + and - pulled them together), but the particles' BEING itself was not.

 

The crux of the issue is that contrast can result from or exist in "Being", and in fact the contrasts could be causative or essential in the evolution of things which are, but they are not causative or essential to the BEING of those things which are.

 

At a slightly higher level, your attempt amounts to trying to define BEING, even partially, as such, as dependent upon "something"... and no matter what you try to identify the "something" as, IT TOO must BE... and here is the rub.

 

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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Thanks StrictlyLogical

 

Preamble 
Despite tapering into a two-way dialogue, this thread is doing what I wanted; helping me to re-assess my own ideas, hone my concepts/terminology and force me to consider new perspectives. The concept of ‘Contrast Ontology’ has gone through some welcome modifications during this process. It originally seemed fairly straightforward in my mind, but in describing it here to others I saw some emerging ambiguities that I wouldn’t have otherwise noticed, as well as a realization that this was a devilishly tricky idea to get across clearly — and hence worry that something rudimentary might be amiss with it. 

Once again StrictlyLogical (whom, like others on these forums, I can’t picture but admire) has been able to recalibrate my thinking, as well as chide the laxity of my language usage — and with good reason. 
Nevertheless, I don’t think there has yet been a metaphysical knockout blow against ‘Contrast Ontology’ as tenable hypothesis (at least not as I recognize the concept), or for that matter any enduring settling of issues from the physical sciences. 

One quandary has latterly become apparent, following on from StrictlyLogical’s last post: the candidacy of the proposition rests firmly upon presuppositions about the structure/composition of the universe.


There’s six headings and a summary. First I’ll deal with three general criticisms, then mull over StrictlyLogical’s excellent ‘relational A–B–C model’ and compare it to a (purified) plenum model which I’m starting to realize is a premise around which ‘Contrast Ontology’ hangs. Then I’ll tackle a couple of more physics-related responses, ending on a ‘state-of-play’ summary.  

 


1. Misguided foray into physics? 

I’d contend that the sketchy physics foray was still more-or-less within metaphysics territory because I was trying to define the category of ‘entity’. Not so much equation-heavy theoretical physics, more an attempt to set the ground-rules for it. Any incursion into these so-called ‘borderlands’ was in order to draw from what we know, then use that knowledge to illustrate how ‘Contrast Ontology’ might operate physically. This is somewhat unavoidable in any explanation as ‘Contrast Ontology’ does rely on entities being more akin to dynamic forces than discrete particles (at a ‘fundamental level’). I was advancing the idea of force-as-entity: any ‘relational space/time part’ that is able to preclude neighboring forces from encroaching on its threshold ‘bounds’ and thus act/be an objective entity

Obviously physics should have the final say on this, but I don’t think that the broadest metaphysical concept of entity would exclude things like localized force or energy (and it seems from the appended discussions in ITOE, nor did Rand).  

 

However, I do agree with StrictlyLogical that all the rest of those physics musings in that section, intended to stimulate the imagination towards the reciprocity of difference, were at best tangental, at worse contentious and indigestible.  

I bow-out to those amongst us with physics degrees, and humbly eat my lumpy porridge. 

 


2. Still trying to get under IS-ness? 
Anyway, the main admonishment in this section was that I am still inanely attempting to “get under being”. 
I think that this comes from a misinterpretation of ‘Contrast Ontology’ (current version), over-stretching its scope. 
The hypothesis leaves the sovereignty of existence untouched (specified in my third post’s conclusion). It has become a more modest proposal than first appeared at the outset of this thread. 

A modified summation: ‘Contrast Ontology’ is the hypothesis that the axiom of Identity entails ‘difference’.

 

The question ‘what causes existence’ is thus clearly off the table (and actually always was). 

This might best be demonstrated by supplanting the words of StrictlyLogical’s last sentence on this subject so that it attacks the right target:

“All the talk of fundamental physics can only ever be about what we observe (the identity of) existents to exhibit, not any explanation (why) of identity as such, or any notion of a cause for identity as such.” 

In shifting the burden from the axiom of Existence and onto its ‘more mercurial’ corollary, Identity, the appeal of the sentences no longer works, the example shifts from unreasonable to reasonable. The acceptability of the updated sentence, I’d argue, is because Identity entails a contextualized threshold; for example, the identity of an entity depends in part on scale in both space and time and these are entirely relational concepts. If we call an entity ‘tiny’ it is only so in relation to other larger entities; similarly, if we call an event ‘fleeting’ it is only so in relation to other, relatively slower time periods of entity activity. I view Identity as being that aspect of an entity which effectively does the work of carving out a relational niche for it, a relational difference for it, a contrast for it. 


A wrap-up of the ‘Contrast Ontology’ perspective regarding the first two of the axiomatic trinity: 

• Existence (or any entity) as the absolute fact;
• Identity as the relational fact (about that absolute fact).

 

‘It’ takes two to tango. 

 


3. ‘Realms’ smell Kantian? 
Yes they do, sorry for the pong. Please substitute ‘realm’ with something less odious; environment/situation/milieu — any term more redolent of objective simultaneousness and wholesomeness. 

I’m very aware too that the whole topic of ‘Contrast Ontology’ — so tricky to describe and unverifiable in action — will tend to come across as armchair rationalizations anyway, so I ought to be much more careful with the terms I use here. 


As mentioned above, my delve into sub-quantum picture-painting wasn’t a wise tactic — it would have been hard to draw anyone closer towards an appreciation of ‘Contrast Ontology’ amongst the din of alarm bells triggered by the merest whiff of Rationalism wafting around those words. 

 


4. Continuous plenum or distinct particles? 
It very much looks like ‘Contrast Ontology’ either survives or falls upon the suppositions that we hold about this crucial question. 

I very much enjoyed StrictlyLogical’s lucid account of an non-reified relational space/time that ‘left no room’ for the necessity of a plenum to fill. It is a very good case, well worth absorbing. 

If StrictlyLogical’s model were a correct account of reality, then ‘Contrast Ontology’ would indeed be incoherent. ‘Contrast Ontology’ relies on the type of integrated dynamics that a more ‘continuous’ model of the universe offers.


So it is a key task to start to sort out this underlying quandary first — discrete, continuous, or some other configuration. 
Of course it is ultimately a physics question, but what sort of ground-rules (if any) can metaphysics lay down?

 

On 10/18/2018 at 7:20 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

There is literally no philosophical reason to posit a continuous plenum nor to philosophically discount discrete particles in a void.

 

But I think it is fair to say that the reverse is also true: there’s no reason to suppose distinct particles or discount a continuous plenum through philosophy alone. No? 


Can we make any further headway on this matter beyond Objectivism’s established ruling-out of ‘the existence of absolute non-existence’? 


There’s much to agree with in StrictlyLogical’s outlined model; non-reification of space/time, a strong aversion to stuff/events ‘occupying’ dimensions, relations as attributable to entities, no relationships apart from those of actual or potential entity combinations, no ‘empty points’. I’m sure too that some invocations of a plenum do stem out of a desperate but flawed need to carpet-over a presupposed spacial void, and StrictlyLogical’s model sidesteps such howlers deftly. 

 

StrictlyLogical, let me interpret your argument in a step-by-step way so you can tell whether I’ve got it: as space isn’t a thing (agreed), then it can’t be filled (agreed), moreover it certainly can’t be filled with ‘nothing’ (a non-space-filler anyway, so OK), therefore the relational spacial/temporal ‘distances’ between the (assumedly discrete) A–B–Cs are untroubled by notions of emptiness, because emptiness/nothingness/non-existence just doesn’t apply to pure relations between entities. Thus voids (as existence of non-existence) are avoided because they are a non-issue if there is no actual thing called space. 
Is that a fair summary? 

 

Now let me compare it to a plenum, a descent edition anyway (by the way I’m neither fond of its etymological ‘fullness’ nor its checkered history with aether and the like, so I’d welcome a better term).

The best definition is a minimal one: (only) existence exists.
Or, conversely: non-existents are nowhere/never.

Notice that this type of plenum does not reify dimensions, it is not in the business of ‘filling out’ a prior space, merely of existing. It is existence (in a variety of ‘entity densities’) that gives rise to relational space/time in the same non-reified way as your fine model. 


So it looks like the main difference, on zooming down to the scale where the ABCs are seen, is that your discrete model entails ‘absolute gaps’ between discrete ABC particles, whereas the plenum/continuous model’s ‘relative gaps’ are actually ‘full’ of evermore ‘little stuff fluctuations’ upon closer inspection and this appears to be fractal-like when zooming-in (or even on zooming-out). I placed your model’s ‘absolute gaps’ in scare-quotes because it otherwise implies an emptiness-to-be filled which doesn’t do justice to your model, whilst if another term like ‘distance’ is substituted it doesn’t do enough to describe the difference between the two models. 

I was initially tempted to attack it for ‘smuggling in’ an absolute void disguised as entity-relationships, but on reflection I would hesitate in calling those ‘absolute gaps’ in your model ‘true voids’ as I suppose a ‘particle/point’ could traverse it at any future time, whereas an absolute void entails the preclusion of interaction with anything ever.

NB, I would ascribe the category of ‘existent’ to your model’s spacial/temporal relationships-of-entities to indicate ‘a fact about the matter’ (but I’m not sure you would agree?). 

 

But out of these two given alternatives, I’d bet more on the plenum-type model.

Why so?

The discrete entity-relational model presumes absolute discreteness at some ultimate, infinitesimal temporal/spacial scale.
The continuous ‘plenum’ model doesn’t presume the existence of such an ultimate level without evidence — it has one conjecture less. That’s a slim but winner-takes-all advantage I think. 


To elaborate, the ‘plenum’ model does not necessarily entail absolute continuousness, there can still be a relative discreteness of entities at differing scales of analysis, indeed it’s all about this dynamic. It takes the epithet ‘continuum’ not because it is densely-packed, but because it continues on all scales and everywhere to reveal that discrete entities are; wholes, yet are also parts of greater wholes, and yet they themselves contain further parts. Indeed, it is because ‘space’ is not reified that scale is unbounded (in both directions) so the notion of reaching an actual ultimate micro-point, or for that matter imagining the universe from a macro-perspective, is always sabotaged — at least theoretically, unless science could somehow prove ultimate limits (rather than practical limits — which I doubt it ever conclusively could). 


But this is in danger of drifting to a whole other topic. The ‘plenum’ has already been discussed elsewhere within these forums. 


I look forward to any feedback you might have, and please straighten me out if I’ve misunderstood your model. 
That’s my initial thoughts on this heady but key sub-topic — it’ll do for now. 

 


5. Note on “monad pairs”… 

On 10/18/2018 at 7:20 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Suppose the universe were made of paired monads which were such that each monad in a pair had to be the opposite "charge" of the other, and moreover that a collision of pairs of monads sometimes flipped the charge of one, which would always physically cause the other monad of the pair to flip.  Would this be metaphysical reciprocity?  Does the identity of anything here depend upon anything else here?

No.

IF such pairs of monads existed, then part of their identity is that they are a pair and always are pairs of opposites and flipping one causes a flip in the other... THAT is the identity of each monad in the pairs of monads, and that does not depend on the "context" of any other identity, the existence of triads of monads, for example.


An interesting thought-experiment, to me it reveals something interesting about the relationship between entity and identity…

I totally agree that the identity of the entity ‘paired-monad’ is one that encompasses its (actual/potential) flipping aspect.
This is identity in the ‘proper’ overall sense, a metaphysical description of entity in all its aspects.
However, the two states in which this paired-monad can be in are different, so an aspect of its identity undergoes alteration. 
If the entity is analyzed partially, at one timeframe, its identity might be ‘positive charge’ and that would be a sufficient account of its identity within the limited context of that moment (without denying its potential to flip). But there’s always a question as to what is the appropriate timeframe or spacial extension that captures the ‘whole identity’. Notice that a more holistic timeframe that encompasses its flipping action doesn’t go as far as following the entity deep into its past or extend unboundedly into its future — I summit that all identities are parts of a greater contextual/surrounding whole, and identities ‘make sense’ only against ‘the background of’ that whole that circumscribes it. 
Entities are ‘partial’ too in the sense that they are naturally ‘segregated-out’ (via objective scale-dependent thresholds) from the rest of existence. Any entity, together with its overall identity, entails its own temporal/spacial constraints.  

No? Does this exegesis err from Objectivism’s take? 


Anyhow, I think here it starts to become clearer how ‘Contrast Ontology’ fits in naturally to a plenum-type universe, where identity could be conceptualized as operating ‘more holistically’, than a model based on absolute discreteness, where identities somehow sit alone, independently, indifferently.  


So to go back and answer a couple of specific questions…

On 10/18/2018 at 7:20 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Would this be metaphysical reciprocity?

I'll add a contextual clarification for readers:
“Would this [flipping positive/negative of the ‘monad-pair’] be metaphysical reciprocity?”

At the level of one aspect of the entity’s identity — yes (reciprocal flipping of charge as a metaphysical fact). 
At the less superficial, standard level of the whole of the entity’s identity, — no (it’s still the same entity, it’s a conduit for +/− charge rather than ‘being charge’ I’m presuming). 
  

On 10/18/2018 at 7:20 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Does the identity of anything here depend upon anything else here?

The identity of positive charge depends on the existence of the identity of negative charge (and vice versa) according to ‘Contrast Ontology’. Positive charge as an identity can’t exist ‘on its own’ as that would mean it would be undifferentiated throughout space and time because there is no difference with which to circumscribe it. There would be no metaphysical identity nameable as ‘positive charge’.

 


6. Note on positron/electron annihilation… 
This is an example where two real entities dramatically change their identities. So much so that it is not always clear-cut whether or not the emerging two photons ought to be categorized as new entities resulting from an actual annihilation of the positron and electron. Again, this might be ‘resolved’ by factoring-in the relative scale/level of analysis. 

At one level it looks like an annihilation of entities has occurred, but at another, say the level of energy-as-entity (with momentum), nothing has been lost, just converted. 


I ought to say here that these example don’t quite get at what ‘Contrast Ontology’ is about, other than to emphasize that the attributes of identity are scale-dependent and exist within a continual cause/effect dynamics. 

 

I think ‘Contrast Ontology’ can be illustrated more intelligibly and more profoundly via another thought experiment…

 
What would happen if, say, a positron was divorced from the rest of the universe — would it’s identity still be that of a normal positron in situ? 
‘Contrast Ontology’ reasons that it would completely lose its particular positron-ness identity. It would effectively be ‘the entity’ of the universe, yet bereft of temporal/spacial dimensions. It would be “a singular undifferentiated and un-differentiable identity” to paraphrase an earlier post. 
Perhaps it is this odd image above all that suggests to me that the identity of an entity involves difference with the rest of existence. A stand-alone undifferentiated entity/universe would not attain any identity to speak of — indeed without identity it could not be said to exist. 

Key caveat: the example assumes this positron to be internally completely undifferentiated, but a ‘plenum’ model refutes this possibility, indeed it refutes the notion of a fundamental level where entities are single-aspect points. 

 

 


Summary 
This has all helped focus my thinking on this issue, some things seem clearer. I’d welcome any claims, especially from Objectivist texts, that might upset my understanding of Identity and its relation to Existence. 

 

On 10/18/2018 at 7:20 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

At a slightly higher level, your attempt amounts to trying to define BEING, even partially, as such, as dependent upon "something"... and no matter what you try to identify the "something" as, IT TOO must BE... and here is the rub.

I think that the general gist of my answers has dealt with the culminating “rub” about trying to define “being” as “dependent upon ‘something’” — that’s really not what I’m trying to achieve. I'm fully onboard with ‘existence is’ as the axiomatic starting premise for all philosophical enquiry.

   

The state-of-play to my mind is that the ‘Contrast Ontology’ concept is still standing on two feet (but might be due for a name-change befitting its modified scope + further clarification if need be).

 

The underlying ‘discrete/continuous universe’ debate might be a more apt approach towards the issue, so I’m not sure whether to ‘press hold’ on this thread in order to pursue things on one of the ‘plenum’ threads, or keep this thread as the focus a tad longer.  

 


Emerging notions

  • Pithy definition: ‘Contrast Ontology’ is the hypothesis that the axiom of Identity entails ‘difference’.

 

  • Existence — something is
  • Identity — something in particular is.

…or, put in another way…

  • Existence (or any entity) as the absolute fact;
  • Identity as the relational fact.


NB, even if this conception is endorsed, a major niggle still might be whether Identity is entirely relational or is there a core aspect of Identity which is the absolute solitary (discrete) entity? 

 

  • Existence and its constituent entities are ‘primary’; notions of space/time/changes are ‘ancillary’ in that they are about entities, not reifications apart from them.

 

  • The ‘plenum’’ model entails entities/identities being literally bound-up with each other, suggesting that it is their ‘identity bounds’ that at least play a part in mutually ‘shaping’ one identity in relation to its surrounds.  

 

 

 

As has become customary, I’ll end by restating the focus of the initial question: 
Under an Objectivist remit, could ‘Contrast Ontology’ be rejected on metaphysical grounds?


 

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I enjoyed much of your response, there is much I can respond to and much I would respond with, but it seems a bit like idle chit chat in the face of the critical issue which should be addressed squarely. That said I would still be interested to take you up on many of the other tangential subjects, as their discussion is also interesting to me.

 

I am under the impression that you want to posit something about metaphysics rather than epistemology, however upon finding no room in metaphysics, and being edged toward epistemology, you have resorted to a sort of schizophrenic break-up of metaphysics proper.  This on its own constitutes moving into what Objectivism rejects:  the dichotomy between Existence and Identity.  If any such distinction is made, IMHO "Contrast Ontology" is rejected on Objectivist metaphysics.

Objectivism holds existence IS identity.  (It is ironic that the word "IS" must be used here.... the full implication of this equality of existence with identity, to be understood fully and completely, depends on what it means to BE in the mind of the reader...) A thing's existence and identity are one and the same.  Entities ARE their attributes (in the broadest sense), all of them.  At any one time, EVERY thing IS something in particular, namely, ITSELF.

Identity is not what a thing possesses, like a coat of paint, it is the sheer fact that the each thing IS.

This is not merely a semantic exercise.  What would the existence of any thing be divorced from the identity of the thing?  What would it mean for something to "be" without being something "in particular", in any respect (let alone all of them)?  Only one thing, one non-thing is nothing in particular, and it simply IS NOT a thing.... recall there is no nothing.

 

Rand's Razor:

Suppose:

Existence IS Identity

AND

(Rather than identity entailing "difference") identities of reality "exhibit" variety

Q: What further concept(s) are necessary? (with respect to our current discussion)

 

Aside:

You speak of relationships.  Theses are also facts of reality.  They exist, and therefore they also have identity in reality.  Above.  Before.  Between.  All are real aspects of reality.  But note, these are not attributes of isolated individual entities.  They are facts of reality pertaining to multiple entities. A above B. T1 before T2. C between A and B.  These relationships are states of the groups of things.  They are not constitutive of the being of any thing or group, they are in a sense higher order attributes of collective existents.  As attributes of single entities are not separable from those entities, relational attributes of multiple entities (itself constituting a group entity) are not separable from that multiple entity, and not attributable those entities in isolation.  X on its own cannot possess "aboveness".  Likewise, relationships as attributes of multiple things cannot exist independent from those multiple things: "In between" does not exist apart from the (3) things or portions which exhibit it. 

 

 

Another attempt at the Rub

Anything which IS at some time, T, whether continuous or not, or discrete or not, whether recently caused (by any interaction) at a recent time T0 in the past, or not, whether some part of a multiple of other things, IS what it IS, at that time T independent of literally anything "else"... it's existence IS its identity and it is absolute, NOT contingent in any way.

Suppose A IS at time T,

it is A, not in any contingent manner with respect to anything else at time T. It may be A at time T because of what happened at T0 (in the past), but A cannot contingenty be A at T IF it is a fact of reality that A IS at time T. 

It cannot be "A IS" and "A kind of is" at the same time.  ISness defines that which IS ABSOLUTE.

 

We deal with things like potentialities and possibilities of the future by properly referring them as things which might, could, or perhaps will be etc.

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13 hours ago, A.C.E. said:


Emerging notions

  • Pithy definition: ‘Contrast Ontology’ is the hypothesis that the axiom of Identity entails ‘difference’.

 

  • Existence — something is
  • Identity — something in particular is.

…or, put in another way…

  • Existence (or any entity) as the absolute fact;
  • Identity as the relational fact.


NB, even if this conception is endorsed, a major niggle still might be whether Identity is entirely relational or is there a core aspect of Identity which is the absolute solitary (discrete) entity? 

 

  • Existence and its constituent entities are ‘primary’; notions of space/time/changes are ‘ancillary’ in that they are about entities, not reifications apart from them.

 

  • The ‘plenum’’ model entails entities/identities being literally bound-up with each other, suggesting that it is their ‘identity bounds’ that at least play a part in mutually ‘shaping’ one identity in relation to its surrounds.  

 

 

 

As has become customary, I’ll end by restating the focus of the initial question: 
Under an Objectivist remit, could ‘Contrast Ontology’ be rejected on metaphysical grounds?

 

Entities are their attributes.  Attributes can be described as intrinsic or relational.  For example take mass.  At any scale, particle or planet,  all entities having mass are attracted to each other in a way that can be described as an inverse square law or more generally in Einstein space-time terms.  The relation is the changing movements of the interacting entities, and the property of mass is an inference about the entities that participate in those relations.  If it were not for the measurable relationships between entities there would be no evidence to infer an intrinsic attribute such as mass.   An intrinsic attribute is unknowable except by how it causes the entity to act.   

So if an entity has no ability to act with respect one of its intrinsic attributes, that intrinsic attribute is unknowable.  'Contrast Ontology' seems to posit "if an entity has no ability to act with respect one of its intrinsic attributes, that intrinsic attribute does not exist."  And with respect to hypothetical existents of only a single attribute, that existent would not exist.  Put positively, an existent's identity and existence are made possible by its relationships to other existents.

If this is a fair restatement of 'Contrast Ontology' then I think the relevant critique in Objectivist jargon is that moving from what is unknowable to assert therefore also not-existing is to rely on an implicit primacy-of-consciousness premise. 

 

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8 hours ago, Grames said:

If this is a fair restatement of 'Contrast Ontology' then I think the relevant critique in Objectivist jargon is that moving from what is unknowable to assert therefore also not-existing is to rely on an implicit primacy-of-consciousness premise. 

Interesting... although this does form a valid basis to rebut a positive claim to the existence of the arbitrary.  A claim to a "spaghetti monster" which cannot interact in any way with anything else in the universe would be invalid, not only because there IS no evidence available heretofore to make the positive claim but because ANY EVIDENCE supporting its existence would be IMPOSSIBLE.  Here, we know not to state that we can "prove" the non-existence of the spaghetti monster (as a metaphysical fact), but are well advised not to take the claim as valid, the onus is on he who asserts the positive, and given the logical necessity of a complete lack of evidence (the definition of the spaghetti monster), we can be "certain" such a claim to its existence is meaningless, and wholly irrelevant to philosophy (and literally everything), and hence invalid.

The nuance here, is that an appeal to the "arbitrary" does not really refer to AN EXISTENT which we cannot know about, it is a label for an IDEA,  i.e. the idea of a something for which there is no evidence, and that IDEA is not referring to anything in reality, no perceptions or recollections or connections with reality no matter how indirect, are utilized for it (we are talking of the arbitrary). 

A FURTHER arbitrary claim, in the vein of, "well it's POSSIBLE in general that a random ARBITRARY idea corresponds to an existent for which no evidence of its existence is possible, but which nonetheless exists" could be raised.  But this arbitrary claim, requires as part of the argument or justification for it to be accepted (in support of the first arbitrary idea) requires one to accept ITSELF... and hence reduces to a sort of faith in the possibility of the arbitrary, AS SUCH.

Here I am tempted to argue that the "spaghetti monster" as formulated is not an unknowable existent, but that it simply does not exist and that this is proved... but that is not technically correct.  Alas, such a bold statement about the metaphysics of reality is outside of justification, (one simply cannot prove a negative), BUT we are dealing with an arbitrary CLAIM, which is fair game in the field of epistemology.

So technically, according to Objectivism, one can claim one is "certain" that the "spaghetti monster" does not exist, and that any claim to the existence of the "spaghetti monster" is invalid and meaningless.

Any CLAIM to an "unknowable" existent is arbitrary, invalid and meaningless.

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On 10/26/2018 at 8:40 AM, StrictlyLogical said:

Any CLAIM to an "unknowable" existent is arbitrary, invalid and meaningless.

Agreed, and for this topic the variation "Any CLAIM to an "unknowable" NON-existent is arbitrary, invalid and meaningless."

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Thanks again StrictlyLogical

Thanks again Grames

hope you don’t mind if I butt in, but…

 

…Got it! 

I believe that ‘Contrast Ontology’ is indeed guilty of dividing off identity from entity/existence. 
It can be rejected on metaphysical grounds by Objectivism. 

Huzza!


There still might very well be an aspect to identity which is relational, but I now see that as an ancillary aspect which emerges out of the primacy of Existence — entity as identity. Identity always entails, nay, exhibits, this intrinsic attribute (hat duly doffed to both Strictly & Grames). 


Whether or not Identity always exhibits a relational aspect with its surrounding identities is still a good question — perhaps it does. However, identity is first and foremost an expression of an entity/existent — that’s how we ought to set forth our metaphysics. 

 

 

The thought experiment that changed my mind… 
Previously in this thread there had been some deliberation on two versions of the universe; StrictlyLogical’s ‘relational A–B–C model’ (discrete entities) and my own svelte version of the ‘plenum model’ (continuous yet contains relative discreteness, depending on scale of analysis). 
I still prefer my version, yet the discrete A–B–Cs helped me think about something decisive… 


Imagine you take, say, the discrete ‘entity A’ from StrictlyLogical’s model. I don’t know about you, but I imagine it to be a sub-sub-sub-atomic minuscule hard-edged black sphere (I have to visualize something after-all).  


Now subtract every other entity from this model of the universe, all those Bs, Cs, Ds, etc., so that A stands completely alone. 


What now is the identity of A? 


Bear in mind it no longer has any spacial or temporal dimension as it relates to no-thing. It has effectively become the universe (and the word ‘become’ is fallacious if this state of affairs had always been so, just a solitary A for eternity).

Crucially, A’s interior (according to its antecedent ‘relational A–B–C model’) happens to be absolutely undifferentiated. It had zero internal fluctuation, complete sameness all the way through. 
If it remained as the ‘one and only thing’ it would shed all descriptive adjectives; it can no longer be called ‘hard-edged’ as it is edge-less, thus no longer ‘spherical’ as shape is meaningless if unbounded, no longer ‘minuscule’ as scale is meaningless, no longer in movement as time or action no longer apply, no longer ‘black’ because what does blackness mean if there has never been such a thing as light.

This is not just an epistemological ditching of descriptors, it metaphysically has no more relationships anymore, ‘A’ is totally abandoned. 

 

The ‘Contrast Ontology’ frame of mind would declare:


Aha! This A is kinda no longer A because there’s nothing at all to contrast with it. It’s kinda like nothing because there’s no difference. “A is A” kinda no longer holds because any A-ness requires non-A. It’s identity is utterly compromised even if, as an existent entity, we can’t quite go as far as to say it doesn’t exist — but then would existence itself have any meaning in such a case? Kinda not really!’ 

 

But, although thought-provokingly seductive, I now see this line of thinking as fundamentally mistaken…

…because A is still A.


It would be false to state otherwise. 


No matter that A is virtually the same as nothingness, it can never actually be no-thing due to the fact of it being A in the first place. The story tells us that it is ‘A’ — ‘A’ exists as a matter of fact. In this case A would be/exhaust the very definition of the term ‘Existence’. Moreover, it follows that A would also ‘represent’ the term ‘Identity’ for such an unimaginable and utterly unappealing universe.  

 

 

But does my ‘plenum’ model negate this thought-experiment? 

This thought-experiment doesn’t work very well when taking the plenum model as source. That’s because a single pure ’entity A’ can never be found and extracted: its internal differentiations continuously and ceaselessly unfold anew upon zooming-in, without end. 
 
If an almost pure ‘A’ could be separated out from the rest, everything else being annihilated away, upon zooming-in we still can’t help but find some genre of differences lurking. Descriptive adjectives can still be employed to distinguish parts from wholes. Such a universe might in part look much like the universe it came from (perhaps without certain complexities like lifeforms, but nonetheless its in a continual, dynamic flux). It still looks like it could be generated entirely from its internal contrasts, as ‘positive and negative zones’ naturally emerge in reciprocation. It could easily lead one directly towards a metaphysics based around an ontology by way of active contrasts. 

It’s tantalizing, but the oversight here is that it doesn’t acknowledge that our metaphysics is a product of our epistemology, the way we relate to our reality (a fact that it can’t get around even if it wants to). This epistemological ‘constraint’ requires the concept of ‘Existence’ to trump ‘difference’ in order to be able to conceptualize ‘Contrast Ontology’ in the first place!  
Mentally we have to envisage a ‘thing’ prior to imagine how ‘a contrast with another thing reciprocally shaped it’. Our metaphysics is forced to base itself on the way we think because this is what knowledge means — our perceptual observations of reality, and concepts built upon that. Thus it is correct to deny ‘Contrast Ontology’ as the ultimate metaphysical explanation even if a plenum model, itself an imagined abstraction from familiar ‘things’, seems to divulge ‘contrast’ as an underlying ‘generative force’ of sorts. 

 

We have to deny ‘Contrast Ontology’ even here in the plenum universe on the basis that (theoretical yet unreachably pure) ‘A’ still would be ‘A’ (+ would ‘have’ the identity of ‘A’).  

There’s no getting around it!  

That’s the side of the dispute that our metaphysics has to naturally and logically come down on.

 


What to do now with ‘Contrast Ontology’? 

To be generous to ‘Contrast Ontology’ for a moment, when working out our metaphysics (an epistemological process) ‘Contrast Ontology’ (or whatever name it goes by) is something that we might want to conceive of, consider and confront before weeding it out, especially if we take seriously a plenum-type model (as I currently do). But, because Identity is so tightly bound to Existence, Identity always ‘has’ that intrinsic attribute despite any additional relative attribute, ‘Contrast Ontology’ simply has to be shown the door.
A good metaphysical model of reality doesn’t have room for compromise here, it’s conceptual winner-take-all. To return to my initial post: “A is A” must win out against “A is A because of not-A“ because it is the simpler sentence, the other one is built upon the first — it’s actually as simple as that! 

Anyway, that is where we have to secure the metaphysical concept of Existence/Identity. 

We have to couch both Existence and Identity in terms of ‘being’, prior to terms of ‘difference’ for the same reason that number 1 is prior to number 2 beyond mere enumeration — ‘thing’ comes before relations of things. If we play the game the other-way around, even if we only promote ‘difference’ to the very same level of ‘being’ (which is exactly what ‘Contrast Ontology’ tried to do, ingratiating itself as ‘a more sophisticated integration’), we actually lose everything in a fuzzy muddle which does not arrive at a greater truth about reality, despite promising to do so. 

We must conceptualize our metaphysics on ‘solid ground’ — on Existence first — in order to then see ‘difference’ and ‘contrast’ and fit them into the picture. Our metaphysics must be one-thing-at-a-time like our experience of entities in life, it can’t handle being a snap-shot of everything — that only results in a blur.  

 


The idea of contrast as generator of two opposites (e.g., black and white) out of a neutral ‘nothingness’ (undifferentiated ‘grayness’) is actually still an applicable concept, but one more suited to the metaphysics of Consciousness rather than the metaphysics of ontological Existence. 

Over on the Consciousness/identification side of things — moving into epistemology — I think there’s a feasible case that can be made for a ‘Contrast Epistemology’ hypothesis to describe the way percepts are hewn from sensation, then concepts hewn from percepts, then concepts hewn from other concepts. It seems quite compatible with Objectivism, backed-up by advances in neuroscience and predictive coding I venture — but for clarity’s sake that’ll be another topic! 

 

 


Addressing some select points… 

 

On 10/25/2018 at 9:45 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

I am under the impression that you want to posit something about metaphysics rather than epistemology, however upon finding no room in metaphysics, and being edged toward epistemology, you have resorted to a sort of schizophrenic break-up of metaphysics proper.  This on its own constitutes moving into what Objectivism rejects:  the dichotomy between Existence and Identity.


I don’t quite assent to the schizophrenia diagnosis between my metaphysics and epistemology (which might in itself be a symptom!), but I do now think ‘Ontology via Contrast’ at root entails a dichotomy between Existence and Identity. 

Although Objectivism holds that Existence is Identity it also holds them as two distinct axioms. 
Why — isn’t this itself schizophrenic?

Is the second axiom present merely because of the third axiom, Consciousness, requires Identity as a bridge into identifying Existence? 
 
Indeed, in a universe bereft of consciousness, the Identity axiom might look a little redundant, other than serving to underline the fact that entities are what they are. Existence and Identity could be rolled into one paired-axiom, however something metaphysically important would be lost if this is done: we lose all sense of a universe of difference, action, change, relations, etc. Identity has to be conceptually pulled out from brute Existence for entities to ‘exhibit themselves to the rest of reality’ (not only to us). They both need each other, as epistemologically separable concepts, whilst metaphysically they ‘work as one’.

(Sorry, I’m waffling a bit, but it helps me think while I sup my gin lemon) 
 

 

On 10/25/2018 at 9:45 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Objectivism holds existence IS identity.  (It is ironic that the word "IS" must be used here.... the full implication of this equality of existence with identity, to be understood fully and completely, depends on what it means to BE in the mind of the reader...) A thing's existence and identity are one and the same.  Entities ARE their attributes (in the broadest sense), all of them.  At any one time, EVERY thing IS something in particular, namely, ITSELF.

 

Beautiful — I just wanted to re-quote this as it hits the nail so squarely on the head. 


 

On 10/25/2018 at 9:45 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

Rand's Razor:

Suppose:

Existence IS Identity

AND

(Rather than identity entailing "difference") identities of reality "exhibit" variety

Q: What further concept(s) are necessary? (with respect to our current discussion)

 

Yes, I now prefer “identities of reality exhibit variety” rather than “identity entailing ‘difference’”. 

Identity is about ‘exhibiting’ a given attribute or panoply of attributes, rather than demanding a priori difference (in the first instance). 

 


On to Grames… 

On 10/26/2018 at 7:02 AM, Grames said:

Entities are their attributes.  Attributes can be described as intrinsic or relational.


Thanks Grames, it was that intrinsic aspect of the attribute of being the existent which was missing from my thinking — and ultimately sweeps aside ‘Ontology via Contrast’. 


 

On 10/26/2018 at 7:02 AM, Grames said:

An intrinsic attribute is unknowable except by how it causes the entity to act.


Nice, I hadn’t thought of that — ‘act’ in its broadest sense; sounds, smells, and tastes as it does, acts to reflect light, even blocks what is behind it, etc. But also the act of being. So, in a way, all Identity is active (even purely ontologically, without consciousness needing to be in the picture). 


 

On 10/26/2018 at 7:02 AM, Grames said:

'Contrast Ontology' seems to posit "if an entity has no ability to act with respect one of its intrinsic attributes, that intrinsic attribute does not exist."  And with respect to hypothetical existents of only a single attribute, that existent would not exist.  Put positively, an existent's identity and existence are made possible by its relationships to other existents.


However, I wouldn’t have thought of framing ‘Contrast Ontology’ in the way you had: intrinsic attributes, if not active are thus unknowable, if unknowable they don’t exist — that would obviously be primacy-of-consciousness.   

 

Because I didn’t think this was a particularly valid line of attack on ‘Contrast Ontology’, the follow-up post by StrictlyLogical didn’t land any further punches on it — but it had already been on the ropes, then knocked-out by the end on round one. They are all good and interesting points, but I think the unknowability of the Pastafarian deity is starting to drift a wee bit off topic here.  

 

 

What I’ve leant so far on this forum lark… 

Well it’s been very useful. Apart from firming up a better sense of Objectivist metaphysics, how Existence and Identity ought to be conceptualized, I want to mention the importance of explaining things in an unambiguous way. This is especially true for tricky concepts under this particular forum heading of Metaphysics and Epistemology, and I look back at my earlier posts in this thread and can see all the unnecessary communication errors. This resulted in some portions of the replies aiming at the wrong target and my gradual realization of how unclear the ‘Contrast Ontology’ idea had been. Nonetheless, having to then clarify things for others helped sort matters out for myself and I could slowly see certain ambiguities surface which forced me to modify the ‘Contrast Ontology’ position until I could finally reject it as ultimate metaphysical description of reality (without necessarily denying the possible cruciality of difference/contrast within that description). 

My somewhat amorphous ‘Ontology via Contrast’ idea had been my first hurdle to clear on the path towards understanding Objectivism more fully, and I’ve cast it off and am now running with what could be called, if anything, the ‘Ontology via Existence’ concept which is starting to feel like a baton made of much sturdier stuff. 

 

 


So, under an Objectivist remit, could ‘Contrast Ontology’ be refuted on metaphysical grounds? 
Yes, it can and should be refuted. 

Everyone happy?
I am. 


Well played all — StrictlyLogical, Grames, William O.

 


I’ll end on a question which is still apt, but better formulated, one which is still not crystal clear in my mind… 
Does Identity sometimes or always involve a relational aspect with other identities (in addition to an intrinsic ‘existent’ aspect)?  

 


Please feel free, anyone, to add any further thoughts… 


 

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Justice demands more but for now all I can say is Well Done.  For your tenacity, diligence, civility, open mindedness, you sir are a “seeker of truth” if I have ever encountered one... truly one of the most pleasant and interesting exchanges I’ve had here ever.

 

I’m a little pressed for time so I’ll keep what is to follow as succinct as I can.

Philosophically speaking plenum versus discrete is neither here nor there.  I’m perhaps ambivalent to the idea that either matters.  Indeed the extreme case of non locality ... wave functions spanning all of space and overlapping with everything else or the odd mixed case of literal billiard balls being a continuum of stuff in the shape of spheres in a total unreified vacuum, none of it is philosophy proper, they are the domain of the special sciences and physics in particular.

As for your final question in the last part of the post, I can’t quite discern its meaning.

 

I do like how you have begun to shift the idea into epistemology...

I did have a thought still mostly metaphysical and perhaps only analogously and obliquely symmetrical to your original idea...

Now we know in metaphysics and epistemology Identity and Identification are linked by interaction/causality since Without interaction there is no causality and without causality no perception or identification.  But even purely in the realm of metaphysics, if things are thier attributes, then for a thing to BE is equivalent to a thing ACTING... I say this because an entity or an attribute which has no causal consequence whatever would be simply an arbitrary and meaningless claim. By definition attributes of entities ARE causal, they are involved in interaction, they act... otherwise there is nothing attributable to the attribute...  Perhaps there is in a sense a way of looking at things “being the fact that they interact” as identical to a concatenation equivalent to the idea that things are thier attributes and thier attributes are causal/interactive... This isn’t exactly what you had in mind but it squarely places existence as identity in its context of things being thier interacting attributes within a multiplicity.

 

Clear as mud but it covers the floor eh?

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3 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

I’ll end on a question which is still apt, but better formulated, one which is still not crystal clear in my mind… 
Does Identity sometimes or always involve a relational aspect with other identities (in addition to an intrinsic ‘existent’ aspect)?

Many things exist.  Everything that exists interacts with every other thing that exists, and no matter how small or attenuated that interaction may be it is not zero.  For an existent to be somehow isolated fully from every aspect of existence it would effectively be in its own separate universe, unknowable and epistemologically out-of-bounds as an object of valid thought.

Identity  which does not involve a relational aspect with other identities is just unknowable.  So it can't be discussed.  

Metaphysics and epistemology go together because the limits of what can can be claimed to exist coincide with the limits of what is knowable.   No one can justifiably confirm or deny either the existence or nonexistence of what is outside of the Universe.  Any justification that one might discover to such an isolated unknown would also be a casual link that would rope that existent into inclusion in what the concept Universe refers to which is the entirety of existence.   Existence is Identity is Casuality.

 

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Thank you very much StrictlyLogical
Wow! 
I’m cock-a-hoop with your generous praise ~ that's certainly made my day

&
 
Thank you too Grames
Your last posts have been remarkably insightful

 


You both deserve a response to your points, but I’ll try for the brevity award this time… 

 

 

Discrete v continuous ‘plenum’ universe — does it matter?  
I agree with you StrictlyLogical that the proof is in the eating of the pudding, and physics is the preeminent judge on ultimate pudding-ness. 
Our metaphysics should be a domain above natural science’s discrete v continuous debate.
However, as metaphysics lays the ground-rules, it might be conducive to have some prior grasp of the scope of theoretical physics in order that its guidelines are fit for purpose. So some future physics-derived definitions might well need to be processed back through the ontological rulebook: it calls for an occasional two-way street.


As Objectivist metaphysics is shrewdly kept lean, well within philosophy’s tight foundational vertex, in a corner away from physic’s enticing pudding-bowl confectionery and appetizing recipes, so there’s little danger that it will ingest any more than necessary — just an occasional nutritional nibble to ensure that they continue to speak the same language.


I must say I find the discrete v continuous debate an absorbing one — especially the idea that there must be a fact about the matter. I had previously posted that metaphysical ground-rules might be able to help sway our thinking around this dispute. I recognize that I currently have a bias towards the continuum model and acknowledge that this predilection had colored my metaphysics regarding ‘Contrast Ontology’. After-all, picturing how such a ‘plenum’ universe might work was what initially propelled me into speculating that ‘creative contrast’ might be the ‘missing link’ explicating mechanism that ought to take its place alongside the other established metaphysical concepts. My ‘Contrast Ontology’ notion has a history, built upon other ideas but largely hatch out of my rough-hewn armchair physics — of envisaging clouds of +/− forces interact reciprocally — whilst puffing happily away on my Rationalist pipe. 

This is just to relate how predispositions around the discrete–continuous dispute, or similar physics-domain issues, can indeed infect our metaphysics if we are not vigilant. I think it is good practice to acknowledge where we stand, even subconsciously, in order to check against such ‘ideological viruses’ so that our metaphysical premises remain logically untainted, not impeded or derailed.  

 

 

Metaphysics contained within our epistemology… 
Yes, it is only right and natural that our metaphysics is ‘constrained’ by Homo sapiens epistemological apparatus — because it can’t be otherwise, that’s what knowledge actually is for us. We naturally ‘see’ existence as primary whilst relationship notions like ‘difference’ and ‘contrast’ we ‘view’ as ultimately ancillary. Any theory that posits the opposite or conflates primary with ancillary will be in conflict with ‘what we see/know’ and in the last instant must be reconciled, come home to objective sensation-based knowledge. 

In this forum topic I have grasped something vital about the integration of metaphysics and epistemology and that epistemology can justly impinge upon a metaphysical issue. 

 

 

About my last question… 
 

Does Identity sometimes or always involve a relational aspect with other identities (in addition to an intrinsic ‘existent’ aspect)? 

 

The question arose out of Grames’s post on attributes being described as intrinsic or relational. It popped into my head that there was still some last-minute milking to be done around the relational aspect of identity. 

As all existents ‘had’ the intrinsic attribute of simply being something (true even for ‘purely relational’ ones), did they all entail an additional relational aspect


I was just fishing around, waiting to see if someone would be able to sell me an existent which is ‘something’ yet didn’t relate, in some loose way, to another existent.  I had assumed that Identity always involves both an intrinsic and relational aspect, but I wanted to cast around for contrary views. It was no more than a tacked-on query to round off with. 

 
Grames tackles the question with aplomb, step-by-step showing how existence, relations, identity, causation and even knowability are all integrated — intriguing tie-ins, which segues into…

 

  

…‘Being’ as ‘action’ — therefore ontology entails causation… 

On 10/28/2018 at 2:09 AM, StrictlyLogical said:

Perhaps there is in a sense a way of looking at things “being the fact that they interact” as identical to a concatenation equivalent to the idea that things are thier attributes and thier attributes are causal/interactive..

You’re on a roll StrictlyLogical! That’s prescient.


The assumed dichotomy between ‘static being’ v ‘dynamic action’ might have just bitten the dust. 
(There’s a pattern, dichotomies just keep on folding don’t they — and I feel a new topic coming on!)
 
Furthermore, it bolsters the idea that all entities/extents have at least one intrinsic and relational attribute, moreover these aspects of Identity are intrinsically and relationally causal.  


Here, if I may, I think it might be apposite to rehabilitate the notion of ‘difference’ that has run through this thread:    
Every-thing is (supplementarily) a ‘difference’ that makes a difference — thus a definition of no-thing is in not causing any difference anywhere/ever

 

Kudos to Grames for wrapping it up so succinctly… 

On 10/28/2018 at 3:52 AM, Grames said:

Existence is Identity is Casuality.


Perfectly put.

Well, almost…

  • The above quoted dictum exists
  • The above dictum exhibits identity
  • The above existent/identity may even cause Grames to spell-check ‘Causality’ — thus modifying an intrinsic/relative attribute.

(Sorry Grames but I couldn’t resist) 

 

 


Conclusion ~ ‘Ontology via Contrast’ ~ a proposition not concurrent with Objectivism. 
For the various interrelated reasons mustered amongst the posts above…

 

Is that a wrap, folks?

 

 

 

Edited by A.C.E.
I remembered that forum guidelines frown on emojis 😉!
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1 hour ago, A.C.E. said:

Here, if I may, I think it might be apposite to rehabilitate the notion of ‘difference’ that has run through this thread:    
Every-thing is (supplementarily) a ‘difference’ that makes a difference — thus a definition of no-thing is in not causing any difference anywhere/ever

Ah.. the poetry of this is sublime.  As with the best of any poetry, one dispenses with the denotation, and embraces the connotation... which here is spot on.

[If I could "like" your posts (the currency of recognition of value and contribution here) I would (but for some reason I cannot)]

 

I'm quite happy with the exchange, although it has not fundamentally changed my thinking, it has shifted my orientation or perhaps my introspective perspective of those thoughts... "things" are still what they have always been, but now, that reality which has always been a whole, seems just a little more colorful, varied, and slightly more full of vitality and action.

 

As for a wrap...

I'm not so keen on putting something in a box, tying it with a little bow, putting it in a drawer of a cabinet, and closing the door of the closet in which they all sit.  Although it keeps it from dust and damage, the idea of it being in the dark and out of sight make me cringe a little.  Better to simply and carefully place it on a shelf, in full view, for safe keeping but for occasional viewing and dusting and ready for necessary discussion or revision as the occasion warrants.

 

So I'm placing this on my shelf for the nonce, its recently polished beauty stealing a glance from me often... so much so, that I do indeed look forward to hearing any musings you might have in future!

Cheers!

 

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13 hours ago, A.C.E. said:

As all existents ‘had’ the intrinsic attribute of simply being something (true even for ‘purely relational’ ones), did they all entail an additional relational aspect

This framing of the question is itself misleading and presumptuous.   The question implicitly posits some existent above or beneath or prior to its attributes which then acts by possessing its attributes.  It can be challenging process to break a prior habit of mind in favor of a new one, and this is one example of how "existence is identity" is a notion so fundamental that it challenges how one even tries to frame the questions.  The idea of an existent or entity with no attributes is essentially Idealist/Platonic/mystical.  "Existence is identity" is Rand's coined phrase but is essentially Aristotelian, who was and is the metaphysical opponent to Platonism and other more modern versions of Idealism.

To add one more thing. I am a "full plenum" guy myself.  All you need to be "a full plenum guy" was taught by Parmenides.  I do not see why you felt a need to do any philosophizing to enable a full plenum ontology viable.  Moving from metaphysics to physics, Quantum Field Theory is also a full plenum theory.  

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Well spotted Grames — I’ve had my comeuppance!


Yes, at the bare minimum that inept adjective ‘additional’ should have been well-encased between scare-quotes, but actually the whole tenor of that question seems so utterly jarring now that you pointed it out.

All I can say is that it takes time and willed effort to re-wire those 55-year-old neuronal bundles. During this month-long thread they’ve been wrenched out and re-soldered across cortex into the updated assemblage, but there are still a few that are loose and sparking erratically, homesick for their old secure links — but it's nothing regular mental application can’t fix, and what better place than Objectivism Online Forum

 

As for Team-Plenum, yes we’re also ‘fielding’ big badass QFT, but that might not convince the most tenacious particle-philes amongst us because, when you get right down to it, there’s always an ever-smaller scale where fields might turn out to be more particle-like. It looks to me tantamount to a game that no team can conclusively ever win hands-down, not by empirical investigation alone. 

 


I have a hunch (already setting teeth on edge!) that a well-integrated metaphysics might be able to rule-out one or other model, or at least tip the balance. The ‘avoid voids’ logical argument is just within the ambit of metaphysics, and it takes skill for a particle-phile to convincingly parry that particular concern. Occam’s razor too can be wielded against the discrete model, skewing things slightly towards a continuous model (see my 18 October post above). Anyway, if I can marshal a more robust case then it might be an interesting topic. Something along the lines of ‘continuous or discrete: what, if anything, can metaphysics contribute to this debate on the ultimate structure of the universe?


I’ll need to first check through the relevant erstwhile topics (including the Physics and Mathematics heading) before attempting anything new and to avoid rehashing old issues. But I also have one or two other metaphysical topics brewing which I want to launch in an appropriate order.  

 

 


P.S. Thank you very much StrictlyLogical for my very first ‘Like’ + thank you dream_weaver for making it technically possible — this grateful Novice is now basking in a warm glow. 

 

 

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