Consciousness as Irreducible

[StrictlyLogical]

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

This is a confusing way to talk about it.

First off, it is fair to consider information a part of physical reality, much like how light is part of physical reality, or color, or taste (information can't be called an object,. but it is physical)  To call consciousness and other mental phenomena as mental is just to say that they are internal processes of information processing. Color is not a thing you "put onto" objects; flavors are not "put onto" objects. Mental content is not a distinct form of existence, and fundamentally unique compared to anything else that exists - it's just a type of information. So asking what they consist of doesn't make sense. The mind (consciousness) is an action, and action don't really "consist of" anything. What does running consist of? But there are physical parts to the degree that you, the entity, need physical components (more specifically, tangible components) to do anything. 

 

" action don't really "consist of" anything. What does running consist of?"

Conceptually speaking, composites or complexities of any category consist of portions or parts of the same category... so a complex or high level action can consist of a number of subactions etc. until one gets to what one could call "atomic" or fundamental actions.  So running can be a composite action consisting of bending a knee, raising a leg. extending the foot... etc.

Mind not being a substance it would not consist of substances, but it could be a complex process/action (IMHO) consisting of subprocesses/subactions (recalling a memory, bringing a set of premises into focus, repeating the premises, weighing the implications, concentrating on one of the senses, etc.)

Now, your statement (The mind (consciousness) is an action, and action don't really "consist of" anything) I think also implies (more importantly) that action does not consist of substances... which I totally agree with. 

 

 

[MisterSwig]

6 hours ago, Grames said:

With the new conceptual framework of information theory even mental phenomena can now be included with the category of "physical reality". 

I don't see how. Binswanger addressed this view starting on page 45 of How We Know. Do you disagree with his position that computers don't literally process information?

[Grames]

1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

I don't see how. Binswanger addressed this view starting on page 45 of How We Know. Do you disagree with his position that computers don't literally process information?

I emphatically disagree. He does not know what he is talking about.  It is demonstrably false that the only information is semantic information since Shannon published in 1948.  Denying nonsemantic information is as absurd as denying evolution, or more absurd since he uses the internet everyday.

[Easy Truth]

On 5/1/2019 at 8:24 AM, MisterSwig said:

I therefore tend to subclassify "consciousness" (its action and content) as a product of the brain's reaction to stimuli.

Isn't that deterministic argument, against free will, if it is all a product of reaction to stimuli?

[MisterSwig]

1 hour ago, Easy Truth said:

On 5/1/2019 at 8:24 AM, MisterSwig said:

I therefore tend to subclassify "consciousness" (its action and content) as a product of the brain's reaction to stimuli.

Isn't that deterministic argument, against free will, if it is all a product of reaction to stimuli?

No. You must make a choice, but which alternative you choose is up to you.

I have created a blog with two long articles devoted to my theory of free will. The first one covers my main, introspective argument. The second one covers the differences between me and Hume. I'll entertain serious objections in the blog comments. Thanks!

 https://freewilltheory.blogspot.com/