The law of causality incompatible w/ randomness?

[jrs]

The Law of Causality is a corollary of the Axiom of Identity.

Stephen Speicher has claimed in another thread that the Law of Causality is incompatible with the randomness of quantum mechanics. I disagree.

I would formulate the Law of Causality as follows:

The same causes produce the same {probability distribution over possible} effects [regardless of when the event occurs, or where, or in what orientation, or how fast it is moving (below light-speed), or in which direction it is moving].

The part in braces {} takes account of the nondeterminism of radioactive decay, free will, and quantum uncertainty.

The part in brackets [] incorporates the special principle of relativity, a part of the special theory of relativity.

I do not think that the Axiom of Identity forbids the part in braces.

[punk]

I haven't gone back to the cited thread but I'll say my peace.

There are two distinct things that get confused under the notion of "causality":

1. Every effect has a cause.

That is to say that any observed change in the state of things can be deduced to stem from a particular cause.

Quantum mechanics does allow events to occur that have no clear cause. An example is the spontaneous emission of a photon from an excited atom. That is once an electron in an atom is moved to a more energetic state it will sit in that state for some period of time and then will eventually move without an identifiable cause down to a lower energy state emitting a photon.

2. A cause always produces the same effect.

That is to say that if I set up the same situation and do the same thing within it over and over I should get the same results ever time. One could look at this as a kind of uniformity in the behavior of the universe.

This sort of rule *is* consistent with quantum mechanics once you generalize (as done above) to a set of effects each with a specific statistical frequency. So if we call an "experiment" a large number of repetitions of the same event we should be able to observe a set of effects and look at how many times each effect occurs we can measure the statistical frequency of each event. Multiple *experiments* should produce the same set of effects and the same statistical frequencies.

[Hal]

I also disagree regarding this. Objectivism allows that mental events are caused although indeterminate. A person, in identical circumstances, can act in different ways and yet whichever way he does act is held to be 'caused'. There doesnt seem to be anything to prevent a physical object from acting likewise - having 2 or more alternatives open to it in a given circumstance while still causing whichever one occurred. In this case we would say "it is in the nature of this object to act in 2 different ways under the same circumstances", not "this object has no identity".

punk

Every effect has a cause.

This is poor phrasing - saying that every effect has a cause is a trivial statement about language; if something didnt have a cause then we wouldnt call it an 'effect'. A better phrasing would be "every event is caused", but this hides the fact that different events can be caused in radically different ways (mental vs physical causation for instance). Edited April 1, 2005 by Hal

[AisA]

I also disagree regarding this. Objectivism allows that mental events are caused although indeterminate. A person, in identical circumstances, can act in different ways and yet whichever way he does act is held to be 'caused'. There doesnt seem to be anything to prevent a physical object from acting likewise - having 2 or more alternatives open to it in a given circumstance while still causing whichever one occurred. In this case we would say "it is in the nature of this object to act in 2 different ways under the same circumstances", not "this object has no identity".

Volition is an attribute of man's consciousness -- as may be determined directly by introspection.

However, there is no evidence that volition is an attribute of any other matter in the universe. And, since proving a negative is impossible, the fact that "there doesn't seem to be anything to prevent a physical object from acting likewise" does not constitute evidence that such a thing is a possibility.

[dondigitalia]

Where did Mr. Speicher make this claim?

[punk]

I also disagree regarding this. Objectivism allows that mental events are caused although indeterminate. A person, in identical circumstances, can act in different ways and yet whichever way he does act is held to be 'caused'. There doesnt seem to be anything to prevent a physical object from acting likewise - having 2 or more alternatives open to it in a given circumstance while still causing whichever one occurred. In this case we would say "it is in the nature of this object to act in 2 different ways under the same circumstances", not "this object has no identity".

This is poor phrasing - saying that every effect has a cause is a trivial statement about language; if something didnt have a cause then we wouldnt call it an 'effect'. A better phrasing would be "every event is caused", but this hides the fact that different events can be caused in radically different ways (mental vs physical causation for instance).

Congratulations. You've mastered the dictionary.

Replace "effect" with "event" as appropriate.

[jrs]

dondigitalia asked "Where did Mr. Speicher make this claim?".

Excuse me. I should have specified that in my previous message in this thread.

Stephen Speicher made the following statements in the "Heisenberg uncertainty principle" thread in the "Physics and Mathematics" subforum:

"If by 'randomness' in this context you mean that the exact same non-volitional entity may act differently under the exact same physical circumstances, then that is a violation of the law of causality, and causality is a fundamental axiom of Objectivism."

"The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is a separate issue from that of 'randomness on a quantum level.' The assertion of quantum randomness as it is typically made in, say, the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, is of a metaphysical, not an epistemological nature. It is a destruction of causality itself."

"You do not appear to realize that the indeterminism of your 'metaphysical randomness' is a violation of both identity and causality. To exist is to be something specific, and an entity's identity is the sum total of all of its attributes and characteristics. When we say that an entity acts in accord with its nature, we mean that the entity's attributes and characteristics determine, in any given set of physical circumstances, what an entity can do. The action possible to an entity is caused and necessitated by what the entity is."

"For an entity to act against its nature would be a contradiction of its identity; it would be saying that, in spite of the specific attributes and characteristics possessed by the entity, it would act otherwise. According to your notion of metaphysical randomness, an entity could act in two contrary ways under the exact same physical circumstances, and that would imply the existence of two contrary attributes being part of the entity's nature, and that would be a contradiction."

"Identity is the totality of attributes and characteristics possessed by an entity, and such attributes and characteristics cannot be contradictory. If an entity were able to move left in some particular physical circumstances, and yet able to move right in the same physical circumstances, such contradictory actions would be derived from contradictory aspects of the entity's nature. But contradictions do not exist, A is A, and the only action possible to an entity, in any given physical circumstances, is that single action which is caused and necessitated by its nature. Choice is that single action possible to a volitional consciousness, and it is that attribute which permits freely selecting from among alternatives. And, unlike the notion of 'metaphysical randomness,' causality is operative throughout."

I did not post my message in that thread because I wanted to discuss this issue in the context of the Law of Causality rather than in the context of Quantum Mechanics. Consequently, I put my new thread in the "Metaphysics and Epistemology" subforum.

[Hal]

Volition is an attribute of man's consciousness -- as may be determined directly by introspection.

However, there is no evidence that volition is an attribute of any other matter in the universe.  And, since proving a negative is impossible, the fact that "there doesn't seem to be anything to prevent a physical object from acting likewise" does not constitute evidence that such a thing is a possibility.

However claiming something is arbitrary is different from claiming it is impossible. Peikoff's comments in OPAR appear to suggest he views it as the latter.

In any case, quantum physics is 'evidence' that randomness is possible. Perhaps you disagree with the interpretations given, but if it doesn't constitute 'evidence' then I'm not sure what would.

Edited April 4, 2005 by Hal

[AisA]

However claiming something is arbitrary is different from claiming it is impossible. Peikoff's comments in OPAR appear to suggest he views it as the latter.

Can you give me a page number?

In any case, quantum physics is 'evidence' that randomness is possible. Perhaps you disagree with the interpretations given, but if it doesn't constitute 'evidence' then I'm not sure what would.

What observations in quantum physics are evidence of randomness, i.e. of acausal behavior?

[Hal]

Can you give me a page number?

Not offhand, since not at home. His discussion is in the first chapter though, where he states that casuality is a corollary of identity. This suggests that if his statements regarding identity are 'true' then casuality is a logical consequence; ie it is impossible (not arbitrary) for a thing to be

Metaphysics is distinct from epistemology. The statement that something is impossible is a metaphysical, whereas to say that something is arbitrary relates to epistemology.

What observations in quantum physics are evidence of randomness, i.e. of acausal behavior?

From my (albeit very limited) knowledge of quantum physics, no clear cause for collapse of the wave function has been found despite almost 100 years of searching. Also afaik theories advocating randomness proved to be consistent with Bell's inequality immediately, without requiring large numbers of ad hoc revisions. I think that predictive success is certainly evidence that something is fundamentally correct.

Again, I'm not claming that QM _is_ random. I'm arguing that there is evidence to suggest that randomness is a possibility - ie to make it a non-arbitrary claim.

Edited April 4, 2005 by Hal

[AisA]

Not offhand, since not at home. His discussion is in the first chapter though, where he states that casuality is a corollary of identity. This suggests that if his statements regarding identity are 'true' then casuality is a logical consequence; ie it is impossible (not arbitrary) for a thing to be

Metaphysics is distinct from epistemology. The statement that something is impossible is a metaphysical, whereas to say that something is arbitrary relates to epistemology.

Let me clarify my terms.

To use Miss Rand's formulation, the law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. The law states that all actions are actions of entities, and that the identity of an entity determines the actions that are possible to it.

It does not state that all entities have a cause. It states that all actions have a cause.

So, I would agree that the assertion that actions can exist with no cause (random), or in contradiction to the identity of the entity that is acting, is false because it is impossible.

However, volition is not a violation of the law of identity. It is not an example of uncaused action or randomness. Volition is an attribute of human consciousness that gives man the power to choose. An entity – a conscious, human mind – acting in accordance with its identity, causes an action – choice.

Thus, we cannot rule out the existence of volition in non-human matter on the basis that such a notion contradicts the law of identity; it does not. However, in the absence of any evidence to support this notion, we can say that asserting that such a thing is possible is arbitrary.

The arbitrary, incidentally, is not somehow "less false" than the impossible. Peikoff, in fact, notes that in one respect the arbitrary is even worse because there is no way to establish its relationship to reality, i.e. there is no way to know whether it corresponds to reality (i.e. is true) or is contradicted by reality (i.e. is false).

From my (albeit very limited) knowledge of quantum physics, no clear cause for collapse of the wave function has been found despite almost 100 years of searching.

The absence of an explanation for a phenomena is not evidence that there is no explanation, i.e. it is not evidence that the phenomena is causeless or random. There was no explanation for lightning for thousands of years, yet we eventually discovered its cause.

Also afaik theories advocating randomness proved to be consistent with Bell's inequality immediately, without requiring large numbers of ad hoc revisions. I think that predictive success is certainly evidence that something is fundamentally correct.

Predictive success is crucial for any theory, but if it requires the acceptance of a contradiction, one can state with certainty that it is false.

Ptolemy's theory of epicircles predicted planetary motion, but once we realized it was based on a contradiction, it had to be abandoned.

By the way, are you familiar with Dr. Lewis Little's Theory of Elemental Waves? It explains much "quantum weirdness". Though there is still debate about whether it explains the double delayed choice experiment, it is a rational theory requiring no randomness or other contradictions.

Again, I'm not claming that QM _is_ random. I'm arguing that there is evidence to suggest that randomness is a possibility - ie to make it a non-arbitrary claim.

If randomness means lacking a cause, such an assertion is not arbitrary, it is contradictory and therefore impossible.

A phenomena with an unknown cause does not become a phenomena with no cause no matter how much time passes.

[Hal]

It does not state that all entities have a cause. It states that all actions have a cause.

So, I would agree that the assertion that actions can exist with no cause (random), or in contradiction to the identity of the entity that is acting, is false because it is impossible.

It's not being claimed the the action has no cause, it's being claimed that it is in the nature of the entity to act in a random manner, just as it is in the nature of humans to act volitionally. In both cases, the action would be caused by the identity of the agent (at least from an agent-casuality perspective).

However, volition is not a violation of the law of identity.  It is not an example of uncaused action or randomness.  Volition is an attribute of human consciousness that gives man the power to choose.  An entity – a conscious, human mind – acting in accordance with its identity, causes an action – choice.

Just as the entity, the electron, acting randomly would cause <whatever-it-caused>.

The arbitrary, incidentally, is not somehow "less false" than the impossible. 

This may be true (I'm not sure what 'less false' means here), but there is still a _distinction_ between arbitrariness and impossibility - one is metaphysical, the other epistemological.

The absence of an explanation for a phenomena is not evidence that there is no explanation

I would say that the inability to find evidence over a long period of time is certainly a suggestion that your quest is in vain. It doesnt mean that the thing doesnt exist, but it should at least raise some doubts. To take examples from science, the inability to detect ether (NOT in the Objectivist sense of the word) led to the rejection of the concept, and the same with phlogiston.

There's only so long that you can keep insisting "It's there! We just havent found it yet!" before people start explorting other options.

it is not evidence that the phenomena is causeless or random.  There was no explanation for lightning for thousands of years, yet we eventually discovered its cause.

And one day we might discover a fully consistent interpretation of quantum physics which doesnt involve randomness, but until that happens, there is no reason not to explore different avenues.

Predictive success is crucial for any theory, but if it requires the acceptance of a contradiction, one can state with certainty that it is false. 

I agree, but the issue is whether randomness IS a contradiction.

Ptolemy's theory of epicircles predicted planetary motion, but once we realized it was based on a contradiction, it had to be abandoned.

What was the contradiction? As far as I know, it was mainly abandoned because the Copernican theory gave neater mathematics.

By the way, are you familiar with Dr. Lewis Little's Theory of Elemental Waves? It explains much "quantum weirdness".  Though there is still debate about whether it explains the double delayed choice experiment, it is a rational theory requiring no randomness or other contradictions.

I dont (yet) have the background in physics required to evaluate it. However I think it seems slightly ad hoc, and the fact it makes no new predictions is certainly a large point against it. However, if it were to explain all the observed phenomena in a more 'classical' way than opposing theories then I would certainly deem it worthy of serious consideration. I do not have the technical knowledge to comment on whether this is indeed the case. Edited April 4, 2005 by Hal

[Uberzilla]

If randomness means lacking a cause, such an assertion is not arbitrary, it is contradictory and therefore impossible.

There can be no "randomness" in the context used in this conversation as there would be nothing for that which exists to adapt to. For adaptation to occur there has to be repeatable structural behavior. Randomness as described here would indeed contradict existense.

[Hal]

There can be no "randomness" in the context used in this conversation as there would be nothing for that which exists to adapt to. For adaptation to occur there has to be repeatable structural behavior. Randomness as described here would indeed contradict existense.

Im confused what you mean here; are you making a biological/evolutionary argument, or something else?

[AisA]

It's not being claimed the the action has no cause, it's being claimed that it is in the nature of the entity to act in a random manner, just as it is in the nature of humans to act volitionally. In both cases, the action would be caused by the identity of the agent (at least from an agent-casuality perspective).

Before we go any further, please define what you mean by random.

This may be true (I'm not sure what 'less false' means here), but there is still a _distinction_ between arbitrariness and impossibility - one is metaphysical, the other epistemological.

But what is the relevance of this?

I would say that the inability to find evidence over a long period of time is certainly a suggestion that your quest is in vain. It doesnt mean that the thing doesnt exist, but it should at least raise some doubts. To take examples from science, the inability to detect ether (NOT in the Objectivist sense of the word) led to the rejection of the concept, and the same with phlogiston.

There's only so long that you can keep insisting "It's there! We just havent found it yet!" before people start explorting other options.

And one day we might discover a fully consistent interpretation of quantum physics which doesnt involve randomness, but until that happens, there is no reason not to explore different avenues.

Are you saying that the inability to provide a rational explanation justifies accepting an irrational one?

What was the contradiction? As far as I know, it was mainly abandoned because the Copernican theory gave neater mathematics.

The contradiction is that the earth is not the center of the solar system.

I dont (yet) have the background in physics required to evaluate it. However I think it seems slightly ad hoc, and the fact it makes no new predictions is certainly a large point against it.

What do you mean by "ad hoc"? It is a theory that has been formulated by a process of induction and validated by the rules of logic.

And if a theory must make new predictions to be considered valid, then any theory that asserts the possibility of random behavior -- a possibility that throws out the very concept of making predictions -- would have to be discarded out of hand. Such a theory has the ultimate "large point against it".

[Hal]

Before we go any further, please define what you mean by random. 

I would say "capable of producing more than one effect under identical physical circumstances, without the use of volition" captures my meaning.

Are you saying that the inability to provide a rational explanation justifies accepting an irrational one?

No, but I'm saying that it isnt at all clear that the other explanation is irrational. I cannot find any reason why randomness is ruled out by saying 'everything has identity'.

The contradiction is that the earth is not the center of the solar system.

Well, this wasnt the reason the Ptolmic model was abandoned, but its not really relevant here. Even granting this were true, we would have a case where a scientific theory is abandonded due to being inconsistent with observed results. This is not the case with 'random' interpretations of QM - these interpretations are being dismissed due to a questionable use of the law of identity.

What do you mean by "ad hoc"?  It is a theory that has been formulated by a process of induction and validated by the rules of logic.

As far as I can tell, it's a theory which has been designed to fit the data entirely, without risking going beyond it in any way. I'm unsure how TEW would be testable, and it certainly doesnt look like a theory which is capable of falsification in any real sense.

(edit: I don't believe that falsification is the primary goal of science. However, being capable of falsification would be a minimum standard which I would require a theory to meet before I would be prepared to class it as 'scientific' rather than 'philosophical')

And if a theory must make new predictions to be considered valid, then any theory that asserts the possibility of random behavior -- a possibility that throws out the very concept of making predictions -- would have to be discarded out of hand. 

Standard QM has always made perfectly valid predictions, just not at the level of individual particles. TEW doesnt make these either though so the point is moot. Edited April 4, 2005 by Hal

[jrs]

AisA asked "Before we go any further, please define what you mean by random.".

Remember, my version of the Law of Causality was "The same causes produce the same probability distribution over possible effects ...".

So I am not talking about completely arbitrary and unreproducible effects. I am talking about effects which vary within a predictable range and consistently occur with a certain ratio of frequencies.

If I generate new instances of the experiment or examine old instances without selecting them by the outcome, then the average over a large number of cases will tend to approach the probability distribution determined by the identity of the causes.

Defining randomness generally is a very difficult problem which I think goes beyond the scope of this thread. The point here is that the identity of the causes does not have to determine the precise effects but merely a range of possible effects.

[AisA]

I would say "capable of producing more than one effect under identical physical circumstances, without the use of volition" captures my meaning.

That would be a violation of the law of causality.

If particle A produces a certain effect under certain conditions, but produces a different effect when the conditions are reproduced, something must account for the difference. To say that such is simply the nature of the particle is not an explanation -- it is like saying that god caused it. It means we do not know why it behaves this way, and we are just going to say "it does so somehow".

Furthermore, the fact that the different effects are limited to a predictable, repeatable distribution does not change the issue. We still face the fact that something must account for the distribution.

If you weighed a bowling ball on a scale 10 times, and got weight readings ranging from 9.5 pounds to 10.5 pounds, what would you conclude? Would you conclude that the nature of the bowling ball is such that, without changing, it can actually have a different weight each time you weigh it -- though within a narrow range of weights -- or would you conclude that something else accounts for the variation in readings?

Even if I spent a lifetime and was not able to identify the cause of the variation, I would not accept the notion that somehow an unchanging, unaltered, fixed-identity bowling ball causes the variation. Such an explanation would mean that the bowling ball is what it is, and is not what it is, without changing. This would mean that A can be A, and can also be non-A, without changing.

Nor is it an explanation to state that the bowling ball can exist in different "states", for this merely moves the question back to: what accounts for the change from one state to another?

As far as I can tell, it's a theory which has been designed to fit the data entirely, without risking going beyond it in any way. I'm unsure how TEW would be testable, and it certainly doesnt look like a theory which is capable of falsification in any real sense.

(edit: I don't believe that falsification is the primary goal of science. However, being capable of falsification would be a minimum standard which I would require a theory to meet before I would be prepared to class it as 'scientific' rather than 'philosophical')

What does it mean to be "capable of falsification" and why is this the standard for a theory to be scientific rather than philosophical?

Standard QM has always made perfectly valid predictions, just not at the level of individual particles. TEW doesnt make these either though so the point is moot.

But you argued that TEW's failure to make such predictions (assuming that accusation is true) disqualified it. Yet the same failure on the part of QM is okay?

I think you should study TEW more before you dismiss it.

[plaintext]

claiming something is arbitrary is different from claiming it is impossible.

Is it different? How? Could you provide an example of something that is impossible rather than arbitrary?

[kenstauffer]

Is it different? How? Could you provide an example of something that is impossible rather than arbitrary?

Arbitrary:

12 angels can fit on the head of a pin.

Impossible:

Michael Moore's butt can fit in an airline seat.

[rameshkaimal]

I would say "capable of producing more than one effect under identical physical circumstances, without the use of volition" captures my meaning.

From what immutable facts of reality has this definition (or meaning) been induced?

In other words, this definition (or meaning) pre-supposes that one has already identified an attribute in subatomic particles that is essentially different from the attribute of volition in Man. If so, what is that attribute and where is the evidence in reality for inferring its existence?

Besides, the phrase "without the use of volition" cannot mean that one has already proved that subatomic particles do not possess volition because there is no such thing in reason and in reality, as proving a negative.

Ramesh Kaimal