Is the "stolen concept" truly a fallacy?

[Atlas51184]

I'd like to point out something that just occurred to me. If the stolen concept is NOT a fallacy, we can pretty much kiss Objectivism good-bye and start shopping for a new philosophy. A rejection of hierarchy inversion as a fallacy is an outright rejection of the hierarchical nature of concepts, which is a rejection of the theory of abstraction from abstraction and thus Rand's entire theory of concepts. I hope I don't need to point out that the entire system of Objectivism depends on the truth of the theory of concepts.

[JMeganSnow]

jrs hasn't presented a single reason as to why stolen concept isn't a fallacy, anyway. He says it "negates contradiction" . . . and then goes on to explain why, when you "steal" a concept, you're contradicting yourself.

[Tom Robinson]

It's pointless to argue about whether fallacies demonstrate contradictions or not.  Clearly they do.  Identifying the particular form of something is nice, because it means that in a conversation you can say to someone "You're doing this, stop it," instead of having to sit there and patiently explain to them how they are contradicting themselves.  But you don't have to know the fallacies in order to think logically; knowing that you can't contradict yourself is fine.

It's like how you don't HAVE to know the Law of Sines to do basic trigonometry, it just saves you the effort of having to prove it every time you want to solve a problem.

If an identification of a fallacy demonstates that an argument with contradictions is false, then the intellectual requirement on the proponent is that he withdraw it.

[jrs]

Atlas51184:

You said "This is an argument against Branden's style of presentation, not the fallacy as such.".

Sorry, I need to come up with a better example, because this one does not clearly illustrate the issue about which I am concerned.

But it does make a related point. Supposed Brandon tried to use his argument on an anarcho-socialist. And suppose that the anarcho-socialist even accepted that "stolen concept" is a fallacy (fat chance of that). He still would not be impressed by Brandon's argument because in his thinking "theft" is not hierarchically dependent on "legitimate property".

Tom Robinson:

You said "This muddies things up nicely!".

Let me try to clarify it. This is a very difficult issue because one must make the subtle distinction between:

1. a "stolen concept"; and

2. the idea that a step in an argument which is a "stolen concept" is automatically fallacious.

The concept of "stolen concept" is a valid concept. A "stolen concept" is a step in an argument which contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends.

When a contradiction occurs during an argument, there must be an error which caused it. Since a "stolen concept" is a contradiction, there must be an error in the argument leading up to it.

BUT the error does not have to be at the step which is the "stolen concept". Frequently the error will have occurred earlier in the argument.

Therefore, it would be a mistake to ASSUME that the "stolen concept" is the step which is at fault. But that is exactly what the idea that "stolen concept" is a fallacy asks you to do.

If you go around merely rejecting the "stolen concepts", then you are not dealing with the actual fallacies. Consequently the roots of the contradictions in your thinking have not been expunged. So effectively, you are no longer respecting the Principle that Contradictions do not Exist in reality, i.e. PNC.

Conclusion: "the fallacy of the 'stolen concept'" is the negation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction.

JMeganSnow:

You said "But you don't have to know the fallacies in order to think logically; knowing that you can't contradict yourself is fine.".

You may be able to recognize when you have reached a contradiction (not everyone can), but that is not sufficient to identify what you did that caused the contradiction. If you do not know that, then you cannot escape from them. Knowing whether a step is valid or fallacious is essential to rooting out your contradictions.

Atlas51184:

You said "A rejection of hierarchy inversion as a fallacy is an outright rejection of the hierarchical nature of concepts, which is a rejection of the theory of abstraction from abstraction and thus Rand's entire theory of concepts.".

You are implicitly assuming that the hierarchy (when properly developed) can lead to contradictions. That amounts to assuming that the hierarchy is arbitrary rather than based on reality (which is consistent).

[Atlas51184]

But it does make a related point. Supposed Brandon tried to use his argument on an anarcho-socialist. And suppose that the anarcho-socialist even accepted that "stolen concept" is a fallacy (fat chance of that). He still would not be impressed by Brandon's argument because in his thinking "theft" is not hierarchically dependent on "legitimate property".

He might not be convinced it is a fallacy. He might not think of theft as hierachically dependent on property. None of that changes the fact that it is.

The concept of "stolen concept" is a valid concept. A "stolen concept" is a step in an argument which contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends.

No, this isn't what a stolen concept is. The stolen concept is as Branden describes it. A much more complex stolen concept would be the whole Cartesian doubt method (using doubt in an attempt to reach certainty).

You are implicitly assuming that the hierarchy (when properly developed) can lead to contradictions. That amounts to assuming that the hierarchy is arbitrary rather than based on reality (which is consistent).

This doesn't make any sense. I'm defending proper hierachy. If there is a real hierachy to concepts, then any violation of that hierachy is a fallacy in one's reasoning. Proudhon's error is that he doesn't have proper understanding of hierarchy, thus he easily arrives at his non-sense conclusion.

Edited April 23, 2005 by Atlas51184

[jrs]

Atlas51184:

You said "No, this isn't what a stolen concept is. The stolen concept is as Branden describes it.".

I was trying to integrate Ayn Rand's definition -- "assuming that which you are attempting to disprove" -- with Leonard Peikoff's definition -- "using a higher-level concept while denying ... one ... of the earlier concepts on which it logically depends".

I got "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends".

Peikoff's definition is essentially the same as Brandon's.

The one difference in my version to which you might reasonably object is that my version is formulated in terms of steps (propositions) in an argument rather than "concepts". But a proposition is a special kind of concept; and "fallacy" is normally used to refer to a step in an argument.

You said "I'm defending proper hierarchy.".

The fallacy which protects the structure of the hierarchy of concepts is "using an undefined term (unformed concept)". This is a real fallacy; and it is different than "stolen concept".

[JMeganSnow]

I got "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends".

They are not referring to steps in a logical argument, but to concepts. Steps in a logical argument are propositions.

Concepts depend upon a hierarchy. One cannot have, say, a higher-level concept such as "furniture" without having first integrated and conceptualized various lower-level concepts such as actual items of furniture: "table", "chair", "sofa" etc.

So (using an example) if you were to try and make statements about "furniture" while ignoring or denying the fact that the concept "furniture" depends on the existence of actual items of furniture say (attempt at example)to declare that "tables are not furniture" even though tables are one of the percepts you used when integrating the concept "furniture", you would be exhibiting the fallacy of the stolen concept.

It doesn't matter whether you contradict one of your earlier, stated propositions, it matters whether you contradict steps in the foundation of concepts whereby they can be traced back to the perceptual level.

[jrs]

JMeganSnow:

You said "[if you] ... declare that 'tables are not furniture' even though tables are one of the percepts you used when integrating the concept 'furniture', you would be exhibiting the fallacy of the stolen concept.".

According to the 1989 edition (dilithium Press, Ltd.) of "Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language",

"furniture" is defined to mean "1. the movable articles, as tables, chairs, bedsteads, desks, cabinets, etc., required for use or ornament in a house, office, or the like.".

I have been in several restaurants where the tables are welded or bolted firmly to the floor, presumably to prevent theft. The tables in these restaurants would not qualify as movable. Yet tables are explicitly included in the definition as an example.

So Alice could argue that such a table is not furniture because it lies outside the genus "movable article". On the other hand, Bob could argue that it is furniture because it is one of the examples explicitly used to form the concept.

Is it your position that Alice is wrong and Bob is right because Alice is committing the fallacy of the "stolen concept"?

[JMeganSnow]

So Alice could argue that such a table is not furniture because it lies outside the genus "movable article".  On the other hand, Bob could argue that it is furniture because it is one of the examples explicitly used to form the concept.

Is it your position that Alice is wrong and Bob is right because Alice is committing the fallacy of the "stolen concept"?

That would depend on whether you thought the dictionary definition was accurate. Lower-level concepts like "table" and even "furniture" to an extent are usually defined ostensively, by pointing. If someone asks you what a table is, you don't sit there and laboriously explain all the characteristics of a table, you just point to a table, and boom, they know what one is.

Now, I would say that "movable" is not a necessary defining characteristic of furniture. So what Alice is really doing is definition by non-essentials. The most essential defining characteristic of furniture is what it is used for, namely holding things and people, either up off the floor (in the case of a table or sofa) or in a contained space, as in a cabinet or wardrobe. There may be borderline cases, in which case characteristics such as size come into play, but since the primary function of furniture is not to be movable (in fact, in some cases the point is for it to stay put) it's unessential to the definition of what furniture is .

Now, if we were to go back to the other example that's being used, "all property is theft", we could point out, as others have done, that the concept of theft depends on the concept of property. Not on some proposition, on the actual concept itself. In order conceptualize the idea "theft", i.e. to take something that does NOT belong to you, you must have first conceptualized the idea "property", i.e. that things can rightfully belong to someone. So, redefining property to be equivalent to something that you cannot conceptualize until AFTER you have a concept of property is incorrect.

Stolen concepts are often cheerfully mixed in with examples of definition-by-non-essentials, with the one being used to disguise the other. It works so well because many people only define their concepts ostensively, "I know it when I see it", instead of going through an explicit process of reduction. The way to defeat it is to say, explicitly, okay, what precisely do these terms reference? What are the most essential defining characteristics? Once you know those, you can figure out whether they depend on anything else before it is something you can just point to. Someone, say, picking something up (which you can directly perceive with no concepts) is not theft; being able to define the action as "theft" requires you to be able to say, for example, that so-and-so actually owns this object, (it is his property).

Sorry for the long-winded reply. I very much suggest that you re-read ITOE and pay special attention to the explanation of why concepts are hierarchial; that's where the fallacy of th stolen concept comes from and why it is a fallacy.

[jrs]

JMeganSnow:

About the example of furniture, you said "So what Alice is really doing is definition by non-essentials.".

I agree that "definition by non-essentials" is a fallacy, but it is not the same as "stolen concept". Thanks for clarifying this example.

You said "... the concept of theft depends on the concept of property. ... So, redefining property to be equivalent to something that you cannot conceptualize until AFTER you have a concept of property is incorrect.".

Suppose one re-defines a term (re-forms a concept) in such a way that one changes its meaning (extension, i.e. which units it contains) within the old context. Then one has invalidated all the things which depended directly or indirectly on the old definition. If the new definition is one of those things, then it cannot be a proper definition.

Generally, it is a bad idea to re-define terms in a way which changes its meaning in the old context, unless there is an overriding reason (such as an error in the original definition) which justifies the sacrifice of all the things based on the old definition.

If the new definition would be rendered meaningless by the loss of those things, then it would be an instance of "using an undefined term (unformed concept)". With the undefined term(s) being those things used by the new definition which were sacrificed when the old definition was retracted.

So once again, we are talking about a real fallacy. But is it the same as "stolen concept"?

Peikoff said "stolen concept" means "using a higher-level concept while denying ... one ... of the earlier concepts on which it logically depends". One could read this as equivalent to "using an undefined term (unformed concept)". If it were, then I would be wrong. "stolen concept" would be merely a synonym for "using an undefined term" and it would be a real fallacy.

But Ayn Rand herself defined "stolen concept" (in her Journals, page 704) as "assuming that which you are attempting to disprove". I do not see how that could be read as equivalent to "using an undefined term".

[EC]

jrs-- Is your purpose here in denying the reality of stolen concept to attempt to obliterate its meaning so that you can try and convince Objectivists that an actual "infinity" actually exists? That question is rhetorical, and the answer is yes. What you need to is come to grips with reality and a reality-based epistemology and quit wasting our time trying to convince people here and on THE FORUM of rationalistic nonsense. You just don't want to believe that what you wasted years of your life and a lot of money at your "modern" university majoring in mathematical "logic" was all for naught. But in a contest between rationalistic nonsense and reality, reality wins.

[LauricAcid]

"Principle of Non-Contradiction: A cannot be B and not be B.

Principle of Excluded Middle: A either is or is not B.

If Proudhon had said, “Property is neither legitimate no[r] illegitimate,” he would have violated the Principle of Excluded Middle." [Tom Robinson]

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are equivalent in classical propositional logic. Since all tautologies are equivalent, the previous statement is trivial. Nevertheless, non-contradiction and excluded middle are derivable from each other from a DeMorgan's theorem, double negation, and commutativity.

Edited April 25, 2005 by LauricAcid

[jrs]

Rational_One:

You asked "Is your purpose here in denying the reality of stolen concept to attempt to obliterate its meaning so that you can try and convince Objectivists that an actual "infinity" actually exists?".

This issue is much more important than the metaphysical status of infinity.

Either there is something fundamental about logic and epistemology which I do not understand or there is something fundamental about them which most students of Objectivism do not understand.

Either way, I have an interest in trying to resolve the issue.

You said "That question is rhetorical, and the answer is yes. ...".

Please do not insult me.

LauricAcid:

Your message was true. But I do not see its relevance to the argument here.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Atlas51184 (Post #12) said "... the stolen concept is one specific type of contradiction - a hierarchical contradiction.".

Atlas51184 (Post #17) said "The fallacy of the stolen concept is a propositional fallacy.".

These quotes tend to support my belief that (at least in some cases) "stolen concept" means "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends" rather than "using an undefined term".

[Tom Robinson]

"Principle of Non-Contradiction: A cannot be B and not be B.

Principle of Excluded Middle: A either is or is not B.

If Proudhon had said, “Property is neither legitimate no[r] illegitimate,” he would have violated the Principle of Excluded Middle." [Tom Robinson]

The law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are equivalent in classical propositional logic. Since all tautologies are equivalent, the previous statement is trivial. Nevertheless, non-contradiction and excluded middle are derivable from each other from a DeMorgan's theorem, double negation, and commutativity.

If the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle were equivalent, then the definition of the Principle of Non-Contradiction would be A either is or is not B. However, since that clearly is not the case, the terms are not equivalent.

[Atlas51184]

I agree with these points:

I agree that "definition by non-essentials" is a fallacy, but it is not the same as "stolen concept".

Definition by non-essentials is the 'package-deal,' not the stolen concept. The stolen concept is not a definitional fallacy.

These quotes tend to support my belief that (at least in some cases) "stolen concept" means "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends" rather than "using an undefined term".

Using an undefined term is the 'floating abstraction.'

Edited April 26, 2005 by Atlas51184

[LauricAcid]

jrs: The relevence is not necessarily to any particular argument other than the particular comments I quoted.

/

Tom Robinson: Whatever you call the principles, they are equivalent in classical propositional logic. You could call ~(A & ~A) 'the law of gaweebulgok' and A v ~ A 'the law of skerkabook' and it wouldn't change the fact that they can be derived from each other in just a few steps of plain old propositional logic.

/

I saw a movie last night that touched on the subject of stolen concept. The main character is asked if he believes in astrology. He answers, "Absolutely not. I'm a Gemini, and Geminis don't believe in astrology." Good for a chuckle.

Edited April 26, 2005 by LauricAcid

[Tom Robinson]

Tom Robinson: Whatever you call the principles, they are equivalent in classical propositional logic. You could call ~(A & ~A) 'the law of gaweebulgok' and A v ~ A 'the law of skerkabook' and it wouldn't change the fact that they can be derived from each other in just a few steps of plain old propositional logic.

Why derive X from Y if X = Y?

[LauricAcid]

(Remarks here do not necessarily pertain to anything other than classical logic:)

If '=' stands for the equality (or identity) relation and 'x' and 'y' are terms, then there is no answer to your question, since one does not derive (prove) terms from one another.

But one does derive sentences (even formulas) from one another. The reasons for doing this include proving equivalence. If two sentences can be derived each from the other, then they're equivalent.

[Gabriel_S]

This thread seems to have gone afield. Glancing back, I don't see any sort of intelligible argument that dissolves the FSC. So, can we take it as settled by the participants here that the FSC is actually a legitimate fallacy? If not, please give a clear, succinct explanation for your position. Thanks.

Edited April 26, 2005 by Gabriel_S

[LauricAcid]

You have to be careful with this notion.

If you assume A and derive not-A, then not-A has been proven, since the assumption of A has led to the contradiction A and not-A.

But if you assume A and derive not-A, but persist to hold A, then you are being self-contradictory.

But the situation is often more complicated since often what are assumed are methods of reasoning (or at least propositions that assert the correctness of a method of reasoning), not just propositions in an object language.

Edited April 26, 2005 by LauricAcid

[LauricAcid]

"Any fallacy is, ultimately, going to involve some form of saying A and non-A." [Atlas51184]

Many (perhaps most) informal fallacies are variations of non sequitur. But a non sequitur does not necessarily lead to a contradiction. Indeed, while a non sequitur creates an invalid argument, the conclusion of the argument may be a true (thus consistent) statement or even a logically true statement.

One might argue that if non sequitur is allowed then a contradiction can be derived, so that in that sense non sequitur involves contradiction. But it seems to me that that argument is a bit of a stretch since it is not the case that any given non sequitur involves a contradiction. Still, one might argue that non sequitur contradicts logic itself so that non sequitur does necessarily involve contradiction. But that argument seems even more of a stretch. In any case, conflating non sequitur with contradiction undermines understanding the important difference between lack of proof (a non sequitur is lacking as a proof step) and inconsistency.

Question begging is another fallacy that does not entail contradiction. On the contrary, question begging is tautologous (in two senses of 'tautologous': 1) repetition, 2) logically true).

/

Free Capitalist: Do you think all deduction is in the form of (or can be reduced to) Aristotelian syllogisms? (I'm not claiming that you do think this, just that I am curious whether you do.)

/

"[...] logic is the "Art of non-contradictory identification" [...]" [JMeganSnow]

I take it that 'identification' here is not meant to be limited to merely asserting that certain things are identical, but rather is a general rubric for making assertions about the properties of things. Non-contradiction is crucial in logic, but does not define the subject, which, most broadly stated, is the study of entailment. Merely being consistent is a necessary condition for being logical but not a sufficient one: One can be consistent and illogical, but (excluding, of course, dialetheism) one cannot be logical and inconsistent.

[jrs]

To any willing person: Please present and defend an example of "stolen concept" as a propositional fallacy.

Tom Robinson and LauricAcid:

I think the reason that you two are reaching different conclusions is that you are assuming different contexts.

LauricAcid is assuming all of classical logic. In that context all tautologies are equivalent, including ~(A&~A) and Av~A.

Tom Robinson is assuming a pre-logical context because he is discussing two of the basic laws of logic. One could imagine non-classical logics (which are unrealistic) which omit one or the other of these two laws. Thus from a pre-logical viewpoint, they are not equivalent. Rather each adds something different.

Atlas51184:

I agree with you that:

"definition by non-essentials" = "package deal"

"using an undefined term" = "floating abstraction"

You said "The stolen concept is not a definitional fallacy.".

Please give an example of "stolen concept" which you believe is a propositional fallacy and yet is different from "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends".

Gabriel_S:

You said "... can we take it as settled by the participants here that the FSC is actually a legitimate fallacy?".

No. I still believe that "stolen concept" is not a fallacy (at least not a propositional fallacy). For an explanation, see my Post #29.

As I see it, the remaining issue is whether or not I correctly characterized "stolen concept" as "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends".

No one has tried to refute my demonstration that such a "fallacy" would cause one to accept contradictions as real and destroy logic.

LauricAcid:

What is "dialetheism"?

Please explain your claim that the astrology example is a "stolen concept".

[Atlas51184]

Please give an example of "stolen concept" which you believe is a propositional fallacy and yet is different from "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends".

"Property is theft." Let's define.

For property I'll just take a definition that was on another thread for the sake of ease - Any material element or resource to which mental and physical effort have been applied.

Is - do I need to define this?

Theft I have to do myself so... - the taking of another's property against his will. If you don't like that then we can find a definition that is better.

Theft is being used illegitimately in that it is being used to negate itself. If property is out, so is theft. The proposition "property is theft" does not have steps like a syllogism. Are you equivocating on the term 'steps?' I think you might be, because there is a difference between the hierarchy of a concept and the steps of an argument.

This isn't a fallacy in the concept itself, but in the use of the concept. That's the difference between conceptual fallacies and propositional fallacies. This is a fallacy in the use of the concept. Since propositions are units of thought that use concepts to describe concepts, the stolen concept is a propositional fallacy because it is a misuse of valid concepts.

No. I still believe that "stolen concept" is not a fallacy (at least not a propositional fallacy). For an explanation, see my Post #29.

I still think post 29 makes no sense. First you seem to be saying that the stolen concept is the same thing as a premise contradicting a later premise. Ok. That’s not what the stolen concept is. Re-read Branden's essay. Then later you write "it would be a mistake to ASSUME that the "stolen concept" is the step which is at fault. But that is exactly what the idea that "stolen concept" is a fallacy asks you to do." No. If buried somewhere in The Objectivist Ethics Rand committed an ad hominem, that wouldn't invalidate her entire theory. But it wouldn't change the fact that a fallacy had been committed, either. The fact that a stolen concept has been committed in one proposition in a larger argument does not mean that the entire argument is dead. It also doesn't mean that the stolen concept hasn't been committed.

No one has tried to refute my demonstration that such a "fallacy" would cause one to accept contradictions as real and destroy logic.

Where is this demonstration? If the proper use of concepts based on their hierarchical roots leads to contradictions... well right here my brain shuts down because that accusation makes no sense. A concept having a proper relationship to the perceptual data that gives rise to it and then being used in accordance with that relationship gives rise to contradictions? Huh? That's the only way I can make some sense out of the last quote.

Are you an Objectivist? I have been arguing with you on the assumption that you agree with Objectivism in at least regards to Rand's theory of concepts, so if you don’t agree with ITOE then we’re just wasting our times arguing about what is a fallacy because of the truth of the Objectivist theory.

Oh, and astrology is not a stolen concept. A concept by itself is not a stolen concept, a concept becomes stolen when it is being used (incorrectly) to describe another concept. Astrology is something like an anti-concept, but probably not. If I were to say, "I know astrology is crap because I am a Taurus, and us Taruses have great BS detectors," then astology would be stolen.

[dougclayton]

jrs, you say that post 29 contains your explanation that 'stolen concept' is not a fallacy (at least not a propositional fallacy)". Since that post is answering several people, I have extracted the portion that is most general. If there is a more clear explanation of your views, please let me know where that is.

Let me try to clarify it.  This is a very difficult issue because one must make the subtle distinction between:

1. a "stolen concept"; and

2. the idea that a step in an argument which is a "stolen concept" is automatically fallacious.

The concept of "stolen concept" is a valid concept.

I am not entirely sure what you mean--at first I thought you meant that "stolen concept" means "valid concept," but now I think you are saying that the notion of a stolen concept is legitimate and not flawed. Do I understand correctly?

A "stolen concept" is a step in an argument which contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends.

This is overly general ("step" can mean many things), but Jennifer has done an admirable job demonstrating the flaws in this claim , so I won't comment further.

When a contradiction occurs during an argument, there must be an error which caused it.  Since a "stolen concept" is a contradiction, there must be an error in the argument leading up to it.

Should I take it, then, that you agree that a stolen concept represents a contradiction in one's thinking? Or do you mean that the concept of "stolen concept" is itself contradictory (as later remarks seem to indicate)?

BUT the error does not have to be at the step which is the "stolen concept".  Frequently the error will have occurred earlier in the argument.

Therefore, it would be a mistake to ASSUME that the "stolen concept" is the step which is at fault.  But that is exactly what the idea that "stolen concept" is a fallacy asks you to do.

It is true that often an argument will commit multiple errors, and one could even conceive an argument in which the stolen concept was only possible because of earlier arguments. But what of it? "Ad hominem" is a fallacy regardless of whether you commit other fallacies earlier.

If you go around merely rejecting the "stolen concepts", then you are not dealing with the actual fallacies.  Consequently the roots of the contradictions in your thinking have not been expunged.  So effectively, you are no longer respecting the Principle that Contradictions do not Exist in reality, i.e. PNC.

Conclusion:  "the fallacy of the 'stolen concept'" is the negation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction.

I'm sorry, but I do not see how it follows that calling the use of a stolen concept a "fallacy" violates the principle of non-contradiction. Could you explain to me the contradiction one accepts when demonstrating a stolen-concept fallacy? Or are you saying that it is contradictory to catch one contradiction while missing a deeper one?

[LauricAcid]

jrs:

Since I'm not a proponent of dialetheism, I'm not among the best people to present it. However, roughly speaking dialetheism is the belief that contradictions can be sustained or, very roughly speaking, that A and not-A is a possible state of affairs. As I understand, different formulations of dialetheism distinguish among different kinds of contradictions and have special provisions for dealing with them.

The astrology example (in the form of a joke) is one of stolen concept, or at least very close to it, since the character assumed astrology to deny it.

Atlas 51184:

No one said that astrology is an instance of stolen concept. What I said was that the joke "I don't believe in astrology because I'm a Gemini and Geminis don't believe in astrology" touches on stolen concept. Actually, the example does not just touch on the subject but is an example of stolen concept, since the speaker assumes astrology to deny astrology. The speaker uses astrological "reasoning" to deny astrological reasoning. That's pretty much analogous to using, say, inductive reasoning to deny inductive reasoning, or to use deductive reasoning to deny deductive reasoning, or to use the principle of excluded middle to deny the principle of excluded middle.

You wrote:

"If I were to say, "I know astrology is crap because I am a Taurus, and us Taruses have great BS detectors," then ast[r]ology would be stolen."

Exactly. You just recast the original joke I mentioned.

Edited April 27, 2005 by LauricAcid