Is the "stolen concept" truly a fallacy?

[jrs]

Atlas51184:

If someone just said "Property is theft." without any supporting argument (so that it is an argument in one step), then it would be a non sequitur. Non sequitur is different from "stolen concept".

You said "If the proper use of concepts based on their hierarchical roots leads to contradictions... well right here my brain shuts down because that accusation makes no sense. A concept having a proper relationship to the perceptual data that gives rise to it and then being used in accordance with that relationship gives rise to contradictions? Huh?".

You have my position reversed. I agree with you that the hierarchy of concepts (when properly developed) CANNOT lead to contradictions. Therefore, it cannot lead to a step which contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends, in the absence of some other error (fallacy) in the argument. Thus "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends" is not the fallacy responsible, if a contradiction appears.

You asked "Are you an Objectivist?".

I study Objectivism. Obviously, I disagree with parts of it, especially with the idea that "stolen concept" is a fallacy.

dougclayton:

You said "... you are saying that the notion of a stolen concept is legitimate and not flawed.".

Yes, provided that it means what I said it meant. But everyone keeps saying I am wrong. Yet they do not give a clearer explanation than Brandon's unclear definition.

You said "... Jennifer has done an admirable job demonstrating the flaws in this claim ...".

All she said was that I was wrong to think that it is a propositional fallacy. If it is a definitional fallacy, then it is merely the same as "using an undefined term" which I acknowledge is a real fallacy. But statements by Ayn Rand and Atlas51184 indicate that it is a propositional fallacy.

You said "... do you mean that the concept of "stolen concept" is itself contradictory ...".

No. The ASSUMPTION that a "stolen concept" is itself a fallacy, rather than the product of earlier fallacies, leads one to hold uncorrected false ideas which lead to more contradictions.

You said "... often an argument will commit multiple errors ...".

As I said to Atlas51184, a contradiction CANNOT occur in the absence of a fallacy. The mere fact that a step manifests a contradiction does not mean that IT is a fallacy.

You said "Or are you saying that it is contradictory to catch one contradiction while missing a deeper one?".

I am saying that the EFFECT is to leave deeper contradictions uncorrected which violates the spirit of PNC.

LauricAcid:

You said "Actually, the [astrology] example does not just touch on the subject but is an example of stolen concept, since the speaker assumes astrology to deny astrology. The speaker uses astrological 'reasoning' to deny astrological reasoning.".

So you say to him that he should not deny astrology because that is a "stolen concept" fallacy. And he answers "Yes. By gosh you are right. Astrology is valid. So I must have read my star chart wrong.".

[softwareNerd]

If someone just said "Property is theft." without any supporting argument (so that it is an argument in one step), ...

I do not see that as a "one step" argument.

If I state that: "A is B", and expect that to be meaningful, then I am assuming that the person to whom I state it understands what "A" and "B" are. Those two concepts are part of the argument.

In other words: "A is B" can be broken down as:

1) "A" is a concept that means ... ,and can be defined thus...

2) "B" is a concept that means ... ,and can be defined thus...

3) A is B

[Atlas51184]

If someone just said "Property is theft." without any supporting argument (so that it is an argument in one step), then it would be a non sequitur. Non sequitur is different from "stolen concept".

I don't think this is a non sequitur, if non sequitur means offering a conclusion that does not follow from its premises. Even if it is though, why can't it be both?

You have my position reversed. I agree with you that the hierarchy of concepts (when properly developed) CANNOT lead to contradictions. Therefore, it cannot lead to a step which contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends, in the absence of some other error (fallacy) in the argument. Thus "contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends" is not the fallacy responsible, if a contradiction appears.

The fallacy of the stolen concept is the fallacy of using a concept in a way that contradicts its hierarchical nature. Thus, if you are saying 'the stolen concept is not a fallacy,' you are saying 'using a concept in contradiction to its hierarchical nature is not a fallacy.' You seem to be saying that you agree there is a conceptual hierarchy and violating that hierarchy when using concepts is not a fallacy. That makes no sense.

Therefore, it cannot lead to a step which contradicts an earlier step upon which it depends, in the absence of some other error (fallacy) in the argument.

Yes, it can. That is why it is a mistake in reasoning. Most people who make stolen concept errors either do not think there is or know there is a hierarchy to concepts, or if they do their understanding of that hierarchy is fuzzy. That is why Proudhon, and not Peikoff, commits the fallacy. Like I've said before, someone like Proudhon is going to deny that there is an objective conceptual hierarchy. There is no fallacy short of using the concepts in violation of their hierarchy.

[Evangelical Capitalist]

I've skimmed this thread, and while its possible I've missed something, I'm having difficulty making heads or tails of the nature of jrs's objection to concept stealing as a logical fallacy.

From what I can gather, there are two points, at least, on which he objects:

1) A stolen concept is necessarily the result of an antecedent fallacy in someone's argument/chain of logic.

2) A stolen concept doesn't prove that the conclusion thus arrived at is false.

Regarding number 2, no logical fallacy accomplishes this. Any fallacy merely proves that the form of the argument is invalid, that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. An invalid argument can arrive at a correct conclusion.

a. Birds can fly.

b. Pigs are not birds.

c. Therefore, pigs cannot fly.

This is an invalid argument. It contains a fallacy, though I'm not sufficiently versed in the art of formal logic to name it; perhaps someone else can help me out. Nevertheless, its conclusion is true.

Using your example:

LauricAcid:

You said "Actually, the [astrology] example does not just touch on the subject but is an example of stolen concept, since the speaker assumes astrology to deny astrology. The speaker uses astrological 'reasoning' to deny astrological reasoning.".

So you say to him that he should not deny astrology because that is a "stolen concept" fallacy. And he answers "Yes. By gosh you are right. Astrology is valid. So I must have read my star chart wrong."

The person making the argument is free, even after acknowledging the fallacy, to maintain his conclusion on different grounds, but he cannot cling to his invalid argument. In the "All property is theft" example, even if one ackowledges that the concept of theft is reliant upon the validity of the concept of property, one can still attempt to deny the validity of property on other grounds.

Which leads me to address #1: You may or may not be correct in that a stolen concept must be the result of another, previous fallacy. Regardless, any argument which leads to a stolen concept must be invalid. (Again, this doesn't automatically prove the conclusion wrong.) The statement, "All property is theft," (which is not an argument at all, but merely an assertion), must be the result of an invalid argument, if it is backed by any argument at all. The reason we know this is because the statement uses the derivitive concept "theft" to deny the validity of its antecedant concept, "property". That is the stolen concept. The stolen concept is the pattern by which we identify that the statement is invalid, and that any argument behind it must be invalid. The stolen concept is the fallacy we identify.

P.S. I'm thinking of forming a group: Leos Against Astrology. Anyone wanna join?

[jrs]

softwareNerd:

I invite you to expand the argument to include explicitly all the (formerly implicit) steps you think are necessary. If it ends with an absurdity like "Property is theft.", then I think that I will be able to find in it a fallacy OTHER than "stolen concept".

Atlas51184:

Although "non sequitur" literally means "does not follow", the point is that it is a step which is offered like a bolt from the blue without any attempt at justification.

The other fallacies are ways in which a rule of inference can be misapplied. Non sequitur is the miscellaneous catch-all fallacy for things which do not even pretend to follow the rules.

You asked "... why can't it be both?".

I am saying that classifying a "stolen concept" qua "stolen concept" as fallacious is unnecessary. So it is not a question of whether it CAN be both, but rather of whether it MUST be the "fallacy of the 'stolen concept".

Having an unnecessary "fallacy" obscures the real fallacies.

You said "You seem to be saying that you agree there is a conceptual hierarchy and violating that hierarchy when using concepts is not a fallacy.".

Anything which would violate the hierarchy must be the result of committing some OTHER fallacy.

Evangelical Capitalist:

Regarding "1) A stolen concept is necessarily the result of an antecedent fallacy in someone's argument/chain of logic.":

The fallacy might be antecedent or it might be in the same step as the "stolen concept". All I am saying is that it is a fallacy OTHER than the alleged "fallacy of the 'stolen concept'".

Regarding "2) A stolen concept doesn't prove that the conclusion thus arrived at is false.":

I do not think that I made such a point about "stolen concept" exclusively. As you said, a step resulting from any propositional fallacy could none-the-less be true.

You said "... any argument which leads to a stolen concept must be invalid.".

I said as much myself -- "Since a 'stolen concept' is a contradiction, there must be an error in the argument leading up to it.".

You said "The stolen concept is the pattern by which we identify that the statement is invalid, and that any argument behind it must be invalid. The stolen concept is the fallacy we identify.".

Yes, the argument is invalid. But "stolen concept" is not the fallacy responsible. Thinking that it is responsible tends to prevent you from searching for a deeper cause. Thus that deeper cause continues to fester. That is the problem.

[Atlas51184]

Anything which would violate the hierarchy must be the result of committing some OTHER fallacy.

Ok. What is the fallacy behind "Property is theft"? It isn't an argument, it's just a proposition, so it's not a non-sequitur.

[Gabriel_S]

I am saying that classifying a "stolen concept" qua "stolen concept" as fallacious is unnecessary.  So it is not a question of whether it CAN be both, but rather of whether it MUST be the "fallacy of the 'stolen concept".

Having an unnecessary "fallacy" obscures the real fallacies.

Anything which would violate the hierarchy must be the result of committing some OTHER fallacy.

The fallacy might be antecedent or it might be in the same step as the "stolen concept".  All I am saying is that it is a fallacy OTHER than the alleged "fallacy of the 'stolen concept'".

I'm not clear why you think that "anything which would violate the hierarchy must be the result of committing some OTHER fallacy." [emphasis added] Why MUST it? Where are you getting that premise from? You keep asserting that the FSC must involve a deeper fallacy without providing a reason why. After all, why couldn't we say the same thing about one of the other "official" fallacies and claim that the error they identify MUST be the result of some deeper fallacy still? We acknowledge that the FSC does involve a contradiction as you initially pressed, but what we are saying is that it is an identification of a particular type of contradition: a hierarchical contradiction. Just as petitio principii exhibits another form that a contradiction may take.

Two further points: (1) if we think of "fallacy" in the broad sense (rather than in some narrow, technical sense that you seem to be operating under) of informal errors in thinking, as violations of logic, then I don't see why the FSC shouldn't properly be considered a fallacy, and (2) I don't believe the proponents of the FSC claim that there isn't necessarily any other deeper reasons that might lead someone to commit the hierarchy violation. That may be a perfectly fruitful analysis to pursue. However, one benefit of identifying an FSC is that it assists us in tracing where the error occured (and THAT an error occured; despite what you say, without the FSC many errors it identifies will be left uncovered or obscured), which may then permit a further analysis (as you seem so keen to emphasize).

Overall, I'm really not too sure what you are getting at with your claims about the FSC. Are you a minimalist/traditionalist when it comes to the fallacies and are simply trying to preserve the canonical fallacies?

Edited April 29, 2005 by Gabriel_S

[jrs]

Atlas51184:

You responded to my statement "Anything which would violate the hierarchy must be the result of committing some OTHER fallacy." by saying "What is the fallacy behind "Property is theft"? It isn't an argument, it's just a proposition, so it's not a non-sequitur.".

We were speaking in the context of arguments. And "propositional fallacy" only makes sense in the context of arguments. So I treated the proposition "Property is theft." as an argument. It is a proposition, but it could also be an argument in one step. When regarded as such, that step is a non sequitur because it is neither an axiom nor a definition nor a percept nor the result of induction from percepts and it does not follow from any earlier steps since there are none.

Gabriel_S:

Regarding "... must be the result of committing some OTHER fallacy.", you asked "Why MUST it?".

1. That is difficult to explain in the context of informal arguments. In formal (mathematical) logic, one does not think in terms of fallacies. Rather the burden is on the the one who presents a proof to show that each step is valid -- that it is a well-formed formula and that it follows strictly from the accepted rules of inference.

The rules are established in such a way that they preserve truth -- when applied to true premises, they produce true conclusions.

The traditional (informal) fallacies cover all the ways that the rules can be misapplied (or not applied in the case of non sequitur).

2. If there actually were a fallacy that had been overlooked somehow, the burden of showing that it is a fallacy would fall on the one who says that it is a fallacy. Such a demonstration would be done by giving an argument which commits the alleged fallacy. If the earlier steps directly used by the allegedly fallacious step are clearly true and the conclusion is clearly false and no other fallacy occurs in that step, then it must be a fallacy. Only by examining many cases could one be sure that the criteria of the fallacy are correct.

You said "... what we are saying is that it is an identification of a particular type of contradiction: a hierarchical contradiction.".

How is a hierarchical contradiction ESSENTIALLY different from other kinds of contradictions? What justifies treating it differently?

Petitio principii (= "begging the question" = "assuming that which is to be proved") does not necessarily result in a contradiction.

You said "I don't believe the proponents of the FSC claim that there isn't necessarily any other deeper reasons that might lead someone to commit the hierarchy violation.".

In EVERY case (of which I know) where Objectivists identify something as a FSC, they then simply dismiss it without further thought. That is a serious error.

You said "However, one benefit of identifying an FSC is that it assists us in tracing where the error occurred (and THAT an error occurred; despite what you say, without the FSC many errors it identifies will be left uncovered or obscured), which may then permit a further analysis (as you seem so keen to emphasize).".

I defy you to describe even one example where this has happened, excluding discussions like this where the issue is precisely whether "stolen concept" is a fallacy or not.

[LauricAcid]

"In formal (mathematical) logic, one does not think in terms of fallacies. Rather the burden is on the the one who presents a proof to show that each step is valid -- that it is a well-formed formula and that it follows strictly from the accepted rules of inference."

In practice, most mathematics is given informally so that the reader is expected to see how the informal presentation could be formalized. In this sense, one can always challenge the writer to show that all the steps are indeed formalizable and correct. However, any proof that is fully formalized carries no burden whatsoever for the presenter. That is, the presenter has no burden to show that the formulas are well formed or that the steps are correct. The reason there is no burden is that there is always an effective method (an algorithm) to check whether formulas are well formed and whether proof steps are correct. So anyone who doubts that a sequence of forumlas is a proof is welcome to check for himself by using an algorithm to determine whether the sequence is indeed a proof. This is the very purpose of formalization.

Edited April 30, 2005 by LauricAcid

[jrs]

LauricAcid:

You said "So anyone who doubts that a sequence of formulas is a proof is welcome to check for himself by using an algorithm to determine whether the sequence is indeed a proof. This is the very purpose of formalization.".

Yes, I agree with your message.

Computer programs can be used to verify formal proofs. And "proof assistant" programs are available to help one construct such proofs. I wish that they were used more often, and that a database of theorems and their supporting proofs was available.

But at this time, they are applicable only to a subset of mathematics, not to all the topics about which we might argue.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I would like to add that FSC is incompatible with reductio ad absurdum and thus with the Deduction Meta-Theorem of Mathematical Logic.

The Deduction Meta-Theorem is of crucial importance. It is also used informally when people make arguments in the form:

___Suppose A

___................

___B

Thus A => B by the Deduction Meta-Theorem.

[LauricAcid]

Just to be clear, computer checking is of course algorithmic, but proofs are checkable even without any machinary.

I don't know what you mean by only a (proper) subset of mathematical proofs being checkable. What mathematical proofs are published that could not, at least in principle, be formalized and checked? I do understand that, for example, the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem is something that no single human could check, but I don't take that as violationg the principle we're talking about here. However, you did say 'not to all topics of which we may argue'. In that sense, yes, natural language arguments are not checkable.

/

I don't see how the deduction theorem depends on reductio ad absurdum. For that matter, in most systems (and any classical first order system will be equivalent), reductio ad absurdum is itself a derived rule, so whenever there is a proof by reductio ad absurdum, there is a proof from modus ponens alone.

/

But while banning stolen concept does seem eminently reasonable, one does need to explain how it is different from an intuitive reductio ad absurdum across meta boundaries. For example, if I used a method of logic in a meta-language to refute a rule that embodies that method in the object language, then the questions are:

1. Is that stolen concept?

2. Is that convincing reductio ad absurdum to refute the rule in the object language?

Or more anecdotally, If I assume astrology to refute astrology, why is that stolen concept (or is it?) and not a reductio ad absurdum argument refuting astrology?

/

"database of theorems and their supporting proofs"

Here's a start:

http://metamath.org/

A wonderful achievment it is.

Edited May 1, 2005 by LauricAcid

[jrs]

LauricAcid:

You said "I don't know what you mean by only a (proper) subset of mathematical proofs being checkable.".

I was talking about being checkable by computer programs which exist today. Of course, formalized proofs can be checked by hand even for parts of mathematics for which computer programs do not yet exist, although it may be impractical in some cases.

You said "I don't see how the deduction theorem depends on reductio ad absurdum.".

You have it reversed. Reductio ad absurdum (RAA) is usually accomplished by using the Deduction Meta-Theorem (DMT). Also:

(~(FSC & RAA) & (DMT => RAA)) => ~(FSC & DMT)

You said "... so whenever there is a proof by reductio ad absurdum, there is a proof from modus ponens alone.".

But we know that because DMT tells us so.

Thanks for the pointer to metamath.

[LauricAcid]

"You have it reversed. Reductio ad absurdum (RAA) is usually accomplished by using the Deduction Meta-Theorem (DMT)."

Yes, I did mistakenly reverse your meaning. We agree that reductio ad absurdum is derived from modus ponens and is usually given as a corollary to the deduction theorem.

As to stolen concept, first I need to know whether I am correct in surmising that you are using 'FSC' as an abbreviation for 'showing an instance of the fallacy of stolen concepts in an argument suffices to invalidate that argument'. If so, then I don't think you need to bring the deduction theorem into this.

Let 'RAA' stand for 'reductio ad absurdum is a valid rule for propositional logic'. Then this is the argument:

FSC -> ~ RAA

RAA

______

~FSC

However, we would need to prove the first premise (if I am correct, you alluded to it with this subformula: ~(FSC & RAA)). We would need to show precisely how FSC is inconstent with RAA in whatever way (hopefully correct and convincing) we show FSC as it could be expressed in the meta-theory of propositional logic (it could also be expressed in a wider sense, in the meta-theory of other formal logics too, but this would not weigh against a refutation of it if it could be expressed, in particular, in the meta-theory of propositional logic).

But this suggests a conundrum. Showing an inconsistency with RAA (which I do sense is present or at least needs to be explained why it is not present) goes against the grain of our common sense feeling that FSC is correct. For example, it is hard to say that it is not incorrect (a kind of hypocrisy also) to argue, "Theism is false, and I know this because God told me so."

Edited May 2, 2005 by LauricAcid

[jrs]

LauricAcid:

You asked "... whether I am correct in surmising that you are using 'FSC' as an abbreviation for 'showing an instance of the fallacy of stolen concepts in an argument suffices to invalidate that argument'.".

Yes. But more specifically, it supposedly invalidates the particular step which is identified as a "stolen concept" (rather than an earlier step).

You asked "... how FSC is inconsistent with RAA ...".

We have the authority of Ayn Rand herself (the probable 'discoverer' of FSC):

"... 'the stolen concept' is 'begging the answer' or 'assuming that which you are attempting to disprove.' ..."

- Ayn Rand, "Journals of Ayn Rand", p. 704

So she is saying that arguments of this form are fallacious:

___Suppose A

___................

___~A

A => ~A by DMT

(A => ~A) => ~A this is a tautology

~A by modus ponens

But this is a version of RAA.

With respect to "Theism is false, and I know this because God told me so.":

Let us break this down:

1. God said that God does not exist.

2. Whatever God says is true.

3. Thus God does not exist.

FSC would have it that step 3 is fallacious because it contradicts steps 1 and 2 which implicitly contain "God exists.".

This prevents us from discovering that both 1 and 2 are false while 3 which follows from them is true.

Absent FSC, we would recognize the contradiction between 3 and (1 and 2). This would lead us to search for the cause. Since step 3 is valid, we would find that either 1 or 2 or both are false.

[Free Capitalist]

jrs, practically all fallacies can be subsumed under 'non sequitur' just as all of them can be subsumed as violations of the law of non-contradiction. That doesn't mean they are all the same, or that there are no important differences between them.

"Slippery slope" is a a "non sequitur" fallacy. "Ad hominem" is a "non sequitur" fallacy. Clearly then just because "stolen concept" is also a variant of "non sequitur" does not mean it has no useful role to play in its own right; the genus of something is not the only important thing, and the differentia are just as important. You seem to be saying either that the differentia of a thing are not important, or that there are no valid differentia for the "stolen concept" fallacy, a statement which if you really meant it, was seriously mistaken.

So it seems to me that, rather than anything else, it is your position against "stolen concept" that is a non sequitur.

Edited May 3, 2005 by Free Capitalist

[LauricAcid]

jrs:

I think you're on to something.

My reservations are these:

1. If FSC contradicts RAA, then Rand knew that or she didn't.

If Rand knew FSC contradicts RAA, then she would have had to reject one of them, and I (correctly?) suppose that she did not reject RAA.

So if FSC contradicts RAA, then Rand did not know that it does. But then Rand would have erred as to a very basic and simple matter of logic and the many basic Objectivst arguments that rely on FSC are out the window.

2. We may not have stated FSC correctly in terms of propositional logic. I think our formulation may be too crude and overlook some subtlety (perhaps in a predicate or other logic) that allows FSC to be consistent with RAA. This subtlety might have something to do with the meta-argument notion I mentioned earlier. Perhaps FSC operates as a meta-argument, an objection to an argument that is itself one level below FSC. In this way, FSC might not conflict directly with RAA. And this might have something to do with the Objectivist heirarchial principle. Morevover, even if FSC is articulated in way by Objectivists that contradicts RAA, then we might give Objectivism the benefit of the doubt by qualifying FSC in some way (perhaps as to meta-level) that would salvage it. I don't know; admitteldy, I'm only ruminating at this point.

3. I still find a conundrum here. There is something in common sense that makes one want to object to arguments like "Reason is false, and here's my reasoned argument for that proposition..." Is this common sense aversion to such arguments ill founded?

Edited May 3, 2005 by LauricAcid

[Marc K.]

How is a hierarchical contradiction ESSENTIALLY different from other kinds of contradictions?  What justifies treating it differently?

[...]

In EVERY case (of which I know) where Objectivists identify something as a FSC, they then simply dismiss it without further thought.  That is a serious error.

When the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept is employed in an argument and a so called “hierarchical contradiction” (I much prefer: “inversion of the hierarchy of knowledge” or “violation of the hierarchical dependence of knowledge”) is found, Objectivists treat it like any other “contradiction”: we dismiss the argument out of hand.

Also, in the quote above, the first part seems to conflict with the second. First you acknowledge the existence of such a thing as a “hierarchical contradiction” but then question the validity of Objectivists using such a contradiction to dismiss any argument that makes use of it.

Perhaps your intent was to question the hierarchy of knowledge.

If so, let me ask: do you accept that there is a hierarchy to all knowledge? That is: do you accept that all knowledge is built upon other knowledge, such that certain concepts depend logically on others for their definition?

[LauricAcid]

Has anyone made a hierarchical dictionary that covers most of our everyday concepts?

[jrs]

Free Capitalist (Post #65):

You said "... just because 'stolen concept' is also a variant of 'non sequitur' does not mean it has no useful role to play in its own right; ...".

You are missing the point.

1. Treating "stolen concept" as a fallacy is bad because it may result in the WRONG STEP of the argument being identified as the fallacy.

2. In the case of reductio ad absurdum, it may result in a valid argument being rejected as fallacious.

LauricAcid (Post #66):

As to Ayn Rand's motives for promoting FSC, I would rather not speculate here, except to say "CHECK YOUR PREMISES" as she used to say in the Objectivist Newsletter.

You said "We may not have stated FSC correctly in terms of propositional logic.".

Yes, that is possible. But no one has been able to give an alternative explanation that is convincing. This is one of the reasons that I am posting messages in this thread -- the hope that someone can come up with a more rational interpretation of FSC.

You said "Perhaps FSC operates as a meta-argument, an objection to an argument that is itself one level below FSC.".

I do not understand at what you are getting here. Please expand your explanation.

You said "... even if FSC is articulated in way by Objectivists that contradicts RAA, then we might give Objectivism the benefit of the doubt by qualifying FSC in some way (perhaps as to meta-level) that would salvage it.".

I was tempted to think that they might want to use some form of logic (not classical logic) which does not include RAA. However, their insistence on Excluded Middle and Non-Contradiction seems to rule that out. Moreover, Nathaniel Brandon uses the axioms of logic as one of his examples of things he is trying to protect in his original article -- "The Stolen Concept", Objectivist Newsletter, vol. 2, no. 1.

You asked "Is this common sense aversion to such arguments ill founded?".

This is part of what makes FSC so insidious. Your aversion to the argument is probably caused by the fact that it contains contradictory statements, and contradictions are bad. But one must distinguish between what is a contradiction and what is a fallacy.

When I first read Nathaniel Brandon's article to try to understand FSC, the first thing that seemed wrong to me was that he seemed to be implicitly using polylogicism -- the notion that what is true is relative to the person who holds the idea. The use of the word "stolen" (suggesting intellectual theft) and his suggestion that his intellectual opponents are being hypocritical by stealing concepts which they then attack support this view.

But hypocrisy and theft are ethical or political concepts. Logic is part of epistemology; and thus logically prior to them. So logic should pay no attention to hypocrisy and theft.

Marc K. (Post #67):

You said "First you acknowledge the existence of such a thing as a 'hierarchical contradiction' but then question the validity of Objectivists using such a contradiction to dismiss any argument that makes use of it.".

If you skim over another person's argument and find contradictions in it, you might reasonably decide that you do not want to waste your time studying it in detail.

BUT if you arrive at a contradiction in your own thinking or internalize another person's argument which contains a contradiction, then you are in a different situation. For the integrity of your mind, you must root out the contradiction.

It is not enough to just dismiss the obviously contradictory result. You must identify the root cause -- the original fallacy that produced the contradiction. FSC interferes with that process.

You said "Perhaps your intent was to question the hierarchy of knowledge.".

No. Mathematicians know better than most people that one must learn some things before one can understand others.

[y_feldblum]

The fallacy of the stolen concept is not a fallacy of deductive logic, but of inductive logic and of concept formation, specifically, the inversion or rejection of some or all of the hierarchy of concepts. Perhaps the name of the fallacy (to steal is to use without right, without having properly created), and Branden's essay, give the fact away?

[Gabriel_S]

The fallacy of the stolen concept is not a fallacy of deductive logic, but of inductive logic and of concept formation, specifically, the inversion or rejection of some or all of the hierarchy of concepts. Perhaps the name of the fallacy (to steal is to use without right, without having properly created), and Branden's essay, give the fact away?

"jrs" and some of the others are SO FAR OFF in their "understanding" of the FSC that they're really talking about something else entirely (their claims to the contrary notwithstanding). But that doesn't dissuade them a bit. They'll continue to critique their rendering of the FSC without skipping a beat. Obviously, as much of an investment as they've made in this, clear opposition to their interpretation is conveniently ignored or misconstrued.

Also, I wouldn't take the non-existence (if such was the case) of a defense of the FSC on this board to be indicative at all that such a defense isn't possible or available. This is hardly a forum teeming with professional Objectivist intellectuals (most of the participants strike me as young and/or very new to the philosophy). The level of confusion being exhibited here would be best addressed (and would be easily addressed) by Leonard Peikoff, Harry Binswanger, Allan Gotthelf, among others.

But, for crying out loud, if you're going to criticize something get the damn thing right! The bottom line is that I've yet to see a clear understanding of the FSC presented by jrs and the others. Until that is offered, this all just so much fluff and posturing.

Edited May 5, 2005 by Gabriel_S

[JMeganSnow]

All she said was that I was wrong to think that it is a propositional fallacy.  If it is a definitional fallacy, then it is merely the same as "using an undefined term" which I acknowledge is a real fallacy.  But statements by Ayn Rand and Atlas51184 indicate that it is a propositional fallacy.

It is a definitional fallacy, as you say, but that does NOT mean it is the same as using an undefined term. It means that you are trying to define a term in two contradictory ways at the same time; relying on the existance of a previous definition while asserting that the term has, AT THE SAME TIME, a new, CONTRADICTORY definition. I.E. the problem isn't that you have no definition but that you have TWO definitions and they contradict each other.

Ayn Rand's definition is correct, as is Nathanial Branden's; Ayn Rand was referring, in general, to what happens to your propositions if you permit yourself the shoddy thinking of stolen concepts; you wind up, as Kant did, using reason (which depends on validity the senses) to disprove the validity of the senses! You're using the validity of the senses, which are REQUIRED before reason can even be validated, to DISPROVE the validity of the senses!

[LauricAcid]

""jrs" and some of the others [...]" [Gabriel_S]

Who are the others?

"The bottom line is that I've yet to see a clear understanding of the FSC presented by jrs and the others. Until that is offered, this all just so much fluff and posturing." [Gabriel_S]

Perhaps you would offer a clear and definitive statement of the principle. Either in your own words or as quoted.

"I wouldn't take the non-existence (if such was the case) of a defense of the FSC on this board to be indicative at all that such a defense isn't possible or available. " [Gabriel_S]

Nor would I.

Edited May 5, 2005 by LauricAcid

[LauricAcid]

"[...] using reason (which depends on validity the senses) to disprove the validity of the senses!" [JMeganSnow]

Please explain how that uses a contradictory definition as opposed to assuming a proposition to disprove a proposition.

/

"The fallacy of the stolen concept is not a fallacy of deductive logic, but of inductive logic and of concept formation, specifically, the inversion or rejection of some or all of the hierarchy of concepts." [y_feldblum]

The examples given appear to be deductive, not inductive.

Also, I understand JMeganSnow's remarks about contradictory definition in terms of deduction, not induction (I don't know how JMeganSnow regards this, whether deduction or induction). Is her assertion about definitions incorrect?

Edited May 5, 2005 by LauricAcid

[y_feldblum]

The examples given appear to be deductive, not inductive.

They are examples related to concept-formation. See Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.

Also, I understand JMeganSnow's remarks about contradictory definition in terms of deduction, not induction (I don't know how JMeganSnow regards this, whether deduction or induction). Is her assertion about definitions incorrect?

I don't believe so. The fallacy concerns the formation and use of concepts, not their definitions.