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What is the solution to the mind-body dichotomy?

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Couldn't a materialist/determinist reply that when I saw your particular request, certain physical events took place in my brain that caused me either to move my arm up or to leave it where it was?  It seems that you are "begging the question."

This is a technical point, but events do not cause things; entities cause things. What events do is affect entities (which entities may then in turn react to the events).

I believe Matt and Ash have pretty much addressed your questions. I would like you to try and address my little intimation, though: "You can believe that all your actions are determined if you choose to." Wouldn't it be rather inconsistent to choose to believe that you are unable to make choices?

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Sorry I haven't answered all of your questions, I would definitely like to, but I recently came down with a pretty bad bug. I just wanted to let you all know that I'm not ignoring your questions, but I'm going to wait until I'm well so I can use my mind properly.

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Now that I am feeling better, I can address your questions and comments.

Re: The determinist's claim... Yes, he would say that it was just physical events, and the experience of volition is an illusion. But that does not mean that the advocate of volition is begging the question. He is assuming that his experience is not an illusion, and that the shoe is on the determinist's foot to prove that it is. In reply, the determinist would probably make similar arguments to what you are making, i.e., that we know scientifically a lot about the brain and about the universe in general, and that consciousness (as non-physical and causally efficacious) doesn't square with that. Is this pretty much your line of thinking?
It is not personally my line of thinking, but it is the line of thinking that I am having trouble refuting.

Since volition is self-evident--specifically, directly experienced by you--i.e., metaphysically given--the burden of proof is on those who claim it to be an illusion. Before this discussion can progress any further, you must answer the question, do you think any of the determinists' arguments are valid? (If so, which ones, and why?)

Otherwise, you are dismissing volition without rational grounds, and then asking us to prove it to you. But volition is a precondition of proof. If volition did not exist, we could hardly convince you to change your beliefs about something (and as such, this conversation would be pointless). But since it does, and is self-evident, it is irrational to try to debate it. As long as you deny it, this conversation is pointless. You are asking us to provide you with evidence to convince you of its reality, while ignoring the very evidence we keep pointing to. All we can do is further explore the nature of volition, but we have to accept that it is real first. Until you do that, there's really nothing more to say on the matter.

Ok Ash, I think I agree that the burden of proof is on the determinist's foot to demonstrate that volition is an illusion.

However, I am going to disagree with your statement that volition is a precondition of proof. Determinism (hard determinism) states that every human action is determined by antecedent causes, but does not reject that human beings deliberate in some form. There is some course of action picked by a given individual, but the difference between the advocate of volition and the determinist is that the former will say that the individual had the choice to pick that course, whereas the latter will claim that the indvidual's choice was determined by antecedent causes.

It seems that your claim that volition is a precondition of proof is based on the idea that one must deliberate about a particular thing in order to determine it to be true or false. (If I am incorrect, please correct me.) However, it seems pretty clear to me that I can be determined to arrive at a particular conclusion, but that does not in itself negate such a conclusion from being correct.

"You can believe that all your actions are determined if you choose to." Wouldn't it be rather inconsistent to choose to believe that you are unable to make choices?

CF, this seems like begging the question to me. I do not understand why volition must be an axiom, nor do I understand why consciousness existing as a mental entity must also be an axiom.

For all three of you, again, keep in mind that I am playing devil's advocate here. I am trying to understand how to completely defeat the arguments of the determinist and the materialist. Thanks.

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I've had the same problem with volition and causality as you guys are having, and I think it stems from our Humean concept of causality of only events causing other events.

The law of causality states that an entity acts the way it does because it is what it is. The law of causality directly follows from the law of identity. This is a key that is often overlooked: the actions of entities are caused by their nature, their identity--not by antecedent events.

Any massive object within a gravitational field will by nature "fall" towards the center of gravity because it has mass. The object's being in the gravitational field is NOT the cause, but the necessary CONDITION. The cause is both the nature of the gravitational field and the nature of the object--i.e., the cause is their IDENTITY.

Likewise, all my voluntary and conscious acts are caused by me, because it is my nature as a human being, as an animal with volitional consciousness. My choosing to think does indeed depend on a variety of conditions/events--such as my being awake and focused, my being sufficiently well; but again, those conditions are NOT the cause. My volition is the cause. Those necessary conditions/events may be present for any entity, but if that entity is not human--specifically me--they will certainly not cause it to choose to think. In fact they won't cause anything, they will only restrict what actions are possible or inevitable to a certain entity under the given conditions.

Let's take another very common example: the billiard balls example. When two billiard balls collide, they deflect each other's course. The balls' COLLISION is often assumed to cause the balls' deflection. What is often ignored is the nature--the identity--of the billiard balls: that they are round, of certain shape, made of certain type of material, have a specific size, mass, weight, etc... THESE are the cause of the balls' deflection. The collision is but a necessary condition/event.

The collision of entities does not cause their course to deflect. When a bullet collides with an animal, its course is not deflected. Rather, it pierces through the animals flesh and often kills it. The collision is but a condition, the cause is the nature of flesh and the speeding bullet. Notice that we would say: the bullet pierced the animals flesh BECAUSE the animals flesh is easily penetrable by a small projectile traveling at a certain speed and having a certain force. That is, we attribute the cause to specific characteristics/properties of both the the animal and the bullet and indicate the conditions (italicized clause).

Antecedent events only create the CONDITIONS that restricts what actions are possible or inevitable to a given entity. They do not cause it to act. It is the nature of the entity that causes it to act. And an entity with volition will have alternatives--several possible courses of actions under the given conditions.

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What would it mean for consciousness to be a physical entity? I'm very unclear on this. Could you concoct a brief devil's advocate argument?

(I think the self-refuting nature of determinism will be fairly easy to grasp when it has been explained thoroughly. I don't have the time to do that right now, so I thought I'd try to address this first.)

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What would it mean for consciousness to be a physical entity? I'm very unclear on this. Could you concoct a brief devil's advocate argument?

(I think the self-refuting nature of determinism will be fairly easy to grasp when it has been explained thoroughly. I don't have the time to do that right now, so I thought I'd try to address this first.)

When we look into the human body, particularly at the brain, we do not perceive any ethereal, immaterial entity that fills and controls it. We see only matter acting the way it does when so organized and maintained--alive and functioning according to its nature. Yet we know that within it is a consciousness--a mind that is self-conscious and volitional. We know that the nervous system is the means by which the mind is conscious of itself and the external world, the means by which it feels, thinks, imagines, perceives. All of its functions are performed through the brain: from muscle movement and coordination by sheer conscious will to complex logical reasoning by sharp focus and concentration.

We can perceive the action--the brain waves and the active areas of the brain--but we do not perceive the actor, which is presumably that immaterial entity called consciousness. What makes us think that consciousness is immaterial? The fact that it is conscious and volitional? We have never observed inanimate matter possessing such faculties. But we do see them in animals--particularly in ourselves and in each other. And we're certainly physical entities. We also know that when physical entities are so organized and structured into complex forms they can posses incredible properties: they can live and reproduce.(!) Even more astonishing is the fact that the more advanced and complex their physical structures/systems are, the more complex, varied and advanced their behavior and faculties become; this is especially manifest in animals--from the simplest eukaryotic cell to the adult human being.

Yet why is it so incredible for us to believe that when matter is so organized and structured into forms as complex as our brains, it can posses such faculties as self-consciousness and volition? Why must we postulate the existence of an immaterial entity that possesses the said faculties?

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This issue is often known as the "explanatory gap". Physicalists have a lot of trouble explaining consciousness. (I think it's impossible for them to do so.) Let's make it a little less abstract than consciousness itself: take concepts.

You open a brain. You poke around, you pull things apart, you finally find the precise parts that are activated when one uses a concept. Does that mean you've found the concept? Or: take emotions, another mental entity. You find the exact neural structures that are involved in emotions. You find the ones that are activated when one feels love. You learn everything there is to be learned about them. Now here's the question: do you now know about love?

Frank Jackson (I think his name was) wrote a famous thought experiment on a related topic. Take a girl, Mary. Put her, from birth, in a room where everything is black and white. (Make her wear black-and-white clothing, perhaps, or whatever you need to do to make the scenario complete.) Now give her a complete library of knowledge about the world. She learns physics, optics, neuroscience, psychology of perception. She catches on quick and has a lot of time on her hands, so eventually she knows everything there is to know about the physical aspects of perception. One day, you open the door and let Mary outside into the world. She sees colors for the first time. If you hold a physicalist position, that the physical world is *all there is* -- that consciousness is *nothing but* a brain state, perception is *nothing but* a brain activity -- you're in the position of having to claim that she learns *nothing* when she sees colors. But obviously she DOES. Even though she knew every physical aspect of color perception before, she didn't really know what it is to perceive colors. Now she does.

(If you're not trying to make a reductivist claim, by the way, the above won't apply to you... it's not a proof that there's something immaterial about color perception, because you could just say that it depends on specific types of changes to the brain -- learning abstractly is different than experiencing. But I think, indirectly, it does show that. If you're not a reductivist, you either have to say that the mind is "the brain seen from the inside" -- in which case, you run into the "seen by WHAT???" problem. Or, you have to say that consciousness is an emergent property, and I've never seen a coherent account of what a physical emergent property would be.)

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If you're not a reductivist, you either have to say that the mind is "the brain seen from the inside" -- in which case, you run into the "seen by WHAT???" problem.  Or, you have to say that consciousness is an emergent property, and I've never seen a coherent account of what a physical emergent property would be.

Yes! That's a very concise and exact summary of the problem of considering consciousness a physical entity.

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Frank Jackson (I think his name was) wrote a famous thought experiment on a related topic.  Take a girl, Mary.  Put her, from birth, in a room where everything is black and white.  (Make her wear black-and-white clothing, perhaps, or whatever you need to do to make the scenario complete.)  Now give her a complete library of knowledge about the world.  She learns physics, optics, neuroscience, psychology of perception.  She catches on quick and has a lot of time on her hands, so eventually she knows everything there is to know about the physical aspects of perception.  One day, you open the door and let Mary outside into the world.  She sees colors for the first time.  If you hold a physicalist position, that the physical world is *all there is* -- that consciousness is *nothing but* a brain state, perception is *nothing but* a brain activity -- you're in the position of having to claim that she learns *nothing* when she sees colors.  But obviously she DOES.  Even though she knew every physical aspect of color perception before, she didn't really know what it is to perceive colors.  Now she does.

I find that argument very flawed.

The environment in which Frank has placed Mary to live and grow is an impossibility.

If all her life she had only been in that room, had seen only those which are the room (herself, her black and white clothes, and the black and white walls, floor, and ceiling and the lights therein, the bed with the black and white sheets and pillow, the black and white toilet, the black and white sink), had never seen human beings nor interact in any way with them, had never heard anything but her own voice and the sounds that she can make in the room, all the while assuming that somehow she had only eaten black and white food that is flavorless, shapeless, etc... and that she had obtained such food without ever having contact with human beings), that she had survived in that room all by herself from the moment she was born, is a impossible theoretical situation that ignores so much about human nature and human life.

Such a situation is IMPOSSIBLE. Mary would die immediately. And even if she managed to survive long enough to be able to observe the room and everything in it, she would never learn anything, no concepts, no language, nothing.

This argument blatantly ignores how a child learns concepts and language--how a child learns anything at all. It assumes that Mary--who is psychologically and mentally stunted if not dead--can learn complex scientific concepts such as the physics and biology of neurological processess, can know all there is to know about the nervous system (never mind that she can't even read text and conprehend all the pictures, diagrams charts etc...given to her, let alone understand that what has been given to her is a book of knowledge; never mind that learning to read anything is only possible after learning concepts and language, which are impossible to acquire in her situation; never mind that she would never be able to understand anything presented to her at all until she learns how to use her fundamental tool of cognition--her mind--by actually using it to perceive, reason and conclude where there is something to perceive reason and conclude; never mind that she is a human being who could never live and grow and learn in such a situation) let's just ignore the fact that she is what she is--a human being.

Let's assume that she can survive without any other human being to care of her for the first few months or years of her life. Let's assume that she will never see the color of her skin, her hair, her urine and feces. Let's assume that she can form concepts without the percepts or concretes necessary to differentiate and integrate them into concepts. Let's assume that she can learn how to read even though she knows no language. Let's assume that she can comprehend complex, derivative, scientific concepts even though she has never formed even the most rudimentary concepts. Let's assume that she can reason logically although she has never learned (and can never learn) how to do so in the environment in which she can presumably live.

The thought experiment of the Hypothetical Mary is not even possible in theory.

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Likewise, all my voluntary and conscious acts are caused by me, because it is my nature as a human being, as an animal with volitional consciousness. My choosing to think does indeed depend on a variety of conditions/events--such as my being awake and focused, my being sufficiently well; but again, those conditions are NOT the cause. My volition is the cause. Those necessary conditions/events may be present for any entity, but if that entity is not human--specifically me--they will certainly not cause it to choose to think. In fact they won't cause anything, they will only restrict what actions are possible or inevitable to a certain entity under the given conditions.

Tom, I agree with your statements about the Humean concept of causality, that is not what I am unsure of. You say that your nature is such that all of your actions are caused by you. You are making a statement about human nature. My question is not, why does this human nature result in a certain action, but, why do we define volitional consciousness as a part of human nature?

Also, I agree with the impossible nature of Frank Jackson's hypothetical Mary.

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The thought-expirement about Mary is just that: a thought-expirement. Most thought-expirements proposed by today's philosophers are pointless and stupid (often because they are indeed impossible, even in theory). But for this one, it doesn't matter whether or not it is in fact impossible (which I think is debatable). The point is simply that there is a qualitative difference--for which materialists can't account--between knowing the physical causes for some state of consciousness and experiencing it for oneself. You can object to that particular example, but then you're just missing the whole point, and your objection is irrelevent. Take another example that is obviously possible: A person blind from birth learns about all of the physical events taking place in the external world, sense organs, brain, etc. involved in sight. Eventually, he is able to have an operation that restores his sight. On the materialist account, he learns nothing new upon opening his eyes for the first time after his operation. Now try objecting to the actual content of the thought-experiment.

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What I don't understand is how could the blind man learn about the concept of "sight", let alone the science behind it, when he can't even see? That was essentially my objection to the Mary thought-experiment: that (assuming that she is even capable of learning in her hypothetical situation) how could she possibly form the concept of "color", let alone learn anything about the science of color-perception, when she has never supposedly seen color herself?

Are you implying that the concept of "sight" can be formed by one who does not possess the faculty of sight, that the concept "color" can be formed by one who does not perceive "colors"?

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That I have never advocated at all. I am not a materialist. I have merely stated in previous posts that I see nothing incredible about the complex human brain having the faculty of self-consciousness, reason and volition. Perhaps the mind is immaterial and the brain is only the means by which it operates. But that leads to a lot of confusion. I suppose it stems from the premise that only matter and energy can causally influence matter and energy.

---edit---

I am going to read into this so-called "emergent property"...But if you can, would you recommend some sources from which I can learn more about it?

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"'Color' occurs when rays of light acquire varying wavelengths by refracting off objects and then striking the retina. The nervous system/brain then transforms the wavelengths into various hues. Red is the lower spectrum, green the middle, and blue the upper. Above and beyond these frequences, the eye cannot detect light." etc., etc.

Perfectly scientifically sound, materialist, physical account of color that a blind man could understand abstractly. But it does not give us the conscious experience of color, which is something completely different (i.e., mental).

Anyway, I think this is getting off track. I want a coherant account of a physical consciousness.

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Tom -- Maybe I wasn't clear on this. The idea isn't that the only thing Mary is ever exposed to is information on neurology, etc., which she somehow magically manages to understand. It's assumed that she gets some sort of education while in there. You can change anything you want in the scenario, as long as you don't change one thing: she never sees color until after she learns everything there is to know about the relevant scientific fields. (Yes, there IS an impossible claim there: it assumes that she achieves omniscience within a particular field. But it's not the sort of impossible claim that invalidates the point being made, any more than Rand's use of an intelligent atom invalidates her point about the objectivity of knowledge.)

Here's one alteration to the scenario that might make it more palatable for you. Some mad scientist genetically engineers a baby, Mary, to have eyes without cones. (The cones are responsible for color vision, but the baby could still see in black & white due to the rods.) Mary then has a *totally normal life*; not much more unusual, overall, than a color-blind person. Just a bit more so. Now toss in the relevant parts of the original scenario. She learns all the relevant facts in all the relevent fields, etc, etc. Then he abducts her again and implants cones into her eyes. Does that work better for you?

You asked: "Are you implying that the concept of "sight" can be formed by one who does not possess the faculty of sight, that the concept "color" can be formed by one who does not perceive "colors"?" No -- I'm not. I think that's the conclusion the physicalist is driven to, though. If color perception *just is* a bunch of physical facts, then knowing about all those physical facts means that you know everything there is to know about color. I'm saying that's precisely untrue.

I don't know of any good sources on emergent properties off the top of my head. I think there's an online encyclopedia of philosophy, maybe on the Stanford website, that might have some info/links. Try a google search on it.

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  • 3 weeks later...

I thought I'd pass along something that Greg Salmieri mentioned to me in an email:

"I just glanced at the thread on the mind-body problem on your sight. People are ignoring *property* dualism. To say that the mental is irreducible to the physical isn't necessarily to say that there is some entity (r stuff), the mind, which is not reducible to other entities. The mind obviously isn't a separate entity. It is an attribute of certain living creatures, and it is not reducible to any non-mental (i.e. physical) attributes of those creatures. Things have all sorts of attributes that aren't reducible to other attributes: size, shape and weight, for example are irreducibly different attributes, but all three are attributes of the same things. I liked your point about consciousness as a relationship. In a sense it is a relationship, but that doesn't help to reduce it to the physical, b/c it isn't a relationship between the subject's *body* and the object."

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  • 1 month later...

John Searle has a decent paper on consciousness on his website that briefly addresses this problem. While there are some mistakes in the paper (e.g., his attempt to "define" consciousness), the relevant section seems pretty good to me on a first reading. Here is an excerpt:

Notice that I stated the philosophical solution without using  any of the traditional categories of "dualism,” "monism,” "materialism,"  and all the rest of it. Frankly, I think those categories are obsolete.  But if we accept those categories at face value, then we get the following picture: You have a choice between dualism and materialism. According to dualism, consciousness and other mental phenomena exist in a different  ontological realm altogether from the ordinary physical world of physics, chemistry, and biology. According to materialism consciousness as I have described it does not exist. Neither dualism nor  materialism as traditionally construed,  allows us to get an answer  to our question.  Dualism says that there are  two kinds of phenomena in the world, the mental and the  physical; materialism says that there is only one, the material.  Dualism ends up with an impossible bifurcation of reality  into two separate categories and thus makes it impossible to explain the relation between the mental and the physical.  But materialism ends up denying the existence of any  irreducible subjective qualitative states of sentience  or awareness.    In short, dualism makes the problem insoluble; materialism denies  the existence of any phenomenon to study, and hence of any  problem.   

On the view that I am proposing, we should reject those categories altogether.    We know enough about how the world works to know that consciousness is a biological phenomenon caused by brain processes and realized in the structure of the brain. It is irreducible not because it is ineffable or mysterious,  but because it has a first person ontology, and therefore cannot  be reduced to phenomena with a third person ontology.    The traditional  mistake that people have made in both  science and philosophy has been to suppose that if  we reject dualism, as I believe we must, then we have to embrace materialism.  But on the view that I am putting forward, materialism is just as confused as dualism because it denies the existence of ontologically subjective consciousness in the first place.  Just to give it a name, the resulting view that  denies both dualism and materialism, I call biological naturalism.

(That's on page 12, for those of you who might like to read more of this section but not necessarily the whole paper. Although it might be a good idea to start at the beginning, so you will understand what he means by terms such as "ontologically subjective" and "first/third person ontology.")

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  • 5 weeks later...

I havent read through this whole post, and normally that kinda annoys me on forums, so I apologize for that.

thinking = information processing

When light hits your eyes, they transmit the information about the light hitting them to an information processing system (described in detail in ItOE.)

No information exists without a medium. However, information is essentially media-independent. If you write "the cat is on the mat" on a piece of paper, and then type it into a computer, the information - the content - is the same, even though the medium changes.

Therefore, it is often convenient to talk about any sort of information as a "media-less" concept. After all, in integrating the concept of "information," you drop the non-relevant measurements - ie, the type of media that the information exists in. Once you make that leap, it's fairly easy to treat the mind as some formless thing disconnected from reality, while the body is just the meat that the mind is riding in. However, this approach drops the context: All information must be represented in some media in order to exist. Your mind would not exist without a body to "store" or "represent" it. Since the body is the medium, all attributes of the mind (including mental events) must necessarily have some representation in the body. If they don't, then they don't exist (would violate the law of identity.) The information and information processing system and "hardware" are united. When we say "mind" we're refering to a particular aspect of a thinking agent. It makes no more sense to say that your mind and body are split than it does to say that your hieght and weight are split or are "different entities."

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  • 1 month later...

Mental is the physical, albeit volitional. When you form a thought, one doesn't imagine what changes happpen in those physical organic hemispheres. I'm not a cognitive scientist...yet...but the physical things that take part in the process of a thought would have to be chemicals, neurons, etc. Thinking is usually called nonphysical because it is abstract, but when you are thinking, certain things do happen to the organic tissue. It's physical. Isn't it truly a wonder that the chemical elements and matter of a rock are organized in such a way that it allows a living being to think?

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Regarding determinism:

Implicit in any claim of knowledge, is that one has control over one's mind -- otherwise one has no idea how that "knowledge" got there or if it is true. Thus, the claim to know that the content of the mind is determined is self-contradictory. It is the claim to have arrived at the truth that no one can ever know the truth.

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  • 5 years later...

I know this example of proving consciousness has already been brought up, sort of, but there is a test you can do yourself. :)

Is the mind physical? If I answer no, then proof is this - I can't point to or show correspondence of a no to something physical, because there is not no(thing) there, but something. In other words I know of a no in my mind alone and can't point to a no outside my mind. I can even variate this, if I look at a picture of myself, brain scan or some other outside source of my brain, I can't point to my mind. It isn't there in the physical sense, but it is there.

Reality is one in one sense, because everything is connected; but the mind doesn't not correspond to the brain as physical - it is connected, yes and it also obeys reality just like the physical part, but it is not physical. :)

Indeed the law of non-contradiction, which is true of all of reality, is not physical, because you can't literally show A=non-A at the same time and in same sense, yet it is true.

With regard

Mikael

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I know this example of proving consciousness has already been brought up, sort of, but there is a test you can do yourself. :P

Is the mind physical? If I answer no, then proof is this - I can't point to or show correspondence of a no to something physical, because there is not no(thing) there, but something. In other words I know of a no in my mind alone and can't point to a no outside my mind. I can even variate this, if I look at a picture of myself, brain scan or some other outside source of my brain, I can't point to my mind. It isn't there in the physical sense, but it is there.

Reality is one in one sense, because everything is connected; but the mind doesn't not correspond to the brain as physical - it is connected, yes and it also obeys reality just like the physical part, but it is not physical. :)

Indeed the law of non-contradiction, which is true of all of reality, is not physical, because you can't literally show A=non-A at the same time and in same sense, yet it is true.

With regard

Mikael

You fail to know where in a (can we suppose it is a video, not a still picture?) video of brain activity to point to pick out the mental happenings. If you look at very simple examples, this becomes less problematic.

Imagine sand-paper rubbed on your skin, touching a mirror, and then a pin-prick. Imagine recording the nerve action to each stimulus, and finding they are different in terms of the rate of firing. Would it be puzzling to you that these three kinds of physical things produced different effects on your sense-receptors, that the nerves of your skin were caused to fire at different rates, and that three different sensations were produced?

I do not find that puzzling. It seems pretty natural. If you try to couch the mind-body problem in terms of this sequence, doesn't it seem artificial?

I think the answer to the M-B problem lies in a genuine epistemological dualism. I must emphasize that this is not the same as "aspect dualism" where that term is equivalent to "property dualism." What I refer to is an old, venerable, but also ignored point of view that says there are two radically different ways to take cognizance of the same thing, and we call the one "mind" and the other "body."

These two ways of conceiving of the psychological/epistemological/mental catch just the tail of one another's full character.

Mindy

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