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Morality of using a Nuclear Weapon

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smathy

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Why do you say that there is no rational understanding of such situations? The situations exist, and we agree that ethical evaluations apply, so I would think that these are rational ethical evaluations.
That wasn't what I said (some crucial words were left out. Let me restates, so that you can see what I means. The proper standard for evaluating an action undertaken under duress is that it impossible to rationally comprehend the action as supporting life. Some such actions can easily be cmprehended in those terms -- the bombing of Hiroshima, for example. The H-bombing of a bank-robber could not be comprehended in such terms: it can only be understood as the perverted urge to kill, and use an incident of agression as carte blanche to do anything.
But if there were no such means, then it would still be wrong to drop the bomb instead of letting the robber escape.
I don't see that; at any rate, since there are less drastic means to stop the robber, the question is moot.
Even less unrealistic: Suppose the only way to stop a robber (even someone who just murdered) were to take shots into a crowd that have a good chance of striking bystanders. It would be unethical to take the shots.
Why would it be unethical? I don't understand that claim.
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I want a reference for that statement. Who actually advocates that we should be able to choose at our whim what force to direct at the aggressor?

"Whim" may have been the wrong word, I'm waiting to be shown.

A decision was made by America to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and a claim was and is being made that it was a necessary component of America's self-defense (the only way that the action can be claimed to be moral), and yet no rational link between the two has been demonstrated, and that remains my challenge. You stated that it was a moral action, so show it to be moral.

The only statements being made are that (1) Japan started the war, so the deaths are on the Emperor's head and (2) that it saved lives because many more would have died than did. Neither are arguments enough required to establish morality in themselves.

For (1): Without any additional reasoning, that implies that any action of an attacked nation upon the attacker is justified by the fact that the attacker initiated the war. Any action whatsoever, someone punches me, so I bomb his house and claim the lives are his own responsibility.

If that's not the case, then justify the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Show how it was an essential component of America's self-defense.

For (2): The claim that fewer lives were lost in the bombing than would have been is invalid (even if we assume the predictive abilities of those involved to be accurate) as a moral defense because it fails to comment on what other options were available.

Just because more lives will be saved if I blow up a train hurtling toward a crowd, that doesn't mean that its a moral action if I also have the option of signalling the train to stop.

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For (1): Without any additional reasoning, that implies that any action of an attacked nation upon the attacker is justified by the fact that the attacker initiated the war. Any action whatsoever, someone punches me, so I bomb his house and claim the lives are his own responsibility.

This is the heart of your "whim" accusation. The implication you draw completely strips away any concern for the end: America's self-defense. That is the goal and the standard of value for any action we may take against aggressor nations; nothing else is justified.

For (2): The claim that fewer lives were lost in the bombing than would have been is invalid (even if we assume the predictive abilities of those involved to be accurate) as a moral defense because it fails to comment on what other options were available.

And you, too, fail to comment on what other options were available. Other than a land invasion (which any reasonable person would recognize as more costly in lives), what other options were there?

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For (1): Without any additional reasoning, that implies that any action of an attacked nation upon the attacker is justified by the fact that the attacker initiated the war.  Any action whatsoever, someone punches me, so I bomb his house and claim the lives are his own responsibility.
This has been addressed, and you're distorting history. Japan did not punch someone in the nose. They attacked the US and invaded a number of countries, and killed millions. They persisted in their aggression -- they continued to violate rights. The justification lies in the need to stop their aggression.
If that's not the case, then justify the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Show how it was an essential component of America's self-defense.
The alternative was more American deaths. You're ignoring the fact that they continued to push their war of aggression even after we had pushed them back in the Pacific, at great loss of life to ourselves.
For (2): The claim that fewer lives were lost in the bombing than would have been is invalid (even if we assume the predictive abilities of those involved to be accurate) as a moral defense because it fails to comment on what other options were available.
But I just commented on those options (and I am not the first to do so). The comparative number of lives is irrelevant: what matters is that they were trying to kill us, and we have the right to kill them to put an end to this aggression.
Just because more lives will be saved if I blow up a train hurtling toward a crowd, that doesn't mean that its a moral action if I also have the option of signalling the train to stop.
They were "signalled to stop", and they did not. They continued to kill innocents, which is why we had to use force in the first place. Are you seriously claiming that they were somehow confused and didn't realize that they were engaged in a war of aggression, and that we just had to say "Excuse me, you are acting aggressively. Now please stop that!".
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Don't you see?  Any Japanese citizens with flattened houses, severe burns, radiation poisoning, dead relatives or mutant children could just present the Emperor with a bill for damages.  The Emperor could then pay them back by charging a fee on all contracts that are enforceable by the government.  It's a win-win situation.

How can money fix a third eye, or brain damage, or any other irreperable damage? I am not trying to be sarcastic, but I don't understand. Could you explain the idea of "the Emperor should be protecting its citizens"? I don't quite understand your position.

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...

If that's not the case, then justify the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Show how it was an essential component of America's self-defense.

It was an essential component of America's self-defense because:

1) Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, implying that they intended to "beat us into submission."

2) Japan refused America's terms of surrender, meaning that they would continue to kill Americans by maintaining a state of war.

3) More American lives would be lost by a land invasion, not to mention more Japanese lives as well.

4) Therefore, America needed to end the war for her self-defense (nobody is disputing this, I hope) and the best way to do this with minimum loss of life was the Atomic bombings.

For (2): The claim that fewer lives were lost in the bombing than would have been is invalid (even if we assume the predictive abilities of those involved to be accurate) as a moral defense because it fails to comment on what other options were available.

Just because more lives will be saved if I blow up a train hurtling toward a crowd, that doesn't mean that its a moral action if I also have the option of signalling the train to stop.

What other options were available? I'm going to take the word of trained military professionals over yours I'm afraid. The plan, up until the point of the Atomic bombing, was to invade Japan using Okinawa as a launchpad. That is why that battle was so important to the military.

Your analogy doesn't mean anything. For one thing, the train isn't endangering you, so it's not self-defense. Second of all, Japan had no *off-switch.* There was no easy fix. Japan made it clear that we would have to kill every last one of them if we tried to invade Japan. There was not going to be a quick way to end the war, until the Atomic Bomb.

Basically, provide some evidence that there were other *options* available and very good evidence that they were better options, or cut it out, please.

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I don't know what happened, but it seems that I have tripped and stumbled my way to nowhere in this thread. Perhaps I should have begun with a statement to this affect because there seems to have been some hefty assumptions made about my position and knowledge of the related history.

I have never said that the bombings were immoral, nor do I think that they are. I have little knowledge of the history of the situation so would not be able to draw such a conclusion either way. Prior to coming into contact with Objectivism I had an irrational belief that the bombings were immoral. Since discovering Objectivism I have not revisited that belief saw Oakes's comment as a chance to get some help to begin that process.

Thankfully today I had a great conversation with several people in #Objectivist and have some excellent starting points for understanding the morality of war from an Objectivist perspective. So thank you to all those who responded, I shall not be posting to this thread any more.

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How can money fix a third eye, or brain damage, or any other irreperable damage? I am not trying to be sarcastic, but I don't understand. Could you explain the idea of "the Emperor should be protecting its citizens"? I don't quite understand your position.

Tom Robinson is not an Objectivist; he is a Libertarian who has apparently decided to deliberately distort and misrepresent the Objectivist position. His posts should have been deleted sooner.

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Tom Robinson is not an Objectivist; he is a Libertarian who has apparently decided to deliberately distort and misrepresent the Objectivist position. His posts should have been deleted sooner.

Oh. I had no idea. Well, then I suppose that I should readdress my question to everyone. I agree that the immediate loss of lives in Japan due to the atomic bombs iwas not America's fault-it is unfortunate that those who didn't support the Emperor (innocents) were killed, but it is the consequence of war. My concern with using nuclear weapons is with the long term effects of nuclear radiation, as I said "the effect to innocents long after the war is complete". Such effects include radiation which results in life long and irreperable damage, not to mention nuclear winter and mutations. Should nuclear weapon deterence be supported for this reason, or should the "clean up" and after war reconstruction be up to the country in question's government?

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DavidOdden:

"The proper standard for evaluating an action undertaken under duress is that it [is] impossible to rationally comprehend the action as supporting life."

I don't understand what that asserts.

Which, if any, of these are you saying (and should anything be added)?:

1. The proper standard for evaluating an action undertaken under duress is that an action undertaken under duress should be a best attempt, given the circumstances of duress, to support life.

2. Duress is a condition under which no action is optimal for supporting life as such optimal condition is supported by the absence of duress.

3. Imposition of duress is irrational since it prevents optimal action toward supporting life.

"I don't see that [...]''

You said that in response to my assertion that it would be wrong to drop an atomic bomb to stop a robber even if it were the only means to stop him.

I surely don't want to put words in your mouth. But you don't see that it would be wrong to drop an atomic bomb to stop a robber even if it were the only way to stop him?

"Why would it be unethical? I don't understand that claim."

You said that in response to my assertion that it woud be wrong to fire shots at an escaping robber (even murderer) if there were a good chance the shots would strike bystanders.

Let's simplify, by starting first with a robber.

Do you think it is morally permissible to fire shots that have a good chance of killing, maiming, paralyzing, or wounding bystanders just to stop an escaping robber?

Edited by LauricAcid
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Why is it that people persist in trying to discount Objectivist foreign policy by bringing up analogies dealing in domestic situations? Why would one presume that a government, charged with protecting its own citizens, would apply the same principles in war as in crime-fighting? Of course the government cannot blow up a city block in order to kill a serial rapist on the run. That would be violating its established duty: to protect its citizens' rights.

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Why is it that people persist in trying to discount Objectivist foreign policy by bringing up analogies dealing in domestic situations? Why would one presume that a government, charged with protecting its own citizens, would apply the same principles in war as in crime-fighting? Of course the government cannot blow up a city block in order to kill a serial rapist on the run. That would be violating its established duty: to protect its citizens' rights.

Can you provide an argument that the rights of non-Americans are inferior to the rights of Americans? If, as Rand argued, rights are derived from the nature of man qua man, why should one nationality of man deserve a higher degree of rights protection than another?

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Can you provide an argument that the rights of non-Americans are inferior to the rights of Americans?  If, as Rand argued, rights are derived from the nature of man qua man, why should one nationality of man deserve a higher degree of rights protection than another?

If I hire a security guard, he is charged with protecting MY rights. He does not stalk the night streets wearing a cape and fighting crime. It is the same with governments. A proper government is established with the purpose of protecting the rights OF ITS CITIZENS. If a dictator uses force to make my government choose between saving the lives of its own citizens or saving the lives of foreign citizens, it should properly save the lives of its own. The responsibility for the loss of the lives of the foreign citizens lies with those who INITIATED force, in any case, and NOT with my government.

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The proper standard for evaluating an action undertaken under duress is that an action undertaken under duress should be a best attempt, given the circumstances of duress, to support life.
No. BTW this should be, in the context, "evaluate as immoral". Since we're talking about moral evaluation (not moral conduct), the questions are all epistemological. The question that I must ask, in all contexts, is "Is that person acting according to what he knows is right, thus acting to support his life and values?". The evidence needed to support the negative conclusion changes radically, when your range of options has been reduced by coersion.
But you don't see that it would be wrong to drop an atomic bomb to stop a robber even if it were the only way to stop him?
Since it can't be the case that dropping an atomic bomb on him is the only way to stop the robber, then the question doesn't arise (hence I can't see it). It is wrong to A-bomb bank robbers because it unnecessarily destroys value. Please remember that moral evaluation is about how to chose between actions in reality, so situations which cannot be real are irrelevant. If it were legitimate to freely invoke counterfactual and impossible situations, then morality would be meaningless because you could always thwart the restrictions imposed by a moral code by saying "Now suppose you were immortal and always guaranteed of success. Then would it be moral to..."
Do you think it is morally permissible to fire shots that have a good chance of killing, maiming, paralyzing, or wounding bystanders just to stop an escaping robber?
First, let's change the escapee from a bank-robber to a mass murderer, just to be sure that the argument isn't grounded on bad assumptions about banks (i.e. the false dichotomy "no amount of money is worth a life"). Second, we need two different people firing the gun, because it depends on the shooter. I would say it is not morally permissible for me to do so, because I am reasonably certain (empirically) that I am not a good shot, and that there is little change that I would hit the killer. So it would be pointless for me to shoot at him, and the chances of hitting an innocent bystander are vastly higher than the chances of me hitting the killer. If you replace me with, say, Vern (who I presume can hit the narrow side of a barn, inter alia) then it is permissible. I am not certain that he would make the shot; I am virtually certain that I would not.
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If I hire a security guard, he is charged with protecting MY rights. He does not stalk the night streets wearing a cape and fighting crime. It is the same with governments. A proper government is established with the purpose of protecting the rights OF ITS CITIZENS. If a dictator uses force to make my government choose between saving the lives of its own citizens or saving the lives of foreign citizens, it should properly save the lives of its own. The responsibility for the loss of the lives of the foreign citizens lies with those who INITIATED force, in any case, and NOT with my government.

I see. My rights are the only rights to be considered? My hired security guards may violate the rights of others in order to secure my rights? My guards may mow down citizens in a crowd to eliminate any potential threat to me? And the responsibility for any persons killed by my security guard lies not with me or my hired guns, but with those who are perceived by me or my guards to be a threat? In this scheme, any hired gun is above reproach, and any dead or injured bystanders must take up their case with the “enemy” perceived by the hired gun to be the threat.

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DavidOdden:

"Since it can't be the case that dropping an atomic bomb on him is the only way to stop the robber, then the question doesn't arise [...]"

That is missing the point of hypothetical testing. Okay, so it's not an atomic bomb. It's some other situation in which the field commander determines there is no way to ensure capture except by killing the suspect but with loss of life to many bystanders. The atomic bomb hypothetical is used since it frames this question in its starkest terms. Such hypotheticals are valid means of probing the consequences of principles. Atomic bombs were used in 1945 with the justification that they were the only way to end the war without greater loss of life.

Here's a long list of hypotheticals:

What if the projected loss of life from a land invasion had been much less? What if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor but we had taken action against Japan to prevent any more aggression than it had already perpetrated? What if we had to destroy ten more Japanese cities with atomic bombs to get a surrender? What if Japan weren't a totalitarian state but nevertheless a military enemy of the United States? What if Japan's people were in revolt against the dictatorship, but still only atomic bombings would cause a military surrender? What if, hypothetically, we keep gradually reducing the threat to the United States and increase the loss of non-combatants. Eventually we get to the bank robber and the atomic bomb hypothetical.

These are valid hypothetical probes and if one wants to seriously face one's moral system, then one should not shy from grappling with such probes, either to answer them, to keep looking for answers, or to admit that there are intractable moral dilemmas.

Notice, none of the hypotheticals are so outlandish that they change the very metaphysics we must suppose for a moral theory based on the world we actually live in. Specifically, no one is asking for answers to hypotheticals of immortality. Objecting to hypotheticals because they could be stretched to even negate the basic metaphysical givens is a strawman.

Also, wouldn't an objective moral theory require, at least in principle, that if rational evaluators have the same information, then they would give the same answers? So, if the people who had the bomb dropped on them had a correct moral system and all the factual information we have, then they'd agree that it was moral for a bomb to be dropped on them?

"First, let's change the escapee from a bank-robber to a mass murderer, just to be sure that the argument isn't grounded on bad assumptions about banks (i.e. the false dichotomy "no amount of money is worth a life"). "

What false dichotomy? No one said that the answer to the question depends on accepting or denying the principle that no amount of money is worth a life. You're introducing that as a strawman and a red herring.

"[...] I would say it is not morally permissible for me to do so, because I am reasonably certain (empirically) that I am not a good shot, and that there is little change that I would hit the killer. So it would be pointless for me to shoot at him, and the chances of hitting an innocent bystander are vastly higher than the chances of me hitting the killer. If you replace me with, say, Vern (who I presume can hit the narrow side of a barn, inter alia) then it is permissible. I am not certain that he would make the shot; I am virtually certain that I would not."

Okay, so if there is a good chance of a bystander getting hit, then you think it is not morally permissible to fire the shots. So I don't understand why you questioned my own assertion saying exactly that.

Edited by LauricAcid
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I see.  My rights are the only rights to be considered?  My hired security guards may violate the rights of others in order to secure my rights?  My guards may mow down citizens in a crowd to eliminate any potential threat to me?  And the responsibility for any persons killed by my security guard lies not with me or my hired guns, but with those who are perceived by me or my guards to be a threat?  In this scheme, any hired gun is above reproach, and any dead or injured bystanders must take up their case with the “enemy” perceived by the hired gun to be the threat.

As far as I can tell, Inspector's comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people. You have now stretched that comparison and, amazingly, applied the same principles used by government against aggressor nations to private security guards against aggressor citizens. This is remarkable considering that I already addressed this ridiculous comparison.

So let's restate what I said in a basic equation: foreign != domestic. Our government has a moral right (and obligation) to protect its citizens, implying (a.) it must end a foreign threat as quickly as possible, and (b.) that it must end domestic threats with a minimum civilian loss of life. Two different situations, same goal.

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As far as I can tell, Inspector's comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people.

And I would add that both have the same ethical responsibility: not to initiate force.

You have now stretched that comparison and, amazingly, applied the same principles used by government against aggressor nations to private security guards against aggressor citizens. This is remarkable considering that I already addressed this ridiculous comparison.

I didn’t propose the analogy of armies to private security guards, Inspector did. If the analogy is flawed, then perhaps Inspector should come up with another.

So let's restate what I said in a basic equation: foreign != domestic. Our government has a moral right (and obligation) to protect its citizens, implying (a.) it must end a foreign threat as quickly as possible, and (b.) that it must end domestic threats with a minimum civilian loss of life. Two different situations, same goal.

As far as I can tell, Objectivist ethical principles do not end at the U.S. border. If they did, then they would not be universal principles and would not qualify as ethics.

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I didn’t propose the analogy of armies to private security guards, Inspector did. If the analogy is flawed, then perhaps Inspector should come up with another.

Are you even reading my posts? As far as I can tell, Inspector's comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people. Take the analogy for what it is, and don't skew it.

As far as I can tell, Objectivist ethical principles do not end at the U.S. border. If they did, then they would not be universal principles and would not qualify as ethics.

The principles don't change; the context does. When you analyze situations like this in a vacuum, the context is what gets lost.

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Are you even reading my posts? As far as I can tell, Inspector's comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people. Take the analogy for what it is, and don't skew it.
And, my reply, if you have a moment to read it, is that both private guards and national armies have moral responsibilities, including the non-initiation of force. Now either the previous sentence is true or it is false. If you think I’d committed an error, you are welcome to point it out.

The principles don't change; the context does. When you analyze situations like this in a vacuum, the context is what gets lost.

If principles do not change according to situation, then armies must follow the same moral code as private security guards or anyone else.

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That is missing the point of hypothetical testing. Okay, so it's not an atomic bomb. It's some other situation in which the field commander determines there is no way to ensure capture except by killing the suspect  but with loss of life to many bystanders.
That is fine: but you seem to be missing the point about denying unlimited hypotheticals. Any possible but unrealised hypothetical can be validly considered. I simply reject impossible hypotheticals. Let's try to bring this closer to reality. For example, if you're talking about field commanders, you are not talking about bank robbers, and you are talking about war. So let's get to your specifics. (I will insert numbers in the quote for eas of reference)
(1)What if the projected loss of life from a land invasion had been much less? (2)What if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor but we had taken action against Japan to prevent any more aggression than it had already perpetrated? (3)What if we had to destroy ten more Japanese cities with atomic bombs to get a surrender? (4)What if Japan weren't a totalitarian state but nevertheless a military enemy of the United States? (5)What if Japan's people were in revolt against the dictatorship, but still only atomic bombings would cause a military surrender? (6)What if, hypothetically, we keep gradually reducing the threat to the United States and increase the loss of non-combatants.
In case (1), that would not be relevant, unless you mean "negligible". If there were good reason to have thought that a projected land invasion would have led to negligible loss of life and property, then the use of nukes would have been immoral. (2) That would depend on whether it was aggression against the US. If so, if would not matter whether it was an attack specifically against Hawaii. OTOH if it had just been an attack against China, US involvement would be altruistic and not self-defensive, and you know that altruism is immoral. (3) If the attack had been insufficient to get them to terminate their aggression, that would have made an even more compelling argument for building and using bigger and better bombs. (4) Not a lot of difference. (5) Hard to say: strategically, it would seem to be pointless destruction in such a case, i.e. it would be knowingly ineffective. However, if the targets had great military importance (and their destruction would have ended that government) then it would have been moral. (6) Sorry, I can't make any sense out of that case: what do you mean? What are we doing? How?
Eventually we get to the bank robber and the atomic bomb hypothetical.
You say, but I don't see how. It is never the case that the only way to stop a bank robber is by setting off a nuke. I have no problem grappling with hypotheticals, but they have to be possible (I hope you understood the reason why -- "Now suppose you were immortal and always guaranteed of success. Then would it be moral to...").
Also, wouldn't an objective moral theory require, at least in principle, that if rational evaluators have the same information, then they would give the same answers? So, if the people who had the bomb dropped on them had a correct moral system and all the factual information we have, then they'd agree that it was moral for a bomb to be dropped on them?
Yes, if that were the case, which it manifestly was not.
Okay, so if there is a good chance of a bystander getting hit, then you think it is not morally permissible to fire the shots. So I don't understand why you questioned my own assertion saying exactly that.
I said something stronger: that there is little chance that the criminal would be stopped, and that it was virtually guaranteed that innocents would be harmed. I assume you recall what I said about pointless destruction. You were incorrectly focusing on the possibility of collateral damage with no consideration for whether the purpose of the action could be satisfied. Only a pacifist takes the protection of the lives of enemy non-combatants to be a moral absolute.
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And, my reply, if you have a moment to read it, is that both private guards and national armies have moral responsibilities, including the non-initiation of force. Now either the previous sentence is true or it is false.  If you think I’d committed an error, you are welcome to point it out.

If principles do not change according to situation, then armies must follow the same moral code as private security guards or anyone else.

In the context of Hiroshima, America was not initiating force. The American government had to choose between doing its duty (protecting Americans), and fulfilling the obligation of not harming innocents. Such an unreconcilable dilemma was created by the Japanese government. Thus in that context, they were the initiators, and we were the retaliators.

In the context of government police in a domestic situation, everyone falls under its jurisdiction, thus the way to protect its citizens is not to end the threat quickest, but to end it with fewest casualties.

In the context of private security (or private individuals in general), they may only retaliate against immediate emergencies, and leave the rest to the government. Thus private security may not shoot into a crowd in response to a perceived threat, because that is not an immediate emergency.

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"[...] but you seem to be missing the point about denying unlimited hypotheticals." [DavidOdden]

No I'm not. I grant that hypotheticals that alter the very metaphysical conditions of ethical situations are unreasonable for testing ethical propositions.

"I simply reject impossible hypotheticals."

No hypothetical in front of us is impossible simply for being hypothetical.

Do you believe we can meaningfully talk about the ethics of fictional characters and fictional situations, such as in novels? If so, then we can meaningfully talk about fictional situations such as those that have been mentioned.

"[...] if you're talking about field commanders, you are not talking about bank robbers, and you are talking about war."

Not necessarily. It could be a field commander of a SWAT or of any domestic police.

"In case (1), that would not be relevant, unless you mean "negligible". If there were good reason to have thought that a projected land invasion would have led to negligible loss of life and property, then the use of nukes would have been immoral."

What is negligible? How many losses? On the other hand, if there were Allied losses of, say, a thousand men, but civilian losses of say, a million from dropping atomic bombs, what would your answer be? Where do you draw your line? Or no line? One Allied loss as opposed to the entire civilian population of a nation?

("2) That would depend on whether it was aggression against the US. If so, if would not matter whether it was an attack specifically against Hawaii."

Of course I didn't mean to confine to Hawaii specifically. Anyway, the general question can be reset: What if Japan had not attacked the U.S. but instead the U.S., in the interest of thwarting further Japanese agression that was likely to endanger the U.S., had first attacked Japanese forces in the Pacific?

"(3) If the attack had been insufficient to get them to terminate their aggression, that would have made an even more compelling argument for building and using bigger and better bombs."

So there's no limit to how many civilians you can morally kill?

"(6) Sorry, I can't make any sense out of that case: what do you mean? What are we doing? How?"

What doesn't make sense? We can consider cases that have less and less damage to ourselves but have greater and greater damage to bystanders. The point is to get a sense of how great a damage to ourselves is required to justify how much damage to bystanders? If the formula is absolute, then any damage or threat of damage to ourselves, no matter how tiny, would justify any damage, no matter how great, to bystanders, in case we couldn't avoid that damage to bystanders to protect ourselves from further damage or threat of damage. If the formula is not absolute, then we need to know where on the continuum lies the particular incidents in 1945.

"You say, but I don't see how."

Anyway we want by gradually decreasing (or increasing) hypothetical damage to ourselves and increasing (decreasing) hypothetical damage to bystanders.

"It is never the case that the only way to stop a bank robber is by setting off a nuke. I have no problem grappling with hypotheticals, but they have to be possible (I hope you understood the reason why -- "Now suppose you were immortal and always guaranteed of success. Then would it be moral to...")."

First, I already answered your objection about metaphysical contrafactuals.

Second, that in our present circumstances a nuke is never needed for a robber doesn't detract from the point of the hypothetical. If you like, take the situation as fictional...but I'm not asking you to take the situation as metaphysically fictional!

"[...] if that were the case, which it manifestly was not.?

You mean in your ethical theory two people who are both rational and have the same information can disagree about the moral permissibilty of an act?

"I said something stronger: that there is little chance that the criminal would be stopped, and that it was virtually guaranteed that innocents would be harmed. I assume you recall what I said about pointless destruction. You were incorrectly focusing on the possibility of collateral damage with no consideration for whether the purpose of the action could be satisfied. "

Fine. Then the original question is not answered: What if the only way to stop the robber were to fire shots that had a good chance of striking bystanders (you may add to this that firing enough shots will have a very very good chance of stopping the robber)? Whatever quibbles you may have with how much of a chance of stopping the robber, etc., the basic point of the original assertion was clear enough: There is no unlimited moral right to endanger bystanders just to apprehend an initiator of force.

"Only a pacifist takes the protection of the lives of enemy non-combatants to be a moral absolute."

Did someone say anything about protection (actually not protection, but restraint from force that includes force against) civilians as an absolute?

Edited by LauricAcid
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