On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[ColdWontRise]

just as there arent any species that act to their own destruction.

Except the human race, which has exceded at this in the past, it seems. Im sure several of the first bacteria werent much better at this, but at least our existence is volitional.

[Park Zoo]

If I knew the position and energy of every molecule in a brain at a certain moment, would I be able to predict that mind's state (and thinking, and volition) for a short time afterwards?

A "will" that he has been previously arguing does not exist. Oh, the irony.

He suspects that his will is determined. There's nothing ironic here at all.

[entripon]

For those who are still struggling with (or downright disagree with) the fact of volition, I would suggest a simple exercise which helped me out when I was having the same troubles: Go lie down on your bed, or, if you're at work, just recline in your chair and close your eyes. Simply lie there and don't get up; after all, you don't have any choice in the matter, you're determined to do so. Maybe you have some errands to perform; it's really a shame that you can't get up to do them. It's also a pity that you can't get up to eat or to go to the bathroom; yeah, you'll eventually die, but that's none of your concern; it's out of your hands. As time passes, it will become increasingly more difficult to convince yourself that you are not in control of your own actions, until finally you will have to give in to the facts - nothing is compelling you to stay motionless but your own act of volition.

Volition is self-evident. We don't know how it works, but we know that it does. And, as Dr. Peikoff says in OPAR, volition does not contradict the law of causality, it is simply a unique instance of it: every entity has only one action open to it at any given time, and for a human being that action is to choose. You must choose something, but the content of the choice could go either way. This point took me a while to grasp, but I think it is illustrated fairly well by analogy with another action, such as walking. No matter where you are walking, you are still performing the same action. You could be walking to the store or to the post office or wherever, but regardless of the content of the action, the action itself is still the same.

[Park Zoo]

For those who are still struggling with (or downright disagree with) the fact of volition, I would suggest a simple exercise which helped me out

This is a straw man. Determinists are not saying that humans find it incapable to get up after lying down, or that humans cannot be observed making choices. They are only saying that their volition is determined by the physical consitution of their brains. (To argue against that, one would have to say that volition is determined by non-physical factors. What the heck are those?)

[entripon]

This is a straw man. Determinists are not saying that humans find it incapable to get up after lying down, or that humans cannot be observed making choices. They are only saying that their volition is determined by the physical consitution of their brains. (To argue against that, one would have to say that volition is determined by non-physical factors. What the heck are those?)

I was trying to demonstrate the self-evidency of volition, and the fact that it must be implicitly accepted even by those who explicitly deny it.

And volition is reliant on non-physical factors - namely one's consciousness. Consciousness clearly exists and has some sort of causal influence over the physical realm, but it is just as clearly not a physical thing itself. It comes about due to the brain being structured in a certain fashion, and the physical states of the brain affect its operation (as evidenced by "chemical imbalances" or other brain conditions causing mental health problems), but it is not the same thing as the brain. This consciousness also *somehow* has the ability to monitor its own functioning and select among various courses of action, without being forced or determined to choose a certain path by any deterministic physical factors.

Edited November 30, 2005 by entripon

[entripon]

Also, just to add another point I think is important: Since the existence of volition is self-evident (self-evident meaning directly perceivable) no one can "prove" to you that it exists. You just have to honestly examine your own mental processes and draw your conclusions from that. Denying the existence of free will is akin to standing directly in front of a tree and denying that the tree really exists. It is perfectly valid to ask how volition exists (and that is a question for science), but it is not valid to question its existence as such.

[Park Zoo]

I don't know that the determinists are making such absurd claims. We may have a confusion with our definitions. If I told you that the state of your mind at time t precisely determines its state at t + 1 (taking into account the external stimuli, of course), would you take that as a contradiction of your volition?

And volition is reliant on non-physical factors - namely one's consciousness. Consciousness clearly exists and has some sort of causal influence over the physical realm, but it is just as clearly not a physical thing itself. It comes about due to the brain being structured in a certain fashion, and the physical states of the brain affect its operation (as evidenced by "chemical imbalances" or other brain conditions causing mental health problems), but it is not the same thing as the brain.

Seems like you're getting mystical about consciousness. Are you sure it's not simply a description of what brains do? Isn't it just a verb that describes the electrochemical dynamics of certain neuron bundles? It's not a physical "thing", yet neither is speed. But both are physical descriptions of physical systems.

[EC]

If I told you that the state of your mind at time t precisely determines its state at t + 1 (taking into account the external stimuli, of course), would you take that as a contradiction of your volition?

I'll answer that one. Yes. And determinism which is a fact in physics has no bearing on and does NOT negate the fact of volition.

First, speed, or to be more exact, velocity, is simply the change in an existent position with respect to time. With time and position simply being measurents taken between existents without implying their independent existence without existents.

Seems like you're getting mystical about consciousness. Are you sure it's not simply a description of what brains do? Isn't it just a verb that describes the electrochemical dynamics of certain neuron bundles? It's not a physical "thing", yet neither is speed. But both are physical descriptions of physical systems.

Second, there is nothing "mystical" about saying that the mind, i.e., ones conciousness, needs a physical faculty to perform its fuction. It is saying the opposite that implies mysticism.

Edited November 30, 2005 by EC

[Park Zoo]

I'll answer that one. Yes. And determinism which is a fact in physics has no bearing on and does NOT negate the fact of volition.

Then I really don't think there is any dispute between your position and that of materialists and determinists.

Let me see if you agree to more explicit statements. Do you agree that the state of a mind is completely determined by the state of its brain?

Second, there is nothing "mystical" about saying that the mind, i.e., ones conciousness, needs a physical faculty to perform its fuction.

Even that doesn't go quite far enough. It's like saying "speed needs an moving object to perform its function". Consciousness and speed are nothing but observed attributes of certain real things. Not only does consciousness never appear apart from brains, but it is meaningless to even think of it as anything but the activity of a brain. Although I know you're not claiming this, your wording paints the mental picture of a disembodied consciousness in search of a brain through which it can perform its function.

Edited November 30, 2005 by Park Zoo

[EC]

Do trees exist indepently? Yes. When there are many, many trees in a given region can't they then be denoted in a new concept, a forest? And does this new integration of "forest" not have attributes that are far different and more complex than it's parts, the trees?

Like a forest, a mind is then, in a loose sense, an "emergent" property of the brain. It is not the brain itself. Yet it still possesses identity, i.e., it exists. This is a self-evident fact.

What the brain is roughly equivalent to is hardware that runs a computer program. But that terminology is inexact and deterministic,and is NOT what I am implying. What the brain does is set up the "hardware" and then records all the incoming data, so that what you are left with is a sort of "matrix" in your mind which is loaded with a nearly infinite number of choices that one can make. And the brain provides the "machinery" thats purpose is decision making, i.e., volition. In other words, it provides the means to make choices and the data which is integrated via one's senses, but it does NOT make the choice for the mind; that is the minds job. The mind chooses.

To argue that a mind is determined to make certain choices because it requires a physical medium that obeys the laws of physics is the same thing as saying that a car is automatically determined to make certain road trips the second it's made because it's physical and also has to obey physical laws. That is complete nonsense.

Although I know you're not claiming this, your wording paints the mental picture of a disembodied consciousness in search of a brain through which it can perform its function.

It does nothing of the sort. A consciousness without a body is a contradiction. I don't "believe" in ghosts.

Edited November 30, 2005 by EC

[Park Zoo]

What the brain is roughly equivalent to is hardware that runs a computer program. But that terminology is inexact and deterministic,and is NOT what I am implying.

Sorry, but with the t and t + 1 example, you've already accepted determinism. Now we're off to see if there is any ghost in the machine.

In other words, it provides the means to make choices and the data which is integrated via one's senses, but it does NOT make the choice for the mind; that is the minds job. The mind chooses.

Tell me about the dichotomy between mind and brain. Apparently they are in communication with each other? Is it physical communication? (If it is, it means that brain and mind are spatially separated; brain is one organ and mind another.) Or is it non-physical communication?

Do you think modern advances in Neuroscience reflect any of this?

[entripon]

Sorry, but with the t and t + 1 example, you've already accepted determinism. Now we're off to see if there is any ghost in the machine.

I could be wrong, but when EC said "Yes" to the "t and t+1" example I think he meant yes, that would contradict volition. If every state of the mind followed directly from previous states in a clockwork fashion, then there is no choice involved. Observing the workings of our consciousness, however, we can see that that is not the case. There are many factors involved in our decision making which may sway us in one direction or the other, but they do not determine us to make a particular decision; we can choose to think or not, to follow our desires or not, etc.

Tell me about the dichotomy between mind and brain. Apparently they are in communication with each other? Is it physical communication? (If it is, it means that brain and mind are spatially separated; brain is one organ and mind another.) Or is it non-physical communication?

Do you think modern advances in Neuroscience reflect any of this?

I'll be the first to admit that I know very little about neuroscience, and I could not venture to describe the exact relationship between the mind and the brain. I can only say from my own limited knowledge and from direct observation that the mind exists and that it is related to and dependent upon the brain, but that the two are not the same thing. If you took a living brain into a laboratory to be examined, no matter how much you looked you would never find concepts or memories or imagination. You could find the physical components of the brain which make such things possible, but not the faculties themselves. I also know that this non-physical faculty of consciousness is able to affect physical changes. As I type this post, my brain is sending electrical impulses to my hands, causing my fingers to move up and down on my keyboard. The root cause in this chain, however, is my mind, thinking intently on the subject at hand, pondering word choice and sentence structure. To say that the movements of my fingers are caused entirely by a group of neurons firing deterministically is to ignore the obvious, self-evident contribution of my *volitional* consciousness.

Believe me, I understand where you're coming from, because I agreed with you at one point. I just could not fathom how a group of deterministic particles could give rise to consciousness and volition, and I still don't know the answer to that question. But... although I don't know how the brain gives rise to consciousness, I do know that it does. The evidence is staring me in the proverbial face, and it is impossible to ignore.

Edited November 30, 2005 by entripon

[Park Zoo]

I could be wrong, but when EC said "Yes" to the "t and t+1" example I think he meant yes, that would contradict volition.

Perhaps I misunderstood.

If every state of the mind followed directly from previous states in a clockwork fashion, then there is no choice involved. Observing the workings of our consciousness, however, we can see that that is not the case. There are many factors involved in our decision making which may sway us in one direction or the other, but they do not determine us to make a particular decision; we can choose to think or not, to follow our desires or not, etc.

I'm not seeing a contradiction here. Yes, we choose. The electrochemistry is, in fact, how we choose. That is why pills and drugs can influence our behavior at all.

If you took a living brain into a laboratory to be examined, no matter how much you looked you would never find concepts or memories or imagination. You could find the physical components of the brain which make such things possible, but not the faculties themselves. I also know that this non-physical faculty of consciousness is able to affect physical changes.

Given that dynamics (such as speed) and arrangements are physical, you'll have to either accept that mind is physical, or believe that it is spirit. There really is no having it both ways. For you to say that mind is beyond the ability of a laboratory to study is putting it firmly in the area of mysticism. And each year, science learns more and more about the brain and mind.

Believe me, I understand where you're coming from, because I agreed with you at one point. I just could not fathom how a group of deterministic particles could give rise to consciousness and volition, and I still don't know the answer to that question. But... although I don't know how the brain gives rise to consciousness, I do know that it does. The evidence is staring me in the proverbial face, and it is impossible to ignore.

What you are feeling is the personal sensation of being alive. I'm not denying that; I feel the same thing. But there is nothing non-deterministic about it; we are composed of atoms identical to those found in stones and stars. Do atoms stop behaving according to the typical observed principles and adopt odd properties when placed inside a brain? Science has not found anything so peculiar about the human brain; it is simply larger and more complexly interconnected than those more humble models found in snakes and spiders.

[donnywithana]

Careful about the way you go about this dude, it's like walking on eggshells here.

But just to attempt to clarify your t determines t+1 example, you're saying:

1) In a closed system, the state of entities, which must behave according to physical laws, at time T determines the state of those entities at time (T+1). To alter the state of those entities at time (T+1), an external factor would have to be introduced to the system.

2) Volition is a function of the human brain.

3) If we regard all of the entities which interact with the brain over its lifetime as our closed system, then in order to alter the state of the system, an external factor would have to be introduced, and this we call "volition."

4) If volition is to operate as an external factor upon the brain, then it must be isolated from the closed system but be able to manifest physical influence upon the system.

5) In order to accomplish 4, the state of "volition" at time (T+1) must not be dependent on its state at time T.

6) Because in 1 we agreed that 5 is impossible in a closed system, volition must either a) not be definable in bound (e.g. infinite in nature, absolutely random), or b ) not be bound to physical law, or c) be an improper variable.

Is that a pretty good summary of your logical process so far?

Just to correct something said earlier by entripon,

If you took a living brain into a laboratory to be examined, no matter how much you looked you would never find concepts or memories or imagination.

Actually, that's not true. Your brain does go through physical changes as it performs to operations of memory and imagination, but full understanding of this process is still largely theoretical.

Here's an article that'll give you a better understanding of what we're talking about so you don't fall into traps like that (i.e. belief in a soul).

Imagining Imagination

Edited November 30, 2005 by donnywithana

[HaloNoble6]

The question posed in this thread has been answered twice by Don, and perhaps by others. That is, volition is self-evident, axiomatic. Any attempt to undercut volition uses volition; any argument against volition is self-defeating. There is nothing else to say on the matter of volition.

Edited November 30, 2005 by Felipe

[entripon]

In the debate forum thread on volition, donnywithana stated:

"Self evidence" will not be permissible as a valid argument. Any phenomenon that can not be measured is an anti-concept, and will not be tolerated as proof of anything.

Now, this thread is not intended to be another discussion of free will, but rather a discussion of the necessity of self-evident data to form the basis of knowledge. All knowledge has to start somewhere - a proof cannot consist of an infinite string of premises going back an unlimited distance. The purpose of proof is to demonstrate through a process of logic the relationship of a proposition to reality. Reality is the starting point, and our senses are our only direct means of perceiving it. In order to gain any knowledge, then, we must start with our sensory perceptions, accept them as self-evident, and work our way up from there. Note that the same principle applies to the information we acquire by introspection as to the information we acquire through extrospection: it is the foundation of all of our knowledge, and cannot be invalid. Many people accept the data of their external senses as obvious but think that their sense of introspection is somehow tricking them (for example, into believing in volition), without realizing that the same arguments against skepticism about our external senses apply to all forms of sensory experience, whether focused on the outside world or the internal world of the mind.

Also, our mental existents can be measured, although perhaps not to the same exacting accuracy possible to physical phenomena. That we cannot (currently) use physical tools to measure such things is irrelevant; we can discover their identities from direct observation.

If anyone has any other comments (or if donnywithana would like to respond), then post away.

[realitycheck44]

Also, our mental existents can be measured, although perhaps not to the same exacting accuracy possible to physical phenomena. That we cannot (currently) use physical tools to measure such things is irrelevant; we can discover their identities from direct observation.

Could you please expand on this? I'm not sure what you mean by "mental existents". Thanks!

Zak

[HaloNoble6]

Yes, that debate will not proceed with such a 'rule.' Perhaps the debate should be about the notion of "self-evidency" as such rather than volition, since volition is one form of a self-evident fact. That is, perhaps it should be on the validity of axiomatic concepts and the nature of knowledge. Donnywithana appears to be trying to rewrite reality by demanding that "all concepts be based on phenomena that are measurable," whatever that means. There are plenty of higher-level concepts that aren't "measurable phenomena," though inevidably they lead via a conceptual chain to sense-perception and thus measurability.

Edited December 4, 2005 by Felipe

[DavidOdden]

I'm not sure what you mean by "mental existents".

See the definition of existent in ITOE p. 6: 'The building-block of man's knowledge is the concept of an "existent"—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action.' A concept, then, is a mental existent: it exists, and it is mental.

[BurgessLau]

Also, our mental existents can be measured, although perhaps not to the same exacting accuracy possible to physical phenomena. That we cannot (currently) use physical tools to measure such things is irrelevant; we can discover their identities from direct observation.

Yes, all phenomena (that is, existents, their actions, their attributes, etc.), including mental existents, are measurable. Consciousness is measurable, so of course all mental entites are measurable -- either cardinally or ordinally. Concrete-bound mentalities frequently forget about ordinal measurement -- for example, that one idea can be clearer in understanding or wider in its referents in reality.

[Hal]

The problem with saying that you perceive something as self-evident is that it leaves open the question as to what it is you are actually perceiving (is it just a feeling? How do you know what its correlates are?). Volition is a good example; what does the statement "I perceive I have volition" even mean? Its literally nonsense to say "I perceive that I could have done something else" (how could you possibly perceive this? It would involve perceiving a 'potential', or something that never happened), so the argument from the uncontroversial premises "i feel like I have volition" to the conclusion "I could, literally, have done something else" seems invalid. The only thing thats self-evident is that we feel we could have done otherwise. But this itself does not imply that we actually could.

Edited December 4, 2005 by Hal

[Marc K.]

Volition is a good example; what does the statement "I perceive I have volition" even mean? Its literally nonsense to say "I perceive that I could have done something else"

Well since volition is only associated with a conceptual consciousness does it help you if I say: "I conceive I have volition"?

[DavidOdden]

The problem with saying that you perceive something as self-evident ...

It would be a mistake to say that. It would be self-evident that you perceive, but you cannot perceive self-evidence. Percepts are self-evident, but identifications are not -- they require more sophisticated analysis and education, including scientific training (if for example you're aiming for something more precise that the identification "birdie").

[AisA]

The problem with saying that you perceive something as self-evident is that it leaves open the question as to what it is you are actually perceiving (is it just a feeling? How do you know what its correlates are?). Volition is a good example; what does the statement "I perceive I have volition" even mean? Its literally nonsense to say "I perceive that I could have done something else" (how could you possibly perceive this? It would involve perceiving a 'potential', or something that never happened),

One can perceive that one made a choice between alternatives. Are we to understand that you do not make choices between alternatives? Or that you do not know whether or not you do?

[donnywithana]

What I meant is that people on this forum say that things are self evident as a way to avoid having to explain them. In many cases, they're wrong about what they're saying. Because they obviously don't think they are wrong, they tend to think that what they're saying is obvious.

Felipe, everything that exists is measurable. We may not be able to measure it, but that does not mean that it can not be measured. Things that are not currently measurable are called theories, and are certainly not self evident by nature.

The reason I included that rule was this:

Let's say I am a paraplegic individual and can not move my body or eyes, and there is a spot in my vision due to brain damage. I could correctly state that according to my perception, there exists a blackbody in my field of view which is absorbing all light. I could go so far as to say that the object was self evident. However, because my view of the matter is operating from flawed information, the self evidence of my proposed blackbody is not in fact valid proof of its existence.

The reason it was invoked in the free will discussion was that I wanted to ensure that the argument stating "I perceive choice, therefore it exists" was not used. It's the same as the blackbody example. If we are in fact unable to choose freely, we certainly wouldn't be able to prove it ourselves. A third party could potentially measure all of the mental inputs going into an act to determine whether it was independent of causality, or physical laws could be invoked to explain the phenomenon. Those are valid arguments. Self evidence independent of empirical validation is not.