Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

On the question of free-will vs. determinism

Rate this topic


Recommended Posts

Before answering this question, does asking a question as such presuppose the validity of the notion of "proof"? And, does the validity of the notion of "proof" presuppose the existence of an entity that requires such a notion as "proof", which therefore presupposes that its actions aren't automatic?

Edited by Felipe
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I found this old post by David that might help some of you guys who are stuggling to understand consciousness and volition:

I think that attempts to defend volition as purely physical are just as misguided and erroneous as attempts to defend it by quantum randomness. The “mind-body problem” is actually a false dichotomy, as is any attempt to define the mind as either purely physical or entirely non-physical.

Consciousness and volition is probably the hardest aspect of philosophy to understand, and the analogy I use to help me understand it is hardware vs. software. Hardware is the framework that the software runs on, and it places certain limits on the speed and complexity of the computation. Software is the conceptual description of the physical process that occurs during computation. Take the simplest example: a light switch. The hardware is the physical on/off switch and the software is our concept of on or off. The brand of switch may vary, but the concept remains the same. The makeup of a computer program is logical commands and raw data, and the makeup of a mind is concepts and sense impressions. We don’t say that software is physical or not-physical, because it is in fact a description of relationships between physical components – and so is the mind. Consciousness is an emergent entity that can’t be reduced to any single idea or brain cell, and is not dependent on any particular “platform” – but it nevertheless defined and limited by the brain it runs on. Thus, computers are limited to a certain operating speed and memory capacity as defined by their hardware, and humans are limited to a certain thinking speed and limited focus defined by their brain.

While this analogy serves well to describe the nature of consciousness, it doesn't shed much light on volition. While computers and animals aren't self-programming, humans are. That this is the case is self-evident; concepts such as "proof" and "validation" would be meaningless otherwise. Why? Because humans ask for "proof" that such-and-such programming is for or against their nature.

Edited by Felipe
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Mice are self programming, but not volitional. Mice can make choices between alternative actions as well. These are not volitional processes (unless you want to change the meaning of volition and give animals rights).

That which is unique to humans concerns the complex cognitive interface that manifests itself as a consciousness. This interface allows humans to integrate sensory information into their stores of knowledge in ways that are much more advanced than ever before.

Looking at the way that life comes about, it seems difficult to imagine that DNA instructions for cellular arrangement and protein synthesis could result in a non-physical result like Felipe's conception of the mind. Non-physical things simply do not exist, and there is no real compromise.

*Note: Non-material concepts like energy or space are not non-physical.

If the mind is a consequence of physical processes, then it must operate according to the laws of cause and effect that govern the universe.

*Note: Quantum mechanics can be invoked to argue against the laws of cause and effect, but are very theoretical in nature (calling something random belies a lack of understanding), and don't help explain non-arbitrary processes like free will.

The question of the evolution of free will is a good one, because it makes a lot more sense that apes evolved more intelligence to gain a competitive advantage over their environments. The concept of free will implies that when presented with a set of options, a given brain at a given time can come up with more than one conclusion. Because this would violate the causal relationships that govern existence, it is impossible.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Mice are self programming, but not volitional. Mice can make choices between alternative actions as well.
Care to provide the evidence that mice are self-programming? Let me qualify what I mean by "make a choice." I mean to consciously grasp the nature of the alternatives and to consciously deliberate, comparing and contrasting. I don't mean avoiding some negative stimulus. Something the outcome of which didn't have to be.

As to the rest of your comments in this or other posts, I won't be addressing them: I've long given up on the chaos with which you present your position on most things. If you care to present a coherent, structured, integrated argument for something, that's another story.

Edited by Felipe
Link to comment
Share on other sites

But what it means to make a 'choice' is context dependent. Words are used in different ways in different situations. For instance, it is correct to say in ordinary language that tables are solid. But in the context of atomic physics, it might be correct to say that tables arent solid, eg to emphasis that most of matter is actually empty space.

Actually, this is not true, although you might choose to use this inaccurate terminology in order to present an idea.

A solid, in chemistry and thus in atomic physics, is a specific state of matter, namely that the atoms are at a low enough temperature that they form a definite structure, such as water crystallizing into ice . It is a macroscopic term which you are trying to apply to a submicroscopic system. A single atom can't be a solid . . . and a solid actually includes all that "empty space".

The term "choice" is similarly specific. It's hardly our fault if you're linguistically sloppy, and it doesn't have broad philosophical implications, either.

The contradiction is all in your head.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A mouse can learn where a piece of cheese is in a maze, and will remember the correct way to get there. Self programming.

Consciousness provides a wildly complex interface for making choices, but I still don't think it's divorced from the physical processes being undergone in your brain. Because those processes must be caused, then either there is no free will, or some external agent that is not bound to physical law is acting upon the brain to influence it.

To bring order to the apparent chaos of my argument:

Free Will Hypothesis: A given closed system starting from a specific beginning can achieve multiple end states.

Fact: The state of a closed system at time T determines the state of that system at time (T+1).

Conclusion: Hypothesis false.

It's really as simple as that. People here have rejected this conclusion for a while and reiterated their unrelated criticisms of my argument, prompting me to try and rephrase my position half a million ways, but that's really all it is. If you reject the fact that I used to prove my conclusion, then rest assured that you are wrong. Ask your closest scientist friend to hit you up with some knowledge.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A mouse can learn ...
As per usual, this is gibberish. You treat man, for the purposes of discussing volition and consciousness, as if he's a closed thermodynamic system. The "closed system" terminology is used for discovering thermodynamic facts, not for discovering whether volition and consciousness exist. Do not confuse the questions of how, scientifically, free-will works, and how, scientifically,free-will arose, with whether or not free-will as such exists. The problem of free-will is not a scientific one, it is a philosophic one. Can't you see that posing these questions necessarily presupposes free-will? I will not address this gibberish position you present above beyond this. Why don't you answer the clear and understandable questions I posed above:

Before answering this question, does asking a question as such presuppose the validity of the notion of "proof"? And, does the validity of the notion of "proof" presuppose the existence of an entity that requires such a notion as "proof", which therefore presupposes that its actions aren't automatic?
Edited by Felipe
Link to comment
Share on other sites

As per usual, this is gibberish. You treat man, for the purposes of discussing volition and consciousness, as if he's a closed thermodynamic system. The "closed system" terminology is used for discovering thermodynamic facts, not for discovering whether volition and consciousness exist.

I'm not talking about man, I'm talking about the universe. Now reevaluate your stance.

Can't you see that posing these questions necessarily presupposes free-will? I will not address this gibberish position you present above beyond this. Why don't you answer the clear and understandable questions I posed above:

No, I can't, because they don't. They presuppose cognitive capacity and curiosity, which are not associated with volition.

Before answering this question, does asking a question as such presuppose the validity of the notion of "proof"? And, does the validity of the notion of "proof" presuppose the existence of an entity that requires such a notion as "proof", which therefore presupposes that its actions aren't automatic?

When a computer requires the input of parameters in order to proceed with a process, does that presuppose that its actions aren't automatic? Proof is nothing more than enough information to make a new concept fit into the hierarchy of one's knowledge without creating a contradiction that is immediately obvious the the reciever. A computer can give a null value when a parameter causes it to perceive an error; there is no reason a human brain wouldn't work the same way.

And no, free will is not a philosophical issue. It is a scientific issue.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Fact: The state of a closed system at time T determines the state of that system at time (T+1).

...

If you reject the fact that I used to prove my conclusion, then rest assured that you are wrong. Ask your closest scientist friend to hit you up with some knowledge.

I reject the fact that you used to prove your conclusion. :)

As I posted in the Heisenberg thread:

Determinism is not an axiom; it is an induction from countless instances in the universe where entities act in a predictable, linear progression, one event following after another in a causal chain. The problem is that determinists try to over-extend the reach of this principle: it is true of rocks and trees and clocks, so it must be true of human beings, right? Not necessarily, and indeed we can observe directly that that is not the case. The identities of rocks and trees dictate that they act in a deterministic fashion, while the identity of a human being dictates that he must make choices. There is no contradiction and no violation of "physical laws" (which are simply human inductions about what we observe happening in the universe).

A similar fallacy is asserting that the properties of a whole must be completely explainable in terms of its constituent parts. That, too, is not self-evident. It is a hypothesis which must be tested, and it's the job of science to determine whether or not it is true in a particular case. The fact that it is true for most systems does not mean it is necessarily true for all; perhaps when a certain arrangement of particles comes together that arrangement as a whole gains new capacities which would have been unthinkable before. We cannot reject such a scheme a priori, as the determinists try to do. How could one accept determinism and reductionism, which rely on complex inductions, while rejecting volition, which is a self-evident axiom?

The "closed system" argument is a total inversion: it is an attempt to make reality fit one's theories rather than the other way around.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm not talking about man, I'm talking about the universe. Now reevaluate your stance. ...
This is where the conversation ends. It is apparent that you've already convinced yourself that free-will doesn't exist, and that you are not here to learn about O'ism. Confine your gibberish to the debate forum with someone who's willing to deal with your spectacular misuse of concepts, else I will ban you. Edited by Felipe
Link to comment
Share on other sites

... I will ban you.
You mean your "sub-system" will ban his "sub-system"?

...you've already convinced yourself that free-will doesn't exist...
I don't think he claims that he is convinced of his position. Indeed, what would it mean for a non-choosing system to be "convinced"? Would the term have any meaning?

And, why would DonnyWithAnA's sub-system be attempting to catalyze the other systems here into aligning their own molecules in a way that would lead them to make statements similar to those issuing from his sub-system?

The bottom line is that DonnyWithAnA does not believe he's posting here because he has no choice. He believes strongly enough in volition to be trying to convince others. He just doesn't know how to explain that he does, and is uncomfortable with his lack of explanation for what he clearly experiences (but thinks he only believes).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

You certainly have a point. But this poses serious problems for the entropy in the brain, which, given certain stimulus, must increase. The notion that our subsystems are determined seems to imply that entropy goes down with each subsequent thought process. Perhaps perpetual motion machines could be made with the help of our sub-systems?

I don't recall us dealing with a volatile system such that catalyzation were possible, but I could be wrong, or I could be right, or it probably doesn't matter, since my sub-subsystem is closed at time t but open at time t+1. Still, I'm not certain, if certainty can apply to mere sub-systems, as to whether the Gibbs free energy principle applies--after all, only a finite number of quantum states are allowed for the atoms composing my brain-molecules, rendering energy states static.

Edited by Felipe
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I wonder how a determinist feels about the fact that those who love, admire or respect him don't have any choice in the matter. (emphasis added)
Ah! But feelings are not tools of cognition. So, in one sense, this argument won't work: the determinist would argue that his feelings and "self-evident observations" are not reason enough, particularly when they lead him to a seeming contradiction.

In another sense, though, the argument works because the determinist does feel and observe the process of making choices. The determinist knows that he is wrong. Else, he would not be arguing at all. Argument would be pointless if he truly believed what he says he does.

Basically, the casual determinist cannot resolve the apparent contradiction between two observations: his observation of free-will and his observation of causality. Unable to resolve this, rather than plead ignorance of the mechanism of free-will, he denies it can exist. Knowing it is true, he does not deny in action, only in argument.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I wonder how a determinist feels about the fact that those who love, admire or respect him don't have any choice in the matter.

1. Apes aren't volitional.

2. Humans were once apes.

3. Humans are volitional.

Therefore, at some point (or over time), humans must have acquired volition.

The answer seems to be: Volition presupposes [the idea of] evolution and therefore cannot even be considered, if volition wasn't a self-evident entity.

By that logic, the idea of evolution can't exist without volition - fine. But it doesn't matter because the universe still exists independently of you (as an individual) and your thoughts. If you die, I'll still be alive. If we all die, the earth will still orbit the sun. Your idea of the earth orbiting the sun won't exist, but what that idea represents will.

Ayn Rand:

My philosophy, Objectivism, holds that:

1. Reality exists as an objective absolute—facts are facts, independent of man's feelings, wishes, hopes or fears.

As for an explanation of man's acquisition of volition (in the context of evolution), I will try as best as I can.

This is a working hypothesis, based on some research I've been doing:

First of all, it seems that we're talking [generally] about conciousness, and [specifically] about two seperate ideas:

1. Awareness of the sensory world (Self-Awareness).

2. Volition (The voluntary control of thoughts and actions).

Hypothesis: Both 1) and 2) are products of perceived social realities, fundamentally rooted in neurobiological mechanics.

Here we go:

We perceive ourselves as agents that are endowed with the freedom to decide and control (by will) processes in the brain.

In order to perceive ourselves as such agents, we must be able to 1.) sense (see, hear, smell, feel, etc) and 2.) differentiate our individual sensory data from the data of others. In order for me to have an idea of my "self" I need to realize that my perceptions are not your perceptions. Therefore, we need social interaction in order to develop a sense of self. It is this sense of self that leads to the perception that one has a choice - because you could be doing what somebody else is doing - or an action that someone else has done. However, their actions are based on their stored and immediate sensory data. Your awareness of their sensory data means that there's a difference between your actions and theirs, not that your actions could be theirs.

Such social interaction (communication) begins when we interact with other individuals after birth. In this way, early social interactions begin laying the foundation for your future self-awarness (differentiating between "my thoughts" and "your thoughts").

Consequently, the idea of individualism and of responsibility are products of social interactions during early development. These ideas eventually develop into the ideas of self-awareness and volition. However, in [objective] reality, conciousness has the ontological status of a social reality but not an objective reality. This is why conciousness seems to transcend neurobiological explanation (but in actuality, does not).

Unfortunately, due to the immaturity of episodic memory during development, we are unable to remember such events taking place. Thus the evolution of self-perception is lost during our early childhood.

What this means regarding man's acquisition of volition?

Man never acquired it. It evolved along with his brain.

Socially-based "volition" evolved as the human ability to store sensory data (memory) became more and more advanced. The more sound-object associations we were able to store, the more we were able to communicate. The more we were able to communicate, the more we were able to differentiate between our actions/ideas and those of other communicators. Ultimately, the more we differentiated, the more "aware" we became of our own identity (that our actions weren't the actions of others). Because we had no episodic memory of the evolution of socially-based self-awareness, it seemed (and seems) that volition is self-evident.

It would also follow that animals (including humans) simply have different levels of volition - not that volition is solely a human phenomenon. Chimps are more self-aware than mice because their brains are more advanced on a neurbiological level. This enables them to communicate at a more advanced level than mice and thus develop more complex social structures.

In conclusion:

1. Apes are volitional.

2. Humans were once apes.

3. Humans are more volitional than apes.

4. Volition is based on the ability of the brain to store data (and thus communicate with other brains).

Therefore, the ability of the human brain to store data is more advanced than the ability of the ape brain's data storage capacity, making humans more "volitional" than apes because they're brains are ultimately more advanced.

1. Awareness of the sensory world (Self-Awareness).

This is (in objective reality), a social phenomenon that describes the manner in which I acknowledge that you act differently than I do.

2. Volition (The voluntary control of thoughts and actions).

This becomes the false belief that because your action is different than my action, and I am aware of my action, I can be doing what you're doing. In actuality, I cannot, because your action is based on your own (immediate and stored) sensory data, and my action is based on my own (immediate and stored) sensory data.

So if there is a neurobiological explanation, what is it?

Well, it's obviously extremely complex. It's the sum of a measurable but overwhelming amount of different interacting parts.

I apologize for being so long-winded.

Edited by NewYorkRoark
Link to comment
Share on other sites

1. Apes aren't volitional.

2. Humans were once apes.

3. Humans are volitional.

Therefore, at some point (or over time), humans must have acquired volition.

The answer seems to be: Volition presupposes [the idea of] evolution and therefore cannot even be considered, if volition wasn't a self-evident entity.

...

As for an explanation of man's acquisition of volition (in the context of evolution), I will try as best as I can.

Not to quible, but 2. is wrong. Humans evolved from a species of ape; a human can't be both a human and an ape.

I have no clue what "Volition presupposes [the idea of] evolution and therefore cannot even be considered, if volition wasn't a self-evident entity" means. You appear to be under the donnywithana influence. :P Please elaborate clearly on what you mean by this.

As to the rest, I'll say again that not knowing how free-will arose or how it operates biologically poses no problem for the existence of free-will as such. Indeed, any inquiry of the how, when, from what, etc. nature presupposes the existence of a free-will directing such an inquiry.

Edited by Felipe
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I know this has essentially been said over and over again but maybe I'm just determined to say it... WHAT WOULD BE THE POINT IN DEBATING THIS OR ANYTHING IF VOLITION DIDN'T EXIST??? We would all just be playing some idiotic part in some pointless version of reality if determinism of the mind were true. Why would anyone argue for such an asinine position? Why would somebody want to essentially argue that he (as in himself, his ego, his mind, soul, whatever) doesn't actually exist? Maybe these people really just don't want to exist for some reason that eludes me?

Edited by EC
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...