On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[Inspector]

This has, I think, crossed over from "asking questions about Objectivism" into "making statements that are opposed to Objectivism” and should be moved to the debate forum or ended.

[gags]

Just because we are deterministic doesn't mean that we can percieve of the exact state of the universe and are aware of every influence on us. The ultimate outcome of life, the universe, and everything, are not foregone conclusions because we have nowhere near the ability to solve what it is.

You're really talking out of both sides of your mouth here. If we are deterministic, then everything we do is a foregone conclusion. It doesn't matter whether we are able to know the outcome of life because we can't make our own choices.

So why did you make the thread about getting a divorce? From what you said above, it seems that your purpose was to hear from other people with similar personality types so that you would have some idea of what course has been predetermined for you.

[DrBaltar]

Correlation does not equal causation, and any recorded brain activity does not eliminate the fact that a person can choose to approach a problem with one side or the other. To say that different people happen to choose to use one side more often is not to say that they are biologically determined or even predisposed to do so. It is only to say that they have done so.

To draw the conclusion that they had to do so from a simple brain scan is an error. As I said, correlation does not equal causation. Data about human behaviors cannot be understood by using the same models as for physical systems, or even the models that apply to animals.

True, correlation does not equal causation. But it is the beginnings of an hypothesis. Greene had done many brain scans before forming his hypothesis. Then he and his coworkers published their study. Other scientists then test the hypothesis as well to see if the experiments are repeatable:

When Greene and his coworkers first began their study, not a single scan of the brain’s moral decision-making process had been published. Now a number of other scientists are investigating the neural basis of morality, and their results are converging on some of the same ideas. “The neuroanatomy seems to be coming together,” Greene says.

And even theories can eventually have a hole shot through them, but this is the direction that the scientific method is leading them.

In a sense, this is a case of begging the question: you believe that human beings do not have free will, and so you try to explain them with mechanistic models.

Actually the order and origination of my ideas are (over many years)

1) The universe behaves in a natural cause & effect way

2) God is not required to explain phenomenon observed on earth or in the universe

3) Everything is physical, there is no metaphysical

4) The universe is deterministic (seen after several physics classes)

5) 3 implies that the brain is also physical

6) 4 implies that the brain is also deterministic

Plus at the time all this is going on, I'm also a programmer, and familiar with the software implementation of neural networks and genetic algorithms.

[softwareNerd]

... and should be moved to the debate forum or ended.

Maybe this time a debate will really get going

There are a few topics that have lengthy threads, spanning a few hundred posts, across 10 or more pages. The problem is that newbies don't want to wade through the thread: mostly because they just want to make "one small and simple point". Someone responds with a short and simple refutation, along with a comment that it's been discussed already. Before one knows it, the thread is doing another lap around the same track.

I wish we had a good solution to this. Having a summary of the Objectivist position would not be enough for the purpose. I think such a summary also needs to include a short series of devil's-advocate points that are refuted. I wish we had one-page summaries: "Refuting common objections to the Objectivist concept of free-will", "Refuting common objections to the Objectivist position on abortion", and so on. The raw-material form this exists in the forum; putting it together is the real challenge.

For the time being, would someone like to take the Objectivist position on this topic? If so, please start a debate thread. I'm sure Dr. Baltar will take the other side.

[DrBaltar]

This has, I think, crossed over from "asking questions about Objectivism" into "making statements that are opposed to Objectivism” and should be moved to the debate forum or ended.

If I have strayed outside of Objectivism, I apologize. My position about man being deterministic, as I have stated, flows from the foundations that there is nothing metaphysical, and that the universe evolves according to laws of nature, and that man is also a product of nature and is therefore also bound by natural laws. I thought these were basic ideas in Objectivism. If I am wrong about that then I will end my discussion here.

[Inspector]

True, correlation does not equal causation. But it is the beginnings of an hypothesis.

But the hypothesis - namely that people evaluate moral questions based upon biologically determined structures within their brains - is a non-sequitur from the evidence given – that people who evaluate moral questions one way use more of one part of their brain and less of another.

In fact, that evidence merely shows that people who choose to evaluate things in one way are choosing to use one part of their brain more heavily. Just as someone who chooses to turn their head to the left is activating the muscles on that side of his neck.

One could do scans of the muscles and see that every time the head turns left, the muscles activate. Some self-congradulatory high-fives later, and they declare that all human behavior is caused by our muscles firing! Fast forward and the criminal who robs liquor stores is doing so simply because his muscles made him do it.

Of course, we know that muscles don’t fire on their own and that the brain controls them. But the same mistake can be made regarding the brain itself; to say that the brain structures are what cause a person to think things is false when we know the self-evident fact of volition. What this researcher has done is reversed cause and effect: the use of whatever brain structures is the effect of the choice to ponder moral questions in that way, not the cause of doing so.

But such things are lost on people who deny that human consciousness and volition actually exist. As I said, they attempt to explain the human mind as nothing more than meatbags operating on stimulus/response. So they beg the question, and all of their “findings” end up matching this model. Which leads to collectivist ethics and statist politics.

After all, if people are nothing more than machines who “can’t help it,” then there’s no reason not to enslave and kill at whim to achieve totalitarian aims. And if it fails in an orgy of misery and death, well, then they couldn’t help it, as they were biologically programmed to do so.

This whole approach is a total rejection of the Objectivist metaphysics and will lead to rejections of each of its subsequent branches. You need to do some serious checking of your premises.

there is nothing metaphysical

What does that phrase even mean? I've never heard it before. Objectivism most certainly has a Metaphysics, so you seem to be using that term to mean something else...

Did you mean extraphysical?

[DrBaltar]

In fact, that evidence merely shows that people who choose to evaluate things in one way are choosing to use one part of their brain more heavily. Just as someone who chooses to turn their head to the left is activating the muscles on that side of his neck.

I think you've misunderstood a point in the article. In the 2nd trolley scenario the question is do you push the obese guy off the bridge and onto the track to stop the trolley and save the 5 workers. The act of killing someone with your own hands gets an immediate response from our evolved instincts that that is wrong. The logic circuits of the brain don't get a vote. In the first scenario, when asked do you turn the wheel of the trolley to change tracks, there are no applicable instincts to trolley steering wheels that through a number of mechanisms take the trolley to another track. So the logic circuits do get involved this time. If both are activated then the ACC chooses one or the other.

But such things are lost on people who deny that human consciousness and volition actually exist. As I said, they attempt to explain the human mind as nothing more than meatbags operating on stimulus/response. So they beg the question, and all of their “findings” end up matching this model. Which leads to collectivist ethics and statist politics.

You rightly condemn those who do not properly use the scientific method.

This whole approach is a total rejection of the Objectivist metaphysics and will lead to rejections of each of its subsequent branches. You need to do some serious checking of your premises.

What does that phrase even mean? I've never heard it before. Objectivism most certainly has a Metaphysics, so you seem to be using that term to mean something else...

Did you mean extraphysical?

By metaphysics I mean concepts like god, spirits, soul, astral planes, heaven, hell, astrology, etc. But like I say, if the premises that I have stated above are not part of Objectivism then I will end my discussion of it until I understand more about what "Objectivist metaphysics" is and what it has to say about free will. But I did want to clear up what seemed to be a misconception that you had about the article. If it said what you claim it says, then I would agree with you that it would be total bunk. But it doesn't.

[Inspector]

I think you've misunderstood a point in the article. In the 2nd trolley scenario the question is do you push the obese guy off the bridge and onto the track to stop the trolley and save the 5 workers. The act of killing someone with your own hands gets an immediate response from our evolved instincts that that is wrong. The logic circuits of the brain don't get a vote.

I do understand the article perfectly. The conclusion, that there is a hardwired “instinct,” does not follow from the observations. The subconscious is known to function automatically, but that does not mean that it wasn’t programmed by our conscious convictions. There’s no evidence to suggest it was programmed by biology/genes and not by ourselves.

He jumped to that conclusion.

By metaphysics I mean concepts like god, spirits, soul, astral planes, heaven, hell, astrology, etc.

That’s the fallacy of the frozen abstraction; what I mean is that those are examples of bad metaphysics, rather than being representatives of metaphysics as such. Once you get a chance to see Objectivist metaphysics, you’ll see what I mean.

But like I say, if the premises that I have stated above are not part of Objectivism then I will end my discussion of it until I understand more about what "Objectivist metaphysics" is and what it has to say about free will.

That’s a good idea. I think you’ll be a lot less confused about these matters when you do. Good luck!

[EC]

I read the article's you (DrBalter) are talking about when they were first sold and in each of the scenario's I didn't choose any of their false dichotomies that the researchers had set up. I did use logic to make my choice's, and to give an example in the second scenario with the fat guy and the five workers I would either do nothing because I wouldn't want to cause the death of anybody that doesn't deserve it because that is what is immoral. Or I would simply make an attempt at warning the worker's a loud shout, etc. In other words, if they had scanned my brain they wouldn't have had the slightest clue as to what to make of it because it didn't fit their preconcieved and wrong notions stating that determinism of the mind is a reality.

Here's my "order of idea's"

1) The universe behaves in a natural cause & effect way

2) God is not required to explain phenomenon observed on earth or in the universe

3) The metaphysical is everything that is physical, i.e., all that exists.

4) The universe is deterministic (seen after several physics classes)

5) 3 implies that the brain is also physical

6) 4 does not imply that the brain is also deterministic because it would contradict the self-evident fact of volition.

Explaining how volition works, i.e. its physical mechanism, does NOT wipe it out of existence. Explaining how the eye intercepts a photon and changes it into an electrochemical impulse that is then interpreted by the mind does NOT wipe out the fact of the faculty of vision.

This reminds of the argument from Intelligent Design or one of the other Creationist theories that state that all the evidence that we find confirming that the Earth is billions of years old is just an "illusion". "Really" it was "created" eight thousand (or whatever) years ago.

Determinism of the mind essentially use's the same argument. I.e., it is only an "illusion" that you "think" that you possess volition, in reality you are just a mindless robot going through a pointless existence fooling yourself into believing that you exist.

Ockams Razor take's care of that nonsense.

[DrBaltar]

If I have taken myself out of this discussion, please do not then characterize myself as confused without an open dialog.

And EC, you are way off on the ID comparison. Although I do agree with:

Explaining how volition works, i.e. its physical mechanism, does NOT wipe it out of existence. Explaining how the eye intercepts a photon and changes it into an electrochemical impulse that is then interpreted by the mind does NOT wipe out the fact of the faculty of vision.

If anyone would like to continue this conversation, please suggest a forum where I am allowed to speak. There is already a free-will vs determinism debate going on. Can I speak there? According to the debate rules only 2 people can debate, although that doesn't seem to be happening there.

[softwareNerd]

If anyone would like to continue this conversation, please suggest a forum where I am allowed to speak.

The Debate sub-forum would be fine. The current thread on that sub-forum was started and then abandoned. You're right, you need someone who's willing to take the pro-Free will position. Meanwhile, I'm going to close this thread for a little while.

[Onar Åm]

Hi all,

I've battled somewhat with an issue of consciousness and free will, and find that Objectivism does not confront the issue head on. Therefore I want to formulate a proposition that should be possible to give a simple yes/no answer to. The problem is as follows: we have free will, but we also have an identity, we behave predictable. We have a consciousness, but we are also made of matter. What is the relationship between these? Getting a straight answer from Objectivism seems to be very hard, so I'll formulate two specific questions:

(1) with a sufficiently powerful deterministic computer and sufficient detail knowledge of the brain, can we accurately simulate the behavior of a human?

(2) can a sufficiently good computer simulation of the brain be conscious? And if so, does it posess free will even if it is fully built from deterministic components?

[IAmMetaphysical]

I am not going to go in depth with this because there have been a great many other threads which someone will post below, so I will only say that philosophy will only tell us that we have free will, scientific inquiry will tell us how.

[DavidOdden]

(1) with a sufficiently powerful deterministic computer and sufficient detail knowledge of the brain, can we accurately simulate the behavior of a human?

The problem here is the idea of "sufficiently detailed knowledge of the brain". Suppose that I have "atomically-detailed" information about a vast number of human brains (let's say a billion brains) and a monstrously huge computer for doing the analysis, then I could imaginably construct a model of the structure of the human brain so that I know the invariant structural truths, the optional tendencies, and the things that are not found. Still, that doesn't guarantee that I have a clue what the thing does. It would be like trying to determine what a computer's processor does just from its physical makeup and no knowledge of how physical form relates to function. Thus the knowledge of the brain would have to include "and what aspects of the physical brain's nature relate to what aspect of the mind". This might give you a model of a generic homo.

Supposing you had that, you would also need to have the entire history of sensory experiences of a human fed into this brain, but also you would need to have a perfect model of the individual's brain development over time, since variables in early development have an impact on brain structure. In other words, you need to not only replicate the diet, lighting, being accidentally dropped and thus jarred etc. etc. but also the child's prenatal language and musical experiences, whether they had the pleasurable experience of sticking their finger in a light socket and learning the true meaning of pain, ad nauseum.

Now then, given all of those background assumptions, I don't know if we can accurately simulate the behavior of any given human. Answering that question is well beyond my technical scope, nor is the answer implicit in Objectivist philosophy, because you are asking a question about the nature of reality which is not perceptually self-evident, and which Rand did not address (since it's a scientific question).

(2) can a sufficiently good computer simulation of the brain be conscious? And if so, does it posess free will even if it is fully built from deterministic components?

That question is even more impossible to answer in advance of constructing of gadget. If you have a candidate machine, I could run it through some tests to see if it passes certain basis tests for consciousness.

There is nothing in the concepts of "consciousness" or "free will" that dictate that only homo sapiens, or mammals, or carbon-based life forms, can be conscious or have free will. On the other hand, there is nothing in reality that even remotely suggests that non-humans can have free will or that there even exists non-carbon based life. Such entities are epistemologically arbitrary, and while it's sometimes amusing to speculate on such things in the evening, I don't think such ideas deserve serious scientific attention.

[curiosita]

"philosophy will only tell us that we have free will, scientific inquiry will tell us how."

I know that there are other threads on this topic, but I have never found Objectivism's reasoning that there is free will to be strong enough. I don't agree that it's axiomatic, in fact I don't agree that it exists. Could you explain more in depth so I can understand if I may have gone wrong here?

I know that free will can be slippery to define, but I think Objectivism makes its key feature that you act in a certain way, but you "could have acted otherwise." That is the part I disagree with.

[DavidOdden]

I know that there are other threads on this topic, but I have never found Objectivism's reasoning that there is free will to be strong enough. I don't agree that it's axiomatic, in fact I don't agree that it exists. Could you explain more in depth so I can understand if I may have gone wrong here?

What makes you ask that question?

[KendallJ]

I'll take a stab.

Note, if you check the Lexicon, you'll see that almost ALL of Rand's discussion on volition center upon the one key aspect of, and essentially what makes a volitional consciousness: the choice to focus. The OPAR section on consciousness p. 62-72 to be the best sources of articulation of this. If you have not read this passage, I would suggest you do so. If you have, I'd like to know why you find it unconvincing.

As David indicates, I'm not sure that either of these questions help you arrive and any better understanding. Why do they help you? This is basically the Frankenstein question right?

My basic answers are "maybe", and "maybe but not human consciousness."

A human is an entity. It is bound by cause and effect. It's consciousness is part of reality so it must be goverened ultimately by cause and effect. Humans are a mechanism. That gives me the "maybe." However, the key aspect of that mechanism is that it must initiate its processes itself. What is it about cause and effect that leads you to believe that a mechanism which inititates itself, by inititating its conscious processes cannot exist?

I think it is essential in Peikoff's analysis in OPAR that he discusses volition with respect to "higher-level" actions only. Man is determined in some ways, but ultimately his consciousness develops into something that is volitional as well. Man does not initiate himself, but once he is formed he can initiate his higher level conscious processes by himself.

Richard Dawkins in "The Blind Watchmaker" I think has a nice analogy about how this might be possible to build to, and that is the idea of "bootstrapping" like a computer start-up. That is, simple deterministic processes run that bring into existence larger more complex processes until you are "booted up".

I am unclear why an ultimate process that can initiate it operations itself is not possible. A deterministic process can cause a volitional process. Once a volition process exists, it is only partially determined by its internal mechanism and outside stimuli (i.e. experience - which is why child rearing is an essential part of a volitional consciousness), but partially determined by its continued choice to operate itself, but that part makes it "wholly volitional".

Would you suggest that a butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon rainforest somehow has to cause me to choose to think?

Edited November 26, 2006 by KendallJ

[Cogito]

A deterministic process can cause a volitional process.

I've been having trouble with this one How? If the actions of the particles are completely determined, how can they give rise to something volitional? Couldn't one in theory apply all the relevant physical laws to the system and figure out exactly where the determined particles will be at a certain point in the future, thus making any of their actions as a whole completely deterministic?

Edited November 27, 2006 by Cogito

[Vladimir Berkov]

It does indeed seem strange to think of human volition as an "uncaused cause."

What seems more likely is that human thought is deterministic, but so complex that it is unlikely we will ever (in the reasonable future) be able to discover the exact weight and processes that underpin human reasoning.

Thus, it would be in a sense possible for an onmiscient (or nearly so) computer to be able to predict human action based on its having all the required prerequisite knowledge, the structure of the individual's brain, his personal history, interactions, etc.

This of course is not something that seems very practical as a solution, however.

I have always been a bit disappointed with the philosophers who assert that human thought and action is deterministic but we should treat it as willful "just because." Yet when it gets right down to it, this is what most scientifically consistant philosophies have to do. There is no scientific or physical proof or need for the idea of "free will." On the contrary, all the processes we can think of for explaining the human brain and human action are entirely deterministic.

Edited November 27, 2006 by Vladimir Berkov

[y_feldblum]

Volition is axiomatic (and an axiom of Objectivist epistemology): it is self-evident, ie, available to every act of introspection; and it is impossible to deny without presupposing it in the very act of denying it. The fact that we do not currently know how volition arises, does not refute the self-evidence of its existence and its potency, and does not refute the fact that one cannot deny it without presupposing it at the same time.

[Vladimir Berkov]

How does denying volition presuppose it?

And how can something be an axiom yet inexplicable and unanalyzable?

Edited November 27, 2006 by Vladimir Berkov

[y_feldblum]

Volition is not inexplicable or unanalyzable, and the mere fact that we do not currently know how to explain or analyze it in terms of physical processes does not imply either condition.

The act of affirming determinism - and denying volition - entails conceding that every entity, every property, and every action, everywhere and at every instant in time, is predetermined. Your mental state, including your affirmation of determinism and denial of volition, is predetermined. What predetermines all these things? Photons, the strong force, etc. What predetermines your mental state? What predetermines your affirmation of determinism? Muons, gravitons, etc. Your thoughts are forced on you, by gluons and down quarks, and thus are not the result of observation and logic. (The presupposition of volition is implicit in the affirmation of knowledge as the product of observation and logic). Even if you took pains to analyze every step and assumption and concept in your head, to show how each one is the result of observation and logic - all you will actually find is what the electrons and hadrons predetermined that you discover. In other words: your thoughts are all predetermined. And even if you analyzed your thoughts for correspondence to reality, your analysis and its conclusion are predetermined. And even if you analyzed your analysis for correspondence, your second degree analysis and its conclusion are predetermined. In short, your thoughts are not the product of observation and logic. Your affirmation of determinism - and your denial of volition - is not the product of observation and logic. By very similar steps, indeterminism can be shown to be false. Volition is the only choice left.

[Vladimir Berkov]

Feldblum, I think there is a bit of a misrepresentation of what "predetermination" means in your post. Predetermination does not "force" anything upon you. It doesn't mean there isn't observation or logic or that the results obtained by them are invalid. Predetermination simply means that given a set known array of starting conditions, the outcome from them will always be the same. And this can only be seen by looking backwards in time through the process of counterfactuals, which is what is why it is of such interest to humans as they are the only beings who can think in such a manner.

Remember that accepting an idea of scientific predetermination doesn't negate human conciousness. It doesn't mean humans are just mindless drones following the rote orders they are "predetermined" to execute. What predetermination does mean in the context of logic and observation is that for any given human decision there could not have been any other outcome.

This is interesting in the human context because we often think that there could have been other outcomes. For instance, we find questions such as "What if Napoleon hadn't invaded Russia?" interesting because we can posit alternative decisions having been made in the past. Yet it seems odd to think of Napoleon's decision as anything but following inevitably from the preconditions before it. We think of our current and future decisions as being open to free will, but once we look at them in hindsight it is unclear whether they could have been otherwise.

And as strange as the deterministic position is, the free will position seems just as odd. Is the human brain a sort of "quantum computer" as some have alleged such that it can operate in violation of the normal macro laws governing outcomes? This seems even more improbable than a deterministic universe.

And again, it is likely that regardless of the actual result (free will or determination) that the philosophic enquiry doesn't really affect our every-day lives. For determinism to reshape our thoughts and actions, we could have to have a vastly greater understanding of physical processes and how they affect the brain. As DavidOdden says, this is more of a mental conjecture than a realistic possibility. The result is that we act as if we have free will because we have no way to act otherwise. Whether we actually have free will is not a question that will likely be resolved.

[y_feldblum]

The volition position is not strange at all, especially not to the layman. By introspection, one observes that any time one consciously thinks or acts in some manner, he could have thought or acted differently or not at all.

To the layman, determinism is odd, because everybody is perpetually faced with choices: whether to think, how to act, etc. Everybody must perpetually choose what to do and knows it, and is aware that he could always have chosen otherwise than what he did. Tell a layman that all his actions are predetermined by the orbit of Planet 3884XB9 around its star in the galaxy 54Q-989, and he looks at you funny. Tell a layman that he could have done something other than what he did, and he'll say, "yes, but I didn't choose to do what you're suggesting."

From the philosophical perspective of the study of metaphysics and epistemology, however - a perspective common only to those acquainted with philosophy -, one knows enough to question or validate this basic introspective observation of all of one's thoughts and actions. And if one accepts a false metaphysical outlook - such determinism (or indeterminism, which is not a significant position because it is a thorough denial of causality, and need not be mentioned further) - then one will either be forced to compatibilism or be unable to resolve the contradiction inherent between volition and determinism.

Determinism is the product of an incorrect view of metaphysics: the absolute denial of entities and properties, and their replacement with actions and reactions and further reactions forming a "chain of events". All that exists in this view of metaphysics is events, and preceding events and preceding states of the world (the sum of all preceding events). There are no entities. There are only events begetting events begetting events; preceding events determine future events, or rather, preceding states fully determine future states. This is the only kind of view which can necessitate the philosophical viewpoint that everything (ie, all future events) are predetermined.

But the correct view of metaphysics acknowledges entities. It acknowledges that entities have certain properties to certain degrees and that these properties are non-contradictory. It acknowledges that entities act according to what their are, ie, according to their properties. Most entities act in only one way in any one context, true. But that is not true of all entities and there is no philosophical reason to suppose that it is true of all entities. Humans have the power to choose how to act, and they are not limited to acting in only one way in any one context, as any act of introspection will indicate.

By what physical, neurological means does this power arise? Good question. Neurophysical epistemology remains an unexplored field, so we don't have much in the way of an answer. Undoubtedly, people will pursue this question and ultimately be able to answer it. But the fact that we currently cannot currently answer this question does not mean we can simply deny the existence of potency of volition. It would be like denying the existence and potency of the sun in the 19th century, because we did not know by what physical means it radiates energy. We know the sun exists and we know it radiates energy, because we can see the sun and we can detect the energy and detect its effects on many things such as tides, plants, and atmospheric temperature.

[DavidOdden]

Anyhow, there are three threads here which cover the free will topic, and like every discussion that I've seen on the matter, it comes down to whether you are willing to deny the self-evident just because you don't understand it. It's kinda like saying that bumblebees obviously can't fly because physicists have proven that it's impossible (that was of course before the physicists changed their minds and proved that bumblebees can fly). See here, here, here. Given the vast scientific chasm between what we know and what we would have to know in order to explain the physical nature of free will, I have found it to be beyond pointless rationalism to discuss the question beyond what I've said.