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On the question of free-will vs. determinism

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If you mean that objectivism has some special definition of axiom which is contrary to the accepted dictionary and academic definition I am not particularly interested in hearing about it. Objectivism already has tried to change the meanings of too many words for my liking. It is easier to discuss philosophic matters if we stick to accepted usage rather than propriatary definitions.

Hm, this might be a little off topic, but this strikes me as a strange position from someone with a degree in philosophy. I've not studied philosophy in school, but in my private studies of various philosophers--whenever I study a new philosophy or philosopher, I take it for granted that I will have to learn his specific terminology and definitions. Inherent in a definition are implicit philosophical premises. A dictionary definition merely reflects the philosophical ideas which are prominent in the time and place in which that dictionary is published. Academic definitions vary greatly over time, possibly even from one decade to the next or quicker (example: see how rapidly the meaning of "the verifiability principle" evolved over the first part of the 20th century).

But at least Ayn Rand defined her terms.. Many philosophers use their terms in an ambiguous way, and let the reader interpret them however he wants, rendering their ideas unintelligible.

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Actually it is the basis of Peikoff's argument. Peikoff has no ability to explain any scientific or factual basis for why "volition" or free will exists, hence he argues from the negative. By stating a straw-man determinist alternative to volition and showing why it is impossible, he thus "proves" that his concept of volition must be true and is axiomatic.

This really is not the basis of his argument. However it does look an awful lot like what you are doing with regards to gravity. "it must be so, because if it were not, the world would be impossible."

This is not really correct. First, you cannot take gravity "out" of the world, so to speak about necessity by contrasting to removal of it is non sequitir. But for kicks, if you did, then existence would not be impossible. It would simply not be the existence as we know it. That fact does NOT "neccessitate" gravity. Existence is not necessitated. It just is. Look around.

The fundamental argument for any axiom is:

Volition exists. One needs only to introspect to see it.

All the rest are different ways of stating this fact. Peikoff has habit of this in his lectures as well, stating what is essentially the same thing in multiple corrolaries. Argue one if you like but don't call it the "basis".

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In the two examples you gave, what would be different in each to cause the outcomes to be different?
I would say that the chosen application of free will could be different, despite everything else being the same.

I suppose you'd consider this absurd, and at any rate I can see the difficulties in this position. But my reason for asking was that

I hold that determinism (mechanism) explains human action, but that this doesn't mean human's aren't guided by reason or can't be held accountable for their actions.
you are trying to distinguish your form of determinism from hard determinism.

But how can it be said that humans are "guided by reason" if a person who doesn't accept a valid argument in a given situation always does so in that given situation?

Or if a person commits a crime always does so in a given environment... how can he be accountable for his (deterministic?) actions?

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Hm, this might be a little off topic, but this strikes me as a strange position from someone with a degree in philosophy. I've not studied philosophy in school, but in my private studies of various philosophers--whenever I study a new philosophy or philosopher, I take it for granted that I will have to learn his specific terminology and definitions. Inherent in a definition are implicit philosophical premises. A dictionary definition merely reflects the philosophical ideas which are prominent in the time and place in which that dictionary is published. Academic definitions vary greatly over time, possibly even from one decade to the next or quicker (example: see how rapidly the meaning of "the verifiability principle" evolved over the first part of the 20th century).

But at least Ayn Rand defined her terms.. Many philosophers use their terms in an ambiguous way, and let the reader interpret them however he wants, rendering their ideas unintelligible.

I agree with you to a point. Philosophers should define their terms and Ayn Rand was good, in general, about defining terms. The problem I have with a lot of objectivist definitions is that they are unnecessary. For reference see the recent thread in which the definition of "possible" was discussed at length. I think that when a philosopher has a new concept and wants to use a word to describe it the best plan is to use a new word. Redefining a word with an already-accepted meaning is a poor substitute, because it causes confusion among those familiar only with the accepted usage and casts doubt on the necessity of the new concept.

This really is not the basis of his argument. However it does look an awful lot like what you are doing with regards to gravity. "it must be so, because if it were not, the world would be impossible."

This is not really correct. First, you cannot take gravity "out" of the world, so to speak about necessity by contrasting to removal of it is non sequitir. But for kicks, if you did, then existence would not be impossible. It would simply not be the existence as we know it. That fact does NOT "neccessitate" gravity. Existence is not necessitated. It just is. Look around.

Not exactly. This skirts dangerously close to the problem I had earlier with objectivists and defining the "possible." But in general, a world where gravity did not act as it does in our world might be "possible" in some sense. For instance, if gravity was a repellant instead of attractive force, one can imagine a universe in which such a force can exist. It would be radically different from our universe of course. My point on necessity was simply that the force of gravity is necessary to the makeup of our universe, whereas volition is not. This is easy to see in that there was no being with "volition" at the time the universe began, yet the universe still existed. Nor would we think the universe would come to an end if all volitional beings ceased to exist.

The fundamental argument for any axiom is:

Volition exists. One needs only to introspect to see it.

All the rest are different ways of stating this fact. Peikoff has habit of this in his lectures as well, stating what is essentially the same thing in multiple corrolaries. Argue one if you like but don't call it the "basis".

Axioms are an inherently dangerous mode of knowledge. For instance, I could just as easily say "God exists. One needs only to introspect to see it." In fact, this is the EXACT argument many religious people have used to try to convince me I should believe in God. To be a true axiom something needs to be beyond the scope of reasonable doubt or possible alternative explanation. This doesn't seem to be the case with free will. There is ample physical evidence that free will does not exist, and ample well-thought-out philosophic arguments for why it doesn't. This isn't the type of thing you see if something is axiomatic. "Existance exists" is more along the lines of a true axiom. People who doubt that existance exists (in some form) essentially write themselves out of serious consideration, and cannot live their lives in any meaningful way. However people can deny that true "libertarian" free will exists, and go on to lead productive useful lives, and their denial in no meaningful way affects their other arguments, the faculty of reason, their identity as men, etc.

Or if a person commits a crime always does so in a given environment... how can he be accountable for his (deterministic?) actions?

There is a difference between explaining human action and influencing future action. Accepting a deterministic or partly-deterministic worldview doesn't mean the future is "mandated" in the sense that all human action is pointless. What it means is that human society should be structured around the elements of human conciousness which are the least directly determined by environment and are the most guided by the process of human reason. Determinism/mechanism doesn't mean reason doesn't exist, it just means the prerequisite "inputs" to human reason will determine the outcome. Human society can be structured so that these inputs are in accordance with that society's values.

Again, this is the essential problem with all deterministic worldviews and why a straight "hard" determinism is largely irrelevant. Regardless of proof, humans act as if they had free will. Thus law and society needs to take account of that fact. How this should best be done is a matter of some debate, there is a myriad of viewpoints on the best system.

Edited by Vladimir Berkov
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I am afraid I don't understand the question. Are you asking me what methods I would use or what level of proof/evidence I would demand?
No, I am asking what kinds of events (presumably seeing the operation of a machine) would set in motion those inevitable physical reactions then result in you unquestionably holding as fact the free will position (or its negation). It can't be a method that you simply "use" since that would presuppose the choice to use -- I don't mind if there's something that makes you use that method. Also, I have no idea what "level of proof" could refer to except as an evaluation, and that evaluation forces you to this mental change. For the sake of argument I'm accepting your position that free will isn't axiomatic, and asking you to describe what used to be known as a "choice", in automatic non-volitional, physical law terms. I just want to see if you can talk about "free will" without presuming that man has free will -- so far, you're not doing so good.
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I think the problem is that you think the term "choice" presupposes libertarian free will, whereas I would say that "choice" simply refers to the outcome of an essentially mechanistic, yet rational process.

And as I have said earlier, some of man's volabulary does seem to presuppose the idea of true libertarian free will. This doesn't mean that such a thing exists, that simply means that this is the way humans talk. This is due to the unique view that humans have of reality, rather than the nature of reality itself.

If you are asking me for a proof that free will does not exist I am afraid I have not the knowledge to make such a proof. Right now I am only interested in the potential complications of various theories of free will, and I don't see a "hard" libertarian approach as being proved by Peikoff in OPAR.

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Determinism/mechanism doesn't mean reason doesn't exist, it just means the prerequisite "inputs" to human reason will determine the outcome.
If one one has no alternative (in a given situation) whether they accept the good argument or the bad one, how can it be said that reason exists?

Regardless of proof, humans act as if they had free will.
If there is no free will, what does it mean to "act as if one has free will"?
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I don't understand how this statement follows.. Why would a force not be a force unless a person was aware of it?

Because if man has no awareness of how his actions are determined he will act as if he has free will.

Nobody said that man is his own cause, only that he is the cause of his actions. When you say "complete state of the universe prior to the human choice/action," are you including that person's premises, psychology, motives, etc in that state of the universe? If so, I think Dr. Peikoff would probably agree that he would choose the same. But, if you mean merely the state of the physical universe outside of the man and his mind prior to the action, then of course the person could choose differently--it's not the alignment of the planets or even genes that cause actions, but the cognitive process (the choice).
This is an good point. When I am talking about the prior conditions I am including the internal (mental) conditions of the individual up to the point where the choice is made. The thing is, however, that Peikoff can't agree with me that the premises, psychology, etc. is included and that the man would choose the same. This is because it would simply yeild another form of determinism, a form of "internal determinism" instead of external. It would be saying that the material external world is mechanistic and separate from the causal chain inside the human mind, but the human mind has its own deterministic causal chain resulting in the same choice every time.

No, I don't think so-- "Man's actions do have causes; he does choose a course of behavior for a reason," (emphasis mine). If you turned back the clock, presumably you would still have the same reason for declining the sandwich that you did the first time. But if you don't mind getting hypothetical--let's say that although you declined the sandwich, you were really hungry for a sandwich but were evading those hunger pains because of anorexia. Then I think Peikoff would say, if you made the decision to think, and face the hunger pains, then you would have chosen the sandwich; you would have chosen differently. In that case, all of the environmental factors would be the same, but there would be a cognitive factor that was different.

I don't see how the cognitive factor could be different. The array of cognitive factors I use in the decision and their weight seems entirely determined by the preconditions. In your hypo, my anorexia is the factor that tips the scale in favor of soup. If the "experiment" was run again, unless I somehow didn't have anorexia, the outcome would be identiacal. For Peikoff to say the outcome might be diffrent either there must be some difference in the cognitive factors or else a change in their weight. And since cognitive factors are directly dependant on the person's environment, history, personality, etc, their change would require a change in those areas as well.

But, besides, determinism has existed in various forms for thousands of years, and explicitly since Ancient Greece, so why should the latest psuedo-determinism be considered the definitive determinist position, such that to use the term "determinism" to refer to the traditional argument is attacking a straw man?
It is not definitive at all. Yet it is far more problematic for Peikoff than any extremist "hard" determinist position he characterizes. At best, it means his reductio argument in favor of free will needs to be rewritten to account for it.

If one one has no alternative (in a given situation) whether they accept the good argument or the bad one, how can it be said that reason exists?

If there is no free will, what does it mean to "act as if one has free will"?

This is because humans have a unique view on reality in the sense that although their actions can be seen to be determined by looking at them once they are completed, because humans can think and have self-awareness they have a view at the moment of choice in which different possibilities seem open. This is in part because humans don't have the knowledge of what deterministic factors influence their decision or what their decision will be.

I am trying to think of a good example, and this is the best I have come up with so far although it is not perfect.

Imagine a man trying to defuse a bomb. There are two wires he could cut, red and green. He is told that cutting one wire defuses the bomb and cutting the other will detonate the bomb. He agonizes over which to cut and eventually settles on cutting the green wire. The bomb stops ticking and he sighs with relief. What he does not know is that the bomb was actually designed such that cutting EITHER wire would have defused the bomb. The detonation/disarming choice was after a fashion, only illusory. In reality, the outcome would be the same in each instance regardless of the "choice" made.

I realize there are some problems with this hypo but it might help a bit.

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Hello, I will try to post my own thoughts on Free Will later today or tomorrow, but I'd like to recommend to anyone interested in the subject Harry Binswanger's short pamphlet, Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation, which can be purchased for $5.95 at the Ayn Rand Bookstore. It doesn't contain substantially more information on the subject than does OPAR, but in my opinion the presentation is somewhat clearer and more detailed, and it helped me to gain a better understanding of the Objectivist position (which I agree with).

Just one small comment before I run off: the crux of the deterministic argument against the existence of volition is the idea that true choice is incompatible with causality. In this view, causality is (incorrectly) equated with necessity, and if at any given juncture an individual could have selected between two or more possible courses of action (i.e. if one somehow went back in time the content of his choice could possibly be different) this selection is equated with randomness, which is rightly seen as impossible (action can not arise "randomly", out of nowhere - the actions of an entity arise from and are caused by its identity). However, choice is *not* the same as randomness, nor is it the same as mechanistic determinism. The law of causality, properly formulated, does not establish a necessary connection between events, but between the nature of entities and the actions they perform. We can inductively discover that the "billiard ball" model of causality applies in the realm of inanimate matter, but we can even more easily see, through introspection, that the same model does not apply to the workings of the mind. The mind does not operate automatically; we have a constant choice about whether to activate our conscious mental processes and to what degree. The content of this choice - whether we choose to focus or not - is not determined by any antecedent event, but by the mind itself in the act of choosing. Choice as such is the action that is necessitated by our identity, and our choice to focus or not acts as the "first cause" in a long series of mental processes which eventually lead to our bodies taking physical action in the world. Thus every action is caused, but the term "causality" encompasses something broader than just mechanistic determinism. "Caused", in essence, means either determined or chosen, but not random.

I will quote Binswanger:

Mechanistic causality is indeed the form of causation governing the motions of physical objects. Their motions are, of course, subject to necessity: whatever they do, they had to do. But the form of causation applicable to man's consciousness is different. The nature of man causes him to have the power of choice - specifically, the choice to focus his mind or not. By virtue of his makeup, including the makeup of his nervous system, man has a primary, irreducible control over the operation of his conceptual faculty. When a man chooses to use that faculty to pursue conceptual understanding, the action is not causeless - his choice is the cause.

Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation, p. 23

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I have given a whole lot of thought to this subject. I do not have the time now to express it all, so I'll just start.

In some way this question resembles the question "Existence exists, therefor I am" or "I think, therefor I exist"?

This question comes down to: "Does my "will" command my nervous system what to do" or does "The nature of my nervous system+stimuli from environment gives rise to my will, and determines what my will is"?

If we assume the first choice, it runs against evidence. Evidence shows that no "will" "thought" "emotion" "desire" etc' exist without a physical representation. There is no massless, shapeless "will" that is floating in your brain, moving particles.

Every single experience and mental process we have is a result of physical changes that occur in the brain.

As such, the brain is subjected to the law of causality for inanimate matter, as Dr. Binswanger said: "Mechanistic causality is indeed the form of causation governing the motions of physical objects".

Now let's put 1+2+3 together:

  1. Every single mental process/experience is a result/accompanied by a physical process. There is no breach between the two. One cannot "command" the other: they are inseparable.
  2. The brain is wholly physical. There is nothing massless, or that is not produces by mass/charge that gives rise to consciousness. There are no other entities in the brain other than the elements we know, forces of gravity, electricity, and the rest. There is no new and unknown "power" in the brain. At least, none has been observed in any experiment until now. Nothing strange or against the physical properties of the cell ever happened.
  3. The law of causality for inanimate matter.

IF we agree that the brain does not contain anything "non-inanimate" and "unknown powers" then the clear conclusion, as I see it, is that our brain is a device with a certain nature, that is designed to do whatever we can introspect to realize that it does (and more, since not all of it's operations we are aware of).

One wonders to oneself, how can it be that I sit at home and tell myself to think of something randomly, and I succeed? I must have control over my mental focus! Well, indeed: your brain is a device that has a born ability to analyze the representation of knowledge in "neuron language" and to conclude, analyze, desire, choose something relatively randomly (out of the content it contains at that moment), to reason, etc'.

But then you say "but it's not my brain, it is ME that is making the choice!" I tell you: "The conscious activity of your brain IS you, and therefor no wonder that you experience that it is 'you' who is in control".

But then you say: "but I can listen to ideas, consider them and decide if I want to reject them or not", so I tell you: "Of course. Your brain is a device that does just that: processes visual/auditory input into entities and concepts, analyses the result (according to it's automatized mechanism, and the current content of your mind) and decides what to do, while you are conscious of it all while it happens, with a recognition that it is you who is thinking". If someone takes out the part that represents 'you' in your brain, you will still think, but may not be aware who is doing the thinking. There is no "your will" to float between the neurons of your brain and tell them how to act.

Wow, it feels nice to get it off my chest.

Edited by ifatart
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(1) with a sufficiently powerful deterministic computer and sufficient detail knowledge of the brain, can we accurately simulate the behavior of a human?

(2) can a sufficiently good computer simulation of the brain be conscious? And if so, does it posess free will even if it is fully built from deterministic components?

The answer is yes and yes. Of course, your questions presuppose those answers. If the computer is sufficiently powerful and your knowledge of the human brain is sufficiently complete then you could create a human brain which would have freewill. You are essentially asking if we could make a copy of a human brain would it be a human brain? Sure it would. We could theoretically make a molecular scale map of a brain and rebuild it molecule by molecule and it would be indistinguishable from an organically created brain. Perhaps you mean to ask something else?

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Well, from the replies in this thread I can conclude that I still did not get a straight answer, which is fine, but affirming my view that Objectivism does not have a theoretical framework for this question.

If by straight answer you mean that everyone did not agree, well that does not lead you to your conclusion. It is the equivalent of throwing out the question at a party.

I would go for the Binswanger resources and deal with them directly. If he does as well as he did at OCON on perception, then he should be helpful.

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Not exactly. This skirts dangerously close to the problem I had earlier with objectivists and defining the "possible." But in general, a world where gravity did not act as it does in our world might be "possible" in some sense. For instance, if gravity was a repellant instead of attractive force, one can imagine a universe in which such a force can exist. It would be radically different from our universe of course. My point on necessity was simply that the force of gravity is necessary to the makeup of our universe, whereas volition is not. This is easy to see in that there was no being with "volition" at the time the universe began, yet the universe still existed. Nor would we think the universe would come to an end if all volitional beings ceased to exist.

This "necessity" you keep trying to insert is just a circular method to deny (or at least obfuscate) identity, and the fact that causality does not presuppose a particular identity. By trying to pull out gravity as a particularly "special" instance of identity that is more fundamental (which is a Platonic form, for sure) you circumvent the original point.

All of the entities that exist today, or will exist or existed in the past, are implicit potentials at the start of time. They are no more or less fundamental than gravity. The time argument is a trick. All you can say about gravity is that matter possessing this characteristic existed at the beginning of the universe before all of the things which are implied by its identity (also at the beginning of the universe) were brought into being, causally.

Axioms are an inherently dangerous mode of knowledge. For instance, I could just as easily say "God exists. One needs only to introspect to see it." In fact, this is the EXACT argument many religious people have used to try to convince me I should believe in God. To be a true axiom something needs to be beyond the scope of reasonable doubt or possible alternative explanation.

This doesn't seem to be the case with free will. There is ample physical evidence that free will does not exist, and ample well-thought-out philosophic arguments for why it doesn't. This isn't the type of thing you see if something is axiomatic. "Existance exists" is more along the lines of a true axiom. People who doubt that existance exists (in some form) essentially write themselves out of serious consideration, and cannot live their lives in any meaningful way. However people can deny that true "libertarian" free will exists, and go on to lead productive useful lives, and their denial in no meaningful way affects their other arguments, the faculty of reason, their identity as men, etc.

Well, that is not true at all. It is only true of people who doubt either in consistent form. Let me know when you are consistently denying consciousness and we'll have a look at you then. :lol:

I wonder what would happen if I didn't "act as if" I had freewill?

There is a difference between explaining human action and influencing future action. Accepting a deterministic or partly-deterministic worldview doesn't mean the future is "mandated" in the sense that all human action is pointless. What it means is that human society should be structured around the elements of human conciousness which are the least directly determined by environment and are the most guided by the process of human reason. Determinism/mechanism doesn't mean reason doesn't exist, it just means the prerequisite "inputs" to human reason will determine the outcome. Human society can be structured so that these inputs are in accordance with that society's values.

What is a "partly-deterministic worldview exactly?"

Look, this why I said you were in reality acting closely to an Objectivist. You allow for "acting as if" we had free will. You allow and advocate the use of reason. Our only difference seem to be in a time travel hypothetical that you or I will never have a chance to test.

But I wonder. Given that your initial conditions led you causually "through reason" to this assertion, how do you know that it indeed has any bearing on reality?

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This "necessity" you keep trying to insert is just a circular method to deny (or at least obfuscate) identity, and the fact that causality does not presuppose a particular identity. By trying to pull out gravity as a particularly "special" instance of identity that is more fundamental (which is a Platonic form, for sure) you circumvent the original point.

All of the entities that exist today, or will exist or existed in the past, are implicit potentials at the start of time. They are no more or less fundamental than gravity. The time argument is a trick. All you can say about gravity is that matter possessing this characteristic existed at the beginning of the universe before all of the things which are implied by its identity (also at the beginning of the universe) were brought into being, causally.

Lol. A trick? That is kind of funny. I am still not exactly sure what your "gravity argument" is or how it is at all relevant. I entirely agree that every manifestation of the universe in a sense is necessary in that it couldn't have been otherwise, that is the entire point of the determinist position. The difference between gravity and volition is that they do not have equal relevance as concepts in this discussion, although from what I can tell you are attempting to show how they are.

What is a "partly-deterministic worldview exactly?"
It is sometimes called the "compatibilist" position, because it combines mechanistic determination with the belief that humans can be held responsible for the decisions they make guided by reason.

But I wonder. Given that your initial conditions led you causually "through reason" to this assertion, how do you know that it indeed has any bearing on reality?

I don't even understand this question. You are trying to figure out my position on sense-perception?

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This is becoming fairly repetitive so I think it's probably time to call it quits. Last try.

In the sense that retrospectively, they couldn't have been otherwise (i.e. they are "necessitated")is using causation as a circular argument for a particular existence. The caused aspects of reality could not have been otherwise, but that does not in any way argue for gravity as apposed to any other thing. I am not trying ot make a positive argument for volition. I am trying to show that just as you cannot explain that gravity should exist with causation, you cannot explain that volition should not exists with causation.

I did not mean that you intended a trick.

I meant. If you were determined to make a particular assertion (through reason) then how do you know it's true? How does one defend deterministic outcomes of the "reason" process, with respect to reality? (if not by assuming or "acting as if" one has free will) :lol:

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Because if man has no awareness of how his actions are determined he will act as if he has free will.

I'm confused about what you mean.. Are you saying he will act as if he has free will, or that he will act as if he is determined but thinks he has free will?

This is an good point. When I am talking about the prior conditions I am including the internal (mental) conditions of the individual up to the point where the choice is made. The thing is, however, that Peikoff can't agree with me that the premises, psychology, etc. is included and that the man would choose the same. This is because it would simply yeild another form of determinism, a form of "internal determinism" instead of external. It would be saying that the material external world is mechanistic and separate from the causal chain inside the human mind, but the human mind has its own deterministic causal chain resulting in the same choice every time.
This is where I think you're using the terminology differently than Dr. Peikoff (and I think that his use of the terminology is much less misleading and more consistent with the traditional usagage). You seem to be using determinism in this section to be exactly equivolent to causality. Determinism means, and has always meant, the belief that human actions or behavior is necessitated by forces outside of consciousness. "Internal determinsim" is a contradiction in terms. Since the time of Democritus (at least), it has been the determinist position that the "internal" is merely an illusion fed to us by faulty sensory perception, or some such inadequacy of the mind. This has held true for every determinist that I've studied, from Materialistic determinists like Democritus, Skinner, and Hobbes, to Idealistic ones like Hegel (and contemporary determinists who are normally a mishmash of these, sometimes smuggeling in premises from the advocates of volition when the contradictions of determinism become too obvious).

I don't see how the cognitive factor could be different. The array of cognitive factors I use in the decision and their weight seems entirely determined by the preconditions. In your hypo, my anorexia is the factor that tips the scale in favor of soup. If the "experiment" was run again, unless I somehow didn't have anorexia, the outcome would be identiacal.

Well, not being a psychologist, I was using "anorexia" to mean merely a habitual psychological evasion of the fact that one's body needs sustenance, but that is probably not a proper or acurate use of the term. But even in the case of actual clinical anorexia, I don't think it's the case that the anorexic person must starve himself in all circumstances. (Except maybe in some extreme cases). But for the purpose of my example, just forget I said anorexia and pretend I said, you were evading the knowledge that you needed to eat for whatever reason. In order to have chosen differently, your reason would have to be different, but that's an internal, mental difference and therefore volitional not deterministic.

For Peikoff to say the outcome might be diffrent either there must be some difference in the cognitive factors or else a change in their weight. And since cognitive factors are directly dependant on the person's environment, history, personality, etc, their change would require a change in those areas as well.
But you're begging the question. The idea that all cognitive factors are directly dependant on a person's environment, history, personality, etc, (depending somewhat on what you mean by "personality" and "etc") and nothing else is exactly the proposition under criticism by the Objectivists. The question of whether there might be an ultimate necessary connection between physical and mental processes is a scientific one, and Dr. Peikoff explicitly says in his History of Western Philosophy course that there may be such a connection, but that the available evidence is insufficient to conclusively say one way or another. Philosophy says merely that both physical and mental processes necessarily exist (which is immediately validated through sense perception), and that the type of causality which governs the physical world is called "deterministic," whereas the type which governs the mental is called "volitional."

It is not definitive at all. Yet it is far more problematic for Peikoff than any extremist "hard" determinist position he characterizes. At best, it means his reductio argument in favor of free will needs to be rewritten to account for it.

I'm quite convinced at this point that "hard" determinism merely means "consistent" determinism, and that you only consider "soft" determinism to be more problematic because it attempts to find middle ground between determinism and volition, but that it's not in fact problematic, because the elements of determinism which are considered necessary by soft determinism are not necessary, and not true (or at least are stated in a way which is unecessarily confusing and misleading).

This is because humans have a unique view on reality in the sense that although their actions can be seen to be determined by looking at them once they are completed, because humans can think and have self-awareness they have a view at the moment of choice in which different possibilities seem open. This is in part because humans don't have the knowledge of what deterministic factors influence their decision or what their decision will be.
When you say "humans don't have the knowledge of what deterministic factors influence their decision," do you mean that humans are incapable of knowing these factors? If the factors are unknowable, what possible evidence could we have that they exist?

I am trying to think of a good example, and this is the best I have come up with so far although it is not perfect.

Imagine a man trying to defuse a bomb. There are two wires he could cut, red and green. He is told that cutting one wire defuses the bomb and cutting the other will detonate the bomb. He agonizes over which to cut and eventually settles on cutting the green wire. The bomb stops ticking and he sighs with relief. What he does not know is that the bomb was actually designed such that cutting EITHER wire would have defused the bomb. The detonation/disarming choice was after a fashion, only illusory. In reality, the outcome would be the same in each instance regardless of the "choice" made.

I realize there are some problems with this hypo but it might help a bit.

Hm.. So you're saying that the man didn't actually chose to cut the green wire, because if he had chosen the red wire instead, it would have disarmed the bomb? At this point, you've completely lost me.

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I'm confused about what you mean.. Are you saying he will act as if he has free will, or that he will act as if he is determined but thinks he has free will?

I don't think it is possible for humans to act as if their choices were determined. For example, assume that determinism is true. How does this knowledge help you make choices? You can't know what outcome has been determined, or what choices you will make in the end.

This is where I think you're using the terminology differently than Dr. Peikoff (and I think that his use of the terminology is much less misleading and more consistent with the traditional usagage). You seem to be using determinism in this section to be exactly equivolent to causality. Determinism means, and has always meant, the belief that human actions or behavior is necessitated by forces outside of consciousness. "Internal determinsim" is a contradiction in terms. Since the time of Democritus (at least), it has been the determinist position that the "internal" is merely an illusion fed to us by faulty sensory perception, or some such inadequacy of the mind. This has held true for every determinist that I've studied, from Materialistic determinists like Democritus, Skinner, and Hobbes, to Idealistic ones like Hegel (and contemporary determinists who are normally a mishmash of these, sometimes smuggeling in premises from the advocates of volition when the contradictions of determinism become too obvious).

I am using the determinist position as evidenced in all of the legal literature I have studied where determinism is equivilant to holding that all human thought and action is ultimately mechanistic and there is no break in the causal chain between the physical world and human action.

In order to have chosen differently, your reason would have to be different, but that's an internal, mental difference and therefore volitional not deterministic.
My objection is still the same, however. The variety of reasons/factors we use in making choices are ultimately determined by the external world. So for it to be possible for a human to have chosen differently because his reasons/factors in decisionmaking were different, you are holding that somehow the physical world is different as well.

But you're begging the question. The idea that all cognitive factors are directly dependant on a person's environment, history, personality, etc, (depending somewhat on what you mean by "personality" and "etc") and nothing else is exactly the proposition under criticism by the Objectivists. The question of whether there might be an ultimate necessary connection between physical and mental processes is a scientific one, and Dr. Peikoff explicitly says in his History of Western Philosophy course that there may be such a connection, but that the available evidence is insufficient to conclusively say one way or another. Philosophy says merely that both physical and mental processes necessarily exist (which is immediately validated through sense perception), and that the type of causality which governs the physical world is called "deterministic," whereas the type which governs the mental is called "volitional."

The problem is that there is no evidence that there is any break between physical "deterministic" causation and mental "volitional" causation. Peikoff wants to carve out an exception to physical mechanistic causation, although he does it by the roundabout method of extending the definition of causation. In essence, Peikoff wants to have his cake and eat it too. He doesn't want to deny the reality of physical, mechanistic determinism yet he wants to preserve a non-mechanistic, non-deterministic form of causation for human action to be "uncaused" by the outside world. The problem is that there simply seems no validity to this, other than the desire for humans to think their decisions are "free" and uncaused by their preconditions.

I'm quite convinced at this point that "hard" determinism merely means "consistent" determinism, and that you only consider "soft" determinism to be more problematic because it attempts to find middle ground between determinism and volition, but that it's not in fact problematic, because the elements of determinism which are considered necessary by soft determinism are not necessary, and not true (or at least are stated in a way which is unecessarily confusing and misleading).

When you say "humans don't have the knowledge of what deterministic factors influence their decision," do you mean that humans are incapable of knowing these factors? If the factors are unknowable, what possible evidence could we have that they exist?

Hm..

The difference between "hard" and "soft" determinism isn't in their view of the nature of reality, it is in their view of the implications on morality. Both viewpoints believe that human choices could not have been otherwise, only the "hard" determinists also thinks this necessitates that humans cannot be held morally responsible for any actions they do.

So you're saying that the man didn't actually chose to cut the green wire, because if he had chosen the red wire instead, it would have disarmed the bomb? At this point, you've completely lost me.

My point in the example is simply to show that while a man may believe he has the "choice" to create different outcomes, that does not mean that there is ever a possibility of different outcomes.

Edited by Vladimir Berkov
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I have given a whole lot of thought to this subject. I do not have the time now to express it all, so I'll just start.

There is so much involved in this question that is outside the scope of this thread, I almost think it deserves its own thread..

If we assume the first choice, it runs against evidence. Evidence shows that no "will" "thought" "emotion" "desire" etc' exist without a physical representation. There is no massless, shapeless "will" that is floating in your brain, moving particles.
How could this even posibly be shown by evidence? Are you actually asserting that you have seen evidence of the nonexistence of will? There seems to be an immense equivocation between the mental and the physical throughout this post. Will is massless and shapeless because it is not a physical quality, but a mental one. Thoughts, emotions, and desires, while they might correspond to physical phenomena in the brain, are not descriptions of physical phenomena in the brain, but are mental phenomena, and thus do not have mass, shape, quantity, or any other attribute that applies only to physical entities. The exact mechanisms by which physical activity in the brain and mental activity in the mind interact is not known--but it is known that they both exist. Claiming that mental activity simply doesn't exist because it can't be explained by what we know of physical activity is not a solution. You could just as easily claim that physical activity doesn't exist because it can't be explained by what we know of mental activity. Yet, we know that both exist! And they must interact somehow. So don't use Ockham's razor to slit your throat--entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity, but physical reality, mental reality, and volition are all necessary.

Every single experience and mental process we have is a result of physical changes that occur in the brain.

How do you know this? You've gone from positing a correlation to claiming knowledge of causality. How do you know that the physical changes aren't the result of the mental processes? How do you know that they are not reciprocal phenomena? How do you know anything besides that the two states are always observed to accompany one another in time?

Now let's put 1+2+3 together:

[*]Every single mental process/experience is a result/accompanied by a physical process. There is no breach between the two. One cannot "command" the other: they are inseparable.

It's a contradiction to say that the mental is a "result" of the physical, and at the same time, "One cannot 'command' the other." To command means to be the result of something.

[*]There are no other entities in the brain other than the elements we know, forces of gravity, electricity, and the rest. There is no new and unknown "power" in the brain. At least, none has been observed in any experiment until now. Nothing strange or against the physical properties of the cell ever happened.

You are claiming complete omniscience of the workings of the brain? I've had several conversations with professional neorologists who wouldn't claim anywhere near this degree of expertise regarding the mechanics of the brain. Maybe I should tell them to contact you with questions they might have. (Sorry, that was a little sarcastic : P). But sersiously.. Are you claiming omniscience of the workings of the brain? Because if not I'm totally misreading you.

IF we agree that the brain does not contain anything "non-inanimate" and "unknown powers" then the clear conclusion, as I see it, is that our brain is a device with a certain nature, that is designed to do whatever we can introspect to realize that it does (and more, since not all of it's operations we are aware of).
I agree that the brain does not contain anything "non-inanimate," but the mind does. Consequently, you can not judge the brain the same way you would judge any other physical object in existence--because it is the only physical object in existence which is directly connected to consciousness. It's analogous to this: although the laws of gravity are pretty much universal, you couldn't expect a bird to behave the same way that a rock of the same size and shape would behave if you threw it from a window. Because the bird is acted upon by *wings.* Similarly, the brain won't behave the same way as, let's say a computer (of the kind that actually exists), because the brain is acted upon by *consciousness.*

But then you say "but it's not my brain, it is ME that is making the choice!" I tell you: "The conscious activity of your brain IS you, and therefor no wonder that you experience that it is 'you' who is in control".

But your brain is not "conscious." You are conscious.. Your brain is merely the metaphysical condition for consciousness.

But then you say: "but I can listen to ideas, consider them and decide if I want to reject them or not", so I tell you: "Of course. Your brain is a device that does just that: processes visual/auditory input into entities and concepts, analyses the result (according to it's automatized mechanism, and the current content of your mind) and decides what to do, while you are conscious of it all while it happens, with a recognition that it is you who is thinking". If someone takes out the part that represents 'you' in your brain, you will still think, but may not be aware who is doing the thinking. There is no "your will" to float between the neurons of your brain and tell them how to act.

Wow, it feels nice to get it off my chest.

How are you defining will, and why would it have to "float between the neurons of your brain" in order to exist?

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My point in the example is simply to show that while a man may believe he has the "choice" to create different outcomes, that does not mean that there is ever a possibility of different outcomes.

But the outcome was different. He diffused the bomb by cutting the green wire, instead of diffusing it by cutting the red wire. Are you suggesting that since the consequence of either action was identical, the wires themselves were metaphysically identical? (There is a type of metaphysical position derived from Pragmatism that would claim this).

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Peikoff completely and utterly denies mechanistic causation as the general form of causation. It is the form of causation only of entities which do not have the capacity to act otherwise, and, when properly understood, it is a subcategory of Aristotelian causation. Aristotelian causation says that: entities act in accordance with what they are.

You write that "a man may believe he has the 'choice' to create different outcomes, [though] that does not mean that there is ever a possibility of different outcomes." Meaning, you hold a fundamental, unbridgable gap between reality and knowledge: that, though all the evidence in the world points to one having the ability to choose, one really does not and the only means by which he can attain such knowledge is the a priori theory of determinism. You hold that consciousness is not an awareness of reality, which is a flat negation of the second axiom of metaphysics.

Soft determinism is untenable, completely and utterly. The only proper context in which to judge a person is the context where a person could have done otherwise. Under determinism, a person could not act other than how he acted, so judgment is impossible, and no amount of compatibilist whim means anything in the face of that fact.

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Peikoff completely and utterly denies mechanistic causation as the general form of causation. It is the form of causation only of entities which do not have the capacity to act otherwise, and, when properly understood, it is a subcategory of Aristotelian causation. Aristotelian causation says that: entities act in accordance with what they are.

Thank you for bringing this up. I'm not sure if it's been mentioned in this thread already, but even so it bears repeating: Dr. Peikoff doesn't define causality as a mechanistic chain of events, and many determinists do take this view. For him, causality is the behavior of entities acting according to their identities.

Many determinists reject volition, because they hold that all of existence is a chain of events that are necessitated by previous events, and therefore volition is impossible because it would mean an event which is not necessitated by events which occured prior to consciousness. If it is understood that causality is the action of entities according to their nature, then it can be easily understood that entities of different natures will behave differently, and that a "mechanistic" view of causality is grossly insufficient to explain such diverse phenomena as actually exist.

Then the position that conscious entities operate on a different type of causality than unconscious entities, or that living entities operate on a different type of causality than inanimate entities, and so on, becomes much less controversial. It's only on the premise that there is one type of mechanistic causality that all entities *must* conform to, all appearances and evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, that forbids people from accepting or even comprehending this view.

Edited by Bold Standard
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But the outcome was different. He diffused the bomb by cutting the green wire, instead of diffusing it by cutting the red wire. Are you suggesting that since the consequence of either action was identical, the wires themselves were metaphysically identical? (There is a type of metaphysical position derived from Pragmatism that would claim this).

As I said, the hypothetical is not perfect in every respect. The point of it to show is that the appearance of choice does not equal an actual possibility of different outcomes. That is all.

Meaning, you hold a fundamental, unbridgable gap between reality and knowledge: that, though all the evidence in the world points to one having the ability to choose, one really does not and the only means by which he can attain such knowledge is the a priori theory of determinism. You hold that consciousness is not an awareness of reality, which is a flat negation of the second axiom of metaphysics.

I hold nothing of the sort. My point is not that there is an "unbridgable gap" between reality and knowledge, but that in most cases there is a difference between th reality and any individual's knowledge of part of it. Humans are not all-knowing, and in most circumstances do not even have access to most of the knowledge which is potentially available. I am not questioning the validity between what knowledge humans do have, I am simply saying that humans do not always have all potential knowlege which might affect their judgment about a given situation.

Soft determinism is untenable, completely and utterly. The only proper context in which to judge a person is the context where a person could have done otherwise. Under determinism, a person could not act other than how he acted, so judgment is impossible, and no amount of compatibilist whim means anything in the face of that fact.

Not exactly. There is a difference between holding people accountable for their actions and structuring societal laws and norms to guide human action. Determinism doesn't mandate the absence of choice. It it simply a backwards-looking theory, not a forward-looking one. It doesn't mean you can't have laws or norms shaping and guiding human action, or punishing people who deviate from it. What it does mean is that preconditions should be taken into account in making moral judgment, that is not the end of the story however.

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As I said, the hypothetical is not perfect in every respect. The point of it to show is that the appearance of choice does not equal an actual possibility of different outcomes. That is all.

Oohhh, I thought that the analogy was supposed to be a response to the question, "If there is no free will, what does it mean to 'act as if one has free will'?" Which confused me because I couldn't see how failing to predict the possible outcomes of a choice would mean that it wasn't really a choice. But I guess it was actually supposed to be a response to the first part of the quote, "If one one has no alternative (in a given situation) whether they accept the good argument or the bad one, how can it be said that reason exists?" Because the man tried to reason about which wire to cut, when there wasn't a consequentially significant alternative (although, in the context of his knowledge, there might have been). Now I see what you were saying (I think).

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