On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[MisterSwig]

But that primary choice certainly is itself a cause; as Peikoff points out, it is the first cause in a lengthy chain composed of higher-level choices, and these higher-level choices are reducible.

Where does Peikoff say that?

[stephen_speicher]

Where does Peikoff say that?

"On the primary level, to sum up, man chooses to activate his consciousness or not; this is the first cause in a lengthy chain -- and the inescapability of such choice expresses his essential nature. Then, on this basis, he forms the mental content and selects the reasons that will govern all his other choices." (OPAR, p. 69.)

"The choices involved in performing a thought process are different in an important respect from the primary choice. These higher-level choices, as we may call them, are not irreducible." (OPAR, p. 64.)

[MisterSwig]

The idea of man acting in a way that contradicts his nature will be confusing unless you bear in mind the nature of the Objectivist ethics.  It isn't that man literally contradicts his nature in murdering another person; it's not on the same level as, say, if he were to pull a monkey out of his ear.

This is what I meant when I said a murderer does not contradict his nature. He does not, on a metaphysical level, contradict what he is. He is a choice-maker. His nature permits him to choose murder. Given this, I understand that a murderer is morally acting in contradiction to what is good for his life. This, however, is not a metaphysical contradiction. It is a moral one, dependant on the fact that we already have the ability to volitionally choose our own actions.

Since Areactor's question asked how a person could murder and not contradict his nature, I thought it was relevant to show how man is fundamentally a choice-maker.

[MisterSwig]

"The choices involved in performing a thought process are different in an important respect from the primary choice. These higher-level choices, as we may call them, are not irreducible." (OPAR, p. 64.)

You left out the rest of that paragraph:

"The choices involved in performing a thought process are different in an important respect from the primary choice. These higher-level choices, as we may call them, are not irreducible. In their case it is legitimate to ask, in regard both to end and means: why did the individual choose as he did? what was the cause of his choice? Often, the cause involves several factors, including the individual's values and interests, his knowledge of a given subject, the new evidence available to him, and his knowledge of the proper methods of thinking.

"The principle of causality does not apply to consciousness, however, in the same way that it applies to matter. In regard to matter, there is no issue of choice; to be caused is to be necessitated. In regard to the (higher-level) actions of a volitional consciousness, however, "to be caused" does not mean "to be necessitated."

"... To say that a higher-level choice was caused is to say: there was a reason behind it, but other reasons were possible under the circumstances, and the individual himself made the selection among them." (OPAR, pp. 64-5)

So, it seems that Dr. Peikoff is saying that "higher-level" choices are caused. That means they are an effect of some kind, doesn't it? An effect of our volitional consciousness perhaps?

In regard to the primary choice to focus, I'll save that for another post, since I have to think about it more.

[stephen_speicher]

You left out the rest of that paragraph:

An effect of our volitional consciousness perhaps?

In regard to the primary choice to focus, I'll save that for another post, since I have to think about it more.

I left out a lot of things. I only included what was directly relevant to what you questioned about what I wrote.

So, it seems that Dr. Peikoff is saying that "higher-level" choices are caused.

As far as I know, that is uncontroversial among knowledgeable Objectivists. Did someone say otherwise?

That means they are an effect of some kind, doesn't it?

Was all of this quoting an attempt on your part to justify the statement you made that I criticized? Let me remind you. You asserted:

"A choice is not a cause, it is an effect. Man makes choices. Plain and simple. Choices don't cause or make anything."

The fact that an applied force causes a ball to roll does not negate that rolling ball from being the cause of something else. The breaking of a glass with which it collides, for instance. Are you seriously going to argue that the choices we make are not themselves the cause of further action?

[MisterSwig]

The fact that an applied force causes a ball to roll does not negate that rolling ball from being the cause of something else. The breaking of a glass with which it collides, for instance. Are you seriously going to argue that the choices we make are not themselves the cause of further action?

Yes, I think I will argue that--at least for "higher-level" choices. (I want to address the primary choice separately, at a later time. I may have a different understanding of the Dr. Peikoff quote you cited.)

What I will argue now is that higher-level choices are not sufficient factors for further action, they are not the cause of a subsequent effect, but most likely they represent only a necessary factor (or condition) for further action(s) of a volitional mind. For example, one needs to first choose to focus before one can choose to think, but choosing to focus is not sufficient for causing the choice to think. The choice to think is still caused by our volitional consciousness, but being in focus is a necessary condition for thinking.

Now, you seem to be saying that a choice is a cause of something. So my question to you is: what does a choice, any choice, cause? Can you give me an example?

I would also like to clarify the meaning of your "rolling ball" analogy. It seems to me that a rolling ball is not analogous to a choice, if that was the analogy you were trying to draw.

In the physical realm, a rolling ball must break the glass, given the right pre-existing conditions. It has no choice in the matter. The law of causality, however, is applied differently in the mental realm. A choice--let's say the choice to focus--does not necessitate any further action, under any pre-existing conditions. Clearly I have a choice about what I will do next. I could go out of focus. I could begin thinking. I could evade thought. My choices do not roll along like a ball through glass. I must constantly make new choices in order to operate my volitional consciousness.

Even when physically acting, the choice to think about acting in some way is not sufficient to perform the action itself. I must actually compel my body to move, which is a separate step from merely thinking about acting. So, basically, I fail to see how a choice is sufficient to cause anything.

To sum up, my current contention is that a choice is not a cause of something. What we choose is what we do. The cause of what we do is our volitional consciousness.

[stephen_speicher]

Yes, I think I will argue that--at least for "higher-level" choices. (I want to address the primary choice separately, at a later time. I may have a different understanding of the Dr. Peikoff quote you cited.)

... Now, you seem to be saying that a choice is a cause of something. So my question to you is: what does a choice, any choice, cause? Can you give me an example?

I choose to raise my arm. Voila! My arm is raised.

would also like to clarify the meaning of your "rolling ball" analogy. It seems to me that a rolling ball is not analogous to a choice, if that was the analogy you were trying to draw.

The purpose of the analogy was to underscore the notion of a causal chain, whether it be physical or mental. I am sure that you do not consciously reject such a notion, but that is, in effect, what you seem to be doing here. As Peikoff notes in OPAR, p. 68, "The similarity between the physical and mental realms is clear. In action, as in thought, each step a man takes has a cause, which explains it."

Every step of the way, from the primary choice to our thinking processes, all of the mental actions are caused, and there exists a causal chain that leads from one choice to the next. (Simple example: If I did not choose to be in focus I would not have considered all the relevant facts; if I did not choose to assess each fact I would not have separated the more important from the lesser ones; etc.) In this respect there is similarity between mental actions and physical actions. The difference, of course, is that the physical actions and processes of matter are deterministic, whereas our mental thinking processes are not necessitated, even though they are all causally linked.

To sum up, my current contention is that a choice is not a cause of something.

You might want to re-read at least pages 62-69 of OPAR, and give some thought to what I said above.

[stephen_speicher]

I meant to respond to this in the last post.

I want to address the primary choice separately, at a later time. I may have a different understanding of the Dr. Peikoff quote you cited.

I personally thought that Peikoff made that issue crystal clear, so I would like hear your argument about this.

[MinorityOfOne]

MisterSwig:

Even when physically acting, the choice to think about acting in some way is not sufficient to perform the action itself. I must actually compel my body to move, which is a separate step from merely thinking about acting. So, basically, I fail to see how a choice is sufficient to cause anything.

What do you mean by choice here? If I think about moving my arm and then don't, and it's not because my arm is tied down or something, I didn't choose to move it. I just fantasized about moving it. If you just mean that there are additional physical processes (neural signals, etc.) which are also necessary, I agree. But if you mean that the choice to raise one's arm is separate from compelling one's arm to raise, I disagree.

In any case, I'm with you overall. Choices don't cause things, people do. To claim that the choice is the cause is to accept the event-event view of causation, analogous to the person who claims that it's not the moving billiard ball but the billiard ball's movement which causes the motion of the ball it strikes. It's ok to say that choices cause things in a loose sense, insofar as you're just trying to zoom in on what it is about a person that caused something -- he raised his arm by choosing it, rather than by twitching, so you might just say his choice caused it. But if you're doing philosophy, more precision is needed.

Speaking precisely, a choice is something one does, i.e. a part of one's identity at a given time. It is part of the cause of a chosen action, such as raising one's arm; it is one necessary condition among a number of necessary conditions, all of which are together sufficient for one's arm to raise.

(I hope this makes sense. I'm very tired.)

[MisterSwig]

What do you mean by choice here?  If I think about moving my arm and then don't, and it's not because my arm is tied down or something, I didn't choose to move it.  I just fantasized about moving it.  If you just mean that there are additional physical processes (neural signals, etc.) which are also necessary, I agree.  But if you mean that the choice to raise one's arm is separate from compelling one's arm to raise, I disagree.

I think we agree. It may be my poorly phrased sentence that is the problem. This is also a very difficult topic to understand and convey.

I merely meant that thinking, alone, does not move your arm. You can choose to think about moving your arm, but that doesn't produce the action of moving your arm. Another step is required--as you indicated.

Also, like you, I don't believe that the choice to move my arm is somehow separate from actually moving my arm. The choice to move my arm is moving my arm. By saying that I chose to move in a particular way, all I am doing is recognizing the fact that I could have moved differently, if I had chosen another option.

I hope that clears that up, 'cause my head is swirling.

[stephen_speicher]

Choices don't cause things, people do.  To claim that the choice is the cause is to accept the event-event view of causation, analogous to the person who claims that it's not the moving billiard ball but the billiard ball's movement which causes the motion of the ball it strikes.  It's ok to say that choices cause things in a loose sense, insofar as you're just trying to zoom in on what it is about a person that caused something -- he raised his arm by choosing it, rather than by twitching, so you might just say his choice caused it.  But if you're doing philosophy, more precision is needed.

You are mistaken. Of course actions are caused by entities, but it is the specific properties and attributes of entities that are the cause, including volitional choice which is a psychological property of the consciousness of the entity man.

"Prof. F: This question has to do with the concept of "property" and its significance for causality. In Galt's speech, you say every action is caused by the nature of the acting entity. Now, by "the nature of an entity" do you mean the physical properties of an entity—properties like combustible, fragile, corrosive, and so on?

"AR: Yes. And also the psychological properties of a consciousness, including free will."

--ITOE, p282.

(I hope this makes sense.  I'm very tired.)

Get more sleep.

[Areactor]

Quick question. Isn't a choice a decision followed by an action while an action is something the entity does?

[stephen_speicher]

Quick question. Isn't a choice a decision followed by an action while an action is something the entity does?

Choice is an action, an action of consciousness. But consciousness also has causal efficacy in the brain and body on which it depends. Whether mental or physical, the actions are actions of the entity, man.

[Spearmint]

I was rereading the OPAR section on consciousness, and there's one part I dont entirely 'get'. Objectivism is dualistic, in the sense that it regards consciousness and (what we call) matter to be irreducible primaries, but not in the sense that it claims that consciousness can be seperated from matter (man is one indivisble entity, mind depends on brain, etc etc). I agree with this, and I think most variants of strict materialism are nonsensical.

However, I'm not entirely sure how this answers the standard problem of dualism which has existed since Descartes, namely how non-material consciousness has casual efficacy in the brain. If consciousness is not reducible to matter, then how is it able to affect matter, through exerting forces on it?

[MinorityOfOne]

Stephen Speicher:

You are mistaken. Of course actions are caused by entities, but it is the specific properties and attributes of entities that are the cause, including volitional choice which is a psychological property of the consciousness of the entity man.

I'm open to arguments, but I'm not convinced by this one. We were talking about choices, and now you've changed the topic -- you're saying that the capacity to choose can be a cause. Of course it can! (Provided, of course, that you don't separate it entirely from the organism whose capacity it is.) The issue before was whether I can choose, say, to raise my arm, and then that choice goes on to cause my arm to raise. I still think that's totally wrong. I move my arm BY choosing to move it. The choice isn't some intermediary cause.

[IDC]

Well...immaterial is not the same as non-existent.

So even immaterial things are something (A is A) with a certain range of actions. I don't think there is any inherient reason why material and immaterial objects can't interact.

So maybe what we focus on as a consciousness, through some mechanism causes physical neural connections etc to be formed in our brain creating our personality/memories, but I don't know what the mechanism is, just that we can't rule out the existence of such a mechanism philosophically.

[DPW]

However, I'm not entirely sure how this answers the standard problem of dualism which has existed since Descartes, namely how non-material consciousness has casual efficacy in the brain. If consciousness is not reducible to matter, then how is it able to affect matter, through exerting forces on it?

Peikoff once asked Rand that question, and he said her answer went something like this: What is the problem? We know it does happen. It's a scientific question of how it happens.

[Spearmint]

Peikoff once asked Rand that question, and he said her answer went something like this: What is the problem?  We know it does happen.  It's a scientific question of how it happens.

It may well be a scientific question but science so far has found no direct evidence of it, nor do I know of any current physical theories which require it in order to make accurate predictions. Dualism of this sort seems to necessitate that the equations which predict how the atoms constituting a table behave will break down when applied to the atoms constituting a person's brain.

[DPW]

It may well be a scientific question but science so far has found no direct evidence of it, nor do I know of any current physical theories which require it in order to make accurate predictions. Dualism of this sort seems to necessitate that the equations which predict how the atoms constituting a table behave will break down when applied to the atoms constituting a person's brain.

Huh? If I didn't know better, I'd say your initial post was an exercise in baiting. Nevertheless, I'm with Rand. Our ignorance on just how the mind and the body interact doesn't disolve the fact that we know they do, and that no scientific theory can overturn this self-evidency.

[Spearmint]

Huh?  If I didn't know better, I'd say your initial post was an exercise in baiting.  Nevertheless, I'm with Rand.  Our ignorance on just how the mind and the body interact doesn't disolve the fact that we know they do, and that no scientific theory can overturn this self-evidency.

I'm not 'baiting', as I said I think that dualism gives the most intuitive account of how consciousness works, I'm just not entirely convinced about the conseqences. If experiments showed that the atoms inside a person's head behaved in the exact same way as anywhere else, would this refute the claim that consciousness has causual eficacy? It certainly seems that it would.

[Guest jrshep]

There is a very good, multipart article in "The Objectivist" entitled "Biology Without Consciousness--And Its Consequences" by Robert Efron.

One thing to keep in mind is that consciousness is awareness of existence. No matter what is discovered as to the biological causes of our faculty of consciousness, that faculty, consciousness, as awareness of existence, cannot be reduced to those causes. Those causes are not themselves instances of consciousness themselves. For example, neuro transmissions of sensory data are not forms of awareness, yet without them there is no faculty of consciousness. Brain activity is not consciousness, but without such activity the faculty of consciousness couldn't exist. Consciousness is caused by our nature, but analysis of the biological causes of consciousness will not be analysis of aspects of consciousness, of awareness of existence, but will be the analysis of the biological requirements for having such a faculty.

[Spearmint]

There is a very good, multipart article in "The Objectivist" entitled "Biology Without Consciousness--And Its Consequences" by Robert Efron.

One thing to keep in mind is that consciousness is awareness of existence. No matter what is discovered as to the biological causes of our faculty of consciousness, that faculty, consciousness, as awareness of existence, cannot be reduced to those causes. Those causes are not themselves instances of consciousness themselves. For example, neuro transmissions of sensory data are not forms of awareness, yet without them there is no faculty of consciousness. Brain activity is not consciousness, but without such activity the faculty of consciousness couldn't exist. Consciousness is caused by our nature, but analysis of the biological causes of consciousness will not be analysis of aspects of consciousness, of awareness of existence, but will be the analysis of the biological requirements for having such a faculty.

I agree with this, but I'm not talking about consciousness as simply 'awareness', I'm talking about consciousness being able to interact with matter. Volitional consciousness doesnt just have the property of observing reality, it must also have the property of influencing the movement of physical matter.

[DPW]

If experiments showed that the atoms inside a person's head behaved in the exact same way as anywhere else, would this refute the claim that consciousness has causual eficacy? It certainly seems that it would.

To begin with, the fact that consciousness has causal efficacy is not a claim - it is a self-evident fact. Allow me to demonstrate: move your arm. See? There you go. Now you know that consciousness has causal efficacy.

The proper question for science is, how? What is the specific relationship between mind and matter? By what means do they interact? Philosophy can't say. But science cannot contradict what we know philosophically. It cannot tell us that consciousness does not have causal efficacy - to discover that would be to invalidate the means of discovering that, i.e., would invalidate all science.

Now, you are here raising a different question: is it possible that consciousness has causal efficacy AND that the atoms in man's head behave the exact same way as anywhere else? My answer is: I have no idea. I think that's outside the realm of philosophy to answer. But let's assume that we did find that. Then we could say, "No, those two facts don't conflict. The atoms behave the same and consciousness has causal efficacy."

In no case is there even a possibility of reaching a conclusion that would invalidate the self-evident nature of consciousness.

[Spearmint]

But let's assume that we did find that.  Then we could say, "No, those two facts don't conflict.  The atoms behave the same and consciousness has causal efficacy." 

This doesnt make sense. If atoms in the brain behave the same as elsewhere the consciousness does not have casual efficacy. The 2 claims are contradictory - consicousness cannot both influence matter and not influence matter. If matter in the brain 'does what it does' without being affected in any way by consciousness, then your consciousness obviously plays no casual role whatsoever in your arm raising. The raising of the arm is caused by signals transmitted from the brain, and consciousness would not play a role in generating these signals.

[stephen_speicher]

I'm open to arguments, but I'm not convinced by this one. We were talking about choices, and now you've changed the topic ...

No, I have not changed a thing. I have been consistent throughout this thread. You seem to be attributing to me some confusions of your own. You are free to remain unconvinced.