On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[Fred Weiss]

How do a bunch of random neural process convert into consciousness and free will?

There's nothing wrong with your question, per se, except that it is not really a suitable topic for this forum. You are asking a question for science, not philosophy.

If you are implying that it is somehow not possible or contradictory for a physical entity like the brain to interface (in ways we don't yet fully understand) with consciousness and free will, the answer to that is simpler. It is obviously possible and not contradictory, since we possess consciousness and free will. More than that, it is axiomatic that we do!

If you question whether it is axiomatic, I would suggest you read the relevant sections in OPAR where it is discussed.

Fred Weiss

[stephen_speicher]

I can understand this, but what are the connection betwen the two? How do a bunch of random neural process convert into consciousness and free will?

If you are asking "What is the physics by which the brain gives rise to consciousness in the first place,? then the answer to that is "Nobody yet knows." But the existence of our volitional consciousness is an incontrovertible fact of introspection, and the nature of our thought processes are clearly different in kind from the actions of the brain.

[Inspector]

Aren't our thoughts a bunch of a random electrical signals?

I may not be an expert in the field, but I am pretty sure that our thoughts, while being electrical signals, aren't RANDOM.

Was I wrong about that?

[Praxus]

I may not be an expert in the field, but I am pretty sure that our thoughts, while being electrical signals, aren't RANDOM.

Was I wrong about that?

So the electrical signals now have free will?

[Zeus]

So the electrical signals now have free will?

Absolutely! The philosopher Epicurus solved this problem way back in history. Only, sadly, many of us don't read history, so we don't know better.

In fact, if you watch the recently-released movie, I, Robot, you'll notice that free-will is fully explained there. For the robots in the movie, free-will arose from the random collision of protocols. But, in man, it's caused by the random collision of electric signals. Which is really saying the same thing.

Any questions?

[stephen_speicher]

I may not be an expert in the field, but I am pretty sure that our thoughts, while being electrical signals, aren't RANDOM.

Nor are our thoughts electrical signals. Conscious processes are not the same as neural processes.

[stephen_speicher]

Absolutely! The philosopher Epicurus solved this problem way back in history. Only, sadly, many of us don't read history, so we don't know better.

In fact, if you watch the recently-released movie, I, Robot, you'll notice that free-will is fully explained there. For the robots in the movie, free-will arose from the random collision of protocols. But, in man, it's caused by the random collision of electric signals. Which is really saying the same thing.

If you are really serious about what you say, then you are spouting sheer nonsense.

[Zeus]

If you are really serious about what you say, then you are spouting sheer nonsense.

Dr. Speicher,

I believe my sarcasm is obvious...but even it weren't, there is no need to attempt to police me. Not on this board; not ever. You don't know me, and I don't know you. I think we can keep it civil.

I know enough about the basic principles of Objectivism (just to mention one subject of study), and the facts of reality which support them, to take on anyone on this board; of that I am certain. I just don't go around trying to prove that this is the case.

I told what I think is a well-integrated joke. Let's just leave it at that.

Have a good evening.

P.S. For anyone who would like to have the background to my last post, please see G.E.R. Lloyd's "Greek Science After Aristotle," pgs. 21-24.

[stephen_speicher]

I believe my sarcasm is obvious

It was certainly not obvious to me.

...but even it weren't, there is no need to attempt to police me.

Police you? This is a public forum, and if you write what I think to be nonsense, I will identify it as such, if I care to.

Not on this board; not ever.  You don't know me, and I don't know you.  I think we can keep it civil.

Identifying nonsense as nonsense is uncivil?

I know enough about the basic principles of Objectivism (just to mention one subject of study), and the facts of reality which support it, to take on anyone on this board, of that I am certain.  I just don't go around trying to prove that this is the case.

That is exactly what you seem to be doing right now, with these defensive remarks.

I told what I think is a well-integrated joke.

It it was a joke, and I did not get it, you could have just simply told me so. I probably would have said I was sorry, but I did not get it as a "joke" or as "sarcasm." Instead, considering the attitude you have expressed above, I am not wont to apologize for anything.

Have a good evening.

I always do.

[stephen_speicher]

I believe my sarcasm is obvious

Incidentally, perhaps you were not around here a few months ago, when several Objectivists seriously put forth and defended the notion of digital algorithms giving rise to consciousness. Your "robots in the movie" was not that much different, and hence not that "obvious" to me.

[DPW]

I believe my sarcasm is obvious...but even it weren't, there is no need to attempt to police me.  Not on this board; not ever.  You don't know me, and I don't know you.  I think we can keep it civil.

While Stephen doesn't need me to defend him, I will note that I didn't realize you were being sarcastic or joking, nor did it appear to me that Stephen was being uncivil. Certainly, when he thinks someone is wrong, he never pulls punches, even if he respects the person. But that's no sin. I'm the same way.

I know enough about the basic principles of Objectivism (just to mention one subject of study), and the facts of reality which support them, to take on anyone on this board; of that I am certain.

I don't really have anything to say about this particular quote. It just made me smile.

[stephen_speicher]

While Stephen doesn't need me to defend him, I will note that I didn't realize you were being sarcastic or joking, nor did it appear to me that Stephen was being uncivil.  Certainly, when he thinks someone is wrong, he never pulls punches, even if he respects the person.  But that's no sin.  I'm the same way.

I'm glad that you said it this way. Not so much for this thread, but, more generally, for all others. I have always taken ideas very seriously, and I am probably hardest on those closest to me. In a forum like this, where we do not see each other in person, it may be easy to mistake a passion for ideas, as meaning something else. But indeed I do tend to argue most firmly with those who I respect the most, and I welcome a similar response from others. I think that caring about ideas is a sign of a passionate valuer, and it is passionate valuers that I enjoy the most.

[AshRyan]

Just for the record, I thought it was pretty obvious that Zeus was joking. At least, I hoped he was joking.

[Zeus]

Just for the record, I thought it was pretty obvious that Zeus was joking.  At least, I hoped he was joking.

Aww, c'mon Ash, you mean even after reading my other posts, you hoped I wasn't one of these "tommyedison"-type guys?

In any case, good looking out...

[gcbhenry]

Hi, All,

I'm pretty new here, but I figure this is a good place to jump in, since I can probably help you out with this question:

1. You start off, right from the beginning, with the assertion that our thoughts are "random electrical signals". This is obviously false, simply because any sort of brain-strucure whatsoever would preclude "randomness" of any kind.

Nor are our thoughts simply "electrical signals" -- there are also numerous chemical components to neurological function as well.

Now, the fact that brain activity is electrochemical in nature (at least in part, to our best understanding so far), has absolutely nothing to do with "free will" from an Objectivist standpoint.

"Free will" (in the Objectivist sense) is, as far as I can determine, nothing more or less than the ability to choose between two or more alternatives presented at a given time. Humans are not (contrary to what most "behaviorists" etc want to believe) simple "stimulous and response" entities. We have the capacity to choose -- that is, to initiate actions which are not themselves directly NECCESITATED by the preceeding conditions.

For example: you're confronted with this discussion. You could say "this discussion is stupid, since I'm totally socially determined" -- but in so doing, you would be (through whatever means) thinking about the "free will" question, and actively deciding how to reply. Your reply would not simply be a by-product of the question itself. You're presented with several alternatives as to what action you can take (IE you could turn the computer off, and go get drunk, for example). The whole point of "free will" is that YOU are the agent of your own actions -- that you as an individual entity can, in fact, interact with the world consiously (rather than simply by "instinct" or "social conditionig" or what have you.)

The mechanisms of brain-function are a completely different topic, as far as I can see, (especially since the "random electrical signals" you mentioned can be actively controlled to a large degree by the individual himself -- via biofeedback training and such.)

Hope that helps.

[tommyedison]

I have a question. Our brain has a definite structure. It is made up of matter which in turn is made up of the fundamental constituent of all things. The fundamental constituent is necessarily governed by the laws of physics which themselves are definite and precise. So if the structure and constituents of brain are governed by the laws of physics which produces deterministic and infinitely precise (not talking about quantum physics) solutions, motions and results doesn't that mean that are thoughts are too determined according to the laws of physics as thoughts are definitely the by-product of some behavior or motion or property of matter (they cannot be immaterial). So how can we have free will, when everything is determined by physics with complete determinism and infinite precision?

[Bowzer]

Nor are our thoughts simply "electrical signals" -- there are also numerous chemical components to neurological function as well.

That's just as wrong as reducing thought to electrical signals. Thoughts are not reducible to anything in the brain or even the brain and nervous system taken as a whole.

"Free will" (in the Objectivist sense) is, as far as I can determine, nothing more or less than the ability to choose between two or more alternatives presented at a given time.

This isn't quite fundamental enough. An act of focus must come prior to choosing among alternatives. See "The Primary Choice As The Choice To Focus Or Not" in OPAR, Chapter 2.

[Bowzer]

So how can we have free will, when everything is determined by physics with complete determinism and infinite precision?

Would you please point out where you disagree with the above posts since I think this question was sufficiently answered by several people in this very thread...

[tommyedison]

I don't disagree with any of the posts above. It has been clearly mentioned in this threat that free will is a product of consciousness. Consciousness comes from the brain. I just want to know whether completely deterministic, predictable and causal physics is sufficient to adequately describe free will in the future because it doesn't seem so, atleast to me. Complete determinism would imply determinism in all forms, of all acitivities of the brain. If consciousness is a product of some functioning of the brain as it has to be (it cannot be immaterial), then that has to be deterministic too. So how can free will be described out of something entirely deterministic and predictable?

[stephen_speicher]

I don't disagree with any of the posts above. It has been clearly mentioned in this threat that free will is a product of consciousness.

Not a product of consciousness, but an attribute of the consciousness of man.

Consciousness comes from the brain. I just want to know whether completely deterministic, predictable and causal physics is sufficient to adequately describe free will in the future because it doesn't seem so, atleast to me.

That depends on what you mean by "describe." It is perfectly reasonable to expect that physics will eventually explain how the brain gives rise to consciousness and how consciousness can have causal efficacy in the brain and in the body in which it resides. But, ultimately, since the act of choosing from two or more possible courses of action is itself the opposite of deterministic, then clearly there is no deterministic physics to "describe" such an act. What you need to grasp is that the primary choice in man is an irreducible fact, not capable of being explained by anything more fundamental.

Complete determinism would imply determinism in all forms, of all acitivities of the brain. If consciousness is a product of some functioning of the brain as it has to be (it cannot be immaterial),

But clearly consciousness is not material, as has been discussed here all too many times. The fact that the matter of the brain somehow gives rise to consciousness does not mean that consciousness is reducible to matter.

then that has to be deterministic too. So how can free will be described out of something entirely deterministic and predictable?

The fact that free will exists is an indisputable fact available to you directly by introspection. You (and no one else right now) cannot explain the physics of the circumstances that gives rise to a volitional consciousness, but that such exists and is not deterministic is a primary fact of reality.

Personally I do not care to present the issue from the perspective of an emergent property, but it seems that it is helpful to some. The idea of an emergent property is a property which arises from the constituents upon which it depends, but it is not a property of the constituents themselves. To take a simple example: We have a series of wooden sticks that are all slightly curved, and when we place them on a steep incline they slide but do not roll down. Connect all the curved sticks together to form a circle and what results will roll down the incline. One can say that the property of rolling is an emegent property of the organization of the sticks because it was not a property of the sticks themselves. Likewise some think of consciousness as an emergent property of the all of the elements which compose the brain. None of the elements themselves possess the property of consciousness but their organization and interaction results in consciousness. Maybe that will help you to grasp the issue in regards to consciousness.

(As I said, I personally do not like to use the notion of an emergent property, in that it really does not advance my knowledge of what consciousness is and how the brain gives rise to conscious states. I can easily accept consciousness as an irreducible primary, but for some the notion of an emergent property seems to help.)

[gcbhenry]

This is fascinating....

I run into stuff like this on every board I've ever bothered to use (and it's actually kinda sad.)

1. TommyEdison:

I honestly don't know what you're trying to say.

First, you make a claim about physics producing "infininitely precise results" -- while simultaneously exempting Quantum physics. Here's where I see at least two problems with your approach here:

Atomic physics may produce "definite results" (IE, law of identity -- things are what they are), but this does NOT in any sense, imply "determinism" in the Cartesian, mechanistic sense. There is NEVER one single "predetermined" outcome to a given event of any complexity. Rather, there are a series of POSSIBLE outcomes, which are conditioned by the characteristics of the entities involved (IE, their "nature").

For example: the tragectory of a ping-pong ball, when you whack it with a paddle, does not simply follow onespecific path, even when all variables are exactly the same. (Note here that I am NOT implying "indeterminacy" in the sense of randomness). What I am implying is that, under any set of even halfway complex conditions, there is a certain amount of possible variation of outcome --- WITHIN the boundaries of what is "possible to the entities involved". (For example, Peikoff's egg-on-a-pooltable from OPAR.)

TommyEdison, you seem to be operating on the Cartesian premise, that any and all phenomena in the world can be successfully reduced to "atoms in motion". (Why else your insistence that something "cannot be material"?) Really, this is a crude approach in itself, because anything that can be reasonably destribed as "matter" is itself only a relatively small subset of known existents. (For example, would you consider sub-atomic structures like quarks and such to be made of "matter?"

So, no. The "everything is neccesarily 'matter' approach isn't going to get you anywhere. Would you consider the "electroweak force" mentioned by physics, to be 'matter' -- or 'something that matter does'? This is a critical question, because the assumption among many materialists is that admitting something 'non-material' automatically defaults to some form of supernaturalism.

But that's off the topic. Actually, for a fuller expalantion you should read "logical strucure of Objectivism" by David Kelley and William Thomas -- it's over on Objectivistcetner.org's website.

Now, another place where you go wrong is this:

You exempt "quantum mechanics" from your definition of "infinitely precise results" (presumably because of the "uncertainty principle".) So, I ask you: how does an at-least somewhat "indeterminate" Quantum realm give rise to an "infinitely precisely exact" 'macroscopic" level of organization?

Now consider this (just as a hypothetical): if 'indeterminacy' on the micro-level can give rise to 'determinacy' on the macro level, then why couldn't "determinacy" give rise to 'freely-chosen selection between alternatives" -- AKA "free will?"

And lastly, the only way any of us can even take your question seriously, is by default assuming that you DO in fact have "free will" (in the sense that you have, in fact, formulated this question consiously, and are capable of selecting between different ways of thinking about it.) If that is not true, then we have all merely emitted a series of flailing motions, which where themselves implied and neccesitated since time immemorial.

I've pretty much come to the conclusion that attempts to argue against "free will" (IE, the capacity for thought and action initiated by the individual) -- no matter what form it takes, is basically an attempt to dodge the responsibility of one's own life. (Same with astrology.)

So no, Tommy, your point does not hold. If it does, then no conversation has actually take place here -- or is even possible.

Sorry to sound harsh, but you take what you get. "infinitely precise results" y'know.

[stephen_speicher]

I run into stuff like this on every board I've ever bothered to use (and it's actually kinda sad.) ... TommyEdison ... Sorry to sound harsh, but you take what you get.

I object to the attitude and tone that you take with TommyEddison, especially considering that you do not really grasp even a fraction of the issues which your haughty response implies. TommyEdison is fourteen years-old, and I for one am delighted to find such a bright young mind interested in Objectivism and interested in issues such as the nature of consciousness and its relation to physics. We should be encouraging such interest, not berating TommyEdison for what he supposedly does not know.

Atomic physics may produce "definite results" (IE, law of identity -- things are what they are), but this does NOT in any sense, imply "determinism" in the Cartesian, mechanistic sense. There is NEVER one single "predetermined" outcome to a given event of any complexity. Rather, there are a series of POSSIBLE outcomes, which are conditioned by the characteristics of the entities involved (IE, their "nature").

This is very confused. All physical processes are completely deterministic and there is always only one action possible to an entity in any given set of circumstances. Without the intervention of a volitional consciousness, all action in the universe would be completely predetermined and whatever unfolds could not have been otherwise.

For example: the tragectory of a ping-pong ball, when you whack it with a paddle, does not simply follow onespecific path, even when all variables are exactly the same.

This is sheer nonsense and is contrary to both physics and Objectivist principles of identity and causality..

(Note here that I am NOT implying "indeterminacy" in the sense of randomness). What I am implying is that, under any set of even halfway complex conditions, there is a certain amount of possible variation of outcome --- WITHIN the boundaries of what is "possible to the entities involved". (For example, Peikoff's egg-on-a-pooltable from OPAR.)

You obviously misunderstand Peikoff's point. Peikoff was there underscoring that, properly speaking, it is entities that are causes, not actions. Substituting the egg for the billiard ball just illustrates that the effects of an entity traveling at a certain velocity are different depending upon the nature of the entity. But, again, for any given non-volitional entity, under any given circumstances, there is no "certain amount of possible variation of outcome."

Really, this is a crude approach in itself, because anything that can be reasonably destribed as "matter" is itself only a relatively small subset of known existents.  (For example, would you consider sub-atomic structures like quarks and such to be made of "matter?"

Quarks are commonly referred to as matter, and they have mass. It is true that quarks are confined inside hadrons and therefore there is no current method of directly measuring the mass, but, depending on the theory used one determines this mass indirectly by its effect on the properties of hadrons. For instance, in quantum chromodynamics (QCD) one uses the QCD Lagrangian and perturbation theory to determine quark masses according to certain mass-dependent effects.

So, no.  The "everything is neccesarily 'matter' approach isn't going to get you anywhere.  Would you consider the "electroweak force" mentioned by physics, to be 'matter' -- or 'something that matter does'?

Well, as a matter of fact, yes. The electroweak force is mediated by three intermediate vector bosons, the W^+, W^-, and Z particles, each of which has mass which is almost one-hundred times as heavy as the proton mass.

Actually, for a fuller expalantion you should read "logical strucure of Objectivism" by David Kelley and William Thomas ...

I do not know if that explains the source of your massive confusions, but I would suggest reading Ayn Rand instead.

And lastly, the only way any of us can even take your question seriously, is by default assuming that you DO in fact have "free will" (in the sense that you have, in fact, formulated this question consiously, and are capable of selecting between different ways of thinking about it.) If that is not true, then we have all merely emitted a series of flailing motions, which where themselves implied and neccesitated since time immemorial.

This is one of the few things you have said that I can, in essence, agree with.

I've pretty much come to the conclusion that attempts to argue against "free will" (IE, the capacity for thought and action initiated by the individual) -- no matter what form it takes, is basically an attempt to dodge the responsibility of one's own life.

But understanding free will often seems to be a problem for those who otherwise grasp and agree with the rest of Objectivism. Even though volition is directly perceivable via introspection, it sometime takes some "chewing" to fully see, philosophically, how free will fits in with everything else that is known. I do not think that the tone you took with TommyEdison helped in this matter, not to mention the sheer amount of misinformation you gave him.

[gcbhenry]

Mr. Speicher:

While you may "Object to the tone" I take with TommyEdison, that has very little to do with the actual substance of this discussion.

The fact is that yes, I have indeed been involved in far too many discussions where -- rather than actually trying to learn anything -- the parties are trying to use atomic physics (some Cartesian mechanistic version, primarily), to justify other --- "higher-level" deterministic claims (such as behaviorism, or 'social class struggle' or the equivalent.

Thus, I tend (regrettably, and I'm working on it), to be somewhat edgy, in regards to questions which strike me as veiled justifications for the "society made me do it" school of excuses.

Mr. Speicher, you misunderstood my statement entirely. When I said that there was a "certain level of possible variation" you took it as some form of "indeterminacy" claim, which it wasn't.

My point was that the "one action possible to an entity in a given situation" is one TYPE of action. (IE, to take Peikoff's balloon excample, the child releases the balloon, and it rises. Now, the 'one possible action' for the balloon to take is to rise, correct? But there is a certain level of possible variation as to how far it will rise, etc -- even in a completely stagnant room, where there's no airflow.

I didn't realize that TommyEdison was 14 years old, nor to I find it particularly relevant. He seemed to be implying the absense of volitional consiousness, due to the fact that the human brain has a specific structure. That's the sort of thinking that -- however one allows it to happen --- leads to things like the "twinkie defense".

The possible actions of an eneity are conditional on that entitie's NATURE, Mr. Speicher. I understand that. But to go from that to a claim that -- absent voliitonal consiousness everything would be one endless "chain-reaction" with the ending completely predictable at the beginning -- is entirely too broad a claim.

The way you yourself explained it, volitional consiousness comes off as a "non-material substance" that is somehow injected into the Newtonian "mechanism", and somehow allows for variation, where none would even be physically possible, otherwise. Sorry to say it, Mr. Speicher, but that is pure Cartesian dualism, and I don't see how you can do hat, without getting the same basic results as Descartes. His entire system was based on a radical dis-continuity between the "material" clockwork universe, and a mysterious, "thinking substance" injected INTO that clockwork.

What I said, Mr. Speicher, was that the defining characteristic of consiousness (animal as well as human), is that the actions of the entity in question are NOT merely "clockwork" responses to external stimuli. Rather, the entity is itself INITIATING the action. (remember "self-generated, self-sustaining action?)

And thanks for advising me to read Rand. (even though she never actually discusses how a Cartesian, "clockwork universe" such as you described COULD give rise to consious entities. She just seems to assume that consiousness is possible -- and to ascribe moral significance to actions as a result.)

But thanks for the feedback!

[Bowzer]

And thanks for advising me to read Rand.   (even though she never actually discusses how a Cartesian, "clockwork universe" such as you described COULD give rise to consious entities.  She just seems to assume that consiousness is possible -- and to ascribe moral significance to actions as a result.)

Assumes that consciousness is possible? You should indeed thank Mr. Speicher and heed his advice since the above shows either a total lack of understanding or a complete misunderstanding of what Miss Rand wrote about consciousness. And to tie the Objectivist ethics in to that "assumption that consciousness is possible"?? Good God!!

[tommyedison]

I object to the attitude and tone that you take with TommyEddison, especially considering that you do not really grasp even a fraction of the issues which your haughty response implies. TommyEdison is fourteen years-old, and I for one am delighted to find such a bright young mind interested in Objectivism and interested in issues such as the nature of consciousness and its relation to physics. We should be encouraging such interest, not berating TommyEdison for what he supposedly does not know.

Thank you, Mr. Speicher

I am not denying the existence of free will. What I am basically trying to understand is whether consciousness can be explained by deterministic physics or whether it is an irreducible primary(a concept rather difficult to digest). Because if consciousnes is an irreducible primary, then why is it only limited to the human brain? It should be present to some degree in each and every particle. Please correct me if I am wrong but I think that this was the argument voiced by two physicists to explain Schroedinger's Cat?