On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[stephen_speicher]

Mr. Speicher, you misunderstood my statement entirely. When I said that there was a "certain level of possible variation" you took it as some form of "indeterminacy" claim, which it wasn't.

  My point was that the "one action possible to an entity in a given situation" is one TYPE of action. (IE, to take Peikoff's balloon excample, the child releases the balloon, and it rises. Now, the 'one possible action' for the balloon to take is to rise, correct? But there is a certain level of possible variation as to how far it will rise, etc -- even in a completely stagnant room, where there's no airflow.

You are equivocating on the phrase "possible variation" as it applies to deterministic behavior. You might loosely say, not knowing enough about the detailed circumstances, that there was some "possible variation" in how high the balloon will rise. But that is an epistemological statement -- a consequence of you lacking full knowledge of the circumstances -- not a metaphysical statement of causality. You simply do not have the knowledge yourself to determine the outcome. But, the fact remains, given any particular set of circumstances the balloon will rise exactly as far as its does, given those circumstances. There is no "possible variation," metaphysically, about the actions of the balloon. Its behavior is fully determined by its nature and the circumstances in which it acts. That is what we mean when we speak of physically deterministic behavior -- action which is not freely chosen, action which could not have been otherwise.

The possible actions of an eneity are conditional on that entitie's NATURE, Mr. Speicher. I understand that. But to go from that to a claim that -- absent voliitonal consiousness everything would be one endless "chain-reaction" with the ending completely predictable at the beginning -- is entirely too broad a claim.

Would you care to justify your assertion with an actual argument? If you do attempt justification, however, I caution you that in doing so you are arguing against physical determinism as a causal principle.

The way you yourself explained it, volitional consiousness comes off as a "non-material substance" that is somehow injected into the Newtonian "mechanism", and somehow allows for variation, where none would even be physically possible, otherwise. Sorry to say it, Mr. Speicher, but that is pure Cartesian dualism, and I don't see how you can do hat, without getting the same basic results as Descartes.

First, please stop putting words I did not say in quotes when you conjoin them with a statement about me. I did not say that consciousness was a "non-material substance," and I did not say, as it appears further up above, that there would be an endless "chain-reaction." If you want to criticize what I say, then quote me directly and make your criticism, rather than criticizing words I did not say.

Second, consciousness is non-material, though I would never say it was a substance. If you think otherwise, then justify it with an argument, not some vague analogy to Descartes.

Third, instead of accusing me of "pure Cartesian dualism," please quote what I said that gave you such an impression. At least that way others can separate what, in fact, I said, from your misinterpretation of it. It will also afford me an opportunity to identify the error in your thinking, rather than guessing as to what triggered your straw man statement.

What I said, Mr. Speicher, was that the defining characteristic of consiousness (animal as well as human), is that the actions of the entity in question are NOT merely "clockwork" responses to external stimuli.    Rather, the entity is itself INITIATING the action.  (remember "self-generated, self-sustaining action?)

First, you never said in your previous post what you say here. Your backpedalling notwithstanding, I challenge you to show me where you said this before.

Second, the "defining characteristic of consciousness" is awareness -- cognition of reality -- not what you claim.

Third, "self-generated, self-sustaining" refers to the process of life, everything from a cell to a plant, not just those entities that possess consciousness.

I must say, you really do not understand these ideas at all, which makes your pretentious remarks to TommyEdison even more obscence

And thanks for advising me to read Rand. (even though she never actually discusses how a Cartesian, "clockwork universe" such as you described COULD give rise to consious entities.  She just seems to assume that consiousness is possible -- and to ascribe moral significance to actions as a result.)

It is no wonder that you reference Kelley rather than Ayn Rand. As my wife is fond of saying, in the long run you get the kind of friends and enemies that you deserve.

[stephen_speicher]

Thank you, Mr. Speicher

You're welcome.,

I am not denying the existence of free will.

I realize that.

What I am basically trying to understand is whether consciousness can be explained by deterministic physics or whether it is an irreducible primary(a concept rather difficult to digest).

What about "existence" as an irreducible primary. Do you also find that notion difficult to grasp? The two are similar, in the sense that "existence" is directly accessible to you through extrospection, and "consciousness" is directly accessible to you through introspection. Granted that existence is the wider concept, embracing consciousness, but neither can be reduced to anything more fundamental. Consciousness is unlike anything else that exists; it is different in kind than matter. Even the terminology of our thoughts indicates this. We can speak of a bold idea, or an ingenious notion, etc., but we cannot apply such concepts to physical existents. Consciousness depends upon the brain for its existence, yet it is different in kind from the matter of which the brain is composed.

Because if consciousnes is an irreducible primary, then why is it only limited to the human brain? It should be present to some degree in each and every particle.

I tried to explain this in my previous post, and I do not know of other ways to say the same thing. Perhaps you need to chew on this for a while.

Please correct me if I am wrong but I think that this was the argument voiced by two physicists to explain Schroedinger's Cat?

I am not familiar with that argument. Can you give me a reference for this?

[tommyedison]

I am not familiar with that argument. Can you give me a reference for this?

I sincerely apologize, I think I misinterpreted the "consciousness" argument. I think it was Shwinger who put it.

[source]

At some earlier point I started a discussion about whether or not it is possible to program consciousness into a computer. It was a question based on an error. I have not identified what the error is as of yet, but my recent studies of Objectivism have made it possible for me to state my confusion more clearly. I must say, however, that although I am endeavoring into it, I may not be able to articulate the problem with absolute precision. That is the very essence of an error in understanding something – you don't know what it is, but you know something is wrong. Let me elaborate.

From the three axioms of Objectivism I can come to a conclusion that consciousness is metaphysically given. This conclusion is simply drawn from the fact that consciousness has identity, after which an application of existence being identity it is a simple matter to draw the former conclusion. There is a reason why I come to this conclusion in this manner and it is not because I am unable to grasp my consciousness as a concrete. The reason will become evident as I explain my problem.

The first step in stating my problem is to say what it is about.

When a man is conscious, he is faced with the primary choice – to focus or not. Peikoff says:

[When a course of thought or action is "free"], the difference [between the possible courses] is made by the individual's decision, which did not have to be what it is, i.e., which could have been otherwise.

Now I want to stop here and ask if it is legitimate to ask "why?" If the answer to that is yes, then it is legitimate also to ask further. After an individual has made his choice, my question is – why did he make that choice? As the simplest of examples in regard to choices – why did someone choose to focus; or why did he choose not to focus?

I'm sure that people here can provide many reasons for why they focus. My questions further go thus: do those reasons imply that our choice was somehow predetermined? Is it possible that our experiences in the past have indeed determined that a specific impulse in our brain will at this point, after having been affected by the memories of our experiences, determine what our choice will be?

This, as is clear, contradicts the Objectivist definition of choice. Choice is an act of volition, of free will. Yet my questions imply that choice is predetermined and that in fact volition and free will are illusions.

Peikoff states:

If man's consciousness were automatic, if it did react deterministically to outer or inner forces acting upon it, then, by definition, a man would have no choice in regard to his mental content; he would accept whatever he had to accept, whatever ideas the determining forces engendered in him. In such a case, one could not prescribe methods to guide a man's thought or ask him to justify his ideas; the subject of epistemology would be inapplicable. One cannot ask a person to alter or justify the mentally inescapable, any more than, in physical terms, one can ask him to alter or justify his patellar reflex. In regard to the involuntary, there is no alternative but to submit – to do what one must, whatever it is.

In this paragraph I'm challenging this. If, as I previously stated, volition was an illusion, then any discussion about the voluntary or the involuntary is superfluous. However, if we were really deterministic automatons and our actions were predetermined by our experiences, then so would our thoughts. So, why wouldn't we, as such, discuss the issues of volition? Moreover, why wouldn't we be able to "justify our ideas?" Wouldn't that be exactly the scenario in which justification was possible? There would be some very specific reasons why our present state of mind would be as it would be. And note that, in the case of our minds being deterministic and our choices determined, the present state of our minds would be determined by the experiences we have in our lives – and those experiences would be determined by whatever other millions of people were doing and whatever natural occurrence had taken place. Add to that the fact that all humans are mortal and you get a reason strong enough to begin your definition of morality.

Why? Because if our actions are predetermined by our experiences, then it is the experiences which we must change, or avoid, or learn to understand in a specific frame of mind, so that our deterministic selves would, based on their past experiences, accept some ideas and others not.

Why am I saying all this?

I'll return back to my original confusion. My thread of thoughts, at this point, goes thus: If it is true that man's choices and actions are both free and caused, then, obviously, I know what the causes might be. However, when it comes to "free," my question is free from what? As you may have noticed, my questions are focused around the physical aspect of the brain, so my next question is: What really happens in our brain when we make a choice? Is it just a normal progression of stimuli of the nervous cells as usual, or do we have, by our ability to choose, also the ability to extinguish these stimuli or make them appear out of nowhere, by sheer thought? Or is there an alternative I do not see?

If a choice is a normal progression of stimuli in our neural pathways, then my conclusion is that we are quite deterministic. However, if a choice isn't determined by these stimuli occurring according to natural laws, then we indeed do have free will, but in that case it is detached from reality because it fails to comply with its laws. It suddenly loses identity and according to the axioms of Objectivism, what hasn't the identity cannot exist. And if volition doesn't exist, then neither does consciousness, which is an axiom (and volition, according to OPAR, p.69 is axiomatic, i.e. improvable; essence of all proof). I am therefore in a contradiction and must check my premises.

When I do check my premises, however, do I indeed come to a conclusion that we are deterministic? Let me first examine this issue and then address my final point. As I (personally) have no other means to identify my problem and am unable to understand the nature of contradiction I am in, I disprove the deterministic theory by introspection.

I can close my eyes and sit in silence and realize how aware I am of my self and of my existence. I can feel the pressure of the chair against my body; I can feel the warmth around me. And then I think about how this happens. I assume we all know the story about our nerves transmitting data to our brain, so I'm just going to skip it. Of interest to me here is "what" is being transmitted. It must be some kind of data, I imagine, which the brain receives and determines whether or not a certain stimuli is too intense so that I can move away or cover my ears or whatever. However, what is beyond my ability to comprehend is why I "feel" the chair pressing against my back. If you noticed, the same thing happens when I push a button on a computer – certain electrical impulse is sent to the central processor, is being processed and something happens then. But the computer doesn't "feel" me pushing the button. It is a deterministic thing that happens in such a case. The computer doesn't care if I pull the plug on it while it's switched on, because it simply doesn't "feel" the electricity flowing through it. It is not aware of it. Human being is. Unlike the computer, when someone touches my skin, I can feel it; not just process it, but feel it. A deterministic machine isn't capable of that.

As you can see, by such introspection, I am arriving at a contradiction on another side. Whichever stand I take, I have no way of proving it beyond doubt to myself. And if I should enter a debate with a proponent of determinism, on basis of what can I refute his claim that we are indeed deterministic automatons? On the basis of the fact that I can feel the pressure against my skin other than just analyze it and return an instruction back based on the analysis (as a computer does)? He could easily finish me off then by uttering a claim that in that case a computer too feels when a button upon it is pushed, only it has no other way to respond but to display what was pushed on a screen, or some such thing. A similar claim, just about cameras was already mentioned on the board by LadyAttis in her reply to Stephen Speicher by saying:

Cameras are aware, they can even take your picture with the proper stimulus[you pressing its shutter button].

And now for the final point I wish to make. It now becomes clear why I've had to determine that consciousness is metaphysically given not from introspection but from axioms as they are given by Ayn Rand. I have established from introspection that consciousness, at least my consciousness, exists. The axiom of consciousness was obviously derived from that insight, and since this insight was made by someone other than me, I am correct in thinking that other consciousnesses exist as well and that you are the conscious ones. ( ) Since you are conscious, then I am correct in assuming that you may have the key to resolving my dilemma. As I've demonstrated, I am currently drowning in the waters of determinism which claims that everything I do is the consequence which are beyond my comprehension, and at the same time I'm faced with the fact that this philosophy (determinism) is not consistent with the fact that I have in fact established that I am conscious and that consciousness does exist and that it implies volition. On the other hands, I am choking in the waters of mysticism when I say that if volition exists then it is outside existence, that a consciousness is some undetermined entity. This is only one step from saying that our souls are trapped in our bodies and that when we die they are released and everything else that goes with it.

I'm faced with barking contradictions. I see them, but I can't resolve them. Peikoff's explanation I quoted isn't enough for me. I've explained why. I'm sure, however, that there is a missing link somewhere and I'm just not seeing it. There must be an alternative that I just can't identify. There's something I'm overlooking or I'm looking at something the wrong way.

Note that I'm coming to these contradictions because I have reduced choice to the level of physical brain and impulses that travel through its neural pathways. I've done so because Peikoff states:

…a man must work to integrate a new idea. Since a conceptual consciousness is an integrating mechanism, it demands the integration of all its contents.

One step at a time, a man must relate a new item to his previous ideas. To the extent of his knowledge, he must search for aspects, presuppositions, implications, applications of the new idea that bear on his previous views (in any field); and he must identify explicitly the logical relationships he discovers. If he finds a contradiction anywhere, he must eliminate it. Judging on the basis of the available evidence, he must either amend his former views or reject the new claim.

[Bowzer]

I think your problem is that you are dealing with floating abstractions. There is very little to no concretization in your post so it it is only right for you to be disturbed by your thinking on this issue.

My advice would be to study consciousness from the perspective of a good biology/neurobiology textbook. Gather for yourself abundant examples of conscious, living organisms—their structure and the biological functions that consciousness serves for them. Remember that it is not only man that is conscious, that the faculty we possess shares the same fundamental characteristics found in other conscious organisms. Many people would benefit from an inductive approach to the topic of consciousness. The problems that you seem to be having should be rectified by this approach.

I would also very highly recommend Dr. Binswanger’s recent lecture, The Metaphysics of Consciousness. In this lecture he discusses the fundamental nature of consciousness including its biological context and the disastrous AI perspective that seems so popular on this forum. This lecture is required listening if you ask me.

[Brian Faulkner]

Source, you are doing nothing wrong; you are totally determined; you will never be blamed for anything; now go to sleep.

[RichardParker]

I haven't listened to Dr. Binswanger's tapes on The Metaphysics of Consciousness yet, but I do recall him providing a very basic analogy on HBL a few years ago that helped me grasp on a very basic level the distinction between the material source of consciousness (the brain with its extremely complex systems of neuronal pathways) and consciousness itself.

From memory, the analogy was that of an electrical current [neuronal currents] passing through a copper wire [the neuron] which then produces an electromagnetic field [consciousness]. The properties of an electromagnetic field [consciousness] are not the same as the current traveling through a copper wire [the brain].

Dr. Binswanger's basic analogy (for me) was very helpful in changing my own conceptualization of consciousness. I'm sure there are many more goodies in his tapes on this subject.

I can recommend a textbook on neurophysiology: "Principles of Neural Science" by Kandel and Schwartz. I have the second edition, but there is probably a newer edition out.

As far as the determinism vs. free will debate I'm confident that this issue has been settled (philosophically), but its something I can't discuss on this forum right now.

[JoshJaffe]

I haven't listened to Dr. Binswanger's tapes on The Metaphysics of Consciousness yet, but I do recall him providing a very basic analogy on HBL a few years ago that helped me grasp on a very basic level the distinction between the material source of consciousness (the brain with its extremely complex systems of neuronal pathways) and consciousness itself. 

I have listened to the first lecture in this series, and I find it very challenging. In the first lecture Dr. Binswanger presents 6 points about consciousness. These points are clear, and I emphatically agree with them. However he also draws some conclusions from them that I think are problematic or incorrect. Specifically he establishes that consciousness and the brain are metaphysically two different things. I agree with this. Consciousness is obviously also efficatious. But I think a problem arises when HB dedeuces then that the mind has its own form of energy, and that scientists may some day discover a new force corresponding to the action of consciousness. I think with these generalizations he crosses the line from metaphysics (philosophy) into physics (the study of matter and energy). I think that causation is the relevant concept in philosophy and metaphysics, but that force is a concept in science. I think that if he is going to address the subject from the sphere of science, the burden of proof would be on him to show that the enrgy / force is not one that has already been discovered.

Can one who has listened to the lecture series clarify these points?

(edit: ) perhaps we could start another thread on this topic. Would anyone be interested in forming a study group and working through MoC with me?

-- Josh

[RichardParker]

Can one who has listened to the lecture series clarify these points? 

(edit: ) perhaps we could start another thread on this topic.  Would anyone be interested in forming a study group and working through MoC with me?

I'd be interested in this type of study group, but in all honesty, I don't think I'll have the time untill sometime January 2005. Also, I'd have to order the tapes from the AR bookstore, which could also take a few weeks.

[AisA]

Source, the law of causality does not say that everything which exists must have a cause. It does not declare that everything which exists is an "effect" requiring a corresponding "cause".

It says only that the actions of an entity are determined by the nature of the entity.

It is, therefore, a non sequitur to state that since consciousness exists, it must have a cause, i.e. it must be determined.

We can say that since consciousness exists, its action must be determined by the nature of the entity involved -- and indeed it is. The identity of the human brain – the particular arrangement of neurons, synapses, chemicals, blood vessels, etc. – gives rise to the phenomena of volitional consciousness. It arises within a narrow range of biological conditions. If a man's blood pressure falls below a certain threshold, or he suffers a blow on the head, or any one of numerous other conditions change, consciousness is lost. So, clearly it is rooted in man's biology, there is nothing mystical about it.

The fact that we cannot at the moment describe the biochemical and biophysical mechanics of how consciousness arises does not alter the fact that it exists.

Nor does is justify the leap to saying that our consciousness is determined.

Determinism, claim its advocates, results in the illusion of volition, an illusion so perfect that one can never detect the deterministic influences on one's mind. This assertion is arbitrary, in the sense that by its nature it is outside the realm of proof; it can never be evaluated as true or false.

If volition is a perfect illusion, then by definition one will never be able to find evidence that it is indeed an illusion. If volition is not an illusion, there will be no facts or evidence to prove it, since the absence of something -- in this case, deterministic influences -- will never give rise to any facts or evidence.

So, the happy news is that that which is overwhelmingly self-evident to us all -- namely, that we are conscious and possess free will -- is entirely consistent with the laws of identity and causality, and all deterministic theories to the contrary may be dismissed.

[stephen_speicher]

Why am I saying all this?

Excellent question.

Note that I'm coming to these contradictions because I have reduced choice to the level of physical brain and impulses that travel through its neural pathways.

Conscious processes cannot be reduced to neural processes. No more contradictions, then.

[stephen_speicher]

I can recommend a textbook on neurophysiology: "Principles of Neural Science" by Kandel and Schwartz.

Excellent text. And, as a somewhat more succinct alternative, I would also recommend From Neuron to Brain, John G. Nicholls, et al., Sinauer Associates, Inc., 2001.

[stephen_speicher]

I have listened to the first lecture in this series, and I find it very challenging.  In the first lecture Dr. Binswanger presents 6 points about consciousness.  These points are clear, and I emphatically agree with them.  However he also draws some conclusions from them that I think are problematic or incorrect.  Specifically he establishes that consciousness and the brain are metaphysically two different things.  I agree with this.  Consciousness is obviously also efficatious.  But I think a problem arises when HB dedeuces then that the mind has its own form of energy, and that scientists may some day discover a new force corresponding to the action of consciousness.  I think with these generalizations he crosses the line from metaphysics (philosophy) into physics (the study of matter and energy).  I think that causation is the relevant concept in philosophy and metaphysics, but that force is a concept in science.  I think that if he is going to address the subject from the sphere of science, the burden of proof would be on him to show that the enrgy / force is not one that has already been discovered.

But surely the reference to force was one of pure speculation, was it not?

Can one who has listened to the lecture series clarify these points? 

(edit: ) perhaps we could start another thread on this topic.  Would anyone be interested in forming a study group and working through MoC with me?

I do not have the time for a study group, but this is a fascinating subject, so why not bring up questions one at a time on the science forum?

[source]

Conscious processes cannot be reduced to neural processes.

What do men need brains then for?

[source]

I think your problem is that you are dealing with floating abstractions. There is very little to no concretization in your post so it it is only right for you to be disturbed by your thinking on this issue.

Thanks for the references.

[stephen_speicher]

What do men need brains then for?

To fill up their otherwise empty heads?

If your question was meant seriously I could certainly give a lecture on the functions of the brain and the methods and mechanisms by which those functions occur. But I suspect you have at least a basic or common sense notion of this, and I doubt if my spelling it out in detail would be helpful to you. So, if you have a specific and meaningful question in regard to consciousness and the brain, feel free to ask.

[source]

What do men need brains then for?

To fill up their otherwise empty heads?

If your question was meant seriously I could certainly give a lecture on the functions of the brain and the methods and mechanisms by which those functions occur. But I suspect you have at least a basic or common sense notion of this, and I doubt if my spelling it out in detail would be helpful to you. So, if you have a specific and meaningful question in regard to consciousness and the brain, feel free to ask.

My knowledge of neurology is quite limited. I know, for example, how impulses are transmitted through nerves, I studied reflexes and drug effects on the nervous system. That's about all I know and I admit, I need to do some brushing up.

My question was meant seriously, but in the context of your claim. You said that "Conscious processes cannot be reduced to neural processes." If that is so, then there is no need for me to know what the neural processes are in order to understand conscious processes. My question was about making a choice. That too is, and correct me if I'm wrong, a conscious process. If your claim is correct, then nothing has to happen in my brain when I make a choice (say a choice to focus).

I'm preparing a post in reply to AisA in which I'll explain some of my current thoughts. Right now I don't have the time.

[stephen_speicher]

My question was meant seriously, but in the context of your claim. You said that "Conscious processes cannot be reduced to neural processes." If that is so, then there is no need for me to know what the neural processes are in order to understand conscious processes. My question was about making a choice. That too is, and correct me if I'm wrong, a conscious process. If your claim is correct, then nothing has to happen in my brain when I make a choice (say a choice to focus).

One can properly say that neural processess accompany conscious processes, but that is entirely different from saying that the latter can be reduced to the former. Clearly conscious processess are different in kind from the functioning of the brain; can you show me a neuron that is proud? Our thoughts can be clear or confused, abstract or concrete, none of which applies to the matter of the brain. That the brain gives rise to consciousness is an indisputable fact, but that does not mean that consciousness can be reduced to the neuronal processes of the brain. And further, in regard to the "choice to focus" -- the primary choice -- it cannot be explained by anything more fundamental than itself.

[BurgessLau]

[...] That the brain gives rise to consciousness is an indisputable fact, but that does not mean that consciousness can be reduced to the neuronal processes of the brain.[...]

I am wrestling with the idea of reduction. Here is my understanding, for correction.

In the context of discussing the epistemological concept of objectivity, Dr. Peikoff, OPAR, p. 133, defines reduction as "the process of identifying in logical sequence the intermediate steps that relate a cognitive item to perceptual data."

Reducing the concept of consciousness would lead back to introspection of the fact of consciousness -- rather than to physical sense-perception of an exposed brain or (microscopically) of individual neurons. That is, the beginning of the cognitive chain that leads to the concept of consciousness is consciousness itself, which we know through introspection (which is mental "sense-perception").

My concern is this: Might "reduction" refer to two things -- one metaphysical and one epistemological -- and would therefore be ambiguous unless specified or implied by the context?

In other words, would "reducing consciousness" refer to tracing back the concept of consciousness or would it refer to an attempt to find the "cause" of consciousness in particular aspects of a brain?

The fallacy of reductionism -- believing that everything can be "reduced" to its underlying or component parts -- is the latter usage of the term reduction. Correct?

[stephen_speicher]

... My concern is this: Does "reduction" refer to two things -- one metaphysical and one epistemological -- and is therefore ambiguous unless specified?...

Yes, "reduction," like many other words, has more than one meaning, but its meaning is not necessarily "ambiguous unless specified." As with other words that have more than one meaning, we often, quite easily and naturally, tell the difference by the context in which the word is used. The context here is biology, not epistemology. The epistemological context of reduction is the process of reducing a concept to its perceptual roots. The biological context of reduction is the process of reducing life to the biochemical processes from whence it comes.

The real problem with the biological reductionist arises with the issue of consciousness, at least for those reductionists who even acknowledge the existence of consciousness. Life -- nonconscious life -- is reducible to a set of biochemical processes, but consciousness is not reducible to the neural processes of the brain. The reductionist does not recognize that consciousness operates under fundamentally different causal principles than the deterministic matter of the brain. Volition is an attribute of consciousness, not an attribute of the brain. Concepts reside in consciousness, not in the neuronal activity of the brain. The basic fact which is ignored by the reductionist is that the mental states of consciousness are different existents than the neurophysical states of the brain. Both consciousness and the brain exist, and the former is dependent for its existence on the latter, but neither is reducible to the other.

[JoshJaffe]

I do not have the time for a study group, but this is a fascinating subject, so why not bring up questions one at a time on the science forum?

I've started transcribing parts of this lecture, and plan to begin a new thread in the Metaphysics and Epistemology forum. In this I'll try to lay out some specific points in metaphysics that I think will be most relevant. I will start the thread under Metaphysics rather than science, because I think the root of the issue is there. (I think HB may well have been speculating about science, but I think there is an ambiguity in his statements about metaphysics that lead to this.)

(I'm pre-announcing the new thread in this thread, just so you know I haven't vanished. )

-- Josh

[stephen_speicher]

I've started transcribing parts of this lecture, and plan to begin a new thread in the Metaphysics and Epistemology forum.  In this I'll try to lay out some specific points in metaphysics that I think will be most relevant.

Okay. But I hope you present this in bite-sized pieces rather than a huge whole.

[source]

It is, therefore, a non sequitur to state that since consciousness exists, it must have a cause, i.e. it must be determined.

I didn't say that. I said that choice has a cause.

I can understand that certain things don't have a cause. The three things I can think of, which don't have a cause are: existence, consciousness, and identity.

We can say that since consciousness exists, its action must be determined by the nature of the entity involved -- and indeed it is.  The identity of the human brain – the particular arrangement of neurons, synapses, chemicals, blood vessels, etc. – gives rise to the phenomena of volitional consciousness.  It arises within a narrow range of biological conditions.  If a man's blood pressure falls below a certain threshold, or he suffers a blow on the head, or any one of numerous other conditions change, consciousness is lost.  So, clearly it is rooted in man's biology, there is nothing mystical about it.

What you claim is therefore, that consciousness is the result of the way our organs interact under certain conditions, right? If so, then consciousness is an emergent property of the system that is man's body. (I've taken the concept of "emergent property" from "The Art of Systems Thinking" by Joseph O'Connor and Ian McDermott, but I don't have the book with me to quote the exact definition. From my recollection then, an emergent property of a system is a property which none of the parts of that system posess, but is demonstrated by that system, and is a result of the way parts of that system interact. According to the authors, we can't know what the emergent property of the system will be, unless we get it running and place it in a proper context - for example, we should place a car on the road and not in the orbit.) Thus, as you say, we can say that consciousness has a cause, but it only shows up as an emergent property of the system of a human body when it is functioning - and it can function within certain parameters. And so we are conscious. Am I correct on this?

But, as I said, my question is about making choices. A choice as I see it (and as I described it) is a really weird "phenomenon" (if I can use this word here). Human makes choices based on his values, his desires, yet he himself chooses these values. Based on what are those chosen? We'll ultimately get down to the primary choice - the choice to focus. It is again man who has to make that choice. What will he choose? To focus or not to focus? Not many people I know personally know that they have this primary choice to make, let alone what it means. Who chooses for them? Do they ever get focused then? I know many successful people who have never heard of the choice to focus. They usually say that whatever they do is out of the "sense of duty" they have towards others. No matter what they call it, they had to make a choice at one point to focus and then to direct that focus to their studies and then their work. So, they made the choice even if they didn't know that. And here is this what seems to be a causeless nature of choice; a choice to focus made by default, even though the default is no focus. If making a choice is a conscious process, then who was it that made their choice? Which consciousness? What "force" made them think and learn and work? Who invested that energy which is required every time one makes a choice to focus?

I just thought about what I am trying to understand. I have come, as I see it, somewhat closer to my understanding of this. Please evaluate my thoughts.

Let me begin like this: I can look at something, say a blackboard, and there is something written on it. I can look at it, but not know what is written there - because I didn't read it. My eyes may have been even focused at the words, but I just never started reading - because I didn't focus my mind at the task. The nerves in the eyes are being stimulated, and they transmit signals to the brain, but those signals just aren't being processed by the brain's higher functions. Then suddenly I can focus and from the state of blank stare, I can switch into the state of alertness and I read the word(s) and I understand it.

In much the same way, I think, do our memories work. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I recall that a short term memory consists of a signal that constantly circles certain neural pathways until it diminishes, or it is possible for it to cause a chemical reaction in the brain and thus become a long-term memory. Memories, thus, like optical nerves always stimulate our brain, only we consciously have the ability to focus on them only when we need them (just like one would have to focus one's mind and "decode" the stimuli that is arriving through optical nerves). Our choices, therefore, will be based on the things we are focused on. Happily, the choices are made within a certain context, so we don't need to be focused at all the knowledge we posess to make the right choice about something - only that which fits the context.

Let me give an example.

I have a choice to make. I can go to the movies or I can go home and study for the exam that's taking place in say 6 days. Let's say that at first I'm only focused at the fact that it's 6 days until the exam. That's a long time and taking away 2 or 3 hours for going to the cinema won't hurt. The choice then is to go to the cinema. In the second case, I also focus on the fact that I have barely studied for the exam and that I could use these 3 hours very good by studying. So I think "yeah, I could study, but I'm too lazy to do it." So I choose to go to the cinema. In the third case, I also bring up the issue of my values - is passing the exam important to me and why? If I answer yes (supposing I have the reason), then I choose to go home and study. If I answer no then I go to the cinema.

So, indeed, the choices we make depend on all the things we keep in focus at the time we make the choice. Am I right?

Consciousness is conscious of something. In the above example I become conscious of more and more things as I go. Things I can be conscious of are not only physical objects; they are also my emotions, my memories and my thoughts. And the choice I'm making about the test in the above example depends on which of these I'm holding in focus. So it is "determined" so to speak by these. So, my confusion about the choices is almost gone, if my thinking is correct. The only thing in that case that remains to be explained is - how do we choose to focus? How do we choose what to direct that focus to? Peikoff often says in OPAR that focusing is like "throwing the switch," or starting the engine of the car. I can understand this analogy now. But the thing is that it is I who has to make the choice - and my question is: How can I make a choice if there is nothing I am currently focused on? How is it that my unfocused mind is able to even grasp that there is a choice to make, let alone make it? In the analogies, it is always the third party (man) who "throws the switch." Yet when I talk about consciousness, it seems as if the motor is supposed to start itself (to further the analogy). How is that possible?

I hope someone will be able to explain this to me.

[source]

I've written the above post a few days ago and I didn't have the chance to post it until now. I just copied it and pasted it as it was written.

Anyway, Stephen

You say that the choice to focus cannot be explained by anything more fundamental than itself. That would mean that it is axiomatic. If that is so, am I correct if I say that "focus" is what "consciousness" is? Is focus consciousness? And is consciousness really an emergent property (see above post for definition) of the system of human physical body when its parts interact?

I would find that a plausible explanation because it doesn't contradict anything else I know. Focus, then, like consciousness is without cause, and my question from my previous post is answered. If this is correct, then that completes my "quest" to understand the axiom of consciousness, and the reduction of the concept of "choice" to concretes.

[AisA]

I don't mean to sound dismissive, source, but the explanation is simple: you possess volition, it is an attribute of your (human) consciousness and it is that which makes it possible for you to "throw your own switch" -- or, alternatively, to remain switched off and out of focus.

It is invalid to ask, "Why did I choose to focus?", because that choice is the primary, first choice -- it is not determined by any antecedent factors. Until you make that choice to focus, your mind is not operating at a conceptual level and thus cannot be influenced by any reasons or “causes”.

Yes, volition is axiomatic. The concepts of proof and validation presuppose a volitional consciousness. If your consciousness functioned automatically, and not by choice, then you would have no control over its content and validation would be both irrelevant and impossible. It is only the fact that your consciousness is volitional that necessitates and makes possible the concept of validation.

To which we can add the fact that volition is self-evident in any act of introspection.