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On the question of free-will vs. determinism

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You say that the choice to focus cannot be explained by anything more fundamental than itself. That would mean that it is axiomatic. If that is so, am I correct if I say that "focus" is what "consciousness" is? Is focus consciousness?

"Focus" is the primary act of volition, and volition is an attribute of consciousness, so what you say is not correct.

And is consciousness really an emergent property (see above post for definition) of the system of human physical body when its parts interact?
As I have stated in other posts on this forum, I am not a big fan of using the notion of an "emergent property" in regard to consciousness. In a way it makes sense -- the brain does give rise to cosnciousness -- but ultimately the notion does not explain anything about consciousness.

I would find that a plausible explanation because it doesn't contradict anything else I know. Focus, then, like consciousness is without cause, and my question from my previous post is answered. If this is correct, then that completes my "quest" to understand the axiom of consciousness, and the reduction of the concept of "choice" to concretes.

I think your whole approach is too rationalistic and consequently will not help you to really understand. (And, ultimately, as Peikoff explains in OPAR, even the primary choice itself is caused, properly understood.)

Edit: I ended too abruptly. I meant to say that you really should read Chapter 2 of OPAR very carefully.

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"Focus" is the primary act of volition, and volition is an attribute of consciousness, so what you say is not correct.

The bottom line is - consciousness is uncaused (or at least an emergent property in which case its cause is in the interaction of the systems in a human body, in which case it is the question for neurology, not for philosophy), and so is volition. And volition "causes" focus.

As I have stated in other posts on this forum, I am not a big fan of using the notion of an "emergent property" in regard to consciousness. In a way it makes sense -- the brain does give rise to cosnciousness -- but ultimately the notion does not explain anything about consciousness.

Perhaps it doesn't, but it does show that consciousness can be regarded as a concrete, not as a concept. For example, you can say that movement can be regarded as a concrete, because it is (in a context of moving your extremities, for example) the emergent property of the system that is your body. Your leg doesn't move because its parts can move by themselves; in fact, they can't. Yet your leg, as a sytem can move. And when you see a leg moving, you can say "This is movement." By introspection, you can say - "this is consciousness", even though it is only an emergent property. The fact itself that it IS, as you say doesn't tell you anything about it, but it justifies your looking at it as a concrete. With a little Objectivism, you also learn that it is an axiom, i.e. undeniable basis for proof.

I think your whole approach is too rationalistic and consequently will not help you to really understand. (And, ultimately, as Peikoff explains in OPAR, even the primary choice itself is caused, properly understood.)

Edit: I ended too abruptly. I meant to say that you really should read Chapter 2 of OPAR very carefully.

I read Chapter 2, but I'll re-read it. I remember Peikoff mentioning the choice to focus being caused, but I only vaguely remember how or why.

Anyway, you say that I am too rationalistic. I, however, try to find rational explanations for all this. Since OPAR, even though brilliantly written, leaves much space for my thread of thoughts wandering off into rationalism, I've asked my question here, so that those who wish, can tell me when and in what way I am being rationalistic.

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Anyway, you say that I am too rationalistic. I, however, try to find rational explanations for all this. Since OPAR, even though brilliantly written, leaves much space for my thread of thoughts wandering off into rationalism, I've asked my question here, so that those who wish, can tell me when and in what way I am being rationalistic.

Source, I believe that you honestly want to understand these issues, and I applaud your independence in discovering Objectivism in such a bleak intellectual environment as is Croatia. I for one would like to help clarify issues that arise, and answer questions that you have, but frankly I find it somewhat difficult to have a sustained conversation with you. I think that part of the problem may be related to psycho-epistemology, the different way we form our knowledge and the basis upon which it is built. In general my observation is that you need to concentrate on at least two basic things: first, keep the broadest context of an issue or discussion in mind -- which will help keep your mind set to a specific purpose rather than just flitting around -- and second, restrain your tendancy towards deduction and try harder instead to focus on the facts of reality which give rise to the issues you are trying to understand.

For instance, regarding my first point of keeping context: you started this thread by establishing a context -- not understanding an error you made in the idea of programming consciousness into a computer -- but nothing that followed was integrated towards that purpose, which at least partly explains the disconnection between each of your posts in this thread.

And, regarding my second point about deduction and induction: after explaining the purpose of the thread you immediately started off with "From the three axioms of Objectivism I can come to a conclusion that consciousness is ..." Instead of deducing conclusions about consciousness from axioms or other ideas that people make -- whether they be made by Peikoff in OPAR or by myself and others on this forum -- you would fare better by directly looking at consciousness to begin with and inducing conclusions from the facts you discover, and then relate those facts and conclusions to the axioms or ideas. Or, at least, directly relate conclusions drawn by others to what you discover by looking.

You said you wanted people to tell you, so that is what I have done. Note that it would be rather difficult -- and, not appropriate -- to go into any more detail than this here on this forum, so hopefully these general comments will be helpful for you.

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Practically speaking, isn't focus often 'caused' by environmental factors, such as running into difficulties or encountering problems? In day-to-day life I may be unfocused - perhaps day-dreaming, or thinking about something not relevant to that going on around me - when some event will occur which causes me to take notice of my surroundings and start to concentrate. Perhaps I will be driving in my car, totally absorbed in either music from the radio or my own thought, with the task of driving essentially on auto-pilot. But then, when I encounter a non-standard situation, such as another driver behaving recklessly, my attention will be aroused and I will start to focus - my 'switch will be thrown' to use source's term. Or maybe I will be writing an essay - completely lost in the task and again unaware of my surroundings. But then my pencil will break, causing me to become conscious of where I am and what I'm doing, in order to resolve the problem and get back to work. Once I'm 'focused', however that came about, I am then able to make the specific choice on what to focus.

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Source, I believe that you honestly want to understand these issues, and I applaud your independence in discovering Objectivism in such a bleak intellectual environment as is Croatia. I for one would like to help clarify issues that arise, and answer questions that you have, but frankly I find it somewhat difficult to have a sustained conversation with you. I think that part of the problem may be related to psycho-epistemology, the different way we form our knowledge and the basis upon which it is built. In general my observation is that you need to concentrate on at least two basic things: first, keep the broadest context of an issue or discussion in mind -- which will help keep your mind set to a specific purpose rather than just flitting around -- and second, restrain your tendancy towards deduction and try harder instead  to focus on the facts of reality which give rise to the issues you are trying to understand.

For instance, regarding my first point of keeping context: you started this thread by establishing a context -- not understanding an error you made in the idea of programming consciousness into a computer -- but nothing that followed was integrated towards that purpose, which at least partly explains the disconnection between each of your posts in this thread.

And, regarding my second point about deduction and induction: after explaining the purpose of the thread you immediately started off with "From the three axioms of Objectivism I can come to a conclusion that consciousness is ..." Instead of deducing conclusions about consciousness from axioms or other ideas that people make -- whether they be made by Peikoff in OPAR or by myself and others on this forum -- you would fare better by directly looking at consciousness to begin with and inducing conclusions from the facts you discover, and then relate those facts and conclusions to the axioms or ideas. Or, at least, directly relate conclusions drawn by others to what you discover by looking.

You said you wanted people to tell you, so that is what I have done. Note that it would be rather difficult -- and, not appropriate -- to go into any more detail than this here on this forum, so hopefully these general comments will be helpful for you.

I understand how my posts may have been misleading on this subject. I didn't mean to start this thread in such way as to discuss why consciousness cannot be programmed into a computer. I've already made such a thread earlier and since then I realized why that was. There's no way to tell a computer to be conscious. They can be programmed to mimick man, but never to be man. If this issue was to be observed in such way - that humans are programmed, then they would have the ability to change their programming. Computers don't and can't have that ability, because they can only work within the limits of their program. Anything else is science fiction. I've known that before I started this thread. The reason I started this thread was because no matter how I looked at the problem, I always came to a contradiction - whether in terms or with reality - and I wanted that resolved, broader context and reasons notwithstanding.

I basically can't understand an issue if I don't have a general image of how it works. This thread was great for me to form such an image. I see I still have a lot to learn, but I don't think that new material will clash with the "model" I now have in mind. And for that model I needed to go to certain lengths in discussing consciousness, volition and choice. I might make a blog entry explaining this model.

My posts were written in a way they were, because I was gradually building that model and I needed an explanation on certain points. Perhaps I should have said that more clearly then.

Anyway, I'd like to thank you and AisA for the replies you posted. Given our most recent history in the other thread, it was a pleasant surprise to see that you actually took the time to reply to my post.

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Practically speaking, isn't focus often 'caused' by environmental factors, such as running into difficulties or encountering problems? In day-to-day life I may be unfocused - perhaps day-dreaming, or thinking about something not relevant to that going on around me - when some event will occur which causes me to take notice of my surroundings and start to concentrate.

Focus is a commitment to awareness, and concentration is a narrowing of one's awareness to give attention to some facts, to the exclusion of others. Those facts can be external, in the physical world, or internal, in the world of consciousness. Both of these are "environmental factors" in the sense of being objects of awareness, and consciousness would have no meaning without their existence. The selectivity of what we attend to, the content of awareness, is separate from the goal of awareness, focus, this latter referring to a method of conscious functioning. It is this regulation of the level of our awareness, the general setting of our mind to the purpose of cognition, that focus refers, and it is separate from the content of awareness, whatever the "environmental factors" involved. So, even putting "caused" in scare quotes grants too much to these "environmental factors," because the volitional aspect of focus is itself a first cause within consciousness.

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  • 2 months later...

I'm making my way through Peikoff's "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand," and I have some questions about his defense of volition and rejection of materialistic determinism. He makes a few points that I disagree with, and I'm hoping someone in here can help me with this. I should add that I have absolutely no philosophical background, having taken engineering (and, soon, law) throughout university. I became interested in this in December after reading Atlas Shrugged, and have since finished Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology and the first few chapters of Piekoff's book. I know absolutely nothing about Kant, Hume, Hegel... and very, very little about Plato, Aristotle and anyone else for that matter. So, please be gentle :)

Anyways.

As of now, I do see materialistic determinism as the only alternative to some form of supernatural consciousness; I don't consider it a false dichotomy as Peikoff and Rand do.

If we conclude that consciousness is natural, then it is either material or not material. If it is material, then the identity (ie. nature) of material demands a certain application of causality -- namely, material causality, the equivalent of dominoes falling. There is no room for volition in material causality. While I do accept Peikoff's comments about it not necessarily being material, I do not think that he successfully rejects the materialistic alternative and, thus, it remains a possibility -- the most likely one, as I see it, considering there do not exist any solid arguments against determinism and he admits that there is no known alternative to it.

To support that it is material, we can look at the component breakdown of the entities comprising consciousness. Seated in the brain, conscious responses to stimuli are measurable as electrochemical reactions. Complex evaluations such as 'love' and 'kinship' have not merely been measured, but can be artificially engendered through the use of physical substances (MDMA, for one). How can a specifically material cause (unrelated to the self-evident 'stuff' of consciousness, ie. cognition) influence consciousness so dramatically if consciousness is not material?

Piekoff's rejection of determinism doesn't float. All of his rejections seem to paint a fairly skewed view of determinism; he doesn't seem to agree that ideas (ideas inescapably arrived at by dint of determinism, or heard from others who inescapably concluded them) can themselves act as inescapable causes to further ideas. Every choice -- including the base choice to focus -- can certainly be determined if once considers all possible causes, including antecedent ideas. A baby may inescapably observe (in inescapably moving from the sensational to perceptual level of consciousness) that it is through focus that he attains those things he needs, such as food or attention to relieve pain, and will in turn develop that 'choice' to focus as a determined outcome of all stimuli in any given situation throughout the rest of his life.

Even the defense of volition being axiomatic (and, thus, undeniable) is false. I may be determined to type these words in defense of determinism, but that in no way invalidates that defense; volition is certainly not a necessary component of validation. Assuming determinism, then logical people have deterministically arrived at a value of logic, and will inescapably accept or reject an argument based on their inescapable evaluation of its logical cohesiveness. Others, trying to convince those people of something, will deterministically arrive at valuing making arguments palatable to those people -- they will inescapably seek to validate their arguments. Validation is relevant in the absence of true volition if one sees the deterministic cause of validation as being 'valuing convincing others' and the deterministic effect of validation as 'logical people accepting a logical argument.' Each of those causes and effects are likewise caused by antecedent ideas, and so the chain of materialistic causality is intact.

So, either the logic stands up or it doesn't; your deterministic consciousness may or may not be inescapably equipped to value logic or not, to understand my logic or not. I am the same way -- a determined rebuttal to this thread may hold up to the logic I inescapably value, and will serve as an inescapable cause to whether I accept or reject determinism (though, obviously, if I reject it, then we can put all this aside). The idea that the nature of my conscious can be used to invalidate an argument about the nature of conciousness is employing primacy of consciousness. That nature of consciousness either exists or it doesn't; it is a component of existence. Arguing that my means of consciousness necessarily impinges on that fact is arguing that consciousness impinges on existence.

I'm not primarily supporting materialistic determinism here, as much as rejecting Piekoff's rejection of it. Can anyone offer further support to his arguments that might shed light on my own confusion?

Incidentally, I do not believe that materialistic determinism has any fundamental impact on Objectivism. The self-evident fact of consciousness is clear, whatever its nature. Even if 'choice' does not truly exist, the value of that knowledge is only attainable outside of consciousness; ie. through non-consciousness. To put it another way, choice has value as it relates to self. If choice is determined, then self is determined, but the relationship between the two remains the same -- the value remains the same. Devaluing determined choice necessarily requires one do it from the perspective of an undetermined self (as in, your determined choices are imprisoning your undetermined self), but such a self would not exist; it would be a zero.

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If we conclude that consciousness is natural, then it is either material or not material. If it is material, then the identity (ie. nature) of material demands a certain application of causality -- namely, material causality, the equivalent of dominoes falling. There is no room for volition in material causality. While I do accept Peikoff's comments about it not necessarily being material, I do not think that he successfully rejects the materialistic alternative and, thus, it remains a possibility -- the most likely one, as I see it, considering there do not exist any solid arguments against determinism and he admits that there is no known alternative to it.

The fact of volition is all that is required to refute the whole of deterministic theory. Volition is axiomatic; it can be identified only ostensively, through introspection, it cannot be further broken down. It can only be validated, not proved. One contradiction and the entire theory collapses.

Are you saying you know so much about the nature of matter that you can definitively declare that no such thing as volition could exist? It does. It is obvious. Any attempt to deny it must first accept it as a fact.

Causality does not contradict volition; it is a requirement for it. I fully expect, some time in the future, for the mechanisms of volition to be understood; what parts of the brain are thrown into gear, how they function, etc. There will be no explanation of why some people choose to throw these functions into gear and some do not; that is the fundamental choice, after all.

There is a known "alternative" to determinism . . . Objectivism. Or, I suppose you could go with one of the varying supernatural theories. I suggest Objectivism. :)

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I disagree that volition is axiomatic, for two reasons.

It Is Deniable:

I outlined a hypothetical denial of it in my first post, and do not agree that such denial requires an acceptance of volition. Let me compare a deterministic consciousness to a complex computer to illustrate how validation does not require volition:

A properly programmed computer (a deterministic consciousness that has adopted a logical epistemology) can interpret and understand a mathematical formula (can interpret and understand a logical argument), and using the rules of mathematics (and using the rules of logic) can validate this formula as true or false (can validate this argument as true or false).

A computer is not capable of volition, yet is capable of validation. Volition is not a necessary condition for validation; saying otherwise is employing primacy of consciousness, since volition depends on consciousness and validation depends on existence.

It Is Not Self-Evident:

To be perceptually self-evident, there must exist no possible alternative to what is evident to our perception. But there does exist a possible alternative to volition: That we are deterministic, and the fallible nature of our means of perception has inescapably caused us to conclude that we are volitional.

Are you saying you know so much about the nature of matter that you can definitively declare that no such thing as volition could exist?

Absolutely. Objectivism does, after all, in its definition of the "metaphysically given," or metaphysical absolutes. Objectivism claims that only things related to volition 'could have been something else;' everything else can only be as it is. Objectivism, with omniscience, eliminates the possibility of volition in anything that isn't conscious -- in effect, it claims to know so much about the nature of existence that it can definitively declare that no such thing as volition can exist... except in the human mind.

To use your own words, "are you saying you know so much about the nature of consciousness that you can definitively declare that no such thing as the illusion of volition could exist?"

There is no way that material things 'could be something else,' right? If that is true, then a wholly volitional consciousness could not be material, and a wholly material consciousness could not be volitional.

Since you are convinced that you are totally determined you cannot be genuinely hopeful---of anything.

Firstly, I am not convinced I am totally determined; I'm unsure. I only started considering this sort of thing in December :). Please understand that I am only defending determinism here so I can learn from your refutation of it.

To continue my hypothetical defense, I disagree that I could not be genuinely hopeful with a determined consciousness. A great collaboration of countless subconscious environmental, social, ideological and physiological causes, very, very few of which I would be directly aware, would have combined in such a way as to inescapably create the effect of genuine hopefulness, itself serving as a cause of many more things -- including the "base choice" to expend effort and focus on what you're saying, as I'd be inescapably hopeful of gleaning an understanding I'd inescapably been caused to value.

Edited by The Trendy Cynic
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For knowing nothing of Kant, you make good use of him.

I think what you are arguing is compatibilism, ie, that determinism is true, yet somehow, apparently (phenomenally), volition is also true even though it really (noumenally) isn't true.

In fact, the existence of volition is unquestionable. Like a simple act of extrospection will show you the ground upon which you are standing, a simple act of introspection will show you your ability to choose.

The question must be whether determinism is true. It isn't. By the very nature of the doctrine, there cannot be evidence for it, and the assumption that it is true is arbitrary. The very nature of determinism is to project a false compatibility with every piece of evidence against it, in this case, volition. But determinism is not compatible with the evidence against it: A is A. The doctrine of compatibilism attempts to preserve the identity of determinism, which has none, by destroying the identities of all phenomena which contradict it. For example, compatibilism asserts that volition is not really volition in order to save the assumption that determinism is true. The approach is nothing other than hand-waving, putting on blinders, or willing things one doesn't like to go away.

What thoughts people think and actions people take and values people adopt are neither necessary nor determined, but under the person's conscious control. The knowledge of this fact is axiomatic, because it is self-evidence and implicit in all other knowledge. In its context, it contradicts determinism. Since determinism is a global doctrine, its contradiction in any one context disproves the doctrine entirely.

Determinism is false, as is indeterminism. It's a false dichotomy, one which rests on a fraudulently deformed law of causality. On Objectivism, the law of causality is the law of identity applied to action, ie, that a thing acts only in accordance with its identity and does not act in contradiction to its identity.

(The following is my interpretation of some points Peikoff made.) This law of causality does not necessitate determinism, since there may in fact be more ways than one in which a thing can act and all of which remain in accordance with its identity. It is true that most things act deterministically, but it is not necessary. If a thing acts deterministically, then the actions it takes will have been necessary and determined. This is, of course, the general case. Though the doctrine of determinism is false, most things act deterministically. Most things do not have the complex ability to choose among the alternative courses of action open to it, ie, in accordance with and not in contradiction to its identity. But people do have that ability, and it is called volition. (That ability is a function of the conscious, conceptual mind, again a thing which only people have. Thus, the argument that if there is that one thing which only people have and which nothing else has, might it be that you are deluded? is shown facetious, because there are many abilities such as conscious thought and conceptual thought which only people have.)

Edited by y_feldblum
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If determinism were true, then one thing would necessarily follow from another, and no choices are possible. You must do what comes next in the chain.

Only introspection, and the confidence that you actually are making choices in the face of alternatives can fix this. This is a primal, axiomatic fact that cannot be explained or convinced. You must simply "look and see" within yourself.

The approach with arguing against determinism is the same as arguing against God -- we cannot prove a negative, but we can infer it from other things we do know for certain which are positives. For example, the extistence of the concept "arbitrary", and what it is. If determinism were true, how would it explain the arbitrary? What is the purpose of the concept "motivation"? Why do we even have emotional mechanisms? All of these questions are unanswerable assuming determinism is true, just as the premise of the primacy of existence is unfathomable assuming that God exists.

If you need to ask yourself if you are really making choices, or if you are just pretending to choose, and you decide to live by that premise consistently, then you have a serious psychological defect that needs counseling by a professional.

The statement that volition is axiomatic is not the blow-off you think it is, this means serious trouble down the road. If you conclude that determinism is true and then begin living consistently on that premise, you will be dead before long. You may be able to explicitly agree with determinism and implicitly perform volitional choices anyway, but if you force yourself to stop making choices consistently, you're all but dead.

How will you get up in the morning, unless you choose to? Will some fact preceeding your arisal deterministically cause you to get up, with no choice being made on your part?

How will you decide what to have for breakfast? Will some fact of existence determine that you will eat oatmeal today, and sawdust tomorrow? Or will you choose what to eat?

I could go on, but you ought to get the point by now. Now matter how you may want to cloak it, deny it, reject it, or even try to explain it in terms of biochemical reactions, the fact remains that you are making a choice, and thus volition wins.

Errors you have made thus far that I've noticed:

The idea that the nature of your conscious can be used to invalidate an argument about the nature of conciousness is not employing primacy of consciousness. That terminology refers to consciousness having primary over existence, and in pointing you to the nature of your consciousness, no reference is made to existence other than the fact that your consciousness exists (whatever its nature), and in no way claims that consciousness creates existence. In other words; the fact of volition's existence does not grant primacy of consciousness over existence.

A computer cannot understand anything whatsoever. It is a tool, with no more capacity for comprehension than a hammer or a screwdriver. It cannot deduce or induce, either of which is pressuposed by validation (possibly both, but at least one of the two), and thus a computer cannot validate.

Edited by TomL
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Thanks to you all for your time in helping me figure this out. Please, please keep it up... I really, really want to believe that I have free will :)

I guess the problem I'm having is with this line of thought. I'll try and explicitly describe my reasoning; you try to explain where I tripped.

I start by seeking the axiomatic self-evident. When I find (or read about) what may be a self-evident axiom, I begin by trying to imagine alternatives to that axiom and seeing if they are at all possible. If they are, then the 'axiom' cannot be accepted without supporting one alternative over another.

I couldn't even imagine alternatives for existence or consciousness. For identity, I envisioned the alternatives of "no identity" (in which case it wouldn't exist), "multiple identities" (which would either be invalidated through contradiction, or combined into one identity) or "infinite identity" (in which case it must include the characteristic 'visibly impaled through my right palm at this very moment,' which nothing does, and so nothing has infinite identity). Thus, I accept all three of those primary axiomatic concepts.

For volition, however, I could imagine a possible alternative: That every choice I have is determined by subconscious causes of which I am not aware. By definition, I would be unaware of them, and so I see no way whatsoever to definitively say there aren't any -- so it is possible. My belief that I am volitional could itself be caused, and I would be unaware of this. My belief that I am determined could be caused, and I would be unaware of this. How can I know that any given thought -- including the thought that I am volitional -- isn't itself determined by antecedent factors?

To give you a sense of my attempts to reconcile this, I stared at my coffee mug and at my hand. I said to myself "I could reach for that mug now, or I could not." But then I thought: At any given moment, I either AM reaching for the mug, or I am NOT reaching for the mug. A condition of volition is 'it could have been something else,' but it only ever is one thing -- you only end up ever making one choice in any given situation. How can I be CERTAIN that that choice could have been something else? As I sit here with my hand hovering away from it, how can I be sure that it isn't other causes (including the mental deliberation I'm having) that are responsible for my hesitation? Then I extended my hand and touched the cup, and was still unsure... what if, at that exact moment, myriad subconscious cues of all kinds condensed like some super complicated (but determined) computer into the caused action of reaching out?

All of this leads inarguably to the conclusion that I cannot be certain: Volition is not perceptually self-evident.

Like a simple act of extrospection will show you the ground upon which you are standing, a simple act of introspection will show you your ability to choose.

But what if I'm trying to determine whether or not the ground upon which I am standing is real or illusory? You cannot claim that the answer to that question is perceptually self-evident, and yet you are claiming that the answer to the same question asked of volition is.

but under the person's conscious control.

But what if that conscious control is determined by subconscious biological/environmental/historical factors of which the person is unaware? In other words, what if that control is illusionary?

or willing things one doesn't like to go away.

Oh, I'd say the opposite would be true: Determinism is frickin' scary. I'd much rather be confident of my own independent volition, which is why I'm forcing myself to consider the alternative in such detail.

that a thing acts only in accordance with its identity and does not act in contradiction to its identity.

Yes, but inherent to the identity of matter is the metaphysical absolute -- that a thing cannot be something else. If consciousness is composed of matter, then its identity demands that it is determined just like everything else that's made of matter.

As I see it, we have two contradictory facts. 1) Our consciousness appears to us to be volitional. 2) Our consciousness is material and material is metaphysically absolute. A is A, and one of those facts can't be true. Objectivism seems to be holding to both, simultaneously. How? The idea that 'volition could be illusionary' is not some flippant alternative, but the only possibility if one accepts the second fact over the first.

I agree wholeheartedly that determinism isn't necessary. I fully understand (and was, in fact, blown away) by the concept that causality is identity applied to action, and that determinism would have to be inherent to an identity in order for it to apply. But my point is that nothing about consciousness implies that determinism can't be inherent to its identity, and if consciousness is wholly material, then the very nature of the metaphysically absolute seems to imply that determinism is inherent to its identity.

TomL: The basis of my confusion rests on my support of the existence of a valid alternative to true volition -- illusionary volition as a result of determinism. In that sense, all choices and definitions that seem to contradict determinism would be a result of humanity's fallacious belief in volition (ie. "arbitrary" would, in fact, be impossible, and our understanding of it would be based wholly on the illusion of volition).

And before you say anything, yes, I can certainly see how traveling down this road for too long will lead to an intimate relationship with a psychotherapist ;) An understanding that consciousness is deterministic may certainly be self-destructive and lead to nihilism, which is likely why evolution has done such a good job of tricking us into thinking otherwise.

But the fact that the consequences of accepting determinism are bad and may lead to nihilism or insanity cannot be used as evidence against determinism -- that is primacy of consciousness, replacing what is with what is wanted.

The idea that the nature of your conscious can be used to invalidate an argument about the nature of conciousness is not employing primacy of consciousness.

Validation depends exclusively on existence. The validity or invalidity of a concept would certainly exist without consciousness, because validation is merely an application of non-contradiction which is inherent to existence and identity. Yes, our awareness of that validity is dependent on consciousness, but the nature of validity is not (it is non-contradictory), and saying that determinism eliminates validation refers to the nature of validation, not our understanding of it.

If humanity evaporated tomorrow, would existence suddenly lose validity, or God gain it? Validity exists independent of consciousness. Asserting that the nature of volition (dependent entirely on consciousness) somehow affects validation (dependent entirely on existence and identity) is implying that a concept dependent on consciousness can have a real, objective effect on a concept depending on existence and identity.

Alternatively, if determinism is true and volition illusionary, our volitional awareness of validation would also be illusionary. That doesn't change the fact that some things are objectively true and some things aren't. If volition is illusionary, that would have no bearing on whether or not determinism were true, so I do not understand how a lack of volition is used as an argument against the truth of determinism.

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For volition, however, I could imagine a possible alternative: That every choice I have is determined by subconscious causes of which I am not aware.
You are aware of everything in your subconscious, but not necessarily explicitly. The subconcious is not a separate consciousness feeding you information or directing your actions, unless you are a subjectivist following whim.

Your concoction of the subconscious over which you have no awareness and no control is almost arbitrary, but not quite. When you are unfocused and lose touch with your subconscious, as is prevelant in our current culture, people will come to assert that the subconscious is either a mystical, supernatural thing over which we have no control, or that it is a myth and doesn't exist at all.

The subconscious is neither. It is programmed by your conscious mind, and gives you a lightning quick valuation of new information in the form of an emotional response. There is no mystery here, and it certainly exists. It is only mysterious to those who do not understand the role of the subconscious in epistemology.

How can I be CERTAIN that that choice could have been something else?

By accepting the axiom of volition.

All of this leads inarguably to the conclusion that I cannot be certain: Volition is not perceptually self-evident.
No one said that is was perceptually self-evident. It is introspectively self-evident.

But what if that conscious control is determined by subconscious biological/environmental/historical factors of which the person is unaware? In other words, what if that control is illusionary?

This hypothesis rests on the assumption that the subsconsious is either supernatural, non-existent, or unknowable. None of those things are true.

Yes, but inherent to the identity of matter is the metaphysical absolute -- that a thing cannot be something else. If consciousness is composed of matter, then its identity demands that it is determined just like everything else that's made of matter.
Regardless of what is learned biochemically about the mechanics of consciousness and volition in the future, there is nothing that will change with regards to metaphysics or epistemology. The fact will always remain that volition is, that it is a choice in the face of alternatives, and that only a rational process can achieve it. Knowing its mechanics no more changes the fact of it than understanding atoms and molecules, with their enormous gaps between protons, electrons, spinning particles and such -- it doesn't change the fact of solid matter being solid. Just because I know that electrons actually move around a nucleus, and there is a gap between them, doesn't negate the fact that the chair I'm sitting in is solid.

Another venerable example is boiling water. When first discovered, the definition was probably made that "Water boils at 212 degrees" which was and always will be true. Even though, later on, someone else discovered that it boils at lower temperature at higher altitude, that doesn't make the original definition false. One merely amends it to say "Water boils at 212 degrees at sea level" and so on.

We may very well learn much more about consciousness and volition, but none of it will invalidate what we know now.

As I see it, we have two contradictory facts. 1) Our consciousness appears to us to be volitional. 2) Our consciousness is material and material is metaphysically absolute.

And one of the things we know now is: there is a property of consciousness and volition which is non-material, and it is that property to which the terms refer. The bio-mechanics of how they are achieved are unneccessary in order to acknowledge, use, and understand them. The fact of existence does not equate to material existence. Emotions, states of knowledge, and cognition are examples of things which exist independent of any material form, regardless of their biomechanics.

TomL: The basis of my confusion rests on my support of the existence of a valid alternative to true volition -- illusionary volition as a result of determinism. In that sense, all choices and definitions that seem to contradict determinism would be a result of humanity's fallacious belief in volition (ie. "arbitrary" would, in fact, be impossible, and our understanding of it would be based wholly on the illusion of volition).

And thus, you could claim our entirety of knowledge would also be based on illusion -- so what's the point? In the doctrine of determism you have reached a point where everything is necessarily or could be an illusion, so no action can be taken since you won't know whether it is actually an action or not, let alone whether it is the correct one.

An understanding that consciousness is deterministic may certainly be self-destructive and lead to nihilism, which is likely why evolution has done such a good job of tricking us into thinking otherwise.
Another question: assuming determinism is true, and thus everything we think we know is an illusion, then our knowledge of determinism itself is an illusion -- don't we actually know nothing? "We're all just dust in the wind, dude."

But the fact that the consequences of accepting determinism are bad and may lead to nihilism or insanity cannot be used as evidence against determinism -- that is primacy of consciousness, replacing what is with what is wanted.

The fact that there are bad consequences for it presupposes a valid concept of morality, a valid concept of "good and bad". If determinism is true, there is no way to establish such a concept as "morality" and use it in any meaningful way.

Validation depends exclusively on existence.

No. Validity requires only existence, whereas validation requires existence, a consciousness capable of grasping it, and a rational faculty capable of performing the process of validation, e.g. deduction and/or induction -- especially being able to grasp that something can be valid, or not.

(I'm out of quotes -- some limit in the forum code). You said: "If volition is illusionary, that would have no bearing on whether or not determinism were true, so I do not understand how a lack of volition is used as an argument against the truth of determinism."

But everytime we make a point which includes volition as a component, you can simply counter with "but if determinism is true, then your point is an illusion". There is no end to what you can select to acknowledge or refute with this blank-check premise, and you so much as stated that explicitly in response to my statement about the arbitrary. I don't see any way for you out of this maze unless you recognize that assertion for the false blank-check that it is, and put it aside.

The concept of knowledge itself presupposes volition (as apart from the concept of existence) -- it presupposes a consciousness capable of knowing.

If you can make that statement about the arbitrary (which is a state of knowledge) then you can also make it about the true and the false (the other states). So if the concept of a state of knowledge is an illusion, that leaves us nowhere to go.

Except hell, of course. :)

Edited by TomL
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I'm not going to respond to everything in your last post, but not because I didn't read and absorb it (I actually read it three times :)). I'm just moving forward in the direction of those points I think might best help me figure this out.

Firstly, I realise I stumbled into some semantic ambiguity; if there's anything I learned from Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, it's the importance of avoiding ambiguity in the terms one uses.

I shouldn't have used the term 'subconscious,' because it has meaning beyond what I was referring to. By 'subconscious,' I meant all of those components of one's mind of which one is not directly aware. That would include physiological and subliminal factors.

Ditto with 'perceptually self-evident;' I should have just said self-evident, for the nature of that self-evidency was irrelevant. In order for something to be self-evident, there must not exist a possible alternative. If one accepts the possibility of illusionary volition as an alternative to true volition, then it necessarily follows that volition is not self-evident.

I don't understand how Objectivism can reject the concept of illusionary volition.

I do not see why volition is fundamentally necessary to knowledge, such that invalidating one necessarily invalidates the other. Knowledge is a recognition of objective truth. Imagine a deterministic consciousness whose nature inescapably forces it to evaluate the objective truth of claims, reject those that come up short, then integrate those objectively true claims into its store of cognitive content, all the while presenting to itself the illusion of a volitional self behind the wheel. How is this knowledge fundamentally different from that of a truly volitional consciousness? How is this illusionary volition fundamentally impossible in the same way that "A is not-A" is? How does Objectivism, with one hundred percent certainty and with nary a shred of doubt, completely reject it as a valid alternative to true volition?

Or am I asking the wrong questions and attacking this from the wrong angle, like a fly beating itself against the glass of an open window? I'm afraid I may have dug myself into a philosophical hole that I'm unable to find my way out of, one that's preventing me from understanding some simple truth that would solve this whole conundrum for me.

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I shouldn't have used the term 'subconscious,' because it has meaning beyond what I was referring to. By 'subconscious,' I meant all of those components of one's mind of which one is not directly aware. That would include physiological and subliminal factors.

If that is the case, then the assertion is wholly arbitrary and does not warrant consideration. You cannot pull things out of thin air and expect them to be disproven. That is not a method by which one gains knowledge, but by which one attacks it.

I will assert that there is no evidence, either scientific or introspective, to even suggest the possibility that any such "physiological and subliminal factors" of consciousness exist, so to ponder them is unwarranted.

If you have done things in your past and you later did not understand why you did them, it is because you acted subjectively, on emotion: not because there is a little man in your head that you can't really hear, telling you what to do.

In order for something to be self-evident, there must not exist a possible alternative.
That is not the definition of self-evidency, only a means by which one may examine an axiom as a litmus test. The definition of self-evidency is: look and see, there it is. See it?

I do not see why volition is fundamentally necessary to knowledge, such that invalidating one necessarily invalidates the other.

I was on my way back to edit my post on this point, and you beat me to it. I realized that I asserted that knowledge presupposes volition and then didn't say how. After further consideration I wish to withdraw that statement. It isn't knowledge itself that presupposes volition, but to try to choose to ignore knowledge is called evasion, and without volition there can be no evasion and the greatest of our moral evils vanishes into (the illusory) thin air. :)

How does Objectivism, with one hundred percent certainty and with nary a shred of doubt, completely reject it as a valid alternative to true volition?

On the basis that your non-subconscious "physiological and subliminal factors" are an arbitrary concoction, and warrant no consideration whatsoever.

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Objectivism rejects illusory volition with as much certainty as it rejects illusory reality. What is, simply is. And it's not an illusion. Volition is a part of reality, and it's only an illusion if reality is likewise an illusion, which is to say, it's not.

Proof is a necessity precisely because the nature of consciousness is not "deterministic [...] whose nature inescapably forces it to evaluate the objective truth of claims...." If that were the nature of consciousness, then it would have no need for proof. I think Peikoff explains this point.

On the one hand, you have plenty of evidence showing volition to be a fact of human consciousness. On the other hand, you have no evidence upon which to suppose volition to be a facade (you only have the unsupportable assumption of determinism).

One simple truth that seems to be eluding you is that determinism is false. Simply, it's false. Without merit. Without evidence. Arbitrary, even. Any assertion, any concept, backed by the assumption of determinism is thereby without support.

Moreover, that you can imagine an alternative to the facts of reality is not enough evidence against the facts of reality. That you can imagine alternatives to the axioms of epistemology is not enough to reject the axioms of epistemology. It merely shows that you have the ability to imagine. This is trap that many philosophers have fallen into, but which, again, I think Peikoff discusses.

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Trendy Cynic,

I've read only your first post very carefully, and skimmed over the rest, so I'm sorry if i repeat things that have been said. But I think I can help on a couple of points.

1) The concept which you call "materialistic determinism" is referred to in psychology as "Behaviourism". This theory was developed almost exactly as you described by the 20th century psychologist B F Skinner. Rand and Peikoff both have commented extensively on Skinner and his particular kind of psychological "determinism", and their arguments against him might help to clarify your confusion more than their arguments against determinism in general (as there are many variants of determinism, not all of which match the type you've described").

2) There seems to be some obscurity in your exact meaning of the word "choice". "Choice," "Freedom," "Free-will," etc were used often by Kant to describe a state of consciousness which was apart from and impervious to the law of causality and the "physical" laws of nature. But this is not the meaning that Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff have for these words. Peikoff and Rand both state explicitly that "choice" IS subordinate to the law of causality, and the law of identity. Choice, in the Objectivist sense of the word, is NOT a supernatural phenomenon, *even though it might be so in the popular meaning of the word*.

That means that just because there are reasons for the things you choose, doesn't mean that choice doesn't exist. Just because existential ("physical") phenomena can effect consciousness- mdma, sensory deprivation, getting enough rest etc... doesn't mean that the mind doesn't exist and that intellectual (ie logical, rational) processes do not also "determine" ("predict," "precipitate".. in short, "choose") behaviour.

What you might not realize is that this last step is exactly the step that the behaviourists and determinists actually do fail to make. They say that the soul, mind, spirit, etc, do not exist- ONLY your body. Only cells, chemical reactions. The content of your mind is nothing. Just a pragmatic means to an end at most. That's the point Rand and Peikoff are most against.

The critical thing in this discussion is to carefully define your "terms".. ie- concepts.

Edited by Bold Standard
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I do not see why volition is fundamentally necessary to knowledge, such that invalidating one necessarily invalidates the other.

It comes from introspecting on the way you think. When you are engaged in a thought process trying to figure something out, observe what drives that process, what keeps it moving. You will think a little bit and then stop. Now - what makes the process continue to the next step? The answer is, it is your choice. The whole process of doing a proof is driven by choice after choice. Choice is not just part of thinking, it is the driving force.

Now note that this does not apply to perceptual consciousness. The sights we see and sounds we hear just keep coming whether we do anything or not. But on the conceptual level, what keeps the process going is choice after choice (Peikoff gave an example of this). So in a sense your conceptal consciousness is your free will. Without it, if you were just perceptual like the lower animals, you would be determined.

The claim of being able to prove determinism is thus self-contradictory. To have come up with the proof, your must have been thinking. But if you were thinking you must have been choosing.

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I'm going to try to frame my confusion again, as I think the last time I attempted to do so I only offered half of it.

Before I start, I want to be sure I understand the three 'classes' of claims: Impossible claims, possible claims and arbitrary claims. Possible claims are supported by evidence, and lack contradictory evidence. Impossible claims are contradicted by evidence. Arbitrary claims are those claims for which no evidence exists, one way or the other; the claim is empty and rejectable on those grounds.

It is very difficult to reject claims of omniscience (statements that make claims about 'all things') as being impossible. Some alternatives to the three axiomatic concepts are an exceptional example, because those alternatives are impossible (ie. 'infinite identity' means that the object is currently impaled through my left hand, which it is not, and so infinite identity is contradictory and thus impossible). To reject something as impossible does require a clear, explicit statement of how there exists a fundamental contradiction at the heart of that claim.

Objectivism cannot demonstrate that illusionary volition is impossible. Introspection does not identify any fundamental contradiction: Given the identity of the concept 'illusionary volition;' it follows that any act of introspection would conclude true volition -- the fact that this occurs is not fundamentally contradictory. The same is true of illusionary physical reality. Our perceptions cannot demonstrate that illusionary physical reality is impossible, as there is no fundamental contradiction at the heart of, say, the concept that we're jacked into the Matrix.

So. To reject these concepts, we must demonstrate that they are arbitrary.

An arbitrary concept is one lacking in evidence. God is arbitrary. Illusionary physical reality is arbitrary. Neither of these concepts are supported by logical evidence, and so can be dismissed as empty concepts.

To make the same argument for illusionary volition, it must be shown to be arbitrary. Let me outline the evidence I think exists in favor of illusionary volition. I do not believe that illusionary volition can be dismissed unless:

A) You demonstrate evidence that fundamentally contradicts illusionary volition, OR

B) You show how the evidence I have presented is empty and/or completely inapplicable

Let's start with the self-evident: Introspection is evidence neither for or against illusionary volition. It demonstrates that the alternatives are 'illusionary volition' and 'volition' (as opposed to 'introspectively evident determinism' or 'non-consciousness,' for example). I agree that introspection does detect volition, but I maintain that it cannot determine whether that volition is illusionary or not.

Clearly, with the only 'evidence' being utterly neutral, the concept remains arbitrary. This is where Objectivism stops, as I see it, with a rejection of illusionary volition as arbitrary solely on the basis of introspective observation. Were it valid to stop here, I would agree with the rejection of this arbitrary claim. But I can't stop here.

We must consider our knowledge of all relevant factors before we conclude that no evidence exists to support illusionary volition. I argue that, given that introspection provides us with only two valid alternatives, evidence against one serves as evidence in favor of the other (ie. if you know that a ball is either green or red, and you're told that it isn't green, that's evidence that the ball is red and the claim 'the ball is red' is not arbitrary).

What evidence exists against valid volition?

Our consciousness is seated in our brain, which is material. The full extent of our knowledge confirms that the brain is composed exclusively of material components, and all material objects -- all material objects -- are metaphysical absolutes that 'cannot be otherwise.' It necessarily follows that our brain is a metaphysical absolute, governed by purely material laws of causality (read: physical causality), and that everything that occurs within it cannot be otherwise. Volition, on the other hand, demands that those events in our brain could have been otherwise. There is a contradiction here. A is A. A consciousness cannot be all material and volitional at the same time, by the Objectivist understanding of metaphysical absolutes. Am I incorrect in making this statement? I sense that this may be where I've made my mistake; it feels to me like the weak link in the chain.

Moving forward, any capacity for true volition must somehow trancend the material.

But what evidence do we have for this volition that transcends the material? Introspection. Only. But that evidence is empty in framing the distinction between valid volition and illusionary volition, because it supports both equally. There is no weight of evidence to support a transcendant volition over an illusionary volition.

Combining introspection with scientific observation provides us with three alternatives: Material, illusionary volition, material, valid volition and non-material, valid volition. Material, valid volition is impossible by the observation of an internal contradiction. The alternatives of "Non-material" and "Illusionary," which differentiate the remaining alternatives, are equally supported by all evidence.

Both rest on the same weight of evidence, both contain the same added assertion of some further concept (illusion vs. non-material), and so there is no current means to support one over the other.

We're left with the only responsible conclusion: We Don't Know, as opposed to Objectivist certainty.

Edited by The Trendy Cynic
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I should have at least addressed all those helpful people who replied :)

I'll be looking into Behaviourism (and the refutation of it) to see if that gets me any further.

I've identified the seat of my problem with the Objectivist view of volition as being a certainty: I see a contradiction in the idea of a wholly material consciousness being volitional, as Objectivism confirms 'metaphysically absolute' as one of the characteristics of material. The alternatives to a material, volitional consciousness are a non-material, volitional consciousness, or a material, non-volitional consciousness. Introspection does not eliminate the latter, it only necessitates the form this non-volition takes: Illusionary volition. As I see it, there is an equal weight of evidence in favor of "non-material" and "illusionary volition," ie. none. Both are arbitrary alternatives, and thus both must be rejected. The only conclusion is: We don't know.

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Do we in fact have deductive evidence that the behavior of ALL material objects are deterministic? Has science definitively proven that there does not exist the possibility that the living cells within our brains might use some sort of quantum mechanics to posess volition on a material basis? I'm not an expert here, but I think that your "evidence against" might be challenged on that basis.

If introspection says that we have volition, then the claim that it is illusion is just as arbitrary as the claim that the physical world is illusion. In the exact same way and for the exact same reason.

You say that introspection does not yeild whether volition is real or not, but neither does extrospection yeild whether reality is real or not. They're both simply arbitrary.

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