On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[Cole]

I honestly do not think that most human beings are conscious, possess free will and are anything other than automaton robots that can be predicted in terms of what they will do with close to 100% accuracy as one would expect with any machine once you are familiar with the make up of the machine.

This sounds exactly like Skinner-esque behaviorism.

[Capitalism Forever]

Look at how wrong the herd is over and over again.

Look how often they are positioned opposite to the “smart money” (the Commercials).

That is exactly what I would have expected. In a chess game where White thinks his moves over while Black tries blindly to mirror the moves of White, is there any doubt as to who is going to win?

I don't see how this is supposed to prove determinism. What it actually proves is that some people--the "smart money"--DO think, while others--"the herd"--DON'T, even though they all belong to the same species and have the same basic genetic structure. In other words, it is further evidence for free will.

[The Trendy Cynic]

It's fairly clear that the author of this article is not saying that reason is invalid, or that people do not follow reason, or that free choice is an illusion or non-existent. He clearly supports the existence of free choice; to the author, volition is real. He just believes that it only exists for some people, and not for others.

What evidence does he present to support the idea that some people are void of free will?

He shows that a large group of society (his 'herd') consistently make mistakes in the evaluation of the stock market. It follows, by his logic, that this herd does not follow reason and, thus, lacks free will.

If this herd lacked volition, then they would not merely avoid following reason, they would be incapable of reason. In other words, a necessary premise to the author's argument is that every member of that 'Small Speculators' category is absolutely incapable of reason -- not merely ignorant of reason, but incapable of it.

What does this mean for his argument? It means that, according to the author, it is impossible for any member of the 'Small Speculators' group to elevate himself to the 'Large Speculators' group. The latter, by the author's claim, does possess reason and volition, while the former does not. How can one learn reason and volition when he is supposedly incapable of both? Thus, demonstrating even a single instance of a member of the herd becoming an effective trader would invalidate his argument that being a member of the herd necessarily implies you lack volition and reason.

And yet every single one of those Small Speculators has “conscious” reasons for why they are investing the way they do.

The real reason they invest the way they do and can be wrong consistently is, I would suggest, because they are not conscious and they are not acting on the basis of reason or free will.

And then there's this blatant contradiction. The members of the herd have reasons for what they're doing? Then they accept, understand and apply the faculty of reason! The fact that they do it wrongly is irrelevant -- they're still aware of their freedom of choice and applying 'reasons' to their actions.

The problem for the author is that he's using evidence of fallibility as conclusive evidence of determinism. Nothing about fallibility implies that humans can't be fallible as a collective; just look at religion, or altruism. No one claims that the legions of Catholics or philanthropists are automatons; they're just irrational. The same is true, evidently, of the yellow bar, and just like those other groups, it's probably traceable to some fundamental contradiction they all believe in.

The search for such an irrational premise, some defining contradiction, perhaps by comparing the reasons given by members of the herd to those given by successful traders... now that would be an interesting article to read.

[Cole]

What evidence does he present to support the idea that some people are void of free will?

That's the problem. He doesn't. His argument is that some people make good decisions, but most people make bad decisions, so therefore most people don't have have free will. Bad decision making presupposes volition. His argument is unsound.

[The Trendy Cynic]

It was okay.  You tend to approach things from the negative instead of the positive, though . . . worrying about "what are the points against" instead of "what are the points for".  It's easy to get tripped up that way.

When presented with a complete list of possibile explanations for something (say, volition vs. determinism), I know that I can support one of the explanations by shutting down the others. Evidence that clearly eliminates determinism as a viable option is, as I see it, just as effective as evidence that clearly supports volition.

The reason I choose the former over the latter has to do, I think, with my experience with irrational theists. Regardless of the evidence I present in support of an atheistic argument, I learned to loathe the "well, divine alternative X is still possible," while at the same time being unable to deny the truth of that statement -- alternative X, I would think to myself, is technically possible. The result became the deep-seated conviction that it is necessary to defeat alternative explanations (negative), regardless of how effectively you support you own explanation (positive).

While I always knew that the arbitrary could be dismissed as irrelevant, I've come to evaluate a conclusion that states "this is true, because all alternatives are arbitrary" as being somewhat less convincing than a conclusion that says "this is true, because all alternatives are impossible." I just can't find it within myself to allow the wiggle-room afforded by the former type of conclusion when I'm capable of drawing up the latter type.

Could you expand a bit on why taking the negative position should be considered less logically appealing than taking a positive stance (err, assuming that taking the negative position can lead to a decisive conclusion, such as when you're able to negatively address all alternatives)?

[source]

I wouldn't say that this is an argument "for" determinism. The person who wrote this said clearly that he is referring to most people, not all people. Do not be mistaken - there ARE people who go on living day by day without activating their conscious minds for a reason greater than what clothes to put on or to remember a juicy gossip they've heard yesterday. I've been observing it lately as well. They come from nearly all groups of men I know of, but none of the groups could be said to be exactly what I'm thinking of. I have yet to define this group, and this article has given me a nice name for it - the herd. The one I had was - the unthinking mob.

Now all I need to do is state the most important thing that differentiates these men from all others.

This article has been very helpful, though, so thanks for posting.

Edited March 3, 2005 by source

[Hal]

I wouldn't say that this is an argument "for" determinism. The person who wrote this said clearly that he is referring to most people, not all people. Do not be mistaken - there ARE people who go on living day by day without activating their conscious minds for a reason greater than what clothes to put on or to remember a juicy gossip they've heard yesterday. I've been observing it lately as well. They come from nearly all groups of men I know of, but none of the groups could be said to be exactly what I'm thinking of. I have yet to define this group, and this article has given me a nice name for it - the herd. The one I had was - the unthinking mob.

Now all I need to do is state the most important thing that differentiates these men from all others.

This article has been very helpful, though, so thanks for posting.

I agree; he doesnt sound like a determinist, merely someone who is disgusted with the average human being. His views sound closer to someone like Gurdjieff ("Fairness? Decency? You expect fairness and decency on a planet of sleeping people?") than to a behaviorist like Skinner. Edited March 3, 2005 by Hal

[The Trendy Cynic]

My main objection is to the part where he claims the herd lacks volition, as opposed to the correct interpretation of their behavior (ie. they are choosing not to think, or are making mistakes based on false premises). The only alternative to the absence of volition is determinism, and so it follows that anyone advocating a lack of volition is also advocating determinism.

The real reason they invest the way they do and can be wrong consistently is, I would suggest, because they are not conscious and they are not acting on the basis of reason or free will.

It is because they are unconscious machines that have to react to the manipulations of the Commercials.

They have no choice.

It's fairly explicit. Perhaps he was speaking metaphorically, but then this whole article doesn't warrant consideration as it doesn't constitute any contradiction to Objectivist principles.

[NIJamesHughes]

My main objection is to the part where he claims the herd lacks volition, as opposed to the correct interpretation of their behavior (ie. they are choosing not to think, or are making mistakes based on false premises). The only alternative to the absence of volition is determinism, and so it follows that anyone advocating a lack of volition is also advocating determinism.

It's fairly explicit. Perhaps he was speaking metaphorically, but then this whole article doesn't warrant consideration as it doesn't constitute any contradiction to Objectivist principles.

This same fellow once told me that " 'a is a' NOT." I think he is a big fan of quantum mechanics, and uses that as a basis to try to discredit Objectivism, especially objectivist metaphysics. He is an exObjectivist turned Satanist. Here is another of his articles: http://churchofsatan.com/Pages/SatObj.html where he compares and contrasts Satanism and Objectivism.

[AisA]

While I always knew that the arbitrary could be dismissed as irrelevant, I've come to evaluate a conclusion that states "this is true, because all alternatives are arbitrary" as being somewhat less convincing than a conclusion that says "this is true, because all alternatives are impossible." I just can't find it within myself to allow the wiggle-room afforded by the former type of conclusion when I'm capable of drawing up the latter type.

I wonder about this distinction. It strikes me that the arbitrary is also the impossible.

Consider:

To postulate that "A" can be "A" and "non-A" at the same time is a contradiction that can be rejected on the basis of the law of identity. Since contradictions cannot exist, this proposition is impossible. This, I assume, is a bare-bones example of what you mean when you say one can eliminate a proposition because it is impossible.

To postulate that "A" has a nature such that it must forever be outside man's awareness (which makes this an arbitrary proposition) is also a contradiction -- if it is outside man's awareness, one can claim no knowledge of it, including the knowledge that it might exist, including the knowledge that it is a possibility. Since contradictions cannot exist, this proposition may also be eliminated because it is impossible.

As an aside, I would note that the lack of evidence of the non-existence of something is not proof of anything; it is not proof of the possibility of the thing's existence. The nature of proof is such that that which does not exist will never give rise to any sort of proof or evidence, it will never manifest itself in reality in any way. That which does not exist will not leave any traces or have any effect on reality -- hence, there will be no evidence of its non-existence. Therefore, no conclusions of any sort can be drawn from a lack of proof of non-existence.

[JMeganSnow]

I wonder about this distinction.  It strikes me that the arbitrary is also the impossible.

Not quite. If something is truly arbitrary you cannot place it ANYWHERE in your framework of knowledge. It is immune to proof/disproof. Dr. Peikoff notes that sometimes you can disprove an arbitrary statement by demonstrating, as you said, that it contradicts some established fact or axiom, but this is not always the case.

Thus, he said (paraphrasing) that what needs to be done with any arbitrary statement is that you must act as though nothing has been said, which, in fact, it hasn't.

The reason I think it's better to argue FOR a positive instead of to attack all the arguments AGAINST your point is that people can bring up seemingly-sound arguments FOREVER, asking you to disprove each one. It's enough to make anyone crazy, because the only way to defeat this strategy is to claim omniscience and dismiss them on those grounds. People properly announce that you're delusional when you do that.

It's better to say, these are the facts and anything else contradicts them and so is necessarily false than to try and build a case against each and every alternative, especially since this reduces you to using your opponents terms and premises, and those are usually, well, bad.

[The Trendy Cynic]

To postulate that "A" has a nature such that it must forever be outside man's awareness (which makes this an arbitrary proposition) is also a contradiction -- if it is outside man's awareness, one can claim no knowledge of it, including the knowledge that it might exist, including the knowledge that it is a possibility. Since contradictions cannot exist, this proposition may also be eliminated because it is impossible.

Perhaps it's my complete and utter lack of experience with philosophy that makes me suspect reasoning like this as mental sleight-of-hand. I understand arbitrary things to be propositions for which there exists no evidence for or against, not that they 'must forever be outside man's awareness.' Claiming that there is an alien civilization on Pluto would be an arbitrary proposition, but that in no way means that it must be forever out of our awareness (we could, for example, go there and check ourselves in a few decades).

As such, I do not believe there is a fundamental violation of identity when it comes to arbitrary claims. I lean more towards what JMeganSnow said, in that arbitrary claims are empty and must be treated as if nothing was said. There's no contradiction inherent to saying nothing, is there? How can there be?

Saying something is 'impossible,' to me, means it cannot be; it implies knowledge that this thing is not true. Arbitrary statements, though, by definition, are unknowable -- how can you have the knowledge that an unknowable proposition is impossible?

The reason I think it's better to argue FOR a positive instead of to attack all the arguments AGAINST your point is that people can bring up seemingly-sound arguments FOREVER, asking you to disprove each one.  It's enough to make anyone crazy, because the only way to defeat this strategy is to claim omniscience and dismiss them on those grounds.  People properly announce that you're delusional when you do that.

Okay, fair enough -- but in this particular argument, when there only exist two possible alternatives (in that it's not even possible to conceive of something else, because it's an either-or sort of thing), it is no less valid to negatively attack the wrong one than it is to positively support the right one, correct?

[JMeganSnow]

Okay, fair enough -- but in this particular argument, when there only exist two possible alternatives (in that it's not even possible to conceive of something else, because it's an either-or sort of thing), it is no less valid to negatively attack the wrong one than it is to positively support the right one, correct?

This would be a fair statement. However, it has been my experience that people are rarely AWARE that there are really only two alternatives, that an either/or relationship exists, so they keep bogging you down with new arguments, unaware that they've just said the same thing in a slightly different way. (Hence the theist/agnostic/atheist idea, when, in fact, agnosticism is an insupportable position and amounts to theism without the courage to admit it or atheism without the courage to defend it.)

Demonstrating that something IS true necessarily omits ALL alternatives, regardless of phrasing.

[AisA]

Perhaps it's my complete and utter lack of experience with philosophy that makes me suspect reasoning like this as mental sleight-of-hand. I understand arbitrary things to be propositions for which there exists no evidence for or against, not that they 'must forever be outside man's awareness.' Claiming that there is an alien civilization on Pluto would be an arbitrary proposition, but that in no way means that it must be forever out of our awareness (we could, for example, go there and check ourselves in a few decades).

Yes, in a few decades we could go. However, the arbitrary propositions that we are concerned with involve claims that are outside our awareness by their very nature, not because of technological limitations. God, for instance, will never be detectable (according to theist) no matter how advanced our technology.

And in those cases where evidence can be cited that contradicts the assertion, those who traffic in the arbitrary generally respond by redefining the proposition to put it, once again, outside the realm of our awareness. They do not make assertions about things that are within our awareness -- where is the fun in that? -- only about things about which no proof can exist. It is only with such things that they can make the invalid claim, "well, it's possible". (More on the invalidity of this claim in a moment.)

As such, I do not believe there is a fundamental violation of identity when it comes to arbitrary claims.

The only thing that can exist, yet by its nature be outside of man's awareness, is something that exists without identity. That is a contradiction of the law of identity. Specifically, it is the contradiction at the root of the claim that god exists, as well as many similar claims.

I lean more towards what JMeganSnow said, in that arbitrary claims are empty and must be treated as if nothing was said. There's no contradiction inherent to saying nothing, is there? How can there be?

Peikoff said, "cognitively speaking, nothing has been said." (OPAR, page 164.) Obviously, he does not literally mean that nothing has been said, otherwise there would be nothing to denote as arbitrary. He means that the appropriate response is to act as if nothing has been said.

Saying something is 'impossible,' to me, means it cannot be; it implies knowledge that this thing is not true. Arbitrary statements, though, by definition, are unknowable -- how can you have the knowledge that an unknowable proposition is impossible?

What is impossible is to know something about the unknowable -- and yet this is what those who traffic in the arbitrary claim.

For instance, consider the claim that it is possible there is an alien civilization on Pluto. Since we cannot possibly know anything about such a claim, we cannot know that it is possible, can we? We know nothing about it.

The point is that there is no wiggle room inherent in denoting something as arbitrary. The arbitrary is just as invalid as any other contradictory proposition.

In an earlier post you said:

Regardless of the evidence I present in support of an atheistic argument, I learned to loathe the "well, divine alternative X is still possible," while at the same time being unable to deny the truth of that statement -- alternative X, I would think to myself, is technically possible.

This is the error I am trying to address. Asserting that "divine alternative X is possible" does not make it possible, technically or otherwise. In the complete absence of any information about a claim, the only conclusion one can reach about it is that it is arbitrary; no other conclusion, including the conclusion that it is possible, is valid.

[Paganzer]

Not being able to fight determinism undermines the very idea of Objectivism as a whole(since it's based on man's volition).

Now, Objectivists would naturally be proponents of cause and effect. But why does this principle not apply to human conciousness? Since all things right now are somewhere(including neurons in the human brain) and are all moving in one direction or another. So, aren't all things going to move in one specific course in the future, but we cannot yet know what that is since we can't locate everything moving about?

So, if we knew the exact location of everything everywhere in the universe, it's temperature, properties, and what direction it was currently moving, could we not plot out the future? Does this not in fact negate both the ideas of volition and an undetermined future?

If man has a truly independent mind, doesn't that negate cause and effect? Otherwise man's mind really is just a sum of it's surroundings, as far as I could see.

[Gabriel_S]

Now, Objectivists would naturally be proponents of cause and effect.

But why does this principle not apply to human conciousness? Since all things right now are somewhere(including neurons in the human brain) and are all moving in one direction or another. So, aren't all things going to move in one specific course in the future, but we cannot yet know what that is since we can't locate everything moving about?

Causality does apply to human consciousness. However, in the case of human consciousness, it doesn't operate in a deterministic fashion. The rest of your statement presumes determinism, which is the very thing in question.

[MisterSwig]

If man has a truly independent mind, doesn't that negate cause and effect? Otherwise man's mind really is just a sum of it's surroundings, as far as I could see.

The important thing to keep in mind is that cause and effect only tells you that for every cause there is an effect. It does not tell you whether or not the effect is scientifically predictable--or determined.

I think this has been discussed in another thread. So I won't go into detail. But one must begin by recognizing two different natural realms in which cause and effect operates: the physical realm and the mental realm.

In the physical realm, effects are predictable because we know the laws of physical motion do not change. They are not subject to free will. We can use the unchanging laws of motion, and whatever other physical laws apply, to determine future physical events.

However, in the mental realm human choice must be taken into account. Human beings have a volitional faculty. They are choice-makers. And due to the nature of human choice, its effects are not determined, but chosen in accordance with the principle of free will.

[y_feldblum]

Determinism and indeterminism are false and form a false dichotomy. They both follow from a rejection of the Aristotelian, and now Objectivist, law of causality. Determinism and indeterminism conceive of action as primary, independent existents, existing independently from the entities which act. Thus, on the kind of causality presupposed by determinism and indeterminism, actions cause further actions, and - according to determinism - are caused by prior actions, or - according to indeterminism - might not be caused at all.

Objectivism, standing on the shoulders of Aristotle, recognizes that entities are the primary existence, and that all properties, relationships, and actions are properties, relationships, and actions of entities. Thus, the law of identity, which focuses on the fact that properties are properties of entities, or that an entities have certain properties, and the law of causality, which focuses on the fact that actions are actions of entities, or that entities act.

The law of causality is simply the law of identity applied to action. My formulation of it, which reads: entities act - and in its fuller version, entities act in accordance with their identities and never in contradiction to their identities - refutes both determinism and indeterminism. For every action, there is an entity which acts and which caused the action, because only entities act, and actions are actions of entities. The entity which acts is the cause; the action is the effect. "Cause and effect" then, in substance as well as "analytically" in form, is equivalent to "entities act". The Objectivist law of causality refutes deterministic and indeterministic causality because the former recognizes that the latter forgets the law of existence and the law of identity.

Determinism is by no means implied in or to be derived from the law of causality. The most that can be observed is that many or most things act deterministically, in that they are able to act in only one way at any one time or in any one context, and that whatever action they do take was necessarily taken and they could not have acted otherwise. This is because the ability to choose among multiple courses of action requires the ability to choose, ie, requires the property of volition. Entities able to choose among multiple courses of action could have acted other than how they did; entities without the ability could not have acted except in the way that they did. Entities act in accordance with their identities, ie, the sum of their properties, and entities with the property of volition choose among multiple courses of action; whereas entities never act in contradiction to their identities or in accordance with properties they do not have, and entities without the property of volition cannot choose among multiple courses of action. Such an entity must instead must act in only one way, and the action it does take will have been necessary. Thus, since the human consciousness possesses the property of volition, actions it takes are not necessary.

[Malkuth]

I apologize if this seems an ignorant question, but what exactly do you mean when you speak of free will, volition, and choice? I understand their practical usage in everyday speech (ie, if a person can take one of two actions, and consciously takes one of them, he/she is said to have chosen that action, and the ability to choose between the two is volition), but I don't understand what is meant to free will as an alternative to causal determinism. Determinism would say that certain phenomena caused the person to make the choice that they did, and the choice that the peson made was the inevitable result of such phenomena. But what does the concept of free will say caused the person to make the choice that they did? Did something particular cause the person to make the choice they did, and this particular cause is somehow contradictory to causal determinism and unique to free will? Or did nothing cause the choice at all--it just happened? Or am I missing--or misinterperting--something?

[JMeganSnow]

Don't worry about ignorance, Malkuth. There are several threads about determinism on the board, you may benefit from reading some of them. In short, though, the answer to your question is that determinism says not that decisions are caused (which they are) but that WHAT YOU WILL CHOOSE is PRE-DETERMINED. Determinism says, in effect, that the entire universe is a machine grinding inexorably towards an end that was determined from the moment it came into existence, and we just happen to be cogs in this machine.

Volition states that your decisions are caused; from the fundamental choice (to focus or not) to deciding what to wear, your choices are caused by the nature of reality. Likewise, you cannot choose the result of your choices; you cannot change the fact that, if you spend your rent money in a casino you will not be able to pay the rent. Volition does not enable you to violate the law of causality. But WHAT you choose is up to you.

[Malkuth]

Makes sense. I did know that causal determinism says that any state the universe is in--and any choice a person makes--is the only, inevitible result of initial conditions, but I don't seemed to have expressed that well. So it would be correct to say that causality isn't necessarily determinism because causality simply states that everything is the result of the cause and everything has an effect, but not that there is only one possible effect resulting from a particular cause? And that it's possible to get different final conditions from the same initial conditions, and causality (but not determinism) will still hold true?

Alright, I see that I was confused when I made my previous post.

So the stance of 'free will' as an alternative stance to determinism simply states that causality holds true, and that determinism is false?

[Hal]

If there was no existence of free-will, wouldn't there be no such concept of choice?

The concept of proof presupposes free will since it presumes that people can be persuaded otherwise.

This is begging the question.

Imagine we are back in the 18th century, when people believed that living things are alive in virtue of being filled with someone unknown mystical substance, which we shall call the "mist of life" (since I've forgotten the actual name). This was (presumably) breathed into their inanimate bodies by some God-like being, and without it they would lose their life.

Now imagine a group of intrepid young scientists challenge this, and suggest that there is no 'mist' inside the bodies of living things - they claim that the process of life is caused by something completely different. However, they are met with the following argument "Your claims are self-refuting! The mist of life is axiomatic since it is presupposed by the concept of life - if you deny it, then that must mean you are dead! The concept of 'argument' presupposes the concept of 'life' since you must be alive in order to argue. But if there is no mist of life then you cannot be alive!". Would this be an even remotely valid point?

Those that are denying freewill are obviously also denying the claim that "the concept of choice/proof/whatever depends on free-will", just as those biologists were denying the claim that the concept of life depends on the 'mist of lfie'.

Edited May 10, 2005 by Hal

[drc1379]

Is it possible to view determinism as something that exists? Everytime we exlude a possibility: we limit ourselves to answers.

[y_feldblum]

We are introspectively aware of free will. Thus, the concept is not arbitrary. The "mist of life" was arbitrary.

[JMeganSnow]

The concept of 'argument' presupposes the concept of 'life' since you must be alive in order to argue.

All concepts presuppose the existence of a conceptual consciousness. However, the concept "argument" does not actually depend hierarchially on the concept "life".

Note also that the scientists were not saying that "life does not exist", they were saying that the CAUSE of life is not what people thought it was. So they are not, in fact, denying the concept "life" in the first place.

It is also NOT begging the question. The first statement is not even logically related to the second statement; they are not part of the same logical argument.

Proof is a process of demonstrating the soundness of one's ideas in order to convince someone. Without volition, i.e. the ability to make choices no one can change their mind, it would be IMPOSSIBLE to convince anyone of anything, and thus the concept of "proof" would not refer to something that existed in reality; that being the ability to convince someone of the validity of an idea.

Saying that someone must "prove" volition means, in essence, that they must somehow step OUTSIDE the conceptual universe on which proof DEPENDS and then proceed to . . . blank out . . . within that conceptual universe there would be no such thing as "proof". It's a contradiction.

However, it is possible, as with other axiomatic concepts such as existence and identity, to validate volition. This is done by such methods as the ones shown here; demonstrating (usually quite briefly) that all thought and all human knowledge depends on the FACT of volition. Without volition, knowledge is impossible, conceptualization is impossible, having this discussion would be impossible.

Clever determinists usually resort to the "illusionary" volition ploy at this time: "you THINK you have volition but, in fact, you don't". They are evading the fact that an illusion cannot create the effects of a real deal. You cannot drink illusionary water; with out REAL volition you could not even form the concepts with which you are engaging in this discussion and evaluating my position.