On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[Tom Rexton]

According to the Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle, free will exists. But the principle violates the law of causality and that nothing in the present and future can be determined with infinite precision. But without such a principle, free will couldn't exist. Then wasn't Ayn Rand wrong in her firm belief in both causality and free will?

You've not read any of Ayn Rand's writings, have you?

Free will and causality are not contradictory.

Causality is not the determination of the future with "infinite precision".

Free will is not the ability to do whatever irrespective of the facts of reality.

And it always amuses me what twist of logic people must do in deducing "free will exists" from "the position and momentum of a subatomic particle cannot be measured simultaneously with accuracy".

[stephen_speicher]

Firstly, free will has been proven by science, Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle to be exact.

I must admit that is new one on me. Perhaps you can give us a reference for this scientific proof using the uncertainty principle, or just outline the essence of it here.

[DavidOdden]

And it always amuses me what twist of logic people must do in deducing "free will exists" from "the position and momentum of a subatomic particle cannot be measured simultaneously with accuracy".

It says a lot about the kind of particle accelerators we must have for brains. A good thunder storm and we ought to be completely insane.

[y_feldblum]

Better watch out for butterflies on the other side of the world....

[tommyedison]

Well, according to the Uncertainty Principle, momentum and position cannot be determined with exact precision at the same time. This has many philosophical implications. Firstly, it allows space for free will. Because thoughts are made of electrons and electric signals, if we were to know the exact state of mind at present, we could calculate all that the mind would think or decide in the future in different situations. Therefore, a fundamental uncertainty has to exist to allow free will. It doesn't prove it (I goofed on the wording, sorry). Secondly, it disallows determinism. Which means the future cannot be determined exactly. For if we were to know the present exactly, future could be determined. However it violates the Law Of Causality even if at a small scale. More interpretations of this theory can be found at:

http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08c.htm

[stephen_speicher]

Well, according to the Uncertainty Principle, momentum and position cannot be determined with exact precision at the same time. This has many philosophical implications. Firstly, it allows space for free will. Because thoughts are made of electrons and electric signals,

I know a lot about the quantum state of electrons, but I have never heard of one that was dull, or happy, or smart, or confused. It is one thing to say that a volitional consciousness depends on the brain for its existence, but it is something else entirely to claim that the actions of that consciousness -- thought -- are whatever composes the brain. Consciousness is not matter, and thoughts are not electrons.

However it violates the Law Of Causality even if at a small scale. More interpretations of this theory can be found at:

Nothing violates causality. If a theory interprets some physical phemomena as causality violation, that is a sure sign for philosophic rejection of such an interpretation.

[Travis P.]

Electrons and photons act in accordance with their nature (i.e. the law of causality). If the nature of electrons and photons is such that we cannot precisely measure momentum and position at the same time, that is not a violation of causality.

From the website referenced by tommyedison

he challenged the notion of simple causality in nature, that every determinate cause in nature is followed by the resulting effect. Translated into "classical physics," this had meant that the future motion of a particle could be exactly predicted, or "determined,"  from a knowledge of its present position and momentum and all of the forces acting upon it. The uncertainty principle denies this, Heisenberg declared, because one cannot know the precise position and momentum of a particle at a given instant, so its future cannot be determined

I'm not sure if Heisenberg made this statement or not. If so, it's a remarkable mistake. Just because we cannot determine the precise information and therefore cannot determine the precise future doesn't change causality. The fact that a light wave would have to have a small wavelength to hit an electron, and that this small wavelength would imply a large energy and therefore knock the electron out of its path is not a rejection of causality but a wholehearted embrace of it.

This places consciousness over existence (primacy of consciousness). Our own ability or inability to measure things on the scale of electrons to an infinite precision doesn't change the reality of the electrons and that they have a nature and act according to it (causality). Nor does it even prove that electrons and other particles aren't determined (i.e. that something made the electron move at a particular speed in a particular position). All the Uncertainty principle tells us (outside of applications in physics) is that no instrument or form of measurement exists which would enable us to determine exact position and momentum at the same time. From my understanding of physics, all particles of matter are determined and causal, regardless of our own abilities. On the other hand, our minds are causal (act in accordance with their nature), but not determined. We know we have volition from introspection.

I don't want to argue about whether individual particles are "determined" or "random" (which seem to mean predictable or unpredictable in most texts). The point is that the Uncertainty Principle does not violate the law of Causality (that actions are done by entities, in accordance with the nature of the entity), nor does our free will. The fact that motion and position (or any set of conjugate variables) might not be able to be precisely known, however, doesn't imply that this has anything to do with the nature of our consciousness (that we make choices). In fact, the implications of your statement is the opposite, that our choices are determined (almost an oxymoron) by the supposed random or probabilistic motions of the particles. I doubt, therefore, our inability to predict the future position and momentum of small particles has anything to do with volition.

If you had said instead that it is impossible to predict the motions of particles in our brain, and that this may be evidence of our consciousness exercising its free will, then that might be something. Whether we can ever show that, given our inability to predict exactly the motions of particles outside our brain, remains to be seen. Regardless, you don't need to delve into physics to accept volition, and in fact you shouldn't. All the required evidence is available to your own introspection. Trying to reconcile your other knowledge (i.e. physics) with what you learned introspectively (that you have free will) is important, but you need to keep in mind the foundations of your knowledge and thinking.

You know for sure (or should) that you have volition. Looking to physics or biology to make you more comfortable will not only be unsatisfactory, but is unnecessary.

[stephen_speicher]

From the website referenced by tommyedison

I'm not sure if Heisenberg made this statement or not. If so, it's a remarkable mistake.

The mistake that Heisenberg made was even more remarkably wrong than you imagined. Here are the closing words (aside from an addition in proof) of Heisenberg's famous 1927 "uncertainty paper," Uber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Machanik (The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and Mechanics), Zeitschrift fur Physik, 43, pp. 172-198, 1927.

"But what is wrong in the sharp formulation of the law of causality, 'When we know the present precisely, we can predict the future,' is not the conclusion but the assumption. Even in principle we cannot know the present in all detail. For that reason everything observed is a selection from a plentitude of possibilities and a limitation on what is possible in the future. As the statistical character of quantum theory is so closely linked to the inexactness of all perceptions, one might be led to the presumption that behind the perceived statistical world there still resides a 'real' world in which causality holds. But such speculations seem to us, to say it explicitly, fruitless and senseless. Physics ought to describe only the correlation of observations. One can express the true state of affairs better in this way: Because all experiments are subject to the laws of quantum mechanics, and therefor to equation (1) [the momentum-position relation], it follows that quantum mechanics establishes the final failure of causality."

This is one of the more profound expressions in the philosophy of science that relegates physics not to a real world understanding, but simply to the "correlation of observations." This is part of what Einstein fought against.

[hippie]

I cannot sense being forced or free to say what I said. Neither is automatic. I deduce--from other automatic knowledge like existence, perception, consciousness, and causality--that existence is pre-determined. This is only self-defeating if you assume free will. I have just denied it without pre-supposing it. You think I have because you assume free will. As I do not, and as I believe that the circumstances of existence necessitated that I say what I said, I find no contradiction. I only find contradiction in the free will position. Whether you agree with me or not, I do not see how anybody can hold me personally, morally guilty of any intellectual error or dishonesty. If I were to agree with any of you on free will, it would only be out of pressure from you and not out of an actual agreement. *That* would be dishonest and I cannot do it, even though it would temporarily be easier for me to simply lie and concede the matter. From where I stand, the only right, just, honest, moral thing to do is to express and maintain a belief in determinism. Criticize that if you will, but I cannot believe that this should bring my character into question.

Speicher, this is the post you referred me to:

QUOTE (hippie @ Jun 8 2004, 11:20 PM)

"In addition to what Spearmint has said, I would like to throw another mind experiment at you: Assume there is a man who chooses to do a tap dance. Then, time is reversed. Nothing is changed, all things are exactly and perfectly the way they were, all variables being perfectly identical. Must he tap dance again? If he must, he is determined. If he is not compelled to, his will is random, causeless, and without reason. If choice comes ex nihilo, that is just mystical."

But the primary choice does not come from nothing; it derives from the nature of consciousness and the nature of the brain upon which consciousness depends.

You make a false alternative between determinism and randomness, thereby defining volition out of existence. The primary choice is both caused and necessitated by the nature of man; given any particular circumstances, man must choose, but what he chooses, to focus or not, is the expression of volition.

QUOTE

"When you ask, do I sense my own free will, I don’t. When I act, I weigh my options, consider my knowledge, and do what I must because of my reason. For instance, when I must choose between apple juice and orange juice, I know that orange juice is healthy and tastes better than apple juice. Because I value what tastes better, I must drink the orange juice."

If you want to really understand the process that you just described, you need to separate out two things: the primary, irreducible aspect of volition -- the choice to focus, or not -- and volition as a guiding process in our reasoning. This latter process, what Peikoff refers to as the "higher-level" actions of consciousness, unlike the primary choice, are not irreducible, and your thinking above in regard to juice is explainable in terms of your principles, your values, your knowledge, and a multitude of other mental and physical factors.

And at any given step along your reasoning process towards your decision about which juice to drink, you can choose to remain in full focus and avail yourself of the full context of your knowledge and the circumstances, or you can choose to lessen your focus and muddle the reasoning processes that ensue. So all your consequential reasoning is caused, in the sense of being guided by a matter of choice, but it is not necessitated because your primary choice, to focus or not, could have been otherwise.

QUOTE

"He, however, fundamentally agreed with Ayn Rand. He believed that the fundamentally undetermined and, essentially, random choice that a person makes is the choice to think or not to think."

I'm afraid you do not understand what Ayn Rand thought. She would have been horrified at the notion of a "random" choice, itself a contradiction in terms. Hopefully, based on what I wrote above, you will be able to form a different perspective on this issue.

* * *

I do not see a single point that I have not already addressed and would merely be repeating myself to respond to. If choice comes from consciousness, and consciousness from the brain, and the brain is a material object determined as other material objects are, then choice is determined. As I have said in other words, I believe your position is that something adds changes to the brain that do not make it determined. Some kind of external source of cause is, in a sense, injected into the brain. Where does this come from? How is this source not determined like other causes? I’m sure your answer is, respectively, “consciousness” and “somehow”. This is rather circular. The brain causes consciousness, and consciousness cause changes in the brain, but the changes produced by consciousness are not pre-determined even though consciousness is.

Pushing forward, I quite directly addressed the false-dichotomy issue. I understood the “process I described” (choosing between orange juice and apple juice)--that’s how I wrote about it. I addressed, I believe several times, the axiom of free will. This eliminates any need to discuss the primary choice to focus or not to focus. And I addressed whether I understood Ayn Rand (as a refresher: I understand and I disagree).

In regards to the rest of your post, I should point out that I don’t read Ash Ryan’s posts as he has personally insulted me, as you have begun to do. If you take it to the level that Ash Ryan did, I will not read your posts either. My reason for bring this up is that you allude to his posts without clearly stating what was in them and I don’t know what they were. Nonetheless, I ended the conversation (as I’ve said) with the understanding that we had both exhausted anything left in the subject. I was neither ignored any argument nor avoided any thought, and was only trying to prevent repetition (as I’ve said).

I *have* acted as if I had no volition. I have done the things you assume are products of volition, such as typing and thinking, because my consciousness existed in the necessary state that made those actions the only possible result. If you want to blaspheme me for understanding existence this way, you may but I will not dignify ad hominem statements with any response. It’s the same principle as I said at the very beginning: I don’t see what people hope to achieve by yelling at me--as if my supposed volition may be commanded by the volume of their voices or inflection in their text. In this case, it’s as if some think the sagacity of their slanders could direct my supposed volition.

[stephen_speicher]

I cannot sense being forced or free to say what I said. 

Perhaps you need an upgrade. Version HUMAN-2.01 was released quite a few milleniums ago, and if you are still functioning on PRIMATE-1.07, then that could be the problem.

In regards to the rest of your post, I should point out that I don’t read Ash Ryan’s posts as he has personally insulted me, as you have begun to do.  If you take it to the level that Ash Ryan did, I will not read your posts either.

If you no longer read my posts I am sure I will be every bit as devastated as Ash Ryan undoubtedly was when you stopped reading his.

[Betsy]

From where I stand, the only right, just, honest, moral thing to do is to express and maintain a belief in determinism. 

This is a contradiction.

From the point of view of determinism, there IS NO SUCH THING as the "right" or the "honest" or the "moral."

If one cannot choose between truth and error, nothing can be right or wrong. One simply believes or disbelieves what one is compelled to believe or disbelieve without any choice in the matter.

If one cannot choose between loyalty to facts and faking reality, honesty is not an option. One says what one says about reality because one is determined to say it.

If one cannot choose one's actions, one cannot act morally or immorally. One acts as one is compelled to act.

Taking your statement and eliminating the contradictions we get:

From where I stand, the only thing to do is to express and maintain a belief in determinism regardless of whether it is true, honest, or moral to do so.

[Fred Weiss]

... Whether you agree with me or not, I do not see how anybody can hold me personally, morally guilty of any intellectual error or dishonesty.

As Betsy said, morality, and its presupposition "responsibility", presupposes free will.

If I were to agree with any of you on free will, it would only be out of pressure from you and not out of an actual agreement.

I'm glad you at least implicitly agree that you have the choice.

*That* would be dishonest and I cannot do it, even though it would temporarily be easier for me to simply lie and concede the matter.

Honesty, and its presupposition that you have choice in your beliefs, presupposes free will. But once again I am glad to see that though you feel that something would easier for you, and you could lie, that you realize that you can choose something else and be honest instead.

From where I stand, the only right, just, honest, moral thing to do is to express and maintain a belief in determinism.

Your choice. Err...it is your choice, isn't it? I mean, you are not just compelled by forces outside of your control to believe in determinism?

Criticize that if you will, but I cannot believe that this should bring my character into question.

If your character is not up to you, why should you or anyone bring it into question? It would just be, whatever it is and presumably there is nothing you can do about it. So why bring up the issue? You do think, don't you, that your character is up to you?

Fred Weiss

[hippie]

But Speicher, so much love will be lost between us…

Anyway, you're right. If you perceive free will as an axiom, and I do not, then we must be two diffent kinds of beings. I doubt that, and I believe you are simply misinterpreting your senses, but if that is where we stand that that is all we can have to say--which is what I've said, but had hoped not to repeat, yet again.

Betsy, what is right is: what is best to do. Honesty is the act of representing to others what one knows without lies, embellishment, or omission. A state of morality is a state of being proper in the context of one’s environment. None of these contradict determinism. While the act of doing something right or wrong is determined (e.g. studying a business in order to make a sound investment), the existence of a right or wrong is not. Likewise, just because 2 + 2 = 4 is immutable, that doesn’t mean that right and wrong cease to apply. In the problem 2 + 2 = X, the right answer is four. If someone says seven, he is wrong. As an investment consultant, it is right to study businesses. One might not study businesses, and whichever the consultant does is determined, but there is still a right and a wrong.

Fred, I expect I have already addressed most of what you wrote. With the question of, “So why bring up the issue [of your personal character]?” That is exactly my question. Anyway, yes, my character is determined by me… which is then determined by other causes. That’s how the chain of causality goes. Every effect has a cause. Who I am (the effect) has a cause (who I was and what happened to me over time).

I must add, as a general note, that it never ceases to amaze me how excited Objectivists get over this discussion. I cannot imagine that one would get so heated about, say, the argument over the nature of dark matter. I am not a socialist—I am not proposing that physical force be used against anybody, I am not threatening anybody, I am not proposing any kind of threat like gun control or socialized medicine. I can understand getting angry with a communist, who tells you that you ought to be chained and worked like a slave (and is taking political steps to get it done). But on a matter like this, it’s just absurd to get upset.

Editted for sentence flow and clarity.

[RationalBiker]

I don’t see what people hope to achieve by yelling at me--as if my supposed volition may be commanded by the volume of their voices or inflection in their text.  In this case, it’s as if some think the sagacity of their slanders could direct my supposed volition.

Since you have no choice in the matter, volume or inflection may be just as valid a determining factor as reason in helping you "accept" the axiom of free will.

Or, since you believe in determinism, whoever is yelling at you can't help yelling or insulting you, because everything has led up to them taking those actions. Therefore, you can't be mad at them, they did not choose to yell at you, it was determined to happen that way.

Determinism, as I see it, voids any need for emotion. How could one logically be happy, sad or angry about any given outcome of action or decision if they weren't chosen? How can one feel or think they actually have any impact on themselves or the world around them if they aren't actually making choices of free will as opposed to being slaves to a predetermined course of thought leading to action which you can't choose? Taking that one step further, determinism also seems to void purpose and resposibility.

Nope, doesn't make sense or seem logical to me. I'll stick with my free will.

VES

[Fred Weiss]

...That’s how the chain of causality goes.  Every effect has a cause.  Who I am (the effect) has a cause (who I was and what happened to me over time).

Since you are here acknowledging that you are not guided by reason and that what you are and ever will be is compelled by forces outside of your control, it is clear that arguing with you any further on this subject is pointless.

I'll just point out that your considering it necessary nonetheless to continue to justify your position and protest your treatment by us - as if, according to you, any of us had any control over the positions we uphold - once again reveals the self-contradiction in your position - a self-contradiction which is so obvious and that even a dunce should be able to grasp it.

I'll leave you to ponder that, assuming you are able, of which at this point one has to wonder if you are capable.

Fred Weiss

[tommyedison]

If free will does not exist then Osama Bin Laden was not wrong in burning down the WTC and Hitler was not wrong in waging the World War II. If it does not exist then we have no right to condemn or praise a man since whatever the man is, he was not so of his own choice. If there is no free will then there is no difference between Thomas Edison and a common shoplifter.

People may not realize it but this is what they are implying when they say that they do not believe in free will.

Free will is the power to choose or not to choose. Since choice obviously exists, free will follows as a natural consequence. No condition determines whether you like an apple or an orange. You choose one of them out of your own free will.

[Fred Weiss]

If free will does not exist then Osama Bin Laden was not wrong in burning down the WTC and Hitler was not wrong in waging the World War II. If it does not exist then we have no right to condemn or praise a man since whatever the man is, he was not so of his own choice. If there is no free will then there is no difference between Thomas Edison and a common shoplifter.

That's exactly right - and very well put.

But the even more fundamental problem with the position is that it is devoid of meaning. It's advocates, if they were consistent, would realize that the words coming out of their mouths are mere utterances, nothing more than the squawks of parrots over which they have no control. I often say to them, "Aw, you're just saying that because you have to." Or if they ask a question or demand an answer, ask them if you have a choice (which of course they are implicitly assuming you do otherwise there would be no point to the question).

Since free will is axiomatic every aspect of determinism is self-contractory and its advocates therefore cannot deny it without implicitly assuming it and affirming it. So of course as soon as they start making moral judgments they are contradicting themselves.

My own favorite of these self-contradictions is when they pronounce with great confidence that determinism some day will be proven conclusively (assuming they think it hasn't already), apparently not realizing that the concept of "proof" presupposes free will.

Fred Weiss

[Areactor]

The title alone probably gives away the questions itself.

In the first chapter of OPAR, Peikoff states that an entity can only act accordingly to its nature. But he also states that there is only one action an entity can do.

My question is, how is this possible when Man or an individual human being can act in different ways?

My guess is that our actions are applied in different ways because of different situations but at the same time I imagine a person murdering others. If he isn't acting against his nature or in contradiction to it, what is he doing?

[MisterSwig]

My question is, how is this possible when Man or an individual human being can act in different ways?

My guess is that our actions are applied in different ways because of different situations but at the same time I imagine a person murdering others. If he isn't acting against his nature or in contradiction to it, what is he doing?

He is making a choice. He is using his consciousness. Which is what man does.

You cannot escape the fact that you must make choices. That is your nature. Man is a choice-maker. To live, to exercise your volitional consciousness, you must make choices. To live well and avoid death, you must choose to think and make good, subsequent choices.

What you choose, what you do, is up to you. But you must choose something, or die through neglect. For man lacks instincts to keep him alive.

A man who murders is not acting in contradiction to his nature. His nature is to make choices. Murder is a choice. What he is doing, though, is acting in contradiction to what is good for his life. He is choosing badly.

What helped me to understand free will better is to understand that a choice is actually a result of man's exercise of his consciousness. A choice is not a cause, it is an effect. Man makes choices. Plain and simple. Choices don't cause or make anything. Man's mind is the cause.

As men, we volitionally cause our own mental and physical choices. I cause myself to focus, to think, to act. As a volitional being I have the option of causing myself to focus on my girlfriend or the TV. I can then cause myself to think about turning on my girlfriend or turning on the boob tube. And, after that, I can cause myself to caress either my girlfriend or the remote control. All of these actions are not, strictly speaking, the result of my choice, they are my choice. They are the result of the operation of my consciousness, which I happen to have, thanks to nature, an element of control over.

[Travis P.]

But he also states that there is only one action an entity can do.

Where in the chapter is this?

[stephen_speicher]

In the first chapter of OPAR, Peikoff states that an entity can only act accordingly to its nature. But he also states that there is only one action an entity can do.

It is important to add the Peikoff says that there is only one action possible to an entity under a given set of circumstances. Note also that Peikoff characterizes that one action possible as that which is expressive of its identity.

My question is, how is this possible when Man or an individual human being can act in different ways?

Peikoff answers that question in Chapter 2, "Sense Perception and Volition." For man, the one action possible under any given circumstances is the primary choice. Man must choose, the primary choice being to focus or not, but how he chooses, the content of that choice, could have been otherwise.

Permit me to point out that, in my opinion, that entire Chapter 2 is one of the best writings Peikoff has ever done, only surpassed by The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy.

My guess is that our actions are applied in different ways because of different situations but at the same time I imagine a person murdering others. If he isn't acting against his nature or in contradiction to it, what is he doing?

Because of volition, man is the only animal that can act against his nature, primarily because discovery of that nature is a volitional process. But, as I indicated above, man's nature necessitates that he choose, in the primary sense.

[stephen_speicher]

A man who murders is not acting in contradiction to his nature.

Of course he is acting against his nature. The entire Objectivist ethics is predicated on identifying the nature of man and the nature of the reality in which he acts.

His nature is to make choices. Murder is a choice. What he is doing, though, is acting in contradiction to what is good for his life. He is choosing badly.

Choice is not the only part of man's nature. It is because of volitional choice that man can act against his nature.

What helped me to understand free will better is to understand that a choice is actually a result of man's exercise of his consciousness. A choice is not a cause, it is an effect. Man makes choices. Plain and simple. Choices don't cause or make anything. Man's mind is the cause.

I find this formulation to be very confusing. One can properly say that the primary choice is caused by the nature of consciousness and the nature of the brain upon which consciousness depends. But that primary choice certainly is itself a cause; as Peikoff points out, it is the first cause in a lengthy chain composed of higher-level choices, and these higher-level choices are reducible.

[Areactor]

Thanks for clearing that up Stephen. This question was ignorance on my part. I decided to skip Chapter 2 because of my boredom with the subject in Psychology. I'll be sure to read both chapters twice.

[MinorityOfOne]

The idea of man acting in a way that contradicts his nature will be confusing unless you bear in mind the nature of the Objectivist ethics. It isn't that man literally contradicts his nature in murdering another person; it's not on the same level as, say, if he were to pull a monkey out of his ear.

The form of all ethical principles in Objectivism amounts to: "If you wish to live, you must x." (I won't get into the nature of the choice to live, which has been discussed elsewhere.) Once you've made that choice (and you have, implicitly), you must discover what sorts of actions are consistent with a successful life. These are (at least insofar as they're specifically ethical types of actions, as against optional ones) inherent in your nature as a human, in the way that you must interact with reality because of what sort of organism you are. It's in this sense that you can act against your own nature. It's not that you perform the impossible, but rather, that you pretend that you can. The murderer pretends that slaying other humans is a proper way to live, but it is not a way which is consistent with life as a human. He's not pulling a monkey out of his ear, but he sure is trying.

[Capitalism Forever]

The murderer pretends that slaying other humans is a proper way to live, but it is not a way which is consistent with life as a human.  He's not pulling a monkey out of his ear, but he sure is trying.

Brilliantly put!