On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[Vladimir Berkov]

Pretty much.

[Morgan-LynnLamberth]

I go for causal free will [ compatabilism , soft determinism]. There are determinants to our volition, but we can change some of them. If we have paralyzing thoughts ,we can obtain counseling to change them to better determinants. We are a part of cause and effect, but we can thus alter some of our causes.And one holds us thus responsible for our actions.Contra-causal free will implies randomness over which we do not have contro and therefore non- responsible.Societs puts determinants-causes- in place to restrict criminal acts .

[Ifat Glassman]

Just have a question for people here:

What do you think is the relation between mind and brain?

To make it more specific:

Do you think that there can exist a functioning, active mind without a brain? If so, where is the evidence to suggest it?

[DavidOdden]

Do you think that there can exist a functioning, active mind without a brain? If so, where is the evidence to suggest it?

By "brain", do you mean specifically the grey meat-pudding object that exists in the skulls of mammals, or does the concept of "brain" extend to other things? I don't know of any conceptually basis for believing that a brain has to reside in the skull, though all brains that I'm aware of have that property.

[hunterrose]

Being pushed (regardless of whether he weighed the legal prohibition on injury) does not qualify as an action on [one's] part

Pretty much.

And because Jerry's reasoning didn't cause the bodily harm, it is unreasonable to make Jerry accountable for the bodily harm?

[Ifat Glassman]

By "brain", do you mean specifically the grey meat-pudding object that exists in the skulls of mammals, or does the concept of "brain" extend to other things? I don't know of any conceptually basis for believing that a brain has to reside in the skull, though all brains that I'm aware of have that property.

Well "brain" is defined as the upper part of the nervous system, but in all animals I know of, the nervous system also extends through the spinal cord. But the spinal cord was never observed to be involved in any process of conscious thought, only in gathering body sensations, executing motor commands, reflexes, but nothing conscious (as far as I know).

But if you want, I can change my question to "what is the relation between the mind and the nervous system?". I don't see much difference between this question and the original one... There are also regions in the brain that are not involved in conscious thinking (but in subconscious processing of visual information, for example).

And, by "brain" or by "nervous system" I am not only talking about the grey matter. The connections (axons), which compose "the white matter", are just as important as the grey matter for processing information. And the glial cells, the wrapping myelin layer, and the cerevbral fuild are also included. You know, the whole device.

Edited December 1, 2006 by ifatart

[DavidOdden]

But if you want, I can change my question to "what is the relation between the mind and the nervous system?". I don't see much difference between this question and the original one...

I was wondering if you were implicitly saying "at least for organic lifeforms on Earth", or if you had something broader in mind. Since apparently that's what you had in mind, then it appears that a physical brain is a prerequisite to having a mind.

[Ifat Glassman]

I was wondering if you were implicitly saying "at least for organic lifeforms on Earth", or if you had something broader in mind. Since apparently that's what you had in mind, then it appears that a physical brain is a prerequisite to having a mind.

I'm not sure what you mean by "broader"... I'm not interested in discussing machine intelligence, if that's what you're getting at...

Can you... give a more detailed answer about the relation between brain (or nervous system) and a mind?

"mind" is a big word. How about if you answer what is the relation between some thought or some conscious sensation, and the brain? Or between will and the brain? Does the will of a man must have some physical phenomena accompanying it (like electric changes, or chemical changes etc'), or can it exist without the simultaneous existence of some physical phenomena?

[Vladimir Berkov]

And because Jerry's reasoning didn't cause the bodily harm, it is unreasonable to make Jerry accountable for the bodily harm?

First off, it is rather annoying to deal with these questions. If you have some line of questioning you want to put forth to me, please just bring it out at the same time if possible.

To answer this question, the law would say that it would be unreasonable to hold him accountable. The problem with discussing the whole line of questioning is that people should be held accountable for is essentially a legal, not a philosophical, question. Philosophy tells you the goals and principles, law turns those into a workable, practical framework. Because of this legal responsibility doesn't always track moral responsibility.

[DavidOdden]

I'm not sure what you mean by "broader"... I'm not interested in discussing machine intelligence, if that's what you're getting at...

That's a possibility; or, if life exists elsewhere in the universe but has a radically different physical basic than that on earth -- I assume that you're not considering those kinds of minds.

Can you... give a more detailed answer about the relation between brain (or nervous system) and a mind?

Well, the physical locus of the mind is the brain, and if you have no brain, you have no mind. Given the nature of life on earth, you're also dead, but we know that you can destroy parts of the brain and the mind, without killing the person. But it's hard to get approval for those experiments.

"mind" is a big word. How about if you answer what is the relation between some thought or some conscious sensation, and the brain? Or between will and the brain? Does the will of a man must have some physical phenomena accompanying it (like electric changes, or chemical changes etc'), or can it exist without the simultaneous existence of some physical phenomena?

Uh, if you have a thought, they the physical locus is in the brain. But let's say I think of "ice cream" -- something will happen in my brain, but I'm skeptical about the idea that there is a particular, recurrent physical phenomenon that corresponds to the thought "ice cream", for all people. I have no reason to believe, or disbelieve, the proposition that when I conjure up a visual memory of a particular photograph, that some similar physical phenomenon happens each time.

[Ifat Glassman]

Uh, if you have a thought, they the physical locus is in the brain. But let's say I think of "ice cream" -- something will happen in my brain

What is the order of events here? Do you first think, and then something happens in the brain, or do they happen together?

but I'm skeptical about the idea that there is a particular, recurrent physical phenomenon that corresponds to the thought "ice cream", for all people. I have no reason to believe, or disbelieve, the proposition that when I conjure up a visual memory of a particular photograph, that some similar physical phenomenon happens each time.

But, it is KNOWN what happens in the brain when someone thinks of something - the specific neurons in the brain that are responsible for processing that information or represent it start firing action potentials in a higher frequency, and their metabolic consumption gets higher. Also, when those areas are excited electrically, the person reports certain thoughts (depending on the region stimulated). Is this new knoweldge or known one for you?

The exact pattern of neuron activation for "ice cream" will not be the same for all people, but it will certainly be very similar: in the same region, and linked to the same regions.

Anyway, I am especially interested in an answer to my first question or order of events.

[~Sophia~]

What is the order of events here? Do you first think, and then something happens in the brain, or do they happen together?

This is a very intersting question.

From my own observation, it starts with the choice it think - to focus, to analyze. If you don't make that choice - nothing happens. But then by what faculty is that initial choice being made if not by the action of the brain?

[KendallJ]

I'd agree with Sophia.

My particular take on this question is that they are essentially one in the same.

Just as a protein has a primmary structure (a string of amino acids) and a secondary structure (particular manners in which it folds) and a tertiary structure (the conformational structure it folds into), each imparting characteristics and functions which the lower level structure does not have on its own (such as the ability for hemoglobin to bind with oxygen), so to I think "the mind" is a representation of the function of the superstructure of the brain.

The volitional capacity which Sophia mentions, the "autoignition" mechanism if you will, must come from some attribute of that superstructure.

Objectivism takes this volitional structure as a metaphysical given, by virtue of the fact that it is directly observed to function, yet without knowing its actual mechanism.

[hunterrose]

It is rather annoying to deal with these questions. If you have some line of questioning you want to put forth to me, please just bring it out at the same time if possible.

Okay.

You say that it is reasonable to punish X if and only if X causes harm and X weighs the prohibitions of causing harm in such a way that it is applied/attached to the causing of harm.

How do you determine whether a person's weighing of the prohibitions of causing harm is applied/attached to the causing of harm?

In terms of the philosophic question, if you can't objectively determine this, then you can't determine when/if it is reasonable to punish someone and when/if it is unreasonable.

[DavidOdden]

What is the order of events here? Do you first think, and then something happens in the brain, or do they happen together?

They are coextensive; the brain event is the physical identity of thinking.

But, it is KNOWN what happens in the brain when someone thinks of something - the specific neurons in the brain that are responsible for processing that information or represent it start firing action potentials in a higher frequency, and their metabolic consumption gets higher.

I see. Well perhaps you can point me to a publication that describes the specific neurons responsible for the thought "ice cream", and makes that thought physically distinct from "dog" or "eat", in man. A least-difference approximation will suffice.

[Ifat Glassman]

From my own observation, it starts with the choice it think - to focus, to analyze. If you don't make that choice - nothing happens. But then by what faculty is that initial choice being made if not by the action of the brain?

Sophia, you can't observe what is the order of events, since you don't have access to the electrical/chemical activity in your brain as you think or want, or decide to focus. The order of events that you're suggesting is entirely a guess.

BUT... you raised the million dollars question by asking "But then by what faculty is that initial choice being made if not by the action of the brain?"

And the problem, is that if there is no physical phenomena that gives rise to "consciousness", then I don't see how something entirely non-physical can influence the very physical behavior of neurons, which are KNOWN to be the enablers of thoughts.

The only logical answer is:

They are coextensive; the brain event is the physical identity of thinking.

The million dollars answer.

Not only is this answer logical, but also the coextensive relation between thought and brain activity has been observed in numerous brain experiments: the electrical stimulation of certain brain areas produces certain thoughts, and the removal of certain brain regions causes loss of mental ability.

No brain-->No mental experience.

A will is also a type of thought, or a mental experience, and as such it must also be accompanied by some physical change in the brain.

?Does anyone disagree with this conclusion, before I take the next step down this path.

Well perhaps you can point me to a publication that describes the specific neurons responsible for the thought "ice cream", and makes that thought physically distinct from "dog" or "eat", in man. A least-difference approximation will suffice.

Try looking for articles about language processing in the brain. Usually thinking of words involves many areas of the brain, but the initial processing of words (their meaning) was located (in terms of areas and neuron populations, not individual neurons): check out this article: Fitting two languages into one brain.

[DavidOdden]

Try looking for articles about language processing in the brain. Usually thinking of words involves many areas of the brain, but the initial processing of words (their meaning) was located (in terms of areas and neuron populations, not individual neurons)

Right, I'm not unfamiliar with the topic. The thing is, that is elephant-sized precision for threading a virus-sized hole. We cannot point to a concrete and specific aspect of language, for example the difference "noun" versus "verb", a concrete-referential lexical item such as "dog" versus "cat", or the phoneme "s" versus "f". In terms of getting at the specific events that physically underly a particular thought in a human, we still aren't that much further advanced from mid-70's Broca- and Wernicke's area technology.

A will is also a type of thought, or a mental experience, and as such it must also be accompanied by some physical change in the brain.

Do you mean "a wish"?

[Vladimir Berkov]

You say that it is reasonable to punish X if and only if X causes harm and X weighs the prohibitions of causing harm in such a way that it is applied/attached to the causing of harm.

This is oversimplied, for instance harm is not required in criminal law, only in torts.

How do you determine whether a person's weighing of the prohibitions of causing harm is applied/attached to the causing of harm?

This essentially is asking two questions. First, how factual cause is determined. Second, how is it possible to judge intent or culpable mental states. Determining factual cause is relatively easy because it is a fact-based, essentially scientific inquiry no different than in any other area of scientific knowledge. Determining culpable mental states is much harder because it is (at least today) impossible to determine what a person thought at any given instance when they acted. Determining what type of mental processes or levels of consciousness a person had is almost always a circumstantial inquiry.

In terms of the philosophic question, if you can't objectively determine this, then you can't determine when/if it is reasonable to punish someone and when/if it is unreasonable.

Again, it depends on what you mean by "objectively." If by it you mean a 100% certain process, then no, there is no "objective" way to tell. If you mean by "objective" simply a reasonable process to determine the correct result which is applied across all individual fact-patterns, then yes, there is an objective way to determine it. You simply cannot demand too high a level of accuracy in law/morality.

[hunterrose]

This essentially is asking... first, how factual cause is determined.

No, I'm not asking about that. We know that both Jerry and Terry are, to use the term, factual causes. And I'm not asking about intent; we know that both Jerry and Terry had intent to harm Harry.

1. Terry's intent is applied to Terry being a factual cause.
   
2. Jerry's intent is applied to Jerry being a factual cause.
   

I'm asking: can you prove (or even make a strong case) that one is reasonable and the other unreasonable?

If you mean by "objective" simply a reasonable process to determine the correct result which is applied across all individual fact-patterns, then yes, there is an objective way to determine it.

Okay... then what is the way?

You're saying that determinism can answer the Jerry/Terry/Harry question, it's just that you either haven't, can't, or don't want to answer it qua "legal problem".

That's your prerogative, but it's quite the underwhelming argument...

Edit: removed some ambiguities

Edited December 3, 2006 by hunterrose

[Ifat Glassman]

Right, I'm not unfamiliar with the topic. The thing is, that is elephant-sized precision for threading a virus-sized hole. We cannot point to a concrete and specific aspect of language, for example the difference "noun" versus "verb", a concrete-referential lexical item such as "dog" versus "cat", or the phoneme "s" versus "f". In terms of getting at the specific events that physically underly a particular thought in a human, we still aren't that much further advanced from mid-70's Broca- and Wernicke's area technology.

That's not true. There were certainly cases in which individual neurons were pinpointed to the specific information they encode.

Also, in the link I gave you, if I remember correctly they are talking about the region that is responsible for structure of sentences.

I was taught of a case of a neuron from a sheep's brain (a single neuron) that was activated only when the sheep saw a caricature of a face of a male sheep with horns. And the cell started firing less (inhibition) as the horns of the face were shorter . It (the neuron's firing rate) was examined with a drawing of a circle alone, and other elements of the whole face... Don't have time to find it for you (and not sure if I can), but if you read enough you will see that recording from single neurons was certainly done. Specifically, in the study of the role of motor cortex in planning movement: there were lots of recordings from individual neurons using electrodes. There is a lot of money in that field so people study it.

Anyway, this is entirely irrelevant.

I said: "A will is also a type of thought, or a mental experience, and as such it must also be accompanied by some physical change in the brain." And then DavidOdden replied: "Do you mean "a wish"?"

Do you mind saying whether or not you agree with what I said?

Do you think that a will can exist without any physical representation in the brain?

[DavidOdden]

Do you think that a will can exist without any physical representation in the brain?

A will is a legal document. Free will is something else. What is the referent of your question?

[Ifat Glassman]

A will is a legal document. Free will is something else. What is the referent of your question?

Oh sorry!! I wasn't using "will" in the sense of a legal document, I thought the context was clear.

I was referring to "will" from the sentence "where there's a will there's a way".

[Vladimir Berkov]

No, I'm not asking about that. We know that both Jerry and Terry are, to use the term, factual causes. And I'm not asking about intent; we know that both Jerry and Terry had intent to harm Harry.

1. Terry's intent is applied to Terry being a factual cause.
   
2. Jerry's intent is applied to Jerry being a factual cause.
   

I'm asking: can you prove (or even make a strong case) that one is reasonable and the other unreasonable?

I am afraid I just don't see what the problem is. I don't see how it is hard to see a difference between human action and human inaction in a legal context (that is exactly what the difference between them is.)

You're saying that determinism can answer the Jerry/Terry/Harry question, it's just that you either haven't, can't, or don't want to answer it qua "legal problem".

I never said determinism was the "answer" to the problem. I said from the start the question was a legal one and thus I could only really answer it as a legal problem, and then went on to explain what the compatibilist position was as applied to the problem. If you don't like the compatibilist position, that's fine. But that doesn't mean it doesn't provide an explanation of a legal framework of liability.

[DavidOdden]

There were certainly cases in which individual neurons were pinpointed to the specific information they encode.

Stunning, if true. What is the empirical evidence that you're thinking of?

Also, in the link I gave you, if I remember correctly they are talking about the region that is responsible for structure of sentences.

In uninformative terms. As I say, we've had a very coarse-grained understanding of the location of language since Broca's discovery, which has gotten a bit refined (that editorial points to some refinements, which are as useful as me answering the question "Where are you?" with "In Europe"), but not down the the point that we can point to two obviously distinct linguistic events and their neuronal differentiation. Show me the pattern of brain activity that corresponds to active versus passive sentences, past tense versus present tense verbs, relative clauses versus complement clauses, or the words "big" versus "pig". Do that, and I'll eat my hat.

I said: "A will is also a type of thought, or a mental experience, and as such it must also be accompanied by some physical change in the brain.

That's why I asked my question: you're simply wrong about "a will". "Will", in that sense, is not a process, just as a philosophy is not a process, even though having one might lead to some kind of action (which is a process). Since we don't know enough about the physics of memory, we don't know enough about the physics of having a will.

[hunterrose]

I don't see how it is hard to see a difference between human action and human inaction in a legal context (that is exactly what the difference between them is.)

Is that the differentiating factor?

1. Jerry desires to harm Harry. This causes Jerry to grimace at Harry. This grimacing human action causes Terry to desire to harm, which causes Terry to push Jerry into Harry, and thus break Harry's arm.
   
2. Jerry desires to harm Harry. This causes Jerry to solicit Terry's aid. This soliciting human action causes Terry to desire to harm, which causes Terry to push Jerry into Harry, and thus break Harry's arm.
   

Is it reasonable to have a law against grimacing at another man? Volition says no; determinism says maybe?

Your difference (human action vs. human inaction) still doesn't distinguish reasonable/unreasonable.