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On the question of free-will vs. determinism

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Not always.  A wrong choice could also be due to an honest error of knowledge.

to use a rand quote "in the realm of morality nothing less than perfect will do." But i know that objectivism does distinguish between those who consciously make poor choices and those who due to lack of knowledge make poor choices. So i agree with your point

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to use a rand quote "in the realm of morality nothing less than perfect will do."

It's important to understand what that means in Objectivist terms. Perfection doesn't mean omniscience or infallibility. It means an unbreached commitment to understanding reality as best you can.

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Nimble, I think the point is that "an honest error of knowledge" is not the same thing as a "poor choice."

and i said i completely agree, i dont see why i am getting odd little lectures directed at me. I dont know if im am being paranoid, but you guys act as if you are proving something to me, yet i completely agree with both of you. I dont get why any response is necessary to a complete and total agreement, maybe you can tell me?

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1.Lacking nothing essential to the whole; complete of its nature or kind.

2.Being without defect or blemish: a perfect specimen.

3.Thoroughly skilled or talented in a certain field or area; proficient.

"It means an unbreached commitment to understanding reality as best you can. "

this definition seems to only approach the third type of perfection, in which without defect is replaced with skilled, which seems more to mean a higher degree of completeness, not completeness itself.

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Hi, I've been reading this forum for quite some time without posting, but several recent threads regarding consciousness/freewill have caused me to think about this subject a lot and this seems like the best place to find someone to help me with a few questions :)

Let me preface this thread by saying that the only Objectivist text which I have encountered deaing with volition in any significant detail is OPAR (though it was also mentioned in Atlas Shrugged), but this does not seem to answer any of my questions in the detail I require. My only real knowledge of the Objectivist view of the human mind in a scientific sense comes from reading posts on this forum, and on h.p.o. More specifically, Steven Speicher's posts in the artifical intelligence thread on the Science forum here piqued my interest, and caused me to spend several days trawling through the h.p.o archives for similar discussions, where I encountered many particularly informative posts by people such as steven/betsy/etc. However, as you can probably imagine, reading isolated posts on the internet is not the best way to learn about a complex philosophical position and I'm not sure if I fully understand the Objectivist stance on this subject (or even if there actually is an 'Objectivist stance'). In this thread, I intend to outline how I have integrated this subject so far, and I would like people to point out any mistakes that I have made. Also, if anyone knows of any books/audio tapes produced by Objectivist thinkers that address this topic from this angle, I'd be very greatful if you could inform me of them.

On a sidenote, I do not intend for this thread to be a discussion about the existence of volition, since to me this seems a self-evident truth. Rather, I am concerned with what consequences the existence of volition has for our conception of the physical universe - ie what conditions must a physical theory of matter satisfy in order to be compatible with volition? Anyway, here is what I have so far:

1. Identity entails casuality The identity of an object determines what it can and cannot do. All actions has a specific cause (or causes)

1.1. Nothing in the universe can be either acasual or metaphysically random, since this is a violation of casuality and thus identity.

1.2. Therefore, volition cannot be acasual (as many advocates of it have often claimed). Rather, it is a type of causation, which has as it's source volitional consciousness.

1.3. Volitional consciousness is an emergent property of matter.

1.3.1. An emergent property can roughly be described as one that is possessed by an entity as a result of its structure, rather than just as a result of its material components (or in other words, "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts"). Although no specific molecules of H2O are 'wet', water as an entity is wet. Likewise, although no specific atoms can be considered 'alive' in any meaningful sense, certain entities composed of atoms can be alive. Some of these living entitiies can possess consciousness, and some of these conscious entities can possess volitional consciousness.

2. The mind is caused by the brain; we are not dualists in the Cartesian sense. However it is emergent, and cannot be 'reduced' to the brain.

2.1. As evidence for this, I believe there have been numerous experiments where conscious states have been induced by physical contact with certain parts of the brain (eg touching someone's brain in place X can make them experience something similar to Y, and so on).

2.2. Despite the above, it would be fallacious to say that the mind 'is' the brain, or can be reduced to it. We cannot explain things such as concepts, emotions or abstract thoughts by reference to the position of atoms in the brain. As an analogy, consider the internet. The internet 'is' thousands of computers, and a computer 'is' millions of electrons, transistors, and logic gates. However, it would be fallacious to claim that the internet 'is' just electrons etc. Although the internet is certainly caused by physical things such as electrons on a circuit board, it cannot be explained in terms of them. A similar example would be my character's gun in a game of Quake - we could not look at the motherboard and say 'that group of electrons there represent the gun'.

2.3. The brain is made up of entirely physical matter. Not being a neurosurgeon or cognitive scientist, I do not claim to know the current theories relating to how the brain is structured, but I dont think this is relevant to the underlying argument. I will assume the standard popscience version of the brain, ie that it is composed of neurons, which are made up of atoms (please don't correct me on this or give a more detailed explanation here, unless it is actually relevant to this topic).

2.3.1. There must be some kind of isomorphism between consiciously experienced brain-states, and physical patterns of neurons in the brain. If this were not the case, we could not say that the mind was caused by the brain.

2.3.2. Key point: The determinist would claim that it is neurons firing according to the laws of physics which produce our conscious states, and gives us our 'illusion' of freewill. However this misses the point that neurons can only fire if caused to do so, and volition is a type of causation. It is not the movement of atoms that determines our choices and future conscious states, it is our choices that determine how these atoms will move. An entity with volitional consciousness causes its composite individual physical components to move in the way they do. The mind controls the brain, not viceversa. This seems to me the only way that free-will can exist without resorting to dualism, or otherwise rejecting materialism.

3. Our choices affect the way that physical matter will move. This follows immediately from 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.

3.1. Assume that I have 2 choices available to me (simplistically, "the choice to focus or not focus" (I say simplistically because there are obviously varying degrees of focus I can choose to have)). Now, physical matter must move in a different way depending on which choice I make. If I choose one thing, the neurons in my brain will act in one way. If I choose the other, they will act in a different way.

3.2. Keypoint: The universe must by epistemologically unpredictable with regard to this. Leave aside Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle, and assume it were possible for me to know the position and velocity of every single atom in your brain. I would not be able to predict which choice you would make, since it is your choice which affects the way these atoms will move, and not their movement which determines your choice. If it were possible for me to always predict their movement, you could not be said to have free-will since your 'choice' would have been predetermined.

3.2.1. Since your volitional consciousness is caused by your brain, which consists of individual atoms, this means that at some point an atom would have to experience a force which could not be predicted beforehand, even by someone who knew the location and velocity of every atom in the universe. By 1.1, this force doesnt represent 'metaphysical randomness', rather it is caused by your volitional consciousness. This seems to be Condition 1: Physics must allow for an individual atom to be affected by a force which is independent of every other piece of matter in the universe, cannot be predicted in advance regardless of the information available, and yet isn't random.

3.3. The universe must be indeterminate, at least inside a person's head.

3.3.1. If after I had made my choice, it were somehow possible to 'move' every single atom back to its position before I made it, there could be no guarantee that they would move in the same way again. For if they would always move in an identical way, this would mean that my choice would always be the same, which is directly contradictory to the notion of freewill. This seems to be Condition 2: The universe must be metaphysically indeterminate; 2 collections of atoms which start in absolutely identical states are not guaranteed to finish in the same state, if they are part of an entity with volitional consicousness.

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it depends on whether you are talking about moral perfection or objective perfection, where every decision you make is the best objectively that was open to you. Moral perfection would be staying consistent, where you could make a wrong choice based on lack of knowledge and still acheive moral perfection.

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I dont get why any response is necessary to a complete and total agreement, maybe you can tell me?

Because I did not agree with what you thought to be agreement.

Betsy said:

A wrong choice could also be due to an honest error of knowledge.
You responded:
But i know that objectivism does distinguish between those who consciously make poor choices and those who due to lack of knowledge make poor choices.

As I understand these words, they say that there are two different categories of "poor choices." One being those who consciously make "poor choices" and the other being those who make "poor choices" due to lack of knowledge.

I do not think that making an honest error of knowledge belongs in the category of poor choice.

p.s. You seem to be getting quite upset over this. If this conversation really bothers you personally then do not feel any need to respond. I really had no intention to disturb you and the issue itself is not that important to me. I mean you no disrespect and wish you no harm.

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I think you've laid everything out rather well, particularly in your summation and I can't see anything wrong with the physical ramifications of volitional consciousness which you propose. In the last paragraph though, I believe, correct me if I'm wrong, that you mean to say that the universe must also then be physically indeterminate. Physically, the future position of an atom in the brain is impossible to predict.

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Phew! Someone has been moving those brain cells around. :huh:

As a prefacing comment I want to again make clear that I try not to refer to "the Objectivist view" unless I can trace that view back to Ayn Rand or her approved sources. I am an Objectivist and I do have many views, but, unless stated otherwise, such views should be considered as my own. There is no "Objectivist science" except for those few specific scientific matters which were directly addressed by or authorized by Miss Rand. I consider all of my scientific views to be consistent with Objectivist philosophy, but I do not present them as Objectivism.

As to Spearmint's treatise here: I really should go to sleep but I cannot resist. All in all he has put together a nice synopsis of a very broad and sometimes difficult area to grasp. The specific terminology throughout needs to be made more precise, but I think the essence is there. Just a few remarks, on a few issues, keyed to Spearmint's numbering system.

1.2 is a bit circular. Thought processes are higher-level actions of volitional consciousness that are caused but not necessitated, since we could have chosen otherwise. But the fact of volition per se, the primary choice itself, is both caused and necessitated, by our nature.

1.3 & 1.3.1 I think the notion of an emergent property as applied to consciousness has, at best, marginal utility. Fundamentally, as far as our understanding goes, labeling consciousness as an emergent property adds little in the way of insight into the nature of consciousness.

2 - 2.2 The example does not illustrate reduction. The internet, as a physical process, can be reduced to its fundamental physical elements, just as life can be reduced to its fundamental elements. But consciousness cannot be reduced to the neural processes of the brain. This is another illustration where the notion of an emergent property does not really further our understanding of consciousness. The internet is an emergent property of electromagnetic and mechanical processes, and life is an emergent property of biochemical processes, and each is reducible to those processes. Not so with consciousness and neural processess.

Also, I do not like to use "The mind is caused by the brain." The brain is causally required for the mind, but that is not exactly the same thing as saying the mind is caused by the brain.

2.3.x Too much here to cover in detail. But, I do not think it correct to say the "mind controls the brain." Much of brain functioning is automatic and not directly under conscious control. We could not function if we had to consciously attend to all the functional mechanisms in the brain and their interactions with the external world. It is correct to say that consciousness has causal efficacy in the brain within which it exists.

3.x Don't lose sight of the fact that all physical processes are deterministic, and therefore predictable. This includes the neural processes in the brain. It is only by virtue of volitional consciousness that we cannot predict beyond the intervention of that consciousness. Consciousness has causal efficacy in the brain, and once consciousness acts, the physical processes of the brain are fully determinstic, as are the physical mechanisms initiated by the brain.

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As a prefacing comment I want to again make clear that I try not to refer to "the Objectivist view" unless I can trace that view back to Ayn Rand or her approved sources. I am an Objectivist and I do have many views, but, unless stated otherwise, such views should be considered as my own. There is no "Objectivist science" except for those few specific scientific matters which were directly addressed by or authorized by Miss Rand. .
Yes, I agree. I can understand the desire to restrict the phrase 'Objectivism' to solely the body of work written/approved by Rand, but it also strikes me as irritating that there isnt a name to encapuslate the work produced "in the Objectivist tradition", by those drawing upon Rand's principles and applying them to areas which she never wrote about explicitly (or expanding upon those she did). I'd like to a word like "Randian" to describe this, but I know that she explicitly disapproved of this. It seems odd that we do not have a word to refer to the collectivel body of work currently being produced by people like Peikoff/Binswanger/etc, which has obviously been influenced heavily by Rand, and represents a valid concept as a whole.

1.3 & 1.3.1 I think the notion of an emergent property as applied to consciousness has, at best, marginal utility. Fundamentally, as far as our understanding goes, labeling consciousness as an emergent property adds little in the way of insight into the nature of consciousness.
I partially agree here. Calling something emergent seems to be the latest way of saying "we have no idea where this comes from" - it's almost the substitution of a lack of explanation for an explanation. I was using the term to indicate a 'structural' property - ie one that comes as a result of the structure of matter, rather than as a result of the properties of the indiviual 'pieces' of matter composing its structure. However, I'm not sure that even this is meaningful, since you could perhaps argue that all properties are 'structural' in this sense (atoms do not appear to the human eye as 'red', nor could you eat your dinner with individual molecules etc etc).

2 - 2.2 The example does not illustrate reduction. The internet, as a physical process, can be reduced to its fundamental physical elements, just as life can be reduced to its fundamental elements. But consciousness cannot be reduced to the neural processes of the brain. This is another illustration where the notion of an emergent property does not really further our understanding of consciousness. The internet is an emergent property of electromagnetic and mechanical processes, and life is an emergent property of biochemical processes, and each is reducible to those processes. Not so with consciousness and neural processess.

Also, I do not like to use "The mind is caused by the brain." The brain is causally required for the mind, but that is not exactly the same thing as saying the mind is caused by the brain.

Could you please clarify what you mean here? It seems to be the essentail point of this matter, and I'm not sure that I fully grasp what you are trying to say. I assume your claim is that the mind does not stand in the same relationship to the brain as (say) life does to its components, or computers do to electromagnetic phenomenon, but what is the nature of this difference? Is there any evidence for it?

I'm also not entirely sure what you mean by the last sentence. I can understand that theres a difference between saying that the brain is casually required for the mind and sayng that the mind is caused by the brain (as an analogy, being near is a swimming pool is a casual requirement for me to go for a swim, but it is certainly not the cause), but in this case it seems to leave a blank over what causes the mind. I assume that something has to 'cause' it, and the research showing that poking about in relevant parts of the brain can induce conscious states seems like fairly strong evidence that the brain does indeed fill this cause (although I suppose you could also say that this is an example of the brain _affecting_ consciousness rather than _causing_ it).

2.3.x Too much here to cover in detail. But, I do not think it correct to say the "mind controls the brain." Much of brain functioning is automatic and not directly under conscious control. We could not function if we had to consciously attend to all the functional mechanisms in the brain and their interactions with the external world. It is correct to say that consciousness has causal efficacy in the brain within which it exists.
Agreed, poor choice of words on my part. I should rephrase to say that the mind 'controls' parts of the brain (the nature of which 'parts' these are would obviously not be a question for philosophy).

3.x Don't lose sight of the fact that all physical processes are deterministic, and therefore predictable. This includes the neural processes in the brain. It is only by virtue of volitional consciousness that we cannot predict beyond the intervention of that consciousness. Consciousness has causal efficacy in the brain, and once consciousness acts, the physical processes of the brain are fully determinstic, as are the physical mechanisms initiated by the brain.
I''m not sure that I understand this either. Yes, once consciousness has made its choice the resulting processes are fully deterministic, but prior to making this it could not be possible to predict which choice could be made - ie you could not predict _which_ chain of physical processes would be initiated. If my 'focusing' resulted in stream-of-casual-physical-processes A, and my non focusing caused stream-of-casual-physical-processes B, then surely it would not be possible to predict whether A or B would occur, regardless of your knowledge of the universe? Also wouldnt there have to be indeterminism here, in the fact that either A or B could occur from the same starting state (ie the state of atoms in my brain prior to me making my choice), and the same result would not be guaranteed if we were to somehow repeat this position, since I would be able to choose a different alternative to that which I chose the first time?
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I was using the term to indicate a 'structural' property - ie one that comes as a result of the structure of matter, rather than as a result of the properties of the indiviual 'pieces' of matter composing its structure.

We do not yet know enough about the detailed conditions which give rise to consciousness in order to make the distinction you draw. In addition, there may be other things involved not covered by these two alternatives.

I assume your claim is that the mind does not stand in the same relationship to the brain as (say) life does to its components, or computers do to electromagnetic phenomenon, but what is the nature of this difference? Is there any evidence for it?
The evidence is manyfold and directly available by introspection. The measure of consciousness is different in nature from physical states. We refer to our thoughts as being clear or confused, witty or dull, the very language of which is not applicable to the physical states of the brain. That certain neurons fire when we think about the person we love, does not locate that thought as being seated in those neurons. Conscious states and physical states are simply two different things.

Remember, to "be reduced to" means, to "be explained by." There is nothing more fundamental to explain the actions of consciousness than consciousness itself. That is why consciousness is an irreducible primary. That neural processes accompany conscious processess does not mean that the latter is explainable in terms of the former.

I'm also not entirely sure what you mean by the last sentence. I can understand that theres a difference between saying that the brain is casually required for the mind and sayng that the mind is caused by the brain (as an analogy, being near is a swimming pool is a casual requirement for me to go for a swim, but it is certainly not the cause), but in this case it seems to leave a blank over what causes the mind. I assume that something has to 'cause' it, and the research showing that poking about in relevant parts of the brain can induce conscious states seems like fairly strong evidence that the brain does indeed fill this cause (although I suppose you could also say that this is an example of the brain _affecting_ consciousness rather than _causing_ it).

The importance of the distinction is the short steps often made by some who go from "conscious processes accompany neural processes" to "conscious processes are caused by neural processes" to "conscious processes are neural processes." The brain is causally required for the existence of consciousness, but it does not cause conscious actions -- our consciousness is volitional. As you said yourself, consciousness itself is a type of causation.

I''m not sure that I understand this either. Yes, once consciousness has made its choice the resulting processes are fully deterministic, but prior to making this it could not be possible to predict which choice could be made - ie you could not predict _which_ chain of physical processes would be initiated.

Different words, but we are saying the same thing.

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thank you for the explanation, that wasnt clear before that you disagreed there. But i stick by my statement, it may not be an objectivist statement (although i think it is), but a poor choice will always be a poor choice no matter what the intentions were. It may not be morally wrong to make that poor choice, but it will have the same consequences in reality as any other poor choice would. If someone miscalculates the physics of a bungie jump, and dies. It wasnt morally a poor choice, but the man suffers the same consequences as if it were pure suicide. Like i said, i dont view it as morally wrong, but i would sure call it a poor choice.

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thank you for the explanation, that wasnt clear before that you disagreed there. But i stick by my statement, it may not be an objectivist statement (although i think it is),

 

I do not think that either of us are making Objectivist statements. I think we are just disagreeing about the meaning we attach to certain words.

but a poor choice will always be a poor choice no matter what the intentions were.
Why do you suddenly introduce "intentions" here? We were talking about an "honest error of knowledge" as compared to a "poor choice."

It may not be morally wrong to make that poor choice, but it will have the same consequences in reality as any other poor choice would.

This statement assumes what you need to demonstrate, namely your assertion that an honest error of knowledge is a "poor choice."

If someone miscalculates the physics of a bungie jump, and dies. It wasnt morally a poor choice, but the man suffers the same consequences as if it were pure suicide. Like i said, i dont view it as morally wrong, but i would sure call it a poor choice.

In the example you chose I doubt I would refer to a miscalculation as a "poor choice." I see a miscalculation more as an existential mistake, and a "poor choice" more as a matter of judgment.

Perhaps in some sense both of these can be seen as an "honest error of knowledge," but I usually reserve that term to mean something more like what a person holds as a contextual truth, where a broader context shows him to have been in error. I just do not see that as being the same as a "poor choice."

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In the example you chose I doubt I would refer to a miscalculation as a "poor choice." I see a miscalculation more as an existential mistake, and  a "poor choice" more as a matter of judgment.

he chose to take the dive. That choice resulted in death. I would say it was poor. But i see that you just stand clear of the use of that phrase to avoid the confusion that is the root of this argument. I probably do attach a different connotation to my phrase than you would, so these are probably moot points.

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"Once consciousness has made its choice the resulting processes are fully deterministic, but prior to making this it could not be possible to predict which choice could be made - ie you could not predict _which_ chain of physical processes would be initiated."

So, applying this, before a choice is made, atoms are in one position and direction and once the choice is made they proceed in a different direction without any possible physical explanation? (Just want to be sure I understand)

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So, applying this, before a choice is made, atoms are in one position and direction and once the choice is made they proceed in a different direction without any possible physical explanation? (Just want to be sure I understand)

Though not asked of me, permit me to answer.

I do not like this whole "consciousness moving atoms around" terminology because it is misleading and creates confusion. Physical processes are deteministic, period. That means that, any physical process is fully determined by the nature of the physical entities which act, and by all the conditions that impinge upon that entity. This is true of particles, atoms, molecules, etc .

Now, the fact remains that consciousness has causal efficacy in the brain within which it resides. This causal efficacy results in changing the conditions which the brain would have otherwise found itself to be in. Once consciousness so acts, then the neural processes, and physical and chemical mechanisms connected to those processes, act in a fully determinstic manner.

Is the principle now clear?

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This is how I see it:

The brain processes and the processes of consciousness ARE often the same phenomena - but viewed from different perspective that are not reducible.

For example - take love. Love is an emotion, presumably equivalent to chemical reaction X in the brain.

The causes of love are mental causes: values held, sense of life, subconscious integration.

The causes of chemical reaction X are physical/chemical: some hormone, or some chemicals meet in the brain, and form a certain reaction with a certain result.

Now - these are both aspects of the SAME THING. But one is the external, scientific perspective, while the other is the subjective, mental perspective. Both are AS objective. Both exist: the chemical reaction, and the subjective experience of love.

But if you say: "Love is nothing more than chemical reaction X", you are ignoring the meaning and experience of love, which is 100% a part of objective mental reality, and cannot be ignored.

Ayn Rand wrote on this subject in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology:

Extrospection is a process of cognition directed outward - a process of apprehending some existent(s) of the external world. Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward - a process of apprehending one's own psychological actions in regard to some existent(s) of the external world, such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc.
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It may not be morally wrong to make that poor choice, but it will have the same consequences in reality as any other poor choice would.

That is part of the process of learning, since we are not omniscient or infallible. Since, as you said, it is not necessarily morally wrong, it does not necessarily mean that one falls short of moral perfection.

it depends on whether you are talking about moral perfection or objective perfection...
We are talking about moral perfection. That has been the context of this discussion all along, as made explicit by the Ayn Rand quote you provided: "in the realm of morality nothing less than perfect will do." (Emphasis added.)

...or objective perfection, where every decision you make is the best objectively that was open to you.

I think there is an equivocation here, where you mean "objective" in the metaphyisical sense before the comma, but "objectively" in the second part can only validly be used in the epistemological sense (keeping in mind the context that we are not omniscient or infallible). In the latter sense, which is the only one relevant here, "objectively" is more or less equivalent to "morally."

and i said i completely agree, i dont see why i am getting odd little lectures directed at me. I dont know if im am being paranoid, but you guys act as if you are proving something to me, yet i completely agree with both of you. I dont get why any response is necessary to a complete and total agreement, maybe you can tell me?

I find it strange that you characterize Betsy's brief responses as "lectures." It does strike me as kind of paranoid. Obviously, she didn't entirely agree with you, as her response made clear. This is a discussion board--if you can't take such discussion without taking it personally, then maybe you should not participate. Precision is very important to Objectivists, and if you formulate something in an imprecise way they are likely to correct you. This isn't just to prove you wrong, but rather to strive for accuracy and hopefully help you by teaching you to strive for the same.

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I find it strange that you characterize Betsy's brief responses as "lectures." It does strike me as kind of paranoid. Obviously, she didn't entirely agree with you, as her response made clear. This is a discussion board--if you can't take such discussion without taking it personally, then maybe you should not participate. Precision is very important to Objectivists, and if you formulate something in an imprecise way they are likely to correct you. This isn't just to prove you wrong, but rather to strive for accuracy and hopefully help you by teaching you to strive for the same.

sorry i just found that a bit strange that when i said 'i agree', she had a rebuttal. I didnt really take offense to it.

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