Thoughts on Ayer's elimination of metaphysics?

[drewfactor]

I just finished reading A.J. Ayer's book "Language Truth and Logic" and I had a question about what seems to be the basis of his whole argument: The elimination of metaphysics.

My interpretation is that by eliminating metaphysical speculations that cannot be verified by sense-experience, philosophy is emancipated from much of its unresolvable conflicts such as realism vs. idealism etc... I was wondering if Ayer means something different from Rand by the term "metaphysics" since the basis of Objectivism is: metaphysically - existence exists.

[punk]

I just finished reading A.J. Ayer's book "Language Truth and Logic" and I had a question about what seems to be the basis of his whole argument: The elimination of metaphysics.

My interpretation is that by eliminating metaphysical speculations that cannot be verified by sense-experience, philosophy is emancipated from much of its unresolvable conflicts such as realism vs. idealism etc...  I was wondering if Ayer means something different from Rand by the term "metaphysics" since the basis of Objectivism is: metaphysically - existence exists.

Ayer would hold that a statement like "existence exists" is fundamentally meaningless.

But to answer the question, both are using the term "metaphysics" in pretty much the same way.

[BurgessLau]

I just finished reading A.J. Ayer's book "Language Truth and Logic" and I had a question about what seems to be the basis of his whole argument: The elimination of metaphysics.

I haven't read Ayer's work. Does he, in that work, say what he means by "metaphysics"? Does he mean ontology? Or does he mean something like "useless speculation about things-in-themselves"? Or something else?

If the basis of his argument is that metaphysics should be eliminated, and if he doesn't define metaphysics, then I would suspect a con game.

[Cole]

I was just considering something like this before I saw the thread. I only recently discovered that the use of "metaphysics" to mean "supernatural" is pretty common. When I'm in disagreement with somebody about metaphysics, and the disagreement is a result of him using the word to mean "supernatural" and my use of it to mean "the nature of reality," what should be done? Should I just substitute "metaphysics" for "the nature of reality," or is it possible to preserve the word? He would point to multiple dictionary definitions that support his use, as well as the fact that "meta" is Greek for "beyond" and "physica" for "reality"- the supernatural. Is there any objective connection of a specific word to a specific definition? If not, then am I best off just using whatever terms are necessary for the other person to understand my position?

Some other words that I have this problem with are; morals ("how you treat other people"), egotistical/selfish ("false-pride", "rudeness"), and atheism ("a positive assertion of God's non-existence"). Am I better off just repleacing these with "a code of values by which to guide your actions," "rational self-interest," and "being without theism" when any disagreement as to their proper definition arises? Or is it possible to argue that these words have a specific definition?

[Cole]

Ayer would hold that a statement like "existence exists" is fundamentally meaningless.

But to answer the question, both are using the term "metaphysics" in pretty much the same way.

Are you using prior/additional knowledge of Ayer to make that conclusion? I don't see how that can be gathered from what drewfactor paraphrased in this thread. If Ayer uses the word to mean "speculations that cannot be verified by sense-experience" (although these are drewfactor's words, the context seems to imply that this is what Ayer was addressing as well) then he certainly has a different definition of the word than Ayn Rand.

[punk]

Are you using prior/additional knowledge of Ayer to make that conclusion? I don't see how that can be gathered from what drewfactor paraphrased in this thread. If Ayer uses the word to mean "speculations that cannot be verified by sense-experience" (although these are drewfactor's words, the context seems to imply that this is what Ayer was addressing as well) then he certainly has a different definition of the word than Ayn Rand.

I've read Ayer's "Language, Truth, and Logic", and I'm also familiar with logical positivism (a school where calling something "metaphysics" is about the same as calling it "bullshit"). Ayer was rather enamored of the Vienna Circle when he wrote that work.

My recollection of "Language, Truth, and Logic" is that it espouses some form of verificationism. In overly simple terms that principle is:

The meaning of a proposition is its means of verification

The gist of this will be that only propositions which can be empiricially investigated have meaning.

Since it does not appear that a proposition like "Existence exists" lends itself to empiricial verification, in positivist terms it is meaningless. Similar reasoning will toss out most of what people call "metaphysics".

[Hal]

My recollection of "Language, Truth, and Logic" is that it espouses some form of verificationism.  In overly simple terms that principle is:

The meaning of a proposition is its means of verification

Pretty much. Its an extension of the idea that understanding a proposition involves knowing what would be the case if that proposition were true (or false) - ie what consequences does it have for the world, what states of affairs does it rule out, and so on.

Since it does not appear that a proposition like "Existence exists" lends itself to empiricial verification, in positivist terms it is meaningless. Similar reasoning will toss out most of what people call "metaphysics".

Its worth pointing out that Objectivism has a _very_ sparse metaphysics in comparasion with traditional systems like those expoused by Aristotle, Plato, Hegel, Heidegger etc. And a lot of Objectivists do use metaphysics to rule out certain empirical results - such as specific interpretations of quantum mechanics, or nativism in cognitive science, so you could argue that they do in fact have empirical consequences. However it would be more correct to say they are guidelines for interpretating observations, rather than being empirical predictions.

Edited August 15, 2005 by Hal

[BurgessLau]

Cole, as usual your questions are intriguing and practical.

I only recently discovered that the use of "metaphysics" to mean "supernatural" is pretty common.[...]

Worse, "metaphysics" in its general nonphilosophical use often represents extreme irrationalisms. Thomas Aquinas held to a partly supernatural view of existence (two worlds), but did so in a manner that was at least intelligible (in part). On the other hand, some bookstores have sections on "metaphysics." These sections contain everything from "channeling" to crystal gazing. In this sense, "metaphysics" is sometimes a synonym for "occult."

When I'm in disagreement with somebody about metaphysics, and the disagreement is a result of him using the word to mean "supernatural" and my use of it to mean "the nature of reality," what should be done? Should I just substitute "metaphysics" for "the nature of reality," or is it possible to preserve the word?

You have several options depending on the person you are talking to and your purposes, among other factors. For example, you could simply say, "Metaphysics in your sense" or "metaphysics in my sense" for each point you make.

Or you could reach temporary common ground by accepting the term "metaphysics" as labeling the idea of supernaturalism, while using "ontology" as the term labeling the philosophical study of the basic nature of reality (which may be natural or supernatural or both in some combination, depending on the philosophy you are discussing).

He would point to multiple dictionary definitions that support his use, [...]

Keep in mind that most dictionaries don't define concepts, but list usages of certain terms in the language. An unabridged dictionary will list a wide range of usages. Anybody can pick the one he means. Sometimes the various usages are mutually contradictory. "Sanction" is an example. Sometimes it means "support" and sometimes it means "penalize."

as well as the fact that "meta" is Greek for "beyond" and "physica" for "reality"- the supernatural.

I have never heard that explanation before. The conventional explanation among Aristotle scholars whose introductory works I have read is that ancient Greeks who came after Aristotle organized his books in a tutorial manner (probably following Aristotle's own suggestions, but I am not sure). If you study "philosophy" (in the ancient Greek sense), you first study the things you can see. That is phusikos (where ikos indicates a science, here of phusis, nature). What comes after (meta in Greek) physics is ontology, because it is far more abstract -- hence metaphusikos, that is, the study that comes after physics.

Edited August 15, 2005 by BurgessLau

[Hal]

I haven't read Ayer's work. Does he, in that work, say what he means by "metaphysics"? Does he mean ontology? Or does he mean something like "useless speculation about things-in-themselves"? Or something else?

If the basis of his argument is that metaphysics should be eliminated, and if he doesn't define metaphysics, then I would suspect a con game.

He doesnt need to define metaphysics for the purpose of his arguments. All that matters is that metaphyiscs involves statements that have no empirical consequences, and is therefore nonsense by the verificationist theory of meaning. He would probably say that if you want to take a certain subset of nonsensical statements and call them 'metaphysical' then thats fine, but it doesnt give them any meaning. For the positivists, statements like 'God exists', 'human beings have an immaterial soul', or 'the nothing nothings' arent really any different from saying 'pink glazorgs glark furiously' - we cant understand any of them because they arent telling us anything about the world due to their complete lack of empirical content.

Edited August 15, 2005 by Hal

[BurgessLau]

He doesnt need to define metaphysics for the purpose of his arguments.

He doesn't? I am confused. How can Ayer -- as reported by drewfactor -- want to eliminate "metaphysics" if he doesn't know what metaphysics means? I can say that God is not an objective idea, but it nevertheless is an idea that has a referent in the minds of others ("an omnipotent" being, and so forth). I need to know that before I can campaign for rejecting the idea of God in debates with me.

Again, I am relying here on drewfactor's statement in the first post of this thread:

I just finished reading A.J. Ayer's book "Language Truth and Logic" and I had a question about what seems to be the basis of his whole argument: The elimination of metaphysics.

[bold added.]

If the elimination of metaphysics is the whole basis for an argument, how can there even be an argument unless the term "metaphysics" names some idea -- valid or not -- and the idea has been defined at some point?

For me the issue here is not Ayer, but the manner in which philosophers debate. Is Ayer actually basing an argument on the elimination of X -- but never saying what X means?

Edited August 15, 2005 by BurgessLau

[Hal]

He doesn't? I am confused. How can Ayer -- as reported by drewfactor -- want to eliminate "metaphysics" if he doesn't know what metaphysics means?

His attack on metaphysics is indirect - he believes that his work (and that of the Vienna circle) does lead to the elimination of metaphysics, but he doesnt launch a direct offensive against it.

Instead, he gives criteria which have to be satisfied for a statement to be meaningful. This is the role of the verification principle, which has the effect that any statement devoid of empirical content is classed as being literally unintelligible. Then, armed with this principle, he can now say that metaphysics in as much as it makes statements which have no empirical content is nonsense. As such, he doesnt need to define 'metaphysics' at all - he can just say that any statement that is traditionally classed as metaphysical ('God/souls exist') is meaningless unless it has empirical consequences. If someone wants to say that their metaphysical claim does have empirical content, then the onus is on them to state what this is, and once they have done so, the issue of its truth can be settled scientifically.

Edited August 15, 2005 by Hal

[JMeganSnow]

Just an aside: a friend told me that the term "Metaphysics" used to describe contemplation of the nature of reality came about because of the order of Socrates (I think it was Socrates) major teachings . . . the penultimate book was the "Physics", and after that came a bunch of stuff that seemed related to the physics, but they didn't have a real word to describe what it was, so his students called it the "Metaphysics" . . . "after the physics".

This is quite probably apocryphal, though.

[punk]

Just an aside: a friend told me that the term "Metaphysics" used to describe contemplation of the nature of reality came about because of the order of Socrates (I think it was Socrates) major teachings . . . the penultimate book was the "Physics", and after that came a bunch of stuff that seemed related to the physics, but they didn't have a real word to describe what it was, so his students called it the "Metaphysics" . . . "after the physics".

This is quite probably apocryphal, though.

It was Aristotle and not Socrates.

Also that derivation for the word "metaphysics" is likely true. Aristotle never uses the word "metaphysics" to refer to the subject matter. He uses the phrase "first philosophy".

[punk]

Pretty much. Its an extension of the idea that understanding a proposition involves knowing what would be the case if that proposition were true (or false) - ie what consequences does it have for the world, what states of affairs does it rule out, and so on.

Its worth pointing out that Objectivism has a _very_ sparse metaphysics in comparasion with traditional systems like those expoused by Aristotle, Plato, Hegel, Heidegger etc. And a lot of Objectivists do use metaphysics to rule out certain empirical results - such as specific interpretations of quantum mechanics, or nativism in cognitive science, so you could argue that they do in fact have empirical consequences. However it would be more correct to say they are guidelines for interpretating observations, rather than being empirical predictions.

Well, to a positivist like Ayer, either those statements *themselves* are empirically testable, and thus meaningful, or they just get in the way.

If a philosophy has "metaphysical" propositions that lead to empirically testable solutions, then they aren't really "metaphysical" in Ayer's sense.

But I suppose the propositions you are considering aren't considered propositions in Ayer's sense, that is that one is open to them being refuted by empirical observation. That is that they are taken as unrefutable no matter what the empirical observations.

I think that Ayer would say that any statement taken as unrefutable by empirical data automatically becomes meaningless.

[drewfactor]

Based on what I've read in Ayer's book and based on the discussion here, I suspect that the logical positivist and the Objectivist would be in agreement on plenty when it comes to these issues pertaining to existence. The difference seems to be mostly based on a semantic issue surrounding the term "metaphsysics."

In "Language Truth and Logic" the major disagreement I thought I had came mostly when it came to the ethics part. Things such as the is-ought dichotomy are maintained (as he seems to agree much with Hume on many other issues). Interestingly, his views on ethics are corollaries of his assertions on "the elimination of metaphysics." Basically, to him, all ethical propositions are meaningless because they are not conducive to verification. So, just as all metaphysical statements are meaningless, so are all ethical statements. I think I'm starting to understand why Objectivists criticize logical positivism as "concrete bound."

[Hal]

But I suppose the propositions you are considering aren't considered propositions in Ayer's sense, that is that one is open to them being refuted by empirical observation.  That is that they are taken as unrefutable no matter what the empirical observations.

I think that Ayer would say that any statement taken as unrefutable by empirical data automatically becomes meaningless.

Or analytic.

But this is one of the problems with positivism - it impoverishes language by trying to squeeze all statements into the 'declarative sentence' mould.

If someone wanted to hold that 'existence is identity' was a principle like Occams razor, used to choose between competiting explanations for our experiences, how could Ayer respond? It doesnt make sense to say that Occam's Razor is true or false - its a principle, not a proposition. I personally understand "existence is identity" by looking at the kind of things it is meant to rule out - metaphysical randomness, existing infinities, actions without entities, and so on.

Edited August 16, 2005 by Hal

[LifeSimpliciter]

“Is there any objective connection of a specific word to a specific definition?”

No, his choice of ‘beyond’ to translate “meta” is misguiding and misguided. It means ‘beyond’ or ‘overarching‘, or ‘above‘. That is, it takes the physical world in an over-all, overarching view. Aristotle coined the term--or rather was its progenitor--and meant by it the examination of what is necessary in existence as such. This idea is contrasted with what accidentally or contingently obtains in the universe. It stands back from reality and considers what is essential to it. To equate it with the supernatural is flatly mistaken. The supernatural, if such exists, is contained within the subject of metaphysics, but they are not equivalent.

I have also found that many people confuse ‘metaphysical’ with ‘conceptual’, which is an understandable mistake but strictly wrong.

“morals ("how you treat other people")”

True, this is often a narrow understanding of morality. So, too, is the idea that morality is the set of rules that guide one’s behavior. This only accounts for Christian morality, and fails to acknowledge virtue theory.

“egotistical/selfish ("false-pride", "rudeness")”

This is half true, as ‘egotistical’ actually does denote hubris--what Ayn Rand might have called the moral “wolf”: the person with such a lack of ego that he must fill it with other people’s praise.

Personally, I speak in terms of ‘virtue‘, when discussing particular moral goods, ‘morals’ when I speak of particular ways of life, and ‘ethics’ when I speak of what I’ll call ‘meta-morality’ or the study of various moralities. I also use ‘self-interest’ when I’m actually describing my morality, and I always use ‘atheism’ as it literally means ‘a’ (lacking) ‘theism’. I consider it the responsibility of the correspondent to know this.

As far as Ayers goes, I haven’t read his work myself but I understand that by “metaphysics” he meant a part of reality that cannot be observed. In rejecting this, he rejected Platonic idealism as well as the existence of concepts. As one other put it, they are “concrete bound”.

“Its worth pointing out that Objectivism has a _very_ sparse metaphysics in comparasion with traditional systems like those expoused by Aristotle, Plato, Hegel, Heidegger etc.”

How do you mean this? Sparse in terms of what obtains within it or sparse in terms of number of words dedicated to its explanation?

I find it to have as much in it as Aristotle’s.

[punk]

Based on what I've read in Ayer's book and based on the discussion here, I suspect that the logical positivist and the Objectivist would be in agreement on plenty when it comes to these issues pertaining to existence.  The difference seems to be mostly based on a semantic issue surrounding the term "metaphsysics."

In "Language Truth and Logic" the major disagreement I thought I had came mostly when it came to the ethics part.  Things such as the is-ought dichotomy are maintained (as he seems to agree much with Hume on many other issues).  Interestingly, his views on ethics are corollaries of his assertions on "the elimination of metaphysics."  Basically, to him, all ethical propositions are meaningless because they are not conducive to verification.  So, just as all metaphysical statements are meaningless, so are all ethical statements.  I think I'm starting to understand why Objectivists criticize logical positivism as "concrete bound."

Oh there is a large gulf between postivists and objectivists.

Objectivists hold that by reflecting on one's self and the world around one, one can reach basic conclusions, or "axioms" which hold as objectively true of the world, and based on which one can reach rational and true conclusions about the world. These truths lead to definite conclusions about such things as ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of law, philosophy of politics, etc.. So by reflection one can reason to far-ranging truths about us and the world.

Postivists hold that the only meaningful propositions about the world are empirically verifiable. Anything not empirically verifiable is meaningless (or analytic if you will). So things like ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of law, philosophy of politics have no real meaning to them. We can have preferences, but they have no basis other than our own whims.

As an aside, this is why Wittgenstein is *not* a postivist even though he is often classed with them. When the Vienna Circle was going through the Tractatus they kept describing it as "mysticism" which is to say he was saying the most important questions were precisely those the postivists wanted to reject as meaningless (questions of ethics, aesthetics, and so on). Postivists would call objectivists "mystics" as well.

[punk]

Or analytic.

But this is one of the problems with positivism - it impoverishes language by trying to squeeze all statements into the 'declarative sentence' mould.

If someone wanted to hold that 'existence is identity' was a principle like Occams razor, used to choose between competiting explanations for our experiences, how could Ayer respond? It doesnt make sense to say that Occam's Razor is true or false - its a principle, not a proposition. I personally understand "existence is identity" by looking at the kind of things it is meant to rule out - metaphysical randomness, existing infinities, actions without entities, and so on.

Ayer would just say that all you are really doing is modifying the definitions of the words "existence" and "identity".

[drewfactor]

What (or who) exactly is the Vienna circle?

[LifeSimpliciter]

A collection of intellectuals that flowed through the University of Vienna before the Anschluss--probably the single greatest thing Hitler ever destroyed. Their ranks included Godel, Strauss, Freud, Mahler, Schoenberg, Klimt, Kokoschka, Popper, Wittgenstein, and Hitler. It was not just a tradition, but a society and an identity for those who took part in it. Some, like Godel, even refused to leave after the Anschluss, though he did decide to leave in 1940 (39? 41?) when he was nearly beaten by a pack of kids for looking Jewish. But it had long been suspected of "Jewish" tendencies in philosophy, physics, music, et. al. So Hitler thinned its ranks over the years after '38.

Edited August 21, 2005 by LifeSimpliciter

[punk]

A collection of intellectuals that flowed through the University of Vienna before the Anschluss--probably the single greatest thing Hitler ever destroyed.  Their ranks included Godel, Strauss, Freud, Mahler, Schoenberg, Klimt, Kokoschka, Popper, Wittgenstein, and Hitler.  It was not just a tradition, but a society and an identity for those who took part in it.  Some, like Godel, even refused to leave after the Anschluss, though he did decide to leave in 1940 (39?  41?) when he was nearly beaten by a pack of kids for looking Jewish.  But it had long been suspected of "Jewish" tendencies in philosophy, physics, music, et. al.  So Hitler thinned its ranks over the years after '38.

Oh please. Hitler was no intellectual and certainly not involved with the Vienna Circle. Especially since Hitler lived in Germany the entire time the Vienna Circle was active.

Why do people try to make Hitler into an intellectual? This is a man who when asked said that his favorite writer was Karl May.

Yes the Circle had problems with local Austrian Nazis, but I doubt Hitler had heard of them.

[Hal]

drewfactor - the Vienna Circle was essentially a group of philosophers/scientists in Vienna who held regular meetings to discuss philosophy. They were the driving force behind logical positivism in the early half of the 20th century - the leading positivists (Carnap, Schlick, Neurath) were members.

A collection of intellectuals that flowed through the University of Vienna before the Anschluss--probably the single greatest thing Hitler ever destroyed.  Their ranks included Godel, Strauss, Freud, Mahler, Schoenberg, Klimt, Kokoschka, Popper, Wittgenstein, and Hitler.

Popper and Wittgenstein werent in the Vienna circle, but I think they met with some of its members ocassionally. Schoenberg, Freud and Strauss had nothing to do with it. I've no idea where you got Hitler from.

[LifeSimpliciter]

I'm a bit confused. I am getting my names from A World without Time by Palle Yourgrau. The direct quote is:

Born into the Austrian-German minority of Brno, a city now in the Czech Republic, the place where Mendle laid the foundations of the science of genetics, the Godel brothers, Rudolph and Kurt, took it as a given that they would undertake their final academic studies at the storied University of Vienna... In those years there passed through the city many of the individuals who created the twentieth century, including Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis; composers Richard Strauss and Gustav Mahler as well as Arnold Schoenberg, the inventor of twelve-tone music; the painters Gustav Klimt and Oscar Kokoschka, as well as the revolutionary architect Adolf Loos... and the philosophers Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein...

Among those who were privileged to think the unthinkable, however, there is another name that belongs here.  Adolf Hitler's path to Vienna began in Linz, the city of his birth, where in 1904 he attended the same realschule as Wittgenstein.  Though the same age as young Ludwig, young Adolf was two years behind him at school.  There exists a class photograph in which Wittgenstein appears to place near Hitler.

This is all under the chapter "Vienna: Logical Circles" which details Godel's relationship in the Vienna Cirle. The book seems to imply that these were members of the Circle, but does not state it out-right so you very well may be correct. But elsewhere Wittgenstein is mentioned as the very center-piece of the Vienna Circle, and mentions at least one time that he was amidst them so I take it he actually was a member.

[Hal]

I'm a bit confused.  I am getting my names from A World without Time by Palle Yourgrau.  The direct quote is:

This is all under the chapter "Vienna:  Logical Circles" which details Godel's relationship in the Vienna Cirle.  The book seems to imply that these were members of the Circle, but does not state it out-right so you very well may be correct.  But elsewhere Wittgenstein is mentioned as the very center-piece of the Vienna Circle, and mentions at least one time that he was amidst them so I take it he actually was a member.

Well, thats more about the people who studied at the University of Vienna. But the Vienna Circle was a quite specific group, who held regular meetings and tended to share approaches to philosophy. Goedel was in the circle, although I assume he disagreed with most of them since he certainly wasnt a positivist.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus was very influential on the development of logical positivism and afaik was regularly discussed by the Vienna circle. But Wittgenstein generally avoided 'intellectual cliques' and, with few exceptions, had only negative things to say about professional philosophers and the academic lifestyle. Besides, he wasnt living in Vienna at the time - he was away building a house somewhere and teaching schoolchildren. I do think he attended a couple of meetings though, and one of the Vienna Circle (I forget who) visited him semi-regularly.

Edited August 22, 2005 by Hal