Find the Contradiction

[Cave_Dweller]

Quote

 

Let us note . . . the radical difference between Aristotle's view of concepts and the Objectivist view, particularly in regard to the issue of essential characteristics.

It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only concretes exist. But Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences, which exist in concretes as a special element or formative power, and he held that the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of direct intuition by which man's mind grasps these essences and forms concepts accordingly.

Aristotle regarded "essence" as metaphysical; Objectivism regards it as epistemological.

"Definitions,"
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 52

 

 

[tadmjones]

There could be several, any hints? In the formulation of Aristotle , or Rand? In Rand's critique? Is it shared ?

[KyaryPamyu]

Plato said, take any thing that currently exists and you'll notice that it's of a specific "kind." For example, the kind can be a cat. He then argued to the effect that the cats existing right now do not exhaust the kind called "cat," as more cats can be shown to have existed in the past, and more cats will exist in the future. He took this to imply an independence of "kinds" from matter. The totality of independently-existing kinds is called the hyperuranion.

Aristotle said, kinds are clearly located in our everyday world, as everything experienceable is of a specific "kind." Therefore, kinds and matter are not independent of each other, but are always together. His theory is called hylomorphism.

Ayn Rand wants to "one-up" Aristotle by implicitly appealing to the naturalistic motto: "as if." That is, it's as if kinds are an element of the material world, but nope, essences are epistemological. It's a very lucky thing that our world appears "as if" it contained genuine essences, because we can compare our "epistemological" constructs against the real... er, the apparent essences found in the world.

Another theory that denies the existence of universals is called Nominalism. In ITOE, Rand strawmans Nominalism, presenting it as a subjective approach to forming concepts. In truth, Nominalism is loosely similar to Rand's strand of conceptualism: we form "universals" based on resemblances and patterns in reality, not on sheer subjectivity.

The contradiction hinted at by the OP, I think, is that Rand praises Aristotle for saying that only particulars (a.k.a. concretes) are real, then immediately criticizes him for saying that universals are real too.

Edited May 4 by KyaryPamyu

[Kaiser Basileus]

Nothing apriori exists.  A thing is a pattern in a mind, a set of attributes and boundary conditions by which it is distinguished from all other things according to affordances ( expected interactions or uses), and some things have an external referent.  The essence, or spirit, of a thing is the most central, necessary aspects of it.  All things have a unique position in time, space, and scale, and limits to how much it can change while still being considered the same thing - purpose dependent.